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

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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF

RELIGIOUS BELIEF

RIVINGTONS

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THE

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

OF

RELIGIOUS BELIEF

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BY

S. BARING-GOULD, M.A.

AUTHOR OF "CURIOUS MYTHS OF THE MIDDLE AGES," "THE SILVER STORE," ETC.

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PART II

CHRISTIANITY

RIVINGTONS

London, Oxford, and Cambridge

1870

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To the Memory

OF

MY MOTHER

PREFACE

STARTING from the facts of human nature and the laws they reveal to us, as spread out before us in history, can we attain to the existence of God, to Immortality, and to the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, the Incarnation?

Hitherto Christianity has leaned, or has been represented as leaning, on authority,—on the authority of an infallible text, or of an inerrable Church. The inadequacy of either support has been repeatedly demonstrated, and as the props have been withdrawn, the faith of many has fallen with a crash. The religious history of the Church exhibits three phases. The first when dogma appealed to men and met with a ready response, the second when dogma was forced on man by an authoritative society, and the third when dogma was insisted on, upon the authority of an infallible text. Men revolted against the Church, opposing the text against it, men revolt now against the text, and on what does dogma stand?

To this question I offer an answer in this volume. Unless Theology can be based on facts anterior to text or society, to facts in our own nature, ever new, but also ever old, it can never be placed in an unassailable position.

For if Christianity be true, it must be true to human nature and to human thought. It must supply that to which both turn, but which they cannot unassisted attain.

"Revelation," says a reviewer of my first volume, in the *Edinburgh Courant*, "could never itself be made available or useful to man unless man were able to test its claims and recognise its adaptability to complete and satisfy the highest aspirations and the deepest longings of our nature. We start from a sense of insufficiency, a feeling that at present we are not what we should be; that our nature desires, and is therefore capable of, fuller development and a higher career. And to every individual man the ultimate test of the Revelation which speaks in him, though external, is just whether or not it will meet this imperfection, whether or not it will supply a positive to the negative in himself, whether it will or will not complement all his deficiencies. Revelation does, or claims to do, this, and Christianity especially does so, by revealing the Infinite as united to the Finite, as one with it in nature, and, therefore, that the home of the Finite only is in the Infinite. The Incarnation brings home this great lesson to human life and human history; and as it only is the Infinite which can meet and prove the sufficient complement of the Finite, so it is by the latter recognizing its essential unity with the former, that all its wants and longings are satisfied, and that the Revelation is seen to be fully adequate, and inexhaustible in its contents."

In the preceding volume we traced the origin of the multitudinous religions of the ancient and modern world to their roots in the soul of man. "All these religions set themselves to respond to some craving of the heart or head of man, to satisfy some instinct, dimly felt and ill read; and however various, however contradictory they were in their expression, they did fulfil their office in some sort, else they would never have lasted a day. They differ, unquestionably, according to the stage of thought-development of the several peoples and nations which embraced them; but their differences ought, if man is progressive, to be capable of arrangement in a series of progressively advancing truths."

It has been made clear that one truth was conspicuous here—say in Mosaism, that another truth was prominent there—say in Hellenism; it has been shewn that each religion was imperfect because it was partial, it maintained only one truth or one aspect of the Truth; and it was this partiality which was the ruin of each.

That which mankind wanted, and wants still, is not new truths, but the co-ordination of all aspects of the truth. In every religion of the world is to be found distorted or exaggerated, some great truth, otherwise it would never have obtained foothold; every religious revolution has been the struggle of thought to gain another step in the ladder that reaches to heaven.

That which we ask of Revelation is that it shall take up all these varieties into itself, not that it shall supplant them; and shew how that at which each of them aimed

however dimly and indistinctly, has its interpretation and realization in the objective truth brought to light by Revelation. Hence, we shall be able to recognize that religion to be the true one, which is the complement and corrective of all the wanderings of the religious instinct in its efforts to provide objects for its own satisfaction.

Starting from the great facts and laws of human nature and the universe, I have shewn that in them is contained the whole scheme of Christianity. I have shewn that the law of the universe is infinite analysis infinitely synthesized. I have shewn the existence everywhere of an antinomy. I have argued that evil and error are the negation of one factor in this antinomy; that, for instance, is evil which synthesizes without projecting individualities by careful analysis. In what consisted the error of the ancient religions of the world? In the negation of the opposed facts. In what consists the adaptability of Christianity to the indefinite perfection of humanity? In its conformity to the natural law, by insisting on the co-ordination of all truths, by consecrating at once solidarity and individuality, in maintaining unity in the midst of particularization.

The drowning man may be saved by a plank or a rope, but there are circumstances in which plank or rope can not avail him. How much better for him to have learned that in himself is the principle of buoyancy, and then rope and plank will be serviceable though not indispensable. Scripture and Tradition have been the rope and plank to

man drowning in a flood of doubt. Scripture has yielded, Tradition has given way;—must he sink? By no means. The principle of Christianity is within him, let him strike out and gain the shore.

In anticipation of hostile criticism from certain religious periodicals and journals,[1] I must distinctly repudiate having undertaken to give an exhaustive account of Christian dogma. If the Incarnation be a divine *fact*, ten thousand generations of men will not exhaust the truths it contains. I have chosen certain aspects of Catholic doctrine for illustration and elucidation, but I do not pretend to have given all. This applies especially to the chapters on the Atonement and on Immortality. And in speaking of the evidence for the Incarnation, in the Scriptures, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I am examining it from an impartial point of view, such as would be taken in a court of law, and that I in no way deny their inspiration when I dispute the cogency of their evidence. I admit, for argument's sake, every objection raised against their authority;—objections not groundless nor necessarily hostile; and I shew that nevertheless the evidence for the Incarnation is too strong to be overthrown.

I am not aware of any book having taken the line I have adopted; but I thankfully acknowledge a debt of

[1] The Roman "Catholic World," the high Anglican "Church Review," and the extreme Protestant "Press and S. James' Chronicle," have agreed to denounce me as a gross materialist, a thorough rationalist, and an undisguised infidel.

gratitude I owe to writers who have treated in part of a system I have taken as a whole. Especially am I indebted to one of the most original thinkers of the Gallican Church, the Abbé Gabriel, especially for much in Chap. II., also to the Calvinist pastor, M. Charles Secretan, to the Chevalier Bunsen, to M. Thiercelin, to M. de Strada, and to several of the German Hegelianists on the right and on the left. I confess that to Feuerbach I owe a debt of inestimable gratitude. Feeling about, in uncertainty, for the ground, and finding everywhere shifting sands, Feuerbach cast a sudden blaze into the darkness and disclosed to me the way.

Far be it from me to make any pretence to originality or research that are not mine. I may call this book the history of my own religious difficulties and searchings after the truth. That these difficulties are shared by thousands in England and abroad, I am well aware; that my book may produce conviction and rest in other minds is my highest aim.

I have said that I make no pretence to originality. Every intellectual work is a filiation of the individual and society, of the past and the present. Our ideas are formed by assimilating the thoughts, the observations of others, and that part which is really our own often escapes us. The child is occasionally strangely unlike its parents, and the idea formed in our minds is sometimes very different from the ideas from which it was engendered.

S. B.-G.

DALTON, THIRSK.

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CHRISTIANITY

CHAPTER I

THE UNIVERSAL ANTINOMY

"When Being's jarring crowds, together thrown,
Mingle in harsh inextricable strife;
Whose spirit quickens the unvarying round,
And bids it flow to music's measured tone?"—GOETHE'S "FAUST."

Progress in Nature general—Its law the emancipation of individuality—The object of instinct—Animal instincts and Intelligence in man—Consequent Antinomy—Happiness the signal when the instincts are satisfied—The antinomy between reason and sentiment—The antinomy between faith and reason—Reason unable to act without axioms—Antinomy in morals and politics—and in religion—Natural religion inconclusive—The existence of God is incapable of demonstration—The inductive and deductive methods, are usually opposed—Opposition of analysis and synthesis—Science analytic and religion synthetic—Conciliation possible.

THE law of Nature is progress, progress that is gradual, never abruptly transitional; so that Linnæus might well observe, "She never takes a leap."

The mineral kingdom shades into that of vegetation, the plant graduates into the animal, and the instinct of the animal lightens slowly into human intelligence. The rock bears no resemblance to the flower, but there is a point at which inert matter and vegetable life meet and kiss, and

at which the plant loses itself in the animal. On a slope of red bolus, sprinkled with boiling water from a jetter in Iceland, I picked up some red slime, an algid,—vitalized clay.

On my window-sill a shower has deposited an almost imperceptible atom, a dusky grain which the sun in drying has attached to the stone. Respect that granule of dust. It is a living being. The heat has suspended, but not extinguished, its life. Another rain-drop restores it; the diatom swells and revives. Myriads of these little creatures people the lakes, the sea, the springs. They are born, they breathe, they dart nimbly through their element, they die and drop their shells to accumulate in considerable masses at the bottom of the waters. Are they animalcules, or are they vegetables? Their agility belongs to the animal, but they attach themselves to the vegetable realm by one of its most essential characteristics;—under the influence of light, they decompose carbonic acid.

The method by which Nature proceeds is invariable. First she watches over the conservation of the individualities she has called out, then she takes care of the species to which they belong, and lastly, she assigns to all their places and their functions in the scale of creatures. Thus; she introduces into the world duration, stability, and unity.

In the inorganic world matter is preserved by the laws imposed upon it—the laws of affinity and of gravitation; but in the higher classes individuals are made to participate in the execution of the laws. Nature, as it were, admits them to be her auxiliaries, calls on them to co-operate in the work of their own maintenance, and in the preservation of their race. Thus, a plant is not merely subject, like a mineral, to physical laws, but it bears within itself a force, a new principle, a higher law; it grows, protects itself, de-

velops itself by nutrition, and reproduces itself by seed. This double power has made it a living being.

The little celandine that heralds in the spring screens itself from the icy blast:—

> "While the patient primrose sits
> Like a beggar in the cold,
> Thou, a flower of wiser wits,
> Slipp'st into thy sheltered hold;"[1]

and the autumn colchicum retains its seed-pod under ground to mature its germs in darkness till the winter snows are past, when it will thrust them into light.

The life of the animal is more complete than that of the vegetable, for it intervenes more spontaneously and more efficaciously in the double function of self-protection and continuance of the species.

Inorganic matter submits passively to the law without, whereas the organism is regulated by a duality of laws, that law which rules all inorganic matter, and that which governs matter transformed into an activity.

This duality explains the phenomena of life and death. The rudimentary being inspired with vitality, progresses; its fluid parts thicken, its soft parts become firm, membrane changes into cartilage, and cartilage into bone, bone hardens and is welded into neighbouring bones, the entire being advances towards solidification. One day a demonstration on this subject was made in the cabinet of M. Flourens. Some one asked the eminent physiologist at what point the process would terminate. "If we lived long enough," he answered, "we should be mineralized."

This tendency of matter to agglomerate in masses always more compact from the moment that it is put in circulation in an organized being explains life, which is the perpetual

[1] Wordsworth: To the Celandine.

mutation of matter in obedience to the instinct of reparation; it explains also death, which is the climax of this tendency to compacity, opposing insurmountable obstacles to the renovating torrent.

Every rise in the series of organisms brings along with it a disengagement of individuality, a manifestation of greater spontaneity. Man is subject, like inorganic bodies, to the physical laws governing all matter. He develops like the plant and he moves like the beast. He is composed of a portion of matter assuming a determined form, and also, of an internal motor, which moves the totality of this material mass as a lever moves a stone.

This invisible motor in the animal and in man is called Instinct. It excites the organism for the purposes of self-protection, self-perfection and reproduction.

The object set before animal life, and clearly attainable by it, is individual development and propagation of the species. The law of its life is the accomplishment of these two purposes. Its pleasure consists in their attainment. Having attained them its satisfaction is complete. There is no uncertainty in the beast, no conflicting instincts in its nature; it is therefore subject to no doubt, no hesitation; it can do no moral wrong.

Its motive force finds expression in four animal cravings, which are the manifestation of a conservative and governing will, and are limited to the assurance of its own existence and the perpetuation of its species. The analysis of the body shews us organs adapted to the functions it is called upon to accomplish daily. The animal instincts are these:—

1. The instinct of reparation by food and by sleep;
2. That of secretion;
3. That of self-defence;
4. That of reproduction.

The law of progression applies to all organized beings, and to all transitions from one reign to another.

From the conferva to the oak, from the amœba to the lion, organization becomes more complicated; rudimental systems appearing in one class of beings are perfected in another. Everywhere the force of progress appears as the mainspring of life and perfection; it is visible in the transition from one realm to another, from one species to another, and in every individual in the advance from germ to maturity. Man passes through the stages of physical, instinctive, and intelligent life. His uterine existence represents the vegetative stage, his infancy is instinctive and animal; during childhood his intellectual powers are dawning, they blaze into energy at adolescence.

The inferior conditions of being do not disappear as those which are superior emerge, but continue to subsist, so that the human being is subject to the physical laws affecting inorganic matter, to the laws of vegetative growth, and to the laws of animal instincts. He is a mineral, a vegetable, and an animal at once. Physical laws determine his death, —dragging the constituents back from their vital unity into their passivity once more. That wonderful internal microscopic floriation in either sex before fecundation is vegetative. And every animal appetite that characterizes the beast exhibits itself in man.

But in addition to the corporal instincts attaching him to the realm below, man has instincts which distinguish him from it, instincts which are peculiarly his own. He is double. He is, as Pascal says, "neither an angel nor a brute, but a little of both." This duality produces conflict.

"Vivere, mi Lucili, militare est!"[1]

He has two sets of appetites, those belonging to him as

[1] Seneca: Epist. 96.

an animal, and those belonging to him as a man. He can find happiness certainly in the satisfaction of his carnal desires, because he *is* an animal; but that happiness will not be perfect because he is not an animal only. Above the corporal instincts he shares with his dog,—corporal, because they find their complete expression and entire satisfaction in the play of his organs, are the spiritual instincts, speculative and moral,—in other words, the appetite to know, and the appetite to love.

Happiness is the signal to announce to the vital force within that the nature of the animal has met with satisfaction exactly commensurate with its want. If, then, we desire to know what is the σκοπός to which the instincts tend, we have only to ascertain in what those instincts find pleasure.

When the animal lies down in the sun full fed, its happiness is absolute, its satisfaction is complete. In like manner happiness gives notice to the spiritual nature when its appetites touch and assimilate its natural food; and as the purpose of the animal appetite is the perfection of the body, so, the purpose of the spiritual appetite is the development of the soul. I must be allowed, at this stage of my argument, to call the higher force in man,—the presence of which all admit, though its nature may be disputed,—the soul, without committing myself thereby to an admission of its immateriality or of its supernatural origin. I use the word for convenience only, to express that superior life distinguishing man, which, though various in its manifestations, is essentially one.

The analogy between the soul and the body is closer than is suspected. As there is a dualism in the life of the body, organic and animal, so are there in the soul two modes of life, that which is intellectual, and that which is

moral. And as the animal or the organic life may be present, and yet be paralyzed, so may the intellectual or the moral life be present and yet be paralyzed. The paralysis of intellect is idiocy, the paralysis of morals is vice.

As the animal life has its law of progress, so has the spiritual life; as the former has its wants, so has the latter; as the accomplishment of the animal wants is attended by complete satisfaction, so is the realization of the spiritual wants signalized by contentment. As those things affording animal pleasure are necessary to the well-being of the body, so are those things yielding intellectual or moral delight necessary for the perfecting of the spirit.

If then we know what things gratify our higher nature, we know that they are things for which our spiritual instincts are designed, and we know also that they are things essential to the preservation, development and propagation of the spiritual life.

We have therefore to inquire what are those things which do satisfy the spiritual instincts.

On examination, we find that they may all be reduced to three classes, the true, the beautiful, and the good. We find also that the true satisfy the reason of man; the beautiful satisfy his sentiment; and the good are of a mixed order, satisfying both. Man's spiritual being is double, reason and sentiment, therefore the spiritual instincts are double; they may be summed up under two heads, the desire to know and the desire to love, the former rational, the latter sentimental.

The desire to know,—in other words,—Curiosity, is a movement of the soul towards Truth, which it seeks to assimilate by Knowledge. It is the first step in the direction of Certainty, furnishing the mind at every instant with materials for judgment and motives for action. It is restless, for Truth is complex; it is insatiable, for Truth is infinite.

The desire to love is the impulsion of the soul towards the Ideal, it is the sense of the indefinite, the perfect. It is also insatiable, for the perfect is always on the horizon, never attainable.

That pleasure does attend the acquisition of knowledge does not admit of doubt. Take mathematical truths as an instance, the clearest of all to man's perception. Is it not a fact that as soon as the mind has resolved a problem it reposes in the solution with entire complacency? Are not those truths alone completely satisfactory which are absolutely unassailable? Does not a rational verity cease to give pleasure the moment it is breathed upon by doubt, and does not the suspicion of uncertainty goad the mind into inquiry which it cannot relinquish till it has again arrived at an unassailable truth, in which its energy may expire?

In analytical science again, it is truth lying at the bottom of the analysis which attracts the student; and the discovery of a scientific law satisfies the intellectual appetite precisely as food satisfies a hungry dog.

Supreme happiness to reason, that is the Ideal of the intellect, is the attainment of certainty upon every subject and about all things.

The assimilation of truth, or knowledge, is therefore that for which the reason is constituted.

That pleasure does attend the pursuit of the Ideal of beauty who can doubt? It is greater in degree than that afforded by the attainment of truth by the intellect. Music, poetry, painting, sculpture and architecture, the prismatic gleams of the perfect, vibrate through the soul. Beauty warms, and Truth illumines. There is this peculiarity about the pleasure derived from the beautiful, that when raised to the highest pitch it sharpens into pain, acute and exquisite—pain which is itself a delight, produced by the

strain of the soul to grasp and assimilate the perfect, and by the sense of failure, because the perfect is unattainable. The cravings of the soul of man before music and painting were discovered must have resembled the stutterings for impossible utterance in the dumb. And when these cravings found expression, man felt that the expression he gave them was inadequate to sate his sense of perfection. Music, painting, architecture, were and are so many moulds into which he pours the boiling stream of spiritual passion, but to the man of genius the moulds are too strait, and the flood overflows.

The Ideal is to the heart what certainty is to the reason. Truth is the assembly of laws. Reason seeks law after law in succession. The ideal is the assembly of perfections, æsthetic and moral; the sentiment proceeds in quest of it, in a manner resembling the process of reason, it compares analogous and opposed ideas, eliminates some, identifies others, and arrives after an analysis, more or less subtle, at a generalization; that is, through variety it seeks unity.

In the pursuit of the Ideal, happiness is the notice to the sentiment that it is following the right track, that it is accomplishing its destiny. All the forces in the human soul, all the investigations of the mind, the artistic creations of the fancy, all refinements in the pursuit of pleasure even, are the gravitation of man's higher being towards the Ideal. In art and literature, the ideal is a subtilized reality truer than reality itself. The history of the human race is a perpetual legend of creations of the imagination to satisfy this want. It is a singular fact that men generally, and every man in particular, constantly endeavour to desert real life for one which is altogether artificial, artistic, and, in a word, ideal. The ideal is an image of perfection created by the soul itself, which it places before it as a type

to be realized; looking at times back indeed, as though that Ideal were something lost, but, generally forward, as though it were something to be won, so that the ideal is to man's spirit as an Eden, at once an aspiration and a regret.

Reason is a faculty for extracting truth out of materials provided by the sentiment. There are certain fundamental axioms, indemonstrable, which it is obliged to accept or to fall into paralysis. In mathematics it works uncomplainingly from axioms, which serve as the base of all certainty. We know that the whole is greater than its part, that a right line is the shortest way between two points, but we cannot prove these truths. We accept them. Philosophy, in attempting to surpass the rigour of the mathematical sciences, has sought to resolve the problem of certainty; and has, instead, only succeeded in obscuring it. There are axioms self-evident, which are the cyphers with which reason must work; if it refuse the cyphers, it is reduced to practical inaction. We believe in the real existence of that thinking and perceiving unit, the Ego. We believe in the real, substantial existence of the objects presented to us by our senses. But these beliefs are irrational, that is, we cannot say of any one of them, How or why it is. They remain insoluble to logic, dogmas imposed by the sentiment, and accepted at once.

Descartes laid down his axiom *Cogito, ergo sum;* Hume was right in saying that it was a pure hypothesis; *Quod sentio, est,* the basis of sensational philosophy, is also an assumption, but it is a truth of which we are assured by the sentiment.

When philosophy refuses to accept these fundamental axioms, in themselves indemonstrable, but which serve as the base of all demonstration, and whose evidence convinces man in spite of himself, it results in proving nothing at all.

Man exists: that cannot be proved, it is evident in itself. The question of certainty implies this first axiom. The exterior world, of which we have conscience, exists; that escapes demonstration, it carries conviction with it. The fact by means of which we know our own existence assures us of the existence of the world outside: it is the double face of one invincible fundamental evidence. The existence of objects other than ourselves is a second axiom. In us exists thought, with its laws, or the assembly of relations which unite the ideas of our reason: that also cannot be discussed, it can only be felt as certain. The question of certainty implies this third axiom, for every question supposes thought, which is its conception, and reason to which it is submitted. Such are the three axioms from which all intellectual activity starts: they are axioms whose evidence surpasses that of the mathematical axioms which no one disputes.

Thus reason must act upon faith as its foundation; but as reason is by its nature sceptical, it is tempted to question first one, and then another of these axioms, and thus have arisen the philosophic schools which have wrangled for ages over what no one, not even a sceptic, can practically deny.

Every one acts upon the assumption that certainty is derived from faith and reason. Every one believes invincibly in the testimony of sentiment and reason, and cannot reject this testimony without annihilating his being. When they attest to us physical or metaphysical facts, we hold them to be constant. We conclude from the appearance to the reality by an inductive process of which we are not ourselves masters.

By this means we affirm the primitive facts of our existtence, of the world, of our faculties, the legitimacy of the principle of our knowledge, the reality of the first notions

we acquire. Human science, made up of demonstrations, can go no further back. It must rest on faith; it must accept the Cartesian and Sensationalist and Idealist hypotheses, and work up from them. Reason and faith, as two principles of certainty, have sufficed man, and have sufficed him so well, that no sceptic has yet appeared who has not in common life, at every instant, practically contradicted his assumed disbelief. Pyrrho himself, in the abstraction of reason, denied all certainty, but when he entered into real life; "It is impossible," said he, "to shake off human nature."

That reason and faith have a tendency to encroach on one another's domains, and to stand in antagonism, is matter of universal experience. Everything believed in is irrational and every demonstration destroys belief. When I believe something to be true, as that two triangles whose sides are equal have also equal angles, I accept the testimony of my eyes, or of some one else; but when I have worked out the problem, I no longer believe this, I know it. As faith thus disappears before knowledge in many cases, we rashly conclude that knowledge can destroy all faith. But, as has been already shewn, without faith, reason would be totally unable to act. Sentiment and reason have their respective lines, distinct always, divergent often, sometimes convergent, but never disappearing into one another. Under the most favourable circumstances, reason is the asymptote of sentiment, approaching it indefinitely, but never meeting it. Each has its special function, both are a first necessity. In that field which is peculiar to reason alone, or that specially appertaining to sentiment, there can be no antinomy. The delight I receive from a beautiful sunset, or from a strain of Mozart, is purely sentimental. Reason in no way participates in the pleasure of which I am conscious, for reason is no criterium of beauty.

In scientific analysis the process is strictly rational. Sentiment is no criterium of truth in mathematical or physical demonstration.

In art sentiment has the field to itself, in science reason is alone master of the situation. But when we come to ethics, politics, and religion, there is no such simplicity. They are mixed questions, in which both reason and sentiment intervene. As they lose simplicity they lose absolute certainty. Rational verities are indisputable. They are the same for all. Three angles of a triangle cannot be equal to two right angles to an Englishman and equal to four to a Caffre; but moral actions vary in their relative morality according to circumstances; and reason alone is no criterium of their morality; nor would a rational judgment be invariably just. Though reason can apply to moral verities an uniform measure up to a certain point, it has never been able to so formulate them as to make them of universal application. It follows, that if the principle of our duties be certain to ourselves, it is not so in the same degree to others. Moral acts are debateable; the judgment has often to decide between two principles really, or apparently conflicting, if it pretends to be just.

In politics the antinomy becomes more evident. Man as an individual has his rights, as a member of society he has his duties. As a rational being he has a right to absolute freedom, as a social being his liberty must be curtailed. Liberty is requisite for individual development, authority is necessary for social improvement. Right, as a personal faculty, is the manifestation of liberty in opposition to hostile wills which prevent its exercise; as a social requirement it is the erection of a wall of duties around the individual, limiting his freedom.

Thence a bitter, incessant feud between liberty and

authority; liberty tending to burst away from all authority, and wreck all social organizations in its centrifugal violence; authority tending incessantly to encroach on the rights of man, to pare off all inequalities, to blunt all angularities, to flatten all originality, and by its strong centripetal power to absorb the individuality of men in order to destroy it.

Next in order to the verities of science, art, morals, and politics, follow the dogmas of Religion.

The existence of an eternal, infinite, all-powerful Being is believed in; but it cannot be proved. Reason can only start from hypotheses, and argue within the circle of things known. It may, by a series of inductions, shew that it is probable that there is a God, but it can never prove that there is one. As Kant has shewn, there is not a single demonstration of God which does not contain a contradiction.

The idea of the supernatural is not a rational verity. It belongs to the sentiment which is the faculty of perceiving the infinite, whereas the reason is, by its nature, finite. God is perceived by the heart, not concluded by the mind. Natural religion is, properly speaking, not a religion at all. It is deficient in a fixed principle, and halts at conjecture. It yields at the point where strength is required. It is nothing but a prolongation of science, necessarily incomplete, always unsatisfactory. Natural religion is based on induction founded on hypothesis. Starting from the reality of the conscious self, or of the exterior world, it is the result of an argument which concludes nothing but supposes something—the existence of a God to explain the enigma of the universe.

Revealed religion is deduced from the existence of God; from which the reality of our own existence and of the material universe and the world of ideas are demonstrated syllogistically.

Faith must be called into play to furnish the preliminary axiom or axioms, and as reason objects to what is not demonstrable, it at one time assails the basis of the induction, at another time it refuses the basis of the deduction.

Reason may justly ask why is the Cartesian or Sensationalist formula to be accepted? Why is man to be certain that his conscience of his own existence, of the reality of his thoughts and of the world, is not delusive? To this, the only satisfactory answer is that furnished by religion,—because God exists as the author of certainty, the beginning and the end of all created reason, the first and last word of all knowledge, the alpha and omega of everything.

Without axioms reason cannot operate. The question between natural religion and a positive religion is simply the question between induction and deduction. But there is this difference: the inductive process does not lead up to certainty, whereas the deductive process does. The inductive process dies away in conjecture, whereas the other provides a sound basis for action.

The idea of God, in the inductive process, is not more solid than the last term x in an indefinite progression of known terms. Does this last term exist, or is it only an ideal which we seek to approach, but which always escapes us? This is a question natural religion can never answer. It accumulates proofs which are not proofs at all, but conjectures; as though a large number of probabilities would make up certainty.

When geometricians have once proved that the three angles of a triangle whose sides are equal are also equal, they pass on to another theorem, and with reason, for it would be waste of time to prove by additional demonstrations that the proposition once established is true.

The learned naturalist Kircher (d: 1680) calculated the

number of proofs of the existence of God, and estimated them at 6561. Every department of natural philosophy has been ransacked for demonstrations. There has been an astrotheology, a lithotheology, a petinotheology, and an insectotheology. The different classes of animals have contributed their proofs. In 1748, vast swarms of locusts covered the land in Germany and France. Rathlef, pastor of Diepholz, profited by the occasion to fabricate an akritotheology; and among other demonstrations occurs the following, "God has organized their head in a marvellous manner, it is long and the mouth is below, so as to save them the trouble of bending to eat, and thus to enable them to eat faster and eat more." But, as has been shewn repeatedly, such arguments from design are a begging of the whole question.

The argument has sometimes been put in another form. The universe has been likened to a clock, and it has been concluded because the clock has a maker that therefore the world has a Creator. But this argument is not more satisfactory than the other. There is this difference between the clock-maker and the Creator: the latter is supposed to be self-existent; whereas the former is an ordinary man, with father and mother, and is one of the links in the great chain of causes and effects. If, in shewing the clock, the philosopher were to say: There are only two things possible, either it was made by a clock-maker who was his own father and mother, or it made itself, it would not be at all evident which possibility was to be accepted; between two things equally hard to understand, the only situation possible would be one of doubt.

The demonstration of Descartes is no less unsatisfactory.

I have in myself the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of the infinite: how comes it to be there?

Either because the Infinite exists, and then it is quite natural that I should have the idea; or because, the Infinite not existing, I created the idea for myself.

But how is it possible that I should create that which is in myself? I can only form an idea of that which does not exist, by way of attenuation, by suppressing the qualities of the objects I know to exist, or by way of amplification, by uniting together the qualities of many objects in one idea. But the infinite cannot be an attenuation of the finite, nor can it be a collection of finalities; for a great many finite things do not make one infinite.

Therefore I can only have the idea of the Infinite, because the Infinite really exists.

This demonstration is satisfactory to those alone who allow his first hypothesis,—viz., that we have in us the idea of the infinite, and this is precisely the point assailed by the Sensualists.

If reason has never been able to found a religion which will bear criticism, it is because of this, that it begins with an undemonstrable hypothesis and ends in an hypothesis. Consequently, all attempts to prove the existence of God are convincing only to those already convinced.

The story is told of Diderot, that he heard one day an argument on the existence of God which satisfied and delighted him, and he rushed off to a sceptical friend to retail to him his new faith. He found him in a printer's, told him the argument, proved to him the existence of God, and found his friend unconvinced. The latter at once put his finger on the gratuitous assumption on which the whole structure leaned, withdrew the prop, and it crumbled into dust. Diderot saw his error, and fell again into doubt. His apostolate had lasted just one hour.

Arguments of this sort are all well enough to fortify a

conviction already formed, but they will never serve as the mainstay of a religion. And the reason is simple enough: God cannot be concluded, He can be perceived. Reason cannot act without faith; believe in God, and religion can be deduced from it; believe in a multitude of axioms irrational and without *raison d'être*, and religion and philosophy rest on a foundation of sand. The question must always prove sterile, Why am I to believe in the reality of myself, of the world, and of my thought? unless I admit a God as the cause of the truth of these primitive axioms. But till philosophy recognizes this, the inductive and the deductive methods will maintain internecine war.

There are but two methods, which resume all others. In the one, reason starts from itself to return to itself. All that does not admit of being rationalized, it rejects. It is sovereign;—its own judge and authority. Scepticism is the inevitable result, if those who trust to this method stand true to their principle. They are bound to dispute every hypothesis and axiom, or to admit that only to be certain which is so demonstrably. And as it is impossible for reason to prove the primary axioms, they are condemned to blank Pyrrhonism. This result may be evaded, but such an evasion is untrue to the principle.

The other method starts from authority divine or human. Human authority may furnish conviction, but never certainty. Divine authority is immutable and infallible. The method of authority is not vicious in itself, as those who overthrew scholasticism protested, but it is incomplete. As the simplest method for giving elementary instruction, it is unsurpassed, but it is wrong to regard it as the exclusive method, as the sole one admissible.

Philosophy can only be a positive science when it possesses a method truly demonstrative, that is to say, one

which conducts rigorously and incontestibly to certainty. Now this is what has been wanting to all philosophic schools. Scholasticism is the least incomplete, when, starting from revelation, it rests unshaken on its divine foundation, and never deserts the formulæ of absolute verity. But in its exposition, in the deductions it makes from immutable principles, it often enters the domain of opinion, because, starting from revelation, it does not admit the inductive counter-process as its corrective. Hence the astonishing diversity of opinions which divide the schools of deductive theology.

To resume in few words the subject, as far as we have gone—

Man is double, having an animal and a spiritual nature, at war with one another.

His spiritual nature is also double, being made up of reason and sentiment, the one a finite, the other an indefinite faculty, and this antinomy is productive of antagonism.

In morals and politics there is no certainty, but a conflict between man's individual wants and the wants of society.

Authority, which holds society together, and liberty, that which determines the individuality of man, are constantly opposed.

Religion and philosophy are in opposition, for religion assumes the supernatural, and cannot exist without the supernatural, and philosophy denies what is not demonstrable, and only exists on condition of holding for true that alone which is demonstrable.

Reason cannot act without faith, and faith is impotent without reason, nevertheless they are opposed, and tend to invade each other's territory, and to destroy one another.

Admitting the necessity of faith of some sort, there are two methods of reasoning, the inductive and the deductive, and these are opposed to one another and have been held to exclude one another.

Therefore man, in all his relations, is in a state of antinomy; and this antinomy must change into antagonism, unless he admit the existence of a God as a fundamental, indemonstrable axiom, the basis of all certainty, the conciliator of all antinomies.

All things tend to unity. It is the universal law of life. This is no theory, it is a fact. At the same time, all beings tend to individualize themselves. This also is no theory, it is a fact. Here are two opposed facts, and yet practically there is no opposition.

Philosophy and science endeavour, by isolating one object or class of objects, by specializing every branch of human knowledge, to attain certainty. To know anything perfectly, the attention must be concentrated on that alone. Thus science is necessarily, and exclusively, analytical.

We have only a finite knowledge of things; the conditions of our nature do not permit us to embrace with one glance of the mind the entirety of any thing in all its relations, much less the totality of all things in all their aspects. We are obliged to examine them successively, one by one, so as to distinguish them. To the peasant all flowers are flowers, there is no distinction; but if he concentrate his attention on them, he separates the dandelion from the daisy, the hawthorn from the rose. A more attentive student will discover distinctions between roses, hawthorns and daisies. He will separate rose from brier, and hawthorn from blackthorn, and daisy from oxeye. A more exclusive botanist devotes himself to roses alone, or to

daisies alone. We have eminent botanists whose specialities are mosses, willows or algids.

So too in the study of man. Some attach themselves to mankind as a race, others take man in particular, others dissect man with the scalpel, weigh him, dissolve him in acids, test him with the blow-pipe, and tabulate him as so much phosphorus, so much lime and so much carbon. Others again study him as a psychological phenomenon, and dissect his ideas and arrange them artificially.

But this constant analysis and specialization can only give one aspect of the truth, and the natural philosopher and psychologist forget that synthesis is as necessary as analysis.

To separate is to destroy unity, to kill life. Analysis is the disintegration of life, synthesis is its reintegration.

This is precisely what science has forgotten, and it is that which religion,—the Christian religion, at least, undertakes to supply.

Christianity claims to synthesize what science analyzes. Synthesis without analysis is nothing but uniformity. Analysis without synthesis is nothing but diversity.

Therefore science and religion are each necessary, the one to distinguish individualities, the other to bring individualities into unity.

This proposition will appear more evident from the sequel.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCILIATION OF ANTINOMIES

"The whole round earth is every way
Bound by gold chains about the feet of God."
TENNYSON: MORTE D'ARTHUR.

The conciliation of antinomies a law of the universe—Man the union of antinomical forms—The idea of the Indefinite—conciliates religion and philosophy—speciality leads to error—the method of Hegel—applied to man—Life is motion between ever-moving poles—Advance toward the absolute—The existence of God follows the acceptance of the Hegelian axiom—The three moments—the three phases of the Ideal—The good, the true and the beautiful are inseparable—The application to Christianity of the Hegelian method—Its fertility.

THE world presents us with a picture of unity and distinction—unity without uniformity, and distinction without antagonism.

We may say that the law of the universe seems to be infinite analysis infinitely synthesized. There is universal antinomy, universally conciliated.

But when we examine man, a creature with free will, we find that he is capable of turning distinction into opposition, of making scission and separation; and then duality and contradiction begin.

Let us study that law, not in its deviation producing duality, but in its antinomical conception, producing unity.

Everywhere, around us and within us, we see that radical antinomy. The whole astronomic order resolves itself into attraction and repulsion—a centripetal and a centrifugal force; the chemical order into the antinomy of positive and negative electricity, decomposing substances and recomposing them. The whole visible universe presents the antinomy of light and darkness, movement and repose, force and matter, heat and cold, the one and the multiple. The order of life is resumed in the antinomy of the individual and the species, the particular and the general; the order of our sentiments in that of happiness and sorrow, pleasure and pain; that of our conceptions in the antinomy of the ideal and the real; that of our will in the conditions of activity and passivity.

If we specialize one of these features and oppose it to the other, we break the order of the universe; we introduce antagonism where there was only antinomy.

In considering man, made up of body and spirit, we must not regard him as body alone, or as spirit alone. The analysis of his body by the anatomist and chemist is satisfactory so long as it is not opposed to the analysis of the spirit by the metaphysician. It is not the body composed of flesh and blood and bones which I feel to be the I-myself; it is not the soul, composed of reason, will, and feeling, which I consider as the I-myself; but it is the two combined. My feeling in this matter is in perfect accordance with the law of the universe noted above.

The true definition of man is the union of two complex terms, not the specializing of one term to the exclusion of the other.

In the former chapter I pointed out another antinomy in man, faith and reason. The philosopher is impressed with a desire to separate reason from faith, and put it by

itself apart, and then erect it into a totality excluding and annihilating faith. I have shown that such an attempt inevitably breaks down. The theologian, on the other hand, endeavours to oppose authority to reason, to make all demonstration deductive, to erect revelation into a fatal criterium of all truths. His attempt must result in a revolt of the intellect.

If we look about for a simple and indecomposible idea which may harmonize these complex terms, and serve as the proportional mean between them, we shall find it in the idea of the indefinite, or that which is incessantly defining itself, without being ever completely successful, and which has therefore two faces, one intelligible to reason, the other accessible to the sentiment by faith.

Religion and philosophy are not two contradictory systems, but are the positive and negative poles, of which the axis uniting and conciliating them is the idea of the indefinite, which, expressing two complex terms, the body and the spirit, the finite and the infinite, represents the constitutive and fundamental nature of man.

The idea of the indefinite at once *supposes* and *excludes* limitation. The consciousness man has of his own personality distinguishes him to himself from everything else. This consciousness implies, whilst it denies, limitation. It is what I call the sentiment of the indefinite. When he affirms himself, he distinguishes himself from another. To recognise another is to place a limit at which his own personality halts and finishes. But although his personality halts and finishes at a limit through relation to others, it is in itself unlimited; and though having a beginning, it is, or conceives itself to be, without end. To conceive the annihilation of the conscious self is simply impossible. If you doubt this, make the experiment.

Thus, the idea of personality implies limit at the same time that it excludes it.

If man could regard himself as the absolute I-myself, without limitation, he would be the infinite; he would be God.

If he could only regard himself as limited, he would be an animal, nothing more.

But as he has the consciousness of the indefinite, the perfect, he cannot be limited only, to the exclusion of the unlimited—I do not say the infinite, but the indefinite, or unlimited in one direction.

How it is that these two things, the limited and the unlimited, personality and distinction, subsist in one and the same being, simply and indivisibly, is the mystery of human life.

This is what psychologists have termed the Ego, the non-ego and their relation—terms not only inseparable, but indivisible, though perfectly distinct in their simultaneity. But, failing to perceive this unity, they have separated them, making of the Ego, man; of the non-ego, the world; and of their relation, the idea. A fatal mistake to scind what is by its nature indivisible. The secret of life consists in man bearing within him the world, and the idea, without the possibility, of their identification with himself. The world is not me, nevertheless I bear in my body the unity and the synthesis of the world and its laws. Nor is the idea me; it is the link uniting me to the not-me. Thus, in myself I am unlimited; in my relation to others I meet with limitation.

Suppose that I recognise only one of these modes of being, I deny the unlimited, and concentrate my attention on all that limits me, on the material objects of nature. What is the logical result? I fade into that universal

matter, which alone I recognise; I fall from materialism to atheism, and as a final conclusion, to universal negation, because I refuse to acknowledge that invisible force within which insurges against all bounds. But if, on the other hand, I allow myself to be carried away in the current of that power which rolls towards the infinite, I lose sight of the banks, and I disappear in the abyss of the infinite; I become a pantheist. So true is it the division produces ruin, desolation, and death.

Man will never be truly known either by examining him in his finite aspect as a creature, one of the animated atoms of the world, or by investigating him in his infinite aspect as a spiritual force, an active intellect. The animals are limited; they find their life, their repose, their happiness within limits; but limitation stifles man. Let him try to abstract himself from limits, and, like the Buddhist ascetic, he falls into nirvana, which is zero, a simple negation. Limitation is requisite to constitute his personality; illimitation is necessary to make that personality progressive.

But whence does man obtain his unlimited personality? It cannot have been given him by anything that he touches, that surrounds him, for all matter is by its nature limited. This is the problem which religion solves, by laying down as a fundamental axiom the absolute existence of God, the source and author of the existence of man. Man created by God is placed between the infinite and the finite; he is the middle term uniting them through his conscience of the indefinite. Obedient to his true nature, bounded on all sides and in his own faculties, he inclines towards the indefinite; and transpiercing all limits, as electricity penetrates all bodies, he rises by a progression without term towards the infinite.

Life is not a mere exterior movement, the movement of

the being in its relations to other beings, but it is also, and especially, an internal movement from the visible to the invisible, from the real to the ideal, from the finite to the infinite.

The conscience of the true, the beautiful and the good, is the sense of the perfect, which is in itself indefinite. Endeavour to conceive the beautiful in art, truth in science, goodness in morals, without the indefinite, and you will find it impossible; the sense of the beautiful is a sentiment infinite in variety and inexhaustible in modification. The delight dissolving into tears caused by the perception of the beautiful in music, painting and poetry, is the stretching onward of the soul towards perfection; and that which satisfies to-day will not satisfy to-morrow, for the ideal is never stationary.[1] The restless thirst after knowledge in man is consequent on the idea of the unlimited. The acquisition of certainty in one branch of science spurs him on to discover it in another. Without the idea of the indefinite, mathematics would have halted at addition and subtraction, and never have risen through geometry to astronomy. The moral sense is also unlimited: it is well known that the better a man is, the higher is the ideal of virtue he sets before him, and the less satisfied he is with himself.

[1] I may mention here a remarkable fact. When I was about fifteen years old, I dreamt that I saw an angel with a coloured light in his hand, standing in the grass on a starry night. The colour was entirely different from any that we know. I recall it at times, and try to express my idea of it; but I am paralyzed, for it is an idea so entirely *sui generis* and so primitive that I can no more describe it than I could describe red or blue. The only way to express it would be by coining a new word. This fact has often led me to suppose that perhaps colours, forms of beauty and musical notes may be infinite in variety, but that our limited faculties can only catch and retain some. It is well known that many notes of music are inaudible to the ear.

What is the beautiful? what is truth? what is goodness? These ideas cannot be defined; they can be seen, felt, but they cannot be formulated. For a moment they receive definition, but they are permanently indefinable; they are not fixed points in themselves, but, like the cardinal points, fixed by the position man occupies towards them. This is one of the conditions inseparable from the perfectability of man. The danger to him is lest he should consider those points which are gratuitously assumed to facilitate his advance as fixed realities; just as the astronomer would fall into error if he were to regard the cardinal points as real entities, and not as relative terms, which never occupy the same place in the horizon for two minutes successively, although they always express the same relation of the globe to its centre. Now this is precisely the mistake philosophers have made who have sought to enclose life, that is to say, movement, within fixed, immovable points.

How is man to be defined who is precisely the indefinable? how is he who excludes limits to be shut within them? but also, how is he to be known except by definition and the limitation he implies? Such is the antinomy everywhere and always reappearing.

The indefinite, we have said, is that which at the same time implies and excludes limitation. Such is the true sense of Hegel's logical method, which we shall apply to the subject under consideration.

By his famous axiom, "I think, therefore I am," Descartes placed the principle of the absolute in the I-myself. Spinoza, applying this principle to God, or rather to the totality of things, deduced from it pantheism, as a logical consequence. But Kant was the first, by turning philosophy into a true metaphysical algebra, to demonstrate that from this point of view theoretical and practical reason

cannot arrive at the certainty of the real existence of any exterior object, and that consequently man can veritably know nothing. Fichte, Schelling, and all the German philosophers, using with marvellous subtlety the metaphysical system of the Königsberg philosopher, essayed in vain to break through this fatal result, and to pass from the absolute Ego of Descartes and Kant to objective reality. Then arose Hegel, enlightened and warned by the failure of his predecessors, and he laid down the problem under a new form, making it rise out of the absolute. Being, said he, is the undetermined absolute, in face of which you are situated like the eye that gazes on the sun, dazzled and blinded, and incapable of perceiving anything clearly, because everything strikes you simultaneously.

That which is absolutely unlimited is to you equal to zero, all becomes identical with nothing; absolute being is equivalent to entire negation.

The rigorous consequence of this doctrine was the impossibility of knowing God, the Absolute, directly, and by any other means than by an intermediary, a mediator between Him and us. It was a mortal blow struck at rationalism and at deism, though this has not been generally perceived and acknowledged. Hegel, who foresaw the inconceivable fecundity of his system, became himself bewildered, seized with giddiness, and partially blinded by it. By one of those mysterious contradictions so often found in great thinkers, he was unfaithful to his own theory, and erected that very theory into the Absolute.

According to Hegel's system, contraries do not exclude, but on the contrary imply, one another. This proposition, which ignorance can alone prevent us from accepting, is a vulgar, palpable, universal fact, presenting itself to our eyes incessantly in Nature and in ourselves. We cannot

take a step without striking against this inevitable antinomy of two terms opposed, which imply and define each other, as the down thrust at one end of a lever and the upward thrust at the other. Night implies and defines day, so does cold imply and define heat, movement repose, unity diversity, force matter. Suppress one of these two terms, and the other instantaneously disappears.

Every proposition, therefore, is a negative; every notion has in it the idea of the opposite to itself. But again, all negation is affirmation. Admit a third, intermediate term, and in it these mutual contradictions are resolved into friendly contrast. Thus, in this one hypothetical concept diversities are included, differences are conciliated, and contradictions are effaced; for this "moment" which is the Ideal embraces all in its entirety, and binds every moment phase and expression of being, which relatively negative each other, into unity.

Thus, in man, the Indefinite conciliates the relative and the personal, the limited and the unlimited, reason and sentiment. And man himself is the "moment" between the world and the Absolute, part divine, part animal, united in the simplicity of an unique personality, destined to live in other men and in all creatures, to make all live in God. What more admirable conception than this, of man restoring the universe to unity, its eternal principle, without anywhere effacing distinction.

According to the Hegelian method, unity can never become uniformity, for unity exacts diversity as its antinomical moment, without which it could not exist; and diversity implies unity as its *raison d'être*. Thus nature constantly engaged in analysis, in developing individualities, in particularizing and specializing, is incapable of falling into a chaos of conflicting elements, for this analytical pro-

cess implies the opposite, or synthetic process which unifies all these individualities, and conciliates all in a totality of being.

Thus man is also an antinomy. He represents Being under the two contradictory terms which constitute him; 1*st*, that which is indefinite and indetermined, which is called Spirit; 2*nd*, that which is determined and definite, which is vulgarly called body, and in philosophical language, limit. Such is the radical antinomy. But these terms are only fixed points imagined for our orientation. The body is always changing and shifting its relations, and the spirit is in incessant progress also. Man, in reality, is movement; and these terms express, not places of arrest, but the double orientation, one towards God, the other towards the world. Though these two words signify opposition, we might almost say contradiction, it by no means follows that they exclude each other. On the contrary, if the undetermined, the spirit, was always unlimited, without formulæ to define and determine it, it would know nothing, it would be incapable of knowing anything. These terms, apparently opposed and contradictory, imply one another, and unite in a simple term which, giving to the undetermined a form which defines and limits it, constitutes the conception, the idea.

But the contraries thus conciliated, the antinomy reappears; for this conception or idea contains in itself two things opposed, the living spirit which is the essence, and the form or letter which is the boundary and limit. Thus, for instance, the astronomer, after having determined the rotation of the earth on its own axis in twenty-four hours, determines its movement about the sun in three hundred and sixty-five days. These two opposed movements are identified by him in a sole force which produces both.

But the antinomy thus effaced, another rises up under another form, and continues to exist indefinitely, as a series of equations always resolving into higher equations, incessantly approximating the total astronomical verity, towards which they tend interminably, without being able to reach it finally.

This is one of the manifestations of the infinite which we find everywhere. What man does in astronomy, he does in every aspect of life. He incessantly formulates himself in sentiments, thoughts and acts, which are so many diverse terms of the movement of his life, but which are never its extreme limit. For his life, incessantly gaining in activity by these progressive determinations, breaks successively the dead forms at the same moment that it assumes them, to emerge into new sentiments, ideas and acts, which it will again escape from in its unflagging and indefinite ascension.

Thus there opens out to man a magnificent prospect of advance in the acquisition of truth, beauty and goodness; for if these are three aspects of the Ideal, three indefinite realities never to be attained in their entirety, because by their nature they are infinite, the progress of man in science, art and virtue is without possible limit.

He can never arrive at the term of knowledge, never exhaust the circle of the sciences, he can never reach the boundary of the beautiful, but like the waves of the mighty sea, form after form of loveliness will break upon the shore of his perception, he will never attain the perfection of virtue, but goodness will present an infinite variety of modulations as the relations of men alter, so as to be always fresh, always new; the materials may be always the same, but the kaleidoscopic changes will be infinitely diversified.

We say that science is in its infancy; it will never be-

come decrepid, for if truth be infinite, there will always be new aspects of it to be discovered. Art cannot become worn out; from change to change it will alter its type, but each type will be beautiful, and none will be exhaustive. Goodness will be infinitely varied, as the social and political arrangements of men are permuted and afford openings for new varieties and combinations of goodness.

All this follows if we allow the Infinite, or God; if we do not allow Him, we fall into the bondage of the finite. But how are we to refuse to allow this, when we have within us the sentiment of the indefinite pointing to the infinite, and when without it, our existence becomes an enigma impossible of solution.

As I have said before, God's existence escapes demonstration; it is idle to ask reason to prove what is beyond its scope, for reason is the faculty of dealing with the finite. If we accept the existence of God, it will have to be as an axiom; but a necessary axiom, for the existence of the finite implies its contrary the infinite.

If the existence of the sentiment of the indefinite be objected to, I answer, have I not a sense of beauty, goodness and truth? can I not distinguish the beautiful from the ugly, the good from the evil, truth from falsehood? If I have, and no one can dispute this, then I have a second term leading to the third, the existence of God. From the finite I rise to the sense of the indefinite, and thence I arrive at the infinite which completes the problem. I have the opposite and the conciliatory "moments."

If I accept Hegel's hypothesis of the conciliation of antinomies, I cannot avoid the conclusion that God exists as the opposed pole to the world of finalities.

And what is more, without the idea of God, or the Infinite, science, art and morals are impossible. The sense

of the Infinite is to the human intelligence what the sun is to physical nature. If in imagination we extinguish the sun, the world falls into chaos and darkness. So is it with the idea of the Infinite. Suppress it, and man dies intellectually. If phenomenal light be the vital agent of visible creation, the notion of the infinite, or of sovereign perfection, is the invisible light, the life of the spiritual creation.

Let us take the exact sciences as an illustration. At the point of departure of arithmetic is found, not, as is vulgarly explained, number, but that which is at every point inverse, unity, which lies at the root of all numbers, but which none of them can arrive at and equal. The unit is not engendered; it does not multiply itself, it is always itself its own sum and product. Multiplied or divided by itself, it gives itself alone; it cannot be multiplied or divided.

What revealed this mystery to our intelligence? Everything in this world is an effect, issues from father and mother, results from some previous combination; everything is indefinitely multipliable, and subject to the law of division; all changes; consequently nothing in the visible world could have given us the idea of the unit.

The immutable, unengendered, immultipliable, and indivisible unit is the infinite Being: thus the unity of God is at the commencement of the exact sciences, as it is at the root of all equations. When the genius of man broke through the bounds in which numbers held him captive, he placed in the midst of them the infinite, and progress opened out to him an unlimited perspective.

Upon the idea of the infinite geometry rests; for the line, from which all its formulæ are derived, starts from a point, an indivisible unit, without length, breadth, or depth, and which produces all; the invisible measuring all that is

visible, the indefinite of the thought which cannot be seen or felt, but which defines and gives shape to all bodies. In fact, geometry is the science of the forms of matter, and the idea of form is synonymous with that of limit. Thus from the unlimited limitation proceeds.

Algebra is only generalized arithmetic, and one may say of this phase of the science of numbers what was said of arithmetic itself. But what if we speak of the infinitesimal calculus, that synthesis of mathematics which has enabled them to make such giant strides, and which lives upon the idea of the infinite, or rather, of the indefinite, which operates on it alone, reveals it everywhere present, between all numbers, above and below them, in the cypher and in the fraction, in the indefinitely great and in the indefinitely small, in all equations and in all their relations, and which might be called science calculating the indefinite everywhere?

Thus, in the sciences which are called exact, and with which men have laboured, and labour still, to dethrone the supra-sensible verity, they are unable to do without it any more than in the moral and religious and æsthetic sciences. Everything is limited in creation; but athwart all limits intelligence divines the Infinite. In the phenomenal world there is incessant flux, but the eternal verity remains; it is the immutable axis of all science. Everything in the motions and actions of man is bounded, and nevertheless everything within him aspires to and supposes the infinite as his supreme end.

What is all creation but an aspiration towards what it presupposes, the Infinite, from the atom to the globes that revolve in space, from the mineral to the man? It is an always progressive ascent of life, by overstepping limit after limit, from the narrower to the larger; it is Hegel's *processus*.

The mineral life is an escape from the limit which separates atoms, simple bodies; vegetable life assimilates by intussusceptation that which in the mineral was only juxtaposed; another boundary is overthrown; animal life breaks through the limitation of place which tied the plant to one spot, and obtains the faculty of motion; and man in his intellectual life follows the same law, spiring upwards, forming and breaking the moulds he makes as they become too strait for his spirit.

That to which all things tend is universal unity; the means is the sentiment of the indefinite, which is nothing else but the Ego, or human personality itself, having cognizance of its own life as a movement of aspiration without limits towards the beautiful, the good, and the true. But what is this aspiration but the sentiment of perfection in all things?

Our senses are impressed by the beings that compose the world; we are infallibly certain that there exist between us and them constant relations; but we do not find in these creatures the basis of our appreciations, the reason of the laws which govern them, or the relations that unite them. Nor is our own personality the rule or criterium of our judgments, though it is within us. If we attend to the process within ourselves, we discover that there is a criterium which is not ourselves, and which approves or rejects our decisions. This tribunal is the sentiment of perfection, or conscience of what is good, beautiful, and true; in the order of good it is what is commonly called conscience; in the order of arts it is the sense of the beautiful; in the intellectual order it is the conviction of truth; in the practical order it is justice; in logic it is the base and criterium of our premisses for concluding from the finite to the infinite. Under all these aspects, this sentiment implies three things:

—a type of absolute perfection by which one compares everything upon which one is called to judge; a relation between this prototype and the object or being which is compared with it; and an act which judges of the relation of perfection in which one stands to the other.

The living type of absolute perfection is God. "Not only," said Descartes, "do I know that I am an imperfect being, incomplete and dependent on another, who tend and aspire incessantly towards something greater and better than I am; but I know at the same time that He from whom I depend possesses in Himself all those great things to which I aspire, not indefinitely and potentially, alone, but actually and infinitely, and that thus He is God." [1]

The act which affirms the relation between the divine type of absolute perfection and us, is ourselves in our liberty and free-will judging according to our reason, our will, and our sentiment.

And what is the relation, the axis uniting the type with the antitype, the positive with the negative pole?

What is that relation which touches on one side the infinite and on the other the finite, the absolute and the limited, spirit and matter?

That is what we shall answer when we speak of the Incarnate Word.

The good, the true, and the beautiful, are three faces of the same ideal of perfection, the Infinite. The good is not separable from the true, nor the true from the beautiful. They are distinct, yet indissolubly one. That which is good is also true and beautiful. That which is false cannot be good, nor can it be beautiful. That which is beautiful must be true and good. It is impossible to scind these distinct aspects of perfection. The philosopher seeking truth errs

[1] Méditations, i. p. 290.

if he attempts to oppose what is certain to what is goodly. The artist is mistaken if he seeks beauty apart from truth; and what pure act of virtue is not marvellous in its loveliness!

The three sciences, ethics, logic, æsthetics, based on these three aspects of the Infinite, are therefore not to be separated and opposed, for they complement one another and complete what would otherwise be fragmentary.

In ethics, the conscience judges, according to a sliding scale; what it judges at one time to be admissible and good, it decides, as its experience grows, or as circumstances alter, to be inadmissible and bad. That which was right one day is wrong the next, for as conscience grows, its perception strengthens, and it discriminates with greater acuteness; its powers of analysis increase, not for the purpose of dividing and opposing, but for the purpose of reducing what is divided and opposed to unity.

Evil is the rejection of the infinite for the finite, the declension from one pole to the other, and perversion of the moral sense. When the infinite is lost sight of, the sentiment of the indefinite loses its character, and the science of ethics is at an end. Morality is impossible without a sense of the indefinite, and the sense of the indefinite supposes the infinite source of good, or God. How can there be morality without a law, and how can there be law without a lawgiver.

If we pass from conscience to the world of reason, we find that the cause of all error in the science of God, man and the universe, consists in oblivion or an insufficient notion of one of these three terms. Psychologists and ontologists have not clearly seen that the co-ordination of these three terms is necessary for the attainment of certainty. All, starting from one of these terms, by method of division, have ended in abstraction. In placing man outside of unity, they have placed him outside of life. The first have de-

tached all the faculties of the human soul from God, and have examined them by themselves, forgetting that it is impossible to know an object without examining it in all the conditions of its nature. The second have despoiled man of his nature as a living being, and have robbed his ideas of their reality. And because they have taken them in the abstract, all their deductions, all their conclusions are void, without practical application, without other result than weariness of spirit and deadness of heart.

If we pass to the region of art, we find that its vigour depends on the recognition of the Ideal, the relation and the world; the rupture of this union is the dissolution of art. The conception of the ideal cannot furnish man with æsthetic principles apart from the relation. The Jew had a sublime faith in the Infinite of perfection, but He was isolated from the world, the relation uniting them was unrecognized or unknown, and Jewdom was sterile of art. The Greek looked on man as perfection, his ideal did not transcend the "human form divine;" and beautiful as was the plastic art in his hands, it wanted something, the divine. The world without the idea of God, what is it? a riddle; it is without truth unless He be its law, without beauty unless He be its meaning. Take away the idea of God, the infinite perfection, and there is no sense of perfection, no power of discriminating between the beautiful and the offensive.

In discussing Christianity, I propose to apply to it the Hegelian method. Some premiss must be taken; I adopt that of Hegel, because I believe it to be true; and because it throws a vivid light upon a body of doctrine which has been buried in obscurity. The importance of Hegel's method I think it impossible to over-estimate. It has begun to revolutionize philosophy; if it has not at once wrought the effects which Hegel foresaw, it is because he himself was

hardly lucid enough in his exposition of it to place it at the disposition of all thinkers. He has been misunderstood, and his method has been abused; but of its importance, and of the part it is destined to play in the elucidation of the Christian scheme, I am firmly convinced. I believe that if the modern intellect is to be reconciled to the dogma of the Incarnation, it will be through Hegel's discovery. Let the reader bear in mind that I start from the premiss of two terms, opposed and defining one another, conciliated by an intermediate term; and with this key I hope to open the mysteries of the Christian religion.

The great German innovating philosopher saw that his method was destined to revivify Christianity; according to him, the dogma of the Man-God expressed the veritable unity of the subject and the object, not under the form of reflected notion, but under that of symbolic representation enshrined in the history of one person. He applied his doctrine to the orthodox dogma of the Trinity. Science, said he, teaches us that the absolute traverses three moments, that of the idea in itself, then that of the idea out of itself, or the gradual realization of the idea through innumerable negations, and finally that of the identity of the real with the ideal. The first moment is the reign of the Father, of God considered as abstract and anterior to the created world; the second moment, or the development of the world, corresponds with the second person of the Trinity, the Son. The third moment is that in which the absolute arrives at the knowledge of itself as spirit, through the procession of finite causes, and this is the Holy Ghost.[1]

But into the doctrine of the Trinity it is not my purpose to enter specially, but to confine myself to the theory, and to the application, of the dogma of the Incarnation.

[1] Hegel: Philosophie der Religion.

CHAPTER III

THE BASIS OF TRUTH

"*Wahrheit, O Gott, ist dein Leib.*"[1]—WIELAND.

Truth is relative—The antipodes of truth—antagonistic ideas—the antinomy in man — Egoism and sympathy — "Contradictories radically exclude one another" an exploded axiom—The centre of gravity of Truths—The Ideal conciliates all—Conciliation of reason and sentiment—No absolute falsehood—Error the opposition of one relative truth against another to the exclusion of the latter—All truths positive—Negations are nothing—Private judgment the negation of other judgments—Private judgment the negation of absolute Truth—The proper function of private judgment—It is the resolution of what is true to the individual self—Universal truth the combination of all appreciations of truth.

TRUTH, such as it appears to us, can only be relative, because we ourselves, being relative creatures, have only a relative perception and judgment. We appreciate that which is true to ourselves, not that which is universally true. And truth may well assume an aspect to one different from that it assumes to another.

When two men stand face to face, the right of one is the left of the other, and *vice versâ*. The rising sun in one hemisphere is the setting sun in the other; the zenith of one is the nadir of the other; when one hemisphere is enjoying day the other is steeped in darkness. The winter

[1] Truth, O God, is Thy body.

of the arctic regions is the summer of the antarctic pole. The descent of one scale is the ascent of the other. In a word, everything in the world is inverse.

When we talk to English children of the antipodes, they think that the men there walk with their heads downwards; and to New Zealanders we ourselves are reversed. This is at once true and false for each. True, if each considers the other from his own point of view, with reference to himself alone, but false to both if they consider themselves parts of a whole whose centre of gravity is under the feet of one and the other.

Before Newton discovered the law of gravitation, the New Zealanders did actually for English people walk head downwards, for the relative method of viewing the antipodes was the only method at their disposal.

But now that the law of gravitation to a centre is known, it is indicative of childish ignorance to suppose such to be actually the case, though relatively it remains unalterably the same.

In the world of ideas the notions of one man are the inverse of those in another man. And in every man's own head there is a duality, which often eventuates in an antagonism. What is head upwards to the sentiment is often head downwards to the reason. Faith and logic range themselves on opposite sides. Liberty revolts against authority, and authority imposes on liberty. That which is right to the individual is wrong to the society; that which is true to reason is false to sentiment.

In nature, the law of gravitation governing bodies is the opposition of two contrary forces, the centripetal and the centrifugal. This antinomical principle reappears in all combinations of matter as positive and negative electricity, in its composites as statics and dynamics.

"The Solarians," says Campanella, in his City of the Sun, "think that there exists a marvellous harmony between the worlds celestial, terrestrial, and moral." The parallelism is exact. In each there is an antinomy, in all a harmonizing momentum, bringing the oppositions and contradictions to rest.

From the moment the child enters the world it manifests one pre-eminent force, the instinct of self-conservation, or of egoism. Presently, however, another instinct appears. It turns from its mother's breast, and spreads its hands towards the flowers, plays with the kitten, and smiles upon its brothers. That which draws the infant out of itself towards exterior forms is the centrifugal force—the sentiment, the sympathetic instinct, a hidden magnetism, a veiled ray from the great hearth of love which warms and animates the universe. These twin tendencies, opposed as they are, incessantly contradicting one another, are the principle of all activity. Favoured or repressed, directed aright or warped, they determine the nature of the passions which agitate the man, and of the virtues which govern his soul.

The instinct of egoism gathers all surrounding materials into the ever self-forming and vitally persistent centre: it is an inward spiritual energy concentrating, comprehending, contracting all to one geometric point, and the instinct of sympathy is the dispersion of self over an indefinitely outspreading surface. Egoism draws the world into an apex, sympathy spreads it into an extended plain. The egoistic instinct teaches man what he owes to himself, the sympathetic instinct tells him what is due to his neighbours. That they contradict one another perpetually who can deny? that they are capable of harmonization who can doubt?

If the axiom of ancient heathen logic, which laid down that contradictories radically exclude one another, that be-

tween two things in opposition one cannot be accepted without a rejection of the other, be a true axiom, the conciliation of all possible aspects of thought and feeling, nay more, of opposing facts, can only be irrational.

No doubt this principle is true in the sense that one cannot affirm of the same thing, under the same relations, that it is and is not; that, for instance, the sun revolves on its axis, and does not. This axiom, the base of the mathematical method, is at bottom simply this:—every negation is only a negation, that is, it is Nothing.

But this axiom is completely false, comprehended in the sense that things relatively opposed are not absolutely conciliable, that unity excludes distinction, and reciprocally that variety excludes unity; in other terms, that a thing cannot be opposed to itself; for, on the contrary, this antinomy in the principle, and antagonism in the relation, is the most general—indeed, it is the only general—law with which we are acquainted.

But if we suppose that in the ideal world there is a centre of gravity, then the antinomy is conciliated at once. To recur for a moment to the instance of our antipodes. In intelligence we are all great children. Every idea sees the inverse idea head downwards, that is to say, it envisages it as the antipodes of truth. Thence arises universal division, general contradiction. Every man's view of truth is alone right, every one else's is wrong.

But if we divest ourselves of this optical hallucination, and endeavour to understand that, in the world of ideas, truth, like the earth, has two poles, that one idea no more excludes the inverse idea than the arctic pole excludes the antarctic pole; that, on the contrary, they imply each other, by defining and completing one another,—we arrive at an universal conciliation.

Thus, reason and sentiment cease to be absolutely antagonistic, for each complements the other, and the antinomy in man's soul becomes an harmonious discord.

Love is the sense of the universal and undefinable, and reason is that of the particular and defined. The first reveals to us life by that mysterious phase of the infinite which can be felt but not expressed, and the other makes us know it by the intelligible side, which determines the sense and fixes the idea.

Without assuming a centre from which they both radiate, or to which both tend as a focus, the conflict must remain undecided and interminable, but if we admit an ideal, each assumes its place and lives at peace with the other; there is no invasion of each other's functions, no confusion in rights.

As then, every idea has its opposite, and every idea in itself is true to the individual judgment which realizes it, and is a radiation from the central truth, it follows that there is no such thing as absolute falsehood. What is true to one is false to another, and that which is false to the second is truth to the first. But this falsehood is merely relative; false only when seen from the point of view of the individual, but from the centre of gravity of ideas one idea is as true as another, and the false is not; indeed it is inconceivable.

A ray of light penetrates a dark room. I can distinguish the course of the ray, and point out where it is, and where it is not, but when I move into the ray, I see the sun in itself, and of the ray as a ray I am unconscious, I can no longer tell where it is and where it is not. So truths seen sideways are relative and cut off from error, but seen full face streaming from the absolute, error does not exist, nor is truth limited and defined and contradicted.

The idea conceived by man being relative as regards other ideas, is determined by the point at which the mind is situated, in the same manner as the position of the body on the globe determines the zenith; complete verity therefore to man will consist in the synthesis of all relations, that is to say, in the simultaneous admission of all ideas, conciliating thus all intellectual antipodes. Every idea seeing naturally an inverse idea—head downwards—must rectify its ocular mistake by considering the ideal of universal gravitation, whence all are visible in their totality, all in their true directions, and none as negations and errors.

Lactantius approached this sublime truth, as may be judged from the following passage. "It is," says he; "because the philosophers have not been able to establish this body of doctrine, that they have misunderstood the Truth. It is not that they did not see and develop the majority of those things of which this body of doctrine is composed"—he refers to the Catholic faith;—"but that each of them enunciated and established them in a different manner. None of them bound them together, bringing together causes and effects, principles and consequences. All gave themselves up to a blind and insensate passion for contradiction. . . . If among them there had arisen a man wise enough to gather up into one all the scattered verities, and to shape them into one body, his doctrine would have been entirely conformable to ours; but that could only be done by him who possessed the true science; and the true science belongs alone to those whom God Himself has designed to instruct."[1]

Four men stand gazing at a statue; one is before it, another behind it, the other two occupy opposite sides.

The first observes two eyes, a nose and a mouth. The

[1] De Vitâ Beatâ, lib. vii. 7.

second sees neither eyes nor nose nor mouth; but the back parts. The other two see each a different eye and ear and half a mouth.

If we collect the observations of all four men, we obtain a pretty complete idea of the whole statue; but the view of each, by himself, is partial, true in itself, but false if that which is partial be assumed to be the entire truth. So is it with absolute verity. Every one of us contemplates it from a different standpoint and with different perspective. No man is able to embrace at once and in all its aspects that truth or perfection which is infinite, because he himself is a finite being, and he sees only a corner, an angle corresponding to his moral, intellectual or æsthetical predispositions. For him that is truth, and that alone; and as every man differs from every one else in his predispositions, whether native or acquired, every one beholds a different phase, and pretends that his own visual angle is the entire plan, and that one detail is the totality of the statue.

What then is Error? It is nothing *per se*. It is the opposition of one relative truth against another to the exclusion of the latter.

Man has no knowledge of things except by the thoughts present to his mind; that is, he can only know what is thinkable.

The only knowledge man has of his thoughts is by their expression, consequently, every material being that can be conceived by the mind exists or can exist. He may imagine what is incongruous, as the sphinx. But his imagination is a piecing together of realities, not a creation out of nothing.

Every intellectual idea, therefore, which is or may be named, either is or may be; and all the philosophers the

world has produced may be defied to figure or name an impossible idea; for, how can that which is not nor can be, how, I ask, can it be represented or rendered present by name or figure?

Therefore, all the thoughts of men are true, or representatives of things that are.

As Bossuet well observes: "Everything which can be understood is true. When one is deceived, it is that one does not understand. The false, which, in itself, is nothing, is neither understood nor is it intelligible. Truth is that which *is*, the false is that which *is not*. One can easily understand that which is, but it is impossible to understand that which is not. We believe at times that we do understand it, and this it is precisely which constitutes error; but, in fact, we do not understand it, for it has no existence."[1]

Three men, A, B, and C, find a rose. A is colour-blind, B has no sense of smell, and C has lost all feeling in his hands. A affirms of the flower that it is fragrant, soft-petalled, and has a rough, thorny stem. B asserts that the rose has a rich crimson colour, but contradicts the statement of A that it has a scent. C declares that it has neither softness nor roughness, and A interposes to deny the assertion of B that the rose has colour.

A bystander, who is blind, or does not happen to see the object of discussion, concludes that as three men mutually contradict each other in every particular, the rose has no existence.

Now the idea conceived by A was true as far as it went, but it did not extend to the perception of those several verities which were asserted by B and C. And so of the other two. Consequently each was true in what he as-

[1] De la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même, c. i. sec. 16.

serted and each was wrong in what he denied; and the bystander was most wrong in rejecting the positive statements and drawing his conclusions from the negations.

Now, if I assume my own view to be alone infallible, I make my own private judgment the measure of truth to all men. I only admit in their views as much as agrees with my own, and I stigmatize all that is beyond my range as erroneous. By so doing I make my breast the centre of truth, and I deny absolute truth, the all-conciliating. My private judgment is the sole authority and criterium of justice, goodness, and beauty. I am thrown into antagonism, more or less, with every one else.

Two courses are open to me, I must choose one or the other at the peril of being untrue to myself. I must become an anthropophagist or a sceptic.

If I hold my own opinion to be absolute truth, my own judgment to be the only measure of truth, I constitute myself God; I impose my will on all whom I can constrain; or else, seeing contradictions everywhere, between men, and between the elements of my own nature, I deny the existence of truth, goodness, and beauty: I am like the bystander who disbelieved in the rose.

There is no middle term rationally possible. I must doubt everything, or realize my faith by exterminating every obstacle. Such, if the Ideal be denied, is the only alternative for men who are logical and strong. If the vulgar adopt a stupid medium course, that is only a proof of their want of intelligence and of their weakness. Personal autocracy is not, and never can be, an institution, it is a perpetual dissolution of morals, law and religion.

For, if my own opinion be the criterium of right, exclusive of other opinions, I am above all law; that only is

wrong which I deem wrong, and my own self-interest will make me

> "Condone for sins I am inclined to
> By damning those I have no mind to."

The private judgment of Muncer found in the Scriptures that titles of nobility and great estates are impious usurpations, contrary to the natural equality of the faithful, and he invited his followers to examine if this were not the case. They examined into the matter, praised God, and then proceeded by fire and sword to extirpate the impious and possess themselves of their properties. Private judgment made the discovery in the Bible that established laws were a permanent restriction on Christian liberty; and John of Leyden, throwing away his tools, put himself at the head of a mob of fanatics, surprised the town of Münster, proclaimed himself king of Sion, and took fourteen wives at a time, asserting that polygamy was Bible liberty, and the privilege of the saints.

That personal autocracy is the destruction of religion is evident from the nature of the case; it is the negation of absolute law, and may be called personal theocracy or autotheism, for the individual thereby assumes a right and supremacy which is not the subordination of God to man, but the annihilation of God before the individual man.

If the upholders of private judgment as a law of universal application be not invariably atheists, the reason is that they are illogical, and stop short of the inevitable result to which their premisses must conduct them. The doctrine of personal infallibility is a reaction against theocratic or governmental autocracy. It does not establish a false relation between God and man, but it does away with the relation, because it deifies the man. Man, master of the absolute, is himself absolute; master of the law, he is

himself the law. There can be no priesthood, because each man becomes priest to himself. Religiously, socially, civilly, politically, every one has right over the law, and he only wants the power to trample on it. This right of each over the law would seem at first sight to give a general equality, but an equality without a recognition of the Absolute is an impossibility, for there is no possibility of harmony when every man is absolute, when each has unlimited rights, and none have duties. That equality which has not the Absolute as its principle and end, but only personal caprice, is borne down instantly before force. Each man having an equal right over the law, becomes the law destroying opposing laws. Consequently every personal interest, caprice, or passion becomes a law; personalities being absolute, personalities club together as their interests and passions urge them, and all little associations of interests are at blows, and the strongest gains the day. Thus the equality of an hour is destroyed; it is without duration, because without solid base.

Personal autocracy has made many wars, religious, social, and political. By the religious and philosophic struggle, it has striven to affirm and prove itself to be absolute. By the social war it has endeavoured to unite in one the powers temporal and spiritual. By the political war it has erected the will of one man into the Law.

Personal autocracy being the confusion of relative with absolute truth, conciliation of truths becomes an impossibility, and antagonism of ideas is proclaimed as the law of the universe, an antagonism which ends in internecine war.

I have pointed out the dangers of exclusive personal judgment. I have now to show what is the proper function of private judgment.

As I have said in the first chapter of this volume, in every man is the criterium of truth. He can only know the just, the good and the beautiful by the faculties of his own soul. One man cannot know or believe for another; knowledge and belief are individual acts. What is true, just, beautiful, good for each man, is what he feels, conceives and judges to be such in his own mind. It cannot be otherwise. What he feels is part of himself, what he knows is his own; his ideas are determined by his thoughts and beliefs. Therefore, every man's own judgment is the criterium, and the only criterium of what is good, beautiful and true to himself, and this is acknowledged by every one who argues with another. I may change my opinions, pass from one creed to another, my convictions may undergo reversal, but the principle of private judgment by virtue of which the good and the true consist to me, will not be disturbed, but remains invariable. To every objection and criticism, I reply, How otherwise can I judge except according to my conscience, my feelings and my knowledge? And this reply is unanswerable.

But if it be urged that I ought not to believe in my private judgment, I ask, by virtue of what do you forbid me its use? Is it not precisely because you judge its inadvisability. Therefore you repose on your own judgment when you deny the right to do so.

In vain is it argued that we are to give up our private judgment to a revelation; we can only admit the authority of the revelation by an act of our individual judgment. Consequently, in every one the base of all thoughts, beliefs and acts, is personal judgment.

Referring to an inspired medium of revelation, S. Augustine says:—"If he were to speak in the Hebrew tongue, it would strike my senses in vain, nor would any of his

discourse reach my understanding; but if he spoke in Latin, I should know what he said. But how should I know whether he spoke the truth? And even if I knew this, should I know it from him? Surely within, inwardly in the home of my thoughts, truth (which is neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian) without the organs of mouth or tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say, He speaks the truth; and I, rendered certain immediately, should say confidently to that man, Thou speakest truth."[1]

But a principle is only true if it be universal. If I believe in my own judgment, I am bound to believe in the judgments of every one else. If I hold my own spirit to have in it the criteria of truth, I must allow that the same criteria exist in every other spirit of the present times, of the past and of the future. Either conscience is the expression of truth or it is not. If not, we can no more trust to reason or primary beliefs, we cannot affirm anything or know anything. But if it is, then it is so for every one, and I have no more right to contradict its expression in other men than I have to contradict it in myself.

Consequently, private judgment being true for all, we arrive at the necessity of admitting at once and everywhere, as equally legitimate, all the decisions of every man's sense, of admitting them simultaneously, with the Ideal as their conciliation.

But if every positive sentiment is good and true, by the sole fact of its existence, it follows that a sentiment which contradicts another may be a good and a relative truth, inasmuch as it is the veritable expression of an individual conscience, but that it is also an evil and an error, inasmuch as it contradicts another sentiment, thought or will, which

[1] August. Confess. xi.

emanates, with the same titles, from another individual conscience.

If every idea is just and true, because it is, it follows that an idea which excludes another is an evil and an error, inasmuch as it is a denial of another idea equally just.

It also follows, that every exclusion and negation in relative ideas is more or less a denial of the Absolute Truth, the universal Conciliator, and is more or less autotheism.

And also, that evil, error and injustice are that by which sentiments, thoughts, wills and acts contradict one another, exclude and deny one another, either in each man, or in the many; and that goodness, truth, and justice are that by which sentiments, thoughts, wills and acts unite and harmonize.

And lastly, to arrive at the complete, universal, absolute verity, we must admit, without any exclusion, every determination of private judgment; not to eliminate one by the other, but, on the contrary, to conciliate all; and that conciliation is impossible, without the admission of an Ideal.

CHAPTER IV

THE BASIS OF RIGHT

"*Omnia quæ sunt de jure naturæ sunt a Deo ut auctore naturæ.*"—SUAREZ.

Right and its relation to Liberty—difficulty in defining Right—Is right a rational or a sentimental verity?—Difficulty of establishing it on a rational basis—attempt of Hobbes—of Spinoza—of Grotius—of Kant—of Krause—confusion between right and will or force—Right based on duty—a sentimental verity—Liberty alienable and inalienable—Right the faculty of realizing our nature—Possibility of alienating our right—Consequences which flow from the admission of the dogmatic basis of right—1. All rights are equal—2. All infringement of rights is immoral—3. All primitive rights are inalienable—4. Primary rights are not mutually antagonistic—The primary rights of Man—1. The right of personal freedom—2. of good reputation—3. of liberty of conscience—4. of expressing his convictions—5. of appropriation—All these rights dogmatic.

THE idea of Right requires that of Liberty to complete it. Liberty, if not the synonym of right, is, at least, the faculty of exercising it.

If I am able to lift my arm, I have an inherent right to lift it; if I have a right to live, I demand liberty to enable me to acquire the food necessary to sustain life.

If there be an axiom evident to all, it is this, that liberty is a first necessity of existence. It is the privilege of all organized beings. It extends even to the plants, whose locomotion is purely vegetative. Because I feel that I can

move, I act; because I feel that I can transport myself from place to place, I walk. As organisms become more perfect, a larger field of liberty opens to them. In that part of the world of nature not endowed with animal life, there is no margin for oscillation, the eclipses of sun and moon may be calculated to a minute for ten thousand years, the return of a comet is fatal. In the animal world there is a small margin for oscillation; the ostrich buries her eggs in the sand, where "the foot may crush them, or the wild beast may break them," as foolishly now as in the days of Job; the bee will make her six-sided cell with the same precision and geometrical economy of space and material as did her ancestors in remote ages; and as Philomel sang under the poplar-shades in Virgil's time she sings now, without an additional trill or jug.

But man has a larger orbit and a farther swing; he does now what he was unable to do in ages past; he can speak his mind without having his ears cropped, and can worship God as he chooses without incurring deportation.

Liberty, I know, has been denied, and man has been subjected by certain philosophers to a necessity which divests him of a particle of freedom, and with freedom he loses his rights. He becomes an automaton, the slave of a fatal despotism, a beast, nay worse—a stone.

I have no intention of arguing for liberty, because I believe it to be an irrational verity, one which must be assumed, and which can never be demonstrated. Every one, the veriest sceptic included, believes in liberty, and believes in it naturally and invincibly. He cannot emancipate himself from the belief that he has a power of option between two courses of action, though he may have created a system in which he has demonstrated that liberty is impossible.

In its origin the idea of right is so simple, so humble, one may say, that philosophers have gone elsewhere for its explanation.

Right is difficult of definition, and this points it out to be a primary verity, or, at least, almost a primary truth. Every one believes he has a right to personal freedom, to nourish his body, and to educate his mind; but he cannot explain to you what he means, when he uses the term. He may tell you that he demands liberty to exercise his right, that is, the faculty of doing what he is convinced is necessary, without let or hindrance. But liberty is not right. He may be deprived of his liberty, but not of his right; that is inherent. He has a right to worship his God with cobwebs and dirt, if he believes Him to be an ideal of ugliness; and he has a right to worship Him with incense and lights, if he believes Him to be an ideal of beauty; despotism may interfere to sweep away his cobwebs and dirt, or to extinguish his incense and light, but the right to worship God as he thinks proper remains untouched.

Is Right a rational or a sentimental verity? That is, can right be demonstrated by pure reason, or does it repose on a dogma, and fall, therefore, under the head of an irrational truth?

I believe it to be the latter.

If we want to establish right upon an enduring basis, and this is a first necessity, for from it flow all moral obligations and political duties, we must find an immutable principle of universal application.

This is what every philosopher has failed to effect. A very brief survey of the various theories of right that have been propounded will make this apparent.

Hobbes laid down that man, naturally, has a right to everything; that his will is the criterium of right, and that

its law is utility; but inasmuch as the exercise of his will may react to his own disadvantage, man is obliged to restrain his will and modify his liberty, to obtain permanent happiness. For instance, a man covets his neighbour's house, he has a perfect right to turn his neighbour out and to take it to himself; but, if he act thus, there is no security for his own property; therefore he refrains from the exercise of his right in consideration of ultimate advantage.

It is obvious that, according to this utilitarian doctrine, self-interest is the basis of social and political morality, if that can be called morality which is a negation of duty. There is no obligation. Every man is a supreme law to himself.

Hobbes erred in this; he mistook will for right. Self-interest is not a right, it is the negation of right. Because David lusts after Uriah's wife, he has no right to lie with Bathsheba, and to slay Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon.

As self-interest is the negation of right, it is also the negation of morality. If utility constitute my criterium of right, I may keep or violate my oath as my judgment deems expedient. If I am certain to escape detection, I may escape to America with the banker's strong-box. I have a right to do whatsoever I like within the limits of possibility, and everything is possible which is not contradictory; consequently the field of liberty is infinite.

But if right be the same thing as will, the strongest will is the strongest right, and power is the measure of right. Nebuchadnezzar has a right to throw the three children into a fiery furnace if they will not bow down to his golden image, and Madame de Pompadour has a right to rob Latude of the best years of his life, and condemn him to be devoured by hunger and vermin, because he has called

her an ugly name exactly expressive of what she is; but then, she has the right, because, being a king's mistress, she has the power.

But the right of might is not a right, it is the violation of right; and the obligation to obey the strongest is not a duty, it is a physical necessity. It is playing with words to call that a right which is a faculty growing and waning with the power which imposes it, and that a duty which is necessary submission to a power against which resistance is vain.

As Hobbes has observed, the well-being of man being his end, and egoism the principle of his actions, all men in a state of nature rush upon the same objects for the satisfaction of the same appetites; and as full satisfaction of the appetites of all cannot constitute a state of peace, the state of nature is a state of warfare.

But war is a bad state, and peace is better; to obtain it men will surrender their rights, and constituting societies with governments at their head, will renounce their natural liberties. The best government will therefore be the strongest, and the strongest is an absolute monarchy. But the more absolute a monarchy is, the less liberty the subjects enjoy, and their duties merge into the one duty of obedience.

Sovereignty resides in a monarch as the result of a tacit convention; to him the multitude has made over irresponsible power, in order that he may exercise it as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. The king therefore is the supreme and infallible judge of what is expedient for the people and what is inexpedient. If they enjoy so much liberty, it is because he wills it, not because they have a right to it. If the sovereign were to surrender his judicial rights, society would fall back, says Hobbes,

into its former condition of anarchy, out of which it rose by constituting a sovereign.[1]

To this it must be objected that before a sovereignty can be established on a contract, it is necessary to know first on what conditions the contract is binding. Now a convention which binds a portion only, or binds unequally, cannot be the foundation of a right. I may displace the centre of my liberty, change the circumference of my right, permute my duties with my rights, in other words, I may give up what I have in excess in exchange for what is deficient to me, but I cannot abdicate my free-will without just compensation. According to Hobbes' theory the sovereign has all rights, but no responsibilities, for responsibility is the dissolvent of right. Sovereignty has therefore no solid basis, for even if the compact took place, it would not constitute a right.

Spinoza, starting from the assumption that nature is God, possessing a sovereign right over all things, draws the consequence that the right of the individual is nothing other than the power of the individual. In his system all natural forces are in the same rank; the brute is equal to the man, the fool to the sage, the child to the adult, and the power of all these beings is the power of God.

This power being absolute, it follows that every man has a right to whatever he can lay hold of. The right of the strongest is therefore the only natural right; every being has but one rule of action, determined by the tendency of his nature, so that it is not within his compass to be unjust. Spinoza is very consequent; the strong, says he, are made to enslave the feeble, by the same title that big fish devour little ones.[2]

[1] Leviathan, c. xvii. De Cive, c. viii.

[2] Tractatus Theologico-politicus, c. xvi.

The right of the strongest is, as he admits, the instinct of the brute.

Spinoza has, thus, mistaken force for right.

Grotius, on the other hand, makes right consist in the faculty of doing all that which will not have for result the disturbance of the social state; or, as he defines it, "the dictates of right reason governing man's actions, according to the convenience of his actions with his rational nature."[1]

According to this system, every action is just, which agrees with a right reason; and individual right is the correlative term to the duty of another. This is confusing the law of society with the law of the individual. Before a man can ascertain his rights, and when his liberty of choice and action can be exercised, he must become intimately acquainted with the doctrine of political economy. Right is nothing *per se* but the spot of ground left uninvaded by the waves of duty, and that is sterile.

The vice of this definition is, that it subjects right to all the fluctuations which may result from the necessities, well or ill understood, of society. Individual right has no existence by itself, it is not a principle of action, it is merely a faculty whose exercise is subordinated to a superior principle, or rather, to exigencies which by their nature are incessantly varying. Moreover, these exigencies, even if they remained invariable, might be differently appreciated, and that would forbid their forming a solid foundation; for society is not to man an object, but a means, and its necessities come after, do not precede, the right of the individual. The criterium of right is, according to Grotius, not in me, but in every one else: he attempted to trace a circle without fixing its centre.

Kant derived right from equality. "Every action is just

1 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. i. c. sec. 10.

which is not, or whose maxim is not, an obstacle to the agreement of the will of all with the liberty of each, according to the general law," and his categorical imperative is promulgated in these words, "Act so that the free use of your will may agree with the liberty of all."

The objection to Kant's definition is, that it is not a definition but a law, it is a criterium by which licit acts may be distinguished from those which are illicit, but it is not a principle, it gives no fundamental notion of what constitutes right, but in its place puts a measure of appreciation. When he says, Place yourself in the position of your neighbour and do to him as you would be done by, he lays down a maxim of duty, but not a principle of right.

Krause on the other hand deduced right from necessity, and gave the individual a natural faculty of exacting from another all that was necessary for him to realize his destiny; in other words he considered right to be the power of the individual to develop his nature, and to take from others everything that his nature demands as a requisite for its perfection.

But who is to be the criterium of this necessity? If each man is to be the judge, we have anarchy once more, and force prevailing. Have I a right to sink my higher faculties, like the Nibelungen gold, in a flood of sensual indulgence? If I am the law to myself, if my will and judgment are absolute, I have the right to do so. Have I a right to cut my throat if fortune ceases to smile on me? Most certainly, if my will is the measure of right.

If we assume that man has his own nature to realize, his faculties to develop, his gross passions to subordinate to his mental powers, himself, in short, to create, this is a duty; and a duty is authoritative, and the author imposing it on man can be no other than God.

Krause's doctrine is satisfactory enough if the idea of duty be admitted, that is, if his system be underpropped by dogma, but without dogma it must fall. To realize our destiny is either a duty or it is optional. If it is at our option, we are reduced to the position of assuming individual will to be the basis of right.

The theories of right we have been considering have proved erroneous or insufficient; for they have either identified right with the will, or with force, or have confused it with authority.

If self-interest be the principle of right, men are armed by it for fratricidal war, and against such a principle the moral sense protests, because it launches society into absolutism. Force is the annihilation of rights and liberties, and cannot be mistaken for it. Right cannot emanate from society as its first source, for society is the assembly of individuals, and it can only have such rights as belong to its constituents. It cannot found individual right, for right is not of human creation. The bird and the fish have their rights without having constituted societies. Kant's equality gives no sufficient explanation, for it is a result, not a principle, and the necessity of Krause will not make a right, unless that necessity be supposed to be due to the fiat of a Creator.

If all these principles fail, we are brought, by way of exclusion, to the only principle that remains, on which right may be permanently based—the idea of duty to God.

Duty is the faculty of doing freely, and if necessarily, forcibly, that which is imposed on man by God. It is a dogma, and must be accepted as an irrational verity. We can have our rights and demand liberty on no other condition.

If we are creatures of God, we are morally bound to ac-

complish our destiny, and we have a right to do so freely, and to resist to the uttermost, as immoral, every assault made upon it. Admit duty as the basis of right, and every difficulty vanishes. Seek a rational basis of right, and you are precipitated into despotism or inconsequence.

Right is a form of Truth. It must reside primarily in God, and relatively in man by communication, or it must be absolute in man. If it be absolute in man, there is not such a thing as duty, responsibility, morality. The result is the despotism of every man as far as his force can control the wills and actions of others,—a despotism monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic.

But if I recognize God as absolute, my rights and duties fall into their proper places, and can each be rationally accounted for.

If I have a right to the fruits of my toil, it is because to provide for the sustenance of my life is a duty I owe to the giver of my life. If I have a right to freedom of worship, it is because worship is a duty I owe to my Creator. I demand the liberty of the press, because it is my duty to teach what I believe to be the truth.

There is not a single right to be discovered without a duty from which it springs.

Assuming the link between man and God, the idea of duty is the mother of right. Right, in its generality, is nothing else than that which ought to be realized by the activity of free beings, that is to say, it is duty considered from an objective point of view. The free creature finds itself, by the fact of its creation, subject to duty; it is able to destroy its liberty, it is bound to preserve it; the act which conferred on it existence and liberty imposes on it the duty of conserving it, that is, of realizing the liberty it has received.

The liberty of the creature is at once alienable and inalienable; alienable because it depends on the will of the creature, and inalienable because it is absolutely willed by the Creator. It is alienable in fact, but inalienable by right. Natural right is the will of God, as it expresses itself in the essence of our reason, which is His workmanship. And as God alone is absolute, no pretended positive has any authority to contravene a natural right proceeding from Him.

Deriving the right of the creature from the will of God, with the idea of a free creature, we acquire at the same time the law of liberty. That a law does exist inherent in created liberty, must be allowed, otherwise created liberty would dissolve into contradictions. The law of created liberty is to confirm, realize, and render inalienable in fact what is inalienable in right.

The moral law is therefore the law of creation, it is the law of all development, the universal norm: "Realize your essence; become that really which you are virtually."

We have seen in the first chapter that the law of progress manifests itself in the gradual emancipation of the creature; nature gives to the creature a share in carrying out the operation of its own development. We see in man the same law take a wider expansion. The liberty of man is greater than the liberty of the dog, because the point of perfection to be attained by the former is greater than that within reach of the latter.

But there is this difference, and in this difference morality consists. The brute cannot descend to the plane of the vegetable; but man may, at will, surrender his liberty which constitutes him man, and brutalize. His right, which is latent, he surrenders, and instead of rising as a morning mist to heaven, he runs down like Jordan into a Sea of Death.

The child has its rights, and the power to emancipate itself from the chrysalis of animality into the dignity of manhood. He grows up a drunkard and a sensualist. He contradicts, blunts, sterilizes his rights and enslaves himself in grossness.

Moral science is the development of the law which orders the creature, essentially free, to appropriate its liberty by action, to manifest it and maintain it, and thus to realize its nature.

If then it be admitted that right reposes on a dogmatic verity, four consequences follow.

1. All rights are equal. For God being the author of our nature, and the nature of one man being identical with the nature of another man, and right being the faculty of developing his nature without contradiction and constraint, the right of one man must be equal to the right of another man.

2. All infringement of rights is immoral. For the rights of man being of divine origin, and given for a perfect purpose, interference with these rights is interference with the purpose of God, and is therefore a crime against God.

If it be objected that this corollary makes legal penalties immoral,—such as imprisonment for theft and execution for murder,—I answer No, these are not immoral to society, but they are immoral to the criminal; for it is the criminal who deprives himself of liberty or life by his violation of the rights of others. But if society were to hang a man for sheep-stealing, it would commit an immorality, for the invasion of the right of living in the criminal is greater in degree than the invasion of the right of property in the prosecutor.

3. All primitive rights are morally inalienable. By primi-

tive rights I mean those which belong to a man in virtue of his being a free, intelligent being, and not those acquired in society. They have their title in the nature of man, they are the circle in the centre of which each individual finds himself at the moment of birth, whereas the others are an extension, and suppose an exterior fact, an act which produces them. I have a right to the development of my reason,—that is a primary right. I have a right to the property inherited from my father, that is a secondary, social right.

If these primitive rights come from God immediately, and I am responsible immediately to God for their exercise, and if without their exercise I am unable to accomplish my functions in the world,—the development of my nature,—it is evident that I cannot surrender them, or any of them, without treason to my Creator, the author of my right.

4. No primary rights are opposed to one another. For, if God be the source from which all rights flow, He is the conciliator of all, just as He is the conciliator of all truths. Every man's rights being held on the same title as my own, if they seem to contradict mine, I must rectify my moral sight by the Ideal, and in Him I shall find that all are equal and all agree. It is my duty to exact, even by force, respect for my own primary rights, and it is my duty, without compulsion, to respect the primary rights of every one else.

As these latter consequences may not appear self-evident to every one, I will say a few words on the primary or natural rights of man, which will make these consequences clearer.

The first natural right man has in society is that of disposing freely of his person. It is the most sacred property in the world. Of what use is any other property, if between it and you is an impenetrable wall?

Individual liberty is a right by itself, and is the condition of the exercise of other rights. Without freedom they would be nothing, for they could at any moment be confiscated along with the person of the individual.

The right of living, and of living protected from every attack, is by its nature without limit. It was only partially understood in a state of barbarism, it was ignored under an absolute government, it has risen into recognition in modern times.

The only person who can alienate this right is the possessor of it, and the alienation is a violation of right, a crime. He may alienate it by intellectual or actual suicide, or by violating the rights of another, and therefore making it necessary for the commonwealth to suppress his liberty for a time, or totally deprive him of it.

Interference with personal liberty for opinions is immoral, for every man has a right to his own opinions and a right to express them; and interference with the liberty of A is only lawful when A has violated the rights of B, and then one interference must exactly balance the other. When an idea takes the knife like Lady Macbeth, it has on its hands a dye which all the perfumes of Araby cannot efface. It has defied morality, and, as its penalty, morality delivers it over to impotence.

The second natural right is that of having a good reputation, *jus existimationis*. Like the *jus vitæ illesæ* it can only be exercised when it is made to be respected. Nevertheless, it is no less a primordial right, as no one can perfectly exercise his faculties in the social state without that public consideration which a life without reproach can alone give him.

It is a right, like that of personal liberty, which is without limits by its very nature, and which can suffer no

assaults except those which the individual may himself authorize by his own acts.

A third right man has in society is that of believing as he thinks proper; this right is called liberty of conscience. Every man has his own convictions. They are his own individual property. He cannot escape from them, no power on earth can obliterate them. Thought is free and faith is free. No tyrant can bind thought, no inquisitor can root out faith. Like thought, faith is progressive. An attempt to interfere with faith, by cramping it within inelastic laws, is a violation of right. Palings will not stand against the wind. If faith increase in volume, the old banks will not prevent a flood. Only by almost superhuman efforts can a torrent of religious belief be brought to the stagnation of Lake Moeris.

If faith is and must be free, its expression must be free also. Worship is the language of belief: none have a right to interfere with liberty of worship, any more than they have to constrain liberty of speech. The liberty to serve God as he thinks proper is so essential to man, that if it be denied him, he will be ready to overturn all the political institutions of his country to regain it; for religious sentiment is the fiercest of passions if excited by injustice. It is a gentle, steady flame, when nicely raised to its proper pitch: woe to the hand that by violence turns it higher. It will lose steadiness and brilliancy, and roar into fanaticism.

To grow, and develop its manly proportions the body must not be weighed down with chains, nor cramped in an iron cage gradually contracting; and faith, to reach its perfection must be given entire liberty to extend itself. What is living religion? It is the human soul growing towards the Ideal, throwing out tendrils here and there,

and ever ascending from bud to bloom; ever enriched by the fact of its perfectability, operating incessantly on the trammels an establishment may lace around it, straining them and bursting them, ever seeking its proper expansion, and ever therefore impatient of restraint. It is like the great tun of Heidelberg: into it the new wine is yearly poured upon the old wine, and the old perfumes the new with its bouquet, whilst the new regenerates the old by its vigour. The employment of restraint and persecution to keep down the effervescing spirit of religion, by Inquisition, Star-Chamber, or Privy Council, is a policy as shortsighted as it is immoral.

The fourth right of man in society is that of giving free expression to his convictions. This right comprehends the liberty of instruction, and that of expressing one's thoughts through the press, by speech, or any other means of publication.

The faculty of teaching freely is a right, for instruction is a duty. Man feels the need of giving utterance to his thoughts, and this need is imperious like a duty demanding accomplishment. He feels that to keep the truth to himself is a crime equal to that of compressing the utterance of it in another.

The fifth natural right is that of appropriation. The liberty to take possession of the objects of the exterior world necessary for his physical life, is demanded by the very constitution of man. All controversies on the rights of property have never touched the primitive rights of man to enjoy the fruits of his toil, and satisfy the needs of his nature. No man or corporation has a right to employ any man without giving him the equivalent of his labour. Slavery is therefore immoral, so also is the under-payment of labourers or servants.

The fact of the general recognition of this right opens access to property to all.

These five are the primitive rights of man living in society, rights which are inalienable and sacred, if based on God, for they are rights without which social civilization, and the development of man as an individual, are impossible.

If the rights of man be not founded on a dogma, the dogma of man's creation by God for a determined end,—the perfect development of his faculties, they are without guarantee, for their existence imposes no duties on others, corresponding to them; and right becomes a caprice and duty becomes optional.

> "With fearless heart man makes appeal to Heaven,
> And thence brings down his everlasting rights,
> Which there abide, inalienably his,
> And indestructible as are the stars."[1]

[1] Schiller: Wilhelm Tell, act ii. sec. 2.

CHAPTER V

THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY

"*Humana societas debet esse perfecta respublica.*"—BELLARMINE.

The physical condition of man renders society necessary—The Social Instinct—Social organizations the product of the ideas of right and authority—The family, the first society—The idea of parental authority a prolongation of the idea of right—That authority ceases when the child has become a man—for then its rights are equal to its father's rights—Two kinds of authority, Moral authority and effective authority—Moral authority must rest on God—necessitates the hypothesis of free will—Effective authority must derive from man—its mode of exercise compulsion—not to be confused with sovereignty—Sovereignty, the right to violate rights with impunity—Sovereignty only possible, logically, if God be denied—Attempt to subordinate sovereignty to moral authority impossible—The only possible mode of preserving moral authority and effective authority intact is to distinguish them, and derive the one from God, the other from men—Effective authority not necessarily immoral.

MAN has received fewer physical advantages from nature than any other animal. For the protection of his organs he has an envelope as delicate as a rose-leaf, which can be rent by a thorn. The beasts are wrapped in wool or fur, the birds in non-conducting plumage. They have claws and fangs, and are well-shod, and move with agility, but man is tender-footed, slow in his motions, his nails and teeth are fragile.

Our first parents lived in a condition of marked in-

feriority. They were naturally incapacitated from enduring the intemperance of the seasons, seeking and finding their food, and protecting themselves from the dangers that encompassed them. Shrinking from the bramble's straggling braids, flying before the wolf, limping over the stones, was man the lord of creation? The eagle reigned among the birds, and the lion was monarch among the beasts, and in the order of strength man was perhaps the fiftieth, perhaps the hundredth.

But in him was the capability of progress, and this very inferiority which martyred him was the kingmaker that finally crowned him.

No sooner did he perceive the danger of his position than he sought means to remedy it; the well-being that resulted from his efforts opened a field to his aspirations and intelligence. But the creative power distinguishing his race from all others, and giving it its immense superiority, has only devolved on him upon a condition.

Take a man, place him outside of all society, leave him to his own inspirations; he will do a little more than will an animal born at the same time, but he will not advance far in the study of the world and the appropriation of material for his use. He will begin like the first man, by taking the first step in civilization. If men were to succeed one another in isolation, each would be learning the alphabet of experimental truths, and none would be able to put the letters together into practical rules. The thousandth generation would remain within the limits of the first, as the generations of animals always reproduce the features of the first. Our race, adorned with a precious faculty, would be condemned to the labour of Sisyphus, who rolled a stone to the summit of a mountain, only to have to recommence his interminable labour, for it rushed into the plain through

his hands, as he thought he had succeeded in poising it on the peak. Sisyphus underwent this sentence because he had led a dishonest life, man would have had to undergo a similar doom for not having led a social life.

Society is the theatre, obligatory for the emancipation and development of the creative power in man. To reject social life is to deprive ourselves of the power of profiting by the experience of the past and the present.

That we may be able to profit by the experience of others, we are endowed with an instinct adapted to the purpose of drawing us into the company of our fellows;—this is the social instinct.

This instinct is not peculiar to man, it is met with in the animals, the ant, the bee, and the beaver; but it is in the human race alone that it takes a character of organization. Among most animals, after the first year, the parents and their offspring separate. The members of the human family separate also, but only that they may mingle with other men and form new families, which may agglomerate, and constitute in final synthesis the state.

Social organizations are the product of two ideas, the idea of right and the idea of authority; the former, man may possess and exercise in isolation, the latter can only assume function in society. In democracies and republics the idea of right prevails; in theocracies and despotisms that of authority dominates.

In considering the right of man, we have had to treat him as an unit, but the state of separation is not that of the primitive existence of men. On the contrary, the first man alone could have risen into being outside of all social relations; every other man has been born in the bosom of a family, and therefore finds himself in the midst of a society already shaped; and, being unable to grow up with-

out assistance, the association has maintained itself, and the ideas of those educated in it have been moulded by the organization.

Rousseau and those following him, who placed the origin of human society in a convention, started from premisses not conformable to reality. A convention, whether general, like that which is understood under the denomination of a social contract, or particular, such as that resulting from individual necessities, is an act by which begins an union of individuals separated heretofore as to the object upon which they contract. It follows that every society which commences by a convention, presupposes the anterior separation of its members. But this supposition is inadmissible, as from the moment of birth, every man is attached by numerous links to his fellows.

The family being the first society possible for man, it is important for us to examine the relations existing in it, for therein will be discovered the original idea of authority unaltered, untricked out and gilded as it reigns on every throne.

A sentiment of a peculiar nature, and the need of mutual assistance unite man and woman. In soul, as in body, man differs from the woman; the mental constitution, the physical organs of the one, appeal to and suppose the other. "One of the laws which concur to form the first societies," elegantly says Montesquieu, "has its principle in the charm the sexes inspire by their differences, and in that mutual prayer which they are ever addressing to one another."[1]

The more intense this sentiment is, the more exclusive it becomes. This constitutes the distinctive character of the conjugal union, which is lost in polygamy. From this union issues a being deprived of all resources, of all

[1] Montesquieu: Esprit des Lois.

means of existence, and which would infallibly perish, if a natural instinct did not bid the authors of its days render to it the requisite assistance. Without the child, the domestic circle is destitute of a centre, it is widowed of its future. With the arrival of a child the love of the husband for her who has borne it augments, and transforming itself, becomes less passionate but more solid. The man feels himself in conscience bound to protect two frailties, and the obligation is his delight.

The cares lavished by the mother on her infant awaken its filial piety, the superior physical and intellectual power of the father impress on it reverence. It grows up feeling its dependence, and is attached to those on whom it depends by gratitude, respect, and love.

The need for reciprocal assistance makes the utility of the union more apparent as the child emerges from infancy, and it assists the father in the field, or the mother at the hearth.

All these motives woven together constitute that "family tie" which is so strong as to bind the family into a solid mass, which rejoices or suffers as one; and which has led to the mistake of confounding the child with the parent in the exaction of retribution, as, for instance, when a family is banished to Siberia because the father has committed a political crime.

In following the natural formation of the primitive family, we cannot escape the conviction that the relations which manifest themselves are not the product of man's free choice, but are a consequence of the nature of things.

In the family, from the first, the idea of authority has appeared. Protection and order are requisites of the family; and these cannot exist without recognition of an authority.

Of authority there are two sorts, the authority of right,

and the authority of force. The latter is tyranny, the other is defined by Suarez to be "the person, whether natural or moral, in whom reside all the faculties necessary for assuring to the community tranquillity and prosperity."[1] In the family this is the prerogative of the father. Consequently it is he who protects from assaults without, and maintains discipline within, and thus ensures order and peace.

On what title does this authority of the father repose? By what right is it exercised?

When the father of a family provides by the sweat of his brow objects necessary for existence, those objects are his own by right of appropriation. If he gives them to his children, either his right over those objects is broken, and they become the property of the children who assimilate them, or the right persists. For instance: I sold the copyright of a small book for £25. The MS. was my own, being the product of my toil. With that sum, which I take as the equivalent of my work, I clothe my baby and pay the doctor and the nurse for having brought her into the world. Has my right ceased, when the £25 was appropriated by the baby? Is it not transformed into authority equal in amount?

If the objects continue to belong to the father of the family, though transformed by the operations of nature into an integral part of the body of the child, he exercises authority over the child by virtue of his right over the substances of which the child is composed; and in this case there are no limits to its extension.

If at any time the idea of right were to take an unlimited development in the social relations, and were to exclude the idea of liberty, the right of the father over those dependent on him would arrive at the degree of power attained

[1] De Legibus.

by the Romans and almost every nation at a primitive epoch of their social existence; and he would be entitled to expose his child to death or to sell it into slavery.

The relation of husband to wife would also be different. For the female child would be valued at what it cost the father; and the suitor, by indemnifying the parent, would purchase of him his right; and in fact, the price paid for a wife among the Tartars and Indians has no other signification than this, of being the equivalent of the objects she has consumed; and the husband is supposed to purchase the rights those objects represented to the father, and to transfer them to himself.

It was precisely under the influence of these ideas that the first social relations were formed, and once established, they have been continued in the same conditions. The interest of men placed at the head of society, the necessity for order and stability, have concurred to perpetuate them, and authority is taken to be something very different from what it was at the outset.

Authority is indeed nothing other than a transformation of the idea of right of appropriation extended to persons, a prolongation over individuals of the idea of property.

If right be, as has been assumed, a dogmatic verity, authority is a verity also. We shall now inquire within what limits it is justifiable.

The father exercises his right by virtue of his being a completely-developed man; he exercises it over the child because it is as yet in an undeveloped state, and its rights, or, at least, some of them, are as yet in abeyance. The right to live exists in the child from the moment of conception; but it would be absurd to talk of violating the right of liberty of worship and of expressing its opinion, in a sucking child. It has no such rights as yet, for it has

no idea of God, nor has it as yet formed an opinion. These rights accrue to it with the emancipation of reason. As the powers of the child ripen, and its individuality intensifies, its full complement of rights appears, and then the authority of the father is at an end, for the right of one man is equal to that of another.

Some writers, in their attempt to justify royal authority, have supposed that the paternal authority is irrevocable, and that consequently there can be no emancipation. The power of the father is held to be the unique source of the civil power, and men to be perpetually minors, and incapable, in right, of choosing the form of government under which they will serve and the person who shall be their chief. According to this hypothesis, the father draws his power from God, conserves it intact, entire, unalterable, so that he becomes the head of the families that spring from his loins, and chief thereby of a political community. Succession and tradition do the rest, and the crown is merely the hereditary badge of paternity. To interrupt or to modify this providential order is therefore sacrilege, for this is government by Divine Right.

Such a theory goes to the ground at once, when the true origin of right is considered, and authority is seen to be but its temporary extension. If paternal authority can only bind the child till it has perfected into the man, with adolescence the rights of the child are level with those of his father, and the difference, to which has been given a real value, called authority, has disappeared. If all rights flow from God and are dogmatic verities, all rights are equal, and therefore for one man to exercise authority over another man without his consent is to commit an immorality.

A sign is sometimes demanded, by which the complete emancipation of the child from paternal authority may be

discovered. We are incapable of giving one; for, by the nature of the case, that emancipation is progressive, and a sign is as out of the question as is certainty in a calculation of probabilities.

The father must decide according to numerous indices, his experience of anterior emancipations, the remembrance of his own, the study of his son's character, the expansion of his reason; considerations so complex, that it is impossible to describe them. The emancipation announces itself by tentatives, and then accomplishes itself. Strong in the sense of his own rights, the son freely contracts an alliance, and this alliance is the seal of his independence. A new domestic society appears, a new government enthrones itself by the embers of the first hearth, and sheds over it that protection which old age exacts, in the sacred name of love and duty. The new family is, as S. Thomas says, a complete unity, and must therefore be equal to another unity of like nature.

Of authority there are two kinds, and only two: Moral and effective.

Effective authority has but one mode of operation, of self-manifestation, viz., Compulsion.

Moral authority has but one mode of operation, of self-manifestation, viz., Persuasion.

Moral authority can only devolve from God, the Absolute. Authority of all sorts being a prolongation of the idea of right, moral authority is the exercise of the right of God over man.

Destroy the idea of God, and you destroy the idea of moral authority.

Moral authority is an appeal to the conscience alone to recognize responsibility.

Responsibility must be due to man or to God. If to man,

it must be a recognition of his right, or it is not moral responsibility. But right, as has been shewn, is only authoritative when it is dogmatic; and by dogmatic is meant, that it is based on God. Thus responsibility resolves itself into the recognition of God as the basis of right, or it does not exist at all.

To make this clearer we will take two cases.

First. A has sown a field which he reclaimed from the waste, cleared of weeds, dug and dressed. When his wheat has sprung up, B turns his horses into the field to eat the young corn. He has a perfect right to do so, if right be based on superior strength and he be the strongest. If, however, right be dogmatic, he is wrong. A has a moral right to reap the produce of his toil, and B is morally bound not to interfere with this right. By what authority is he bound? By the authority of God, who has made right dogmatic. But A denies the authority of God; denies the existence of God; then he must not complain if B takes advantage of this negation of moral authority, to appropriate the produce of his toil, resting his right on superior force. Why does the crop belong to A? A says, Because I have laboured on it, and have made it mine by appropriation from the waste. Why does B make away with it? B says, Because I have made it mine by appropriation from A; A had no right to the field except the right of seizure, and I have the same right to it; therefore I will take it, for I am stronger than he.

Second. A has excellent natural abilities; he has also a fortune left him, sufficient to maintain him in competence. As there is no God, there is no moral obligation laid upon him to develop his abilities. It is completely at his option whether he will lead an intellectual life, or whether he will lead a life of debauchery. He is perfectly free to

make choice; he chooses the latter; he may have made a mistake in thinking that a life of sensuality will afford him greater happiness than a life of intellectuality; but he has not done wrong, he has violated no duty, for there is no authority to impose a duty on him. No appeal to conscience is of the slightest avail, for his own will is supreme. You may convince him that he is mistaken, but you cannot convince him that he is wrong.

Moral authority, therefore, derives from God alone.

If a government claim moral authority, it is solely in virtue of a Divine commission. If there be no God, government can have no moral authority. I do not say that a government has moral authority, but that its claim to be regarded as conscientiously binding on men wholly depends on its recognition of God.

Moral authority is exercised *in foro conscientiæ* alone.

It derives from God. It is the action of God upon the conscience of man. Man acknowledges his obligation to God to recognize the rights of others, and his duty to develop his own superior faculties. If God be an absolute ruler, fatally determining the actions of man, so that he cannot swerve from the course he is predestined to run, then there is no such a thing as moral authority. Moral authority presupposes a power in the person on whom it is imposed of refusing obedience if he will. If it is impossible for man to resist authority, that authority is no more moral, it is effective; its mode of operation is not persuasion, but compulsion.

The existence of moral authority therefore depends on the exercise by man of free will, and the existence of God as the absolute source of right.

If the link between man and the Absolute were not one of acceptance on the part of man, *i.e.*, that he might or

might not operate, the authority of God would be effective only, and the idea of moral authority would be inconceivable; for man can only conceive what really exists.

If moral authority have its source in God, it follows that any delegation of authority by God must also be moral, not effective.

When man proposes to attach his power to the Absolute, when there is a delegation, mediate or immediate, there will be a delegation of power corresponding with the character of the power which God exercises over free man—that is a moral power.

Just as God has refused to exercise over man an authority interfering with his liberty, and by virtue of this alone he is free; so, in like manner, He has refused to transmit a compulsory authority, since the transmission thereof would be the exercise of it.

Let us next consider effective authority. By effective authority is to be understood the authority exercised by man over man, maintained and expressed by force.

Effective authority can only be derived from man. As all men have not equal strength and power to maintain their rights, they delegate their force to a government or king, for the purpose of maintaining intact their inalienable rights.

A, B, C and D have precisely equal primitive rights, but A, B, C and D have not precisely equal power to support their rights in the face of aggression. A, B and C therefore, combine to confer on D their united force to enable him to protect the rights of A from being encroached on by B or C; the rights of B from invasion by A and C; the rights of C from being alienated by A and B.

Effective authority being solely delegated force, can only express itself by compulsion. It begins where moral au-

thority ends. If A, B, C and D were so impressed with their responsibilities that there was no risk of infringement of one another's liberties, there would be no need for effective authority.

Effective authority, or government, is therefore an evil, but it is a necessary evil, and it is productive of good.

Effective authority and Sovereignty must not be confused. Effective authority is a delegation of power for the sake of preserving order in society and protecting from encroachment the rights of every man.

But this is not what is meant by Sovereignty.

Sovereignty is superiority to law or the right to do wrong with impunity.

It must repose on a religious idea or on force; that is, it must be moral, or it must be effective. It cannot be moral, for if moral it must repose on divine authority, and God's action on man being moral, not compulsory, it cannot derive from God.

It cannot be effective in its proper sense, for effective authority is delegated only for the sake of preserving right; therefore Sovereignty, or the right to do wrong with impunity, can only be an usurpation.

An attempt has been made to fuse moral and effective authorities, but such an attempt is immoral, and the accomplishment of the fusion is impossible.

If force be employed by the representatives of moral authority, that authority resolves itself into effective authority, and its power over consciences disappears. Obedience is of constraint, not of duty.

Sovereignty cannot derive from a contract. For none can give what they have not got. No individual or collection of individuals has the sovereignty, *i.e.*, the right to do wrong with impunity, in itself, and therefore cannot com-

municate it. A political contract, real or obligatory, would only bind those who had subscribed to it; for the solidarity of generations cannot be a rational principle, though it may be a dogma.

Sovereignty must derive its prerogatives from God, and become thereby a power acting with divine authority which it personifies, or from which it depends, or it must abdicate every pretence to command on any other title than that of brute force. But it cannot derive from God, as has been shewn; therefore human sovereignty is nothing but pure despotism and usurpation.

The idea of sovereignty must not be confounded with the power of doing justice, *i.e.*, with effective authority. Sovereignty is a power, if it be defined to be the faculty of enforcing submission to laws. But then the faculty of enforcing submission to bad laws must be included. If the idea of right renders such a power morally impossible, sovereignty disappears. To know if a power be sovereign, one must know whether it is able to violate right with impunity. That is not sovereignty which can only act aright.

The principle of certainty to each man being his own judgment, as has been already pointed out, it belongs to each man to declare what is duty, as his own law, and what is right, as the law of society; precisely as each man has to declare for himself that the exterior world exists, and that the whole is greater than its part.

The consequence of this principle is of the highest importance. To declare right is to exercise legislative power; if then the verity of right be known by the individual judgment, it follows that, in society, the legislative power belongs to each man individually, and not to any one man privately.

The ideas of sovereignty and right exclude one another.

Sovereignty may make concessions, but it cannot acknowledge rights, or it ceases to be sovereignty. Right being a purely personal faculty, is nothing, if there be a power which can prevent its exercise.

But if by sovereignty be understood merely the faculty of declaring right, it means nothing but effective authority. Sovereignty subordinated to right is no more sovereignty.

The idea of right has for corollary the idea of individual independence. The criterium of duty being the conscience, that must also be the criterium of right, for the two ideas are aspects of the same truth.

If, then, there be any other sovereignty than that of right it can only be the authority of the individual over himself, for it is only over himself that man can exercise authority, and for that he is responsible to God.

From this it follows that the whole Mediæval governmental system was irrational.

When force is called in to assist moral authority, a theocracy is the result.

Plato laid down that sovereignty, to be rational and legitimate, must repose on the superiority of the sovereign to those ruled; and that this superiority must be due either to a communication of Divine power, or to a superior force a doctrine which Caligula pushed to an absurdity when he insisted on being a god. "Because," said he, "as a shepherd is different in kind from the sheep, so must a king differ from his subjects, or his government is inconsequent." According to the Mediæval system the state was a pure theocracy. The body of Canon law contains a complete constitution, resting on the principle of authority derived from God. Separating the priest from the magistrate, it subordinated the latter to the former. In order that the

Crown might derive its sovereignty logically from God, it received its power through the Church by consecration.

According to the Mediæval doctrine, the authority of the State to curtail the liberties of the people, and to interfere with their prescriptive rights, was drawn from a Divine commission conferred sacramentally through the Church, the incorporation of Divine power. The monarch was thus invested with a fictitious infallibility, or the privilege of irresponsibility to those governed.

This system is completely false, it rests on a confusion of moral with effective authority. God *cannot* communicate sovereignty without contradicting His moral government. If man is a moral being, he is responsible to God; if responsible to God, he must have liberty—that is the faculty of exercising his right. If God has conferred sovereignty, then He has commissioned some men to curtail the liberty of men in general, to impede them in the exercise of their duty;—He has impressed a duty on man and interfered with its accomplishment, which is impossible.

From this it follows that effective authority is legitimate and quasi-moral when it guarantees the rights of man, and that it is illegitimate and immoral when it becomes sovereign, that is when it assumes the power to violate those rights.

This is a conclusion at which modern political economists have, I believe, pretty generally arrived. But this conclusion entirely depends on the recognition of God as the basis of right, and of authority, which is its prolongation.

Deny God, and authority rests on force alone; we relapse into despotism. Effective authority disappears in violence, which is not the exercise, but the abuse, of effective authority. Right is without guarantee, for right is not acknowledged.

When the National Assembly drew up its famous Declaration of the Rights of Man, in 1789, "Write the name of God at the head of the declaration," said the Abbé Grégoire, "or you leave them without foundation, and you make right the equivalent of force, you declare not the rights of man, but the right of the strongest, you inaugurate the reign of violence." The Assembly refused. Grégoire was correct in his judgment, and the Reign of Terror proved that rights unbased in God produce an authority which is brute force.

Acknowledge God, and what is the result?

His action on man is purely moral; therefore a theocracy, or a despotism, carried on under His sanction, is impossible morally.

Effective authority is based on necessity for the protection of man's rights, which are themselves dogmatic.

Therefore effective authority is limited in its action to the declaration of the relations between man and man, and to their preservation.

In its own sphere effective authority is legitimate and justifiable. It must be recognized by the conscience as having Divine sanction, because social life has divine sanction; and that sanction extends to it in the same degree as force has been delegated to it, *i.e.* to the same degree as it is useful.

"The liberty in which we have been created," says Cardinal Bellarmine, "is not in opposition with political submission, but it is in opposition with despotic subjugation, that is, with true and proper servitude. The citizen therefore is governed for his own advantage, not for the advantage of him who governs him."[1]

[1] Bellarmine: De Laicis, lib. ii. c. 7.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESES OF CHRISTIANITY

> "*Ever fresh, the broad creation,*
> *A Divine improvisation,*
> *From the heart of God proceeds,*
> *A single will, a million deeds.*"—EMERSON.

The subject of the preceding chapters—The First Hypothesis: There is a First Cause self-existent, absolutely free, the Creator of the world—The motive of creation not necessity nor duty—To be sought in the creation, not in the Creator—The creature is the object of creation—The motive of creation is Love—pure love unmixed with selfishness—Second hypothesis: God has made man in His image, *i.e.* with a free will—Man's duty is to distinguish himself, and thus constitute his personality—He cannot do so by denying God—He can only do so by simultaneously distinguishing God and preserving the link between himself and God—This link is love—Recapitulation of the argument.

I HAVE shewn in the first five chapters that there is an universal antinomy in the world; that man himself, a microcosm, contains all the elements of this antagonism; that conciliation is impossible without the idea of God to harmonize these conflicting elements. I have shewn that without the idea of God as a guarantee for the fidelity of our impressions and the truth of our ideas, there is no certainty on any point, and from beginning to end, all men's reasonings, all men's actions, are irrational. I have shewn that without the idea of God to establish the rights of men dogmatically, those rights have no *raison d'être;* and I have

shewn that the only authority conceivable by man, if the idea of God be banished, is the authority of force, and that the idea of moral authority is without basis unless God be assumed to found it.

I pass now to the first Christian axiom:—There is a First Cause, self-existent, absolutely free, the Creator of the world. The world exists and we exist. Why? Because God has willed it. Why has God willed it? On the answer to this question everything depends. It must therefore be considered with care and caution.

Creation is an act of free will, in no way changing the nature of the Absolute Being; for the word creation is used to imply that the idea of production which it involves makes no change in the condition of the Author. Creation being an act of free will, must be the act of a will full of intelligence. Every intelligent and free will supposes a purpose; a purposeless will is blind and fatal.

Liberty acting without motive is no more liberty, it is chance, and chance is another name for ignorance.

If, then, we reject the notion of an ignorant God, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis that He is absolutely free, we are obliged to ask what is the motive of creation. It is evident that the motive of creation must be such as will suit our definition of God.

A preliminary examination of the problem will shew us that the purpose must be sought, not in the idea of the Absolute, but in creation itself.

If we conceive the idea of human motives, it is because we are not absolutely free like the First Principle. We have needs, and the satisfaction of these needs is the motive of our action. But the existence of these needs is a proof of our imperfection. We want something that we have not got, the obtaining of which is necessary to us. But to

the Absolute nothing can be necessary to complete Him; therefore He did not create because the universe was requisite to satisfy any want He felt.

We are subject to moral laws, and are influenced by moral motives. We can obey or disobey the moral rule, but we are obliged to recognize it, and we are unable to change its character. To obey is a duty, and we realize our nature by obedience to the law of right. This law limits us; it is above us. But the Absolute is above law. He is bound by no duty. If the free will of the Absolute assumes the character of goodness, it is by His free act. The distinction between good and evil could not pre-exist before Absolute liberty. As intelligence is before ideas, so is will superior to laws. If the moral order constrained God, the moral order would be God; but then God would be no more free, which is against our hypothesis.

To make this statement clearer, let us suppose God to be the moral law, and see to what consequences we are reduced. Moral order being an intimate necessity, it loses all signification for head and heart. Without a will to institute it, it is an unrealizable abstraction. It is no more moral, for the idea of morality implies the freedom of choice between good and evil, and fatalism reigns over God and men.

Therefore, God did not create the universe from necessity or from duty; and these are the only motives of action inherent in the agent which we can conceive. Either of these suppositions is inconsistent with the idea of an absolutely free God, for a cause acting upon a motive inherent in its nature is not free.

God, then, did not find in Himself any reason for creating. If the reason for creation were to be found in the nature of the Absolute, there would be no creation.

The existence of the world is therefore irrational, for

what can be more irrational than the idea of something added to perfection? Nevertheless the world exists. Reality is not rational, it is superior to reason.

Is it, then, impossible for us to assign a cause for the production of the world? Certainly not. All we have proved is, that the motive of creation must be sought not in the Creator, but in creation, if we are to understand it.

The Absolute not finding in Himself any reason for acting, that is, being neither constrained by duty, nor necessitated by His nature, He creates the world by an act of supreme will, for a rational purpose, but that purpose must be sought outside of Him.

But, before any action on the part of the Absolute, nothing could exist except Himself. We must find His motive of action in that which is not as yet. This is what the idea of creation involves. A relative will towards that which is not could only be a creative will; for what could be willed with regard to that which is not, but that it should be? To leave nothing in its nonentity, no will is necessary. To say that the will by which Absolute Liberty manifests itself as such has its purpose outside of the Absolute Being, is to designate it as a creative will; it wills another being, and by that will causes it to be.

This is not all. Not only does God will the creature He makes, but He wills it for its own sake. The creature is willed for itself; such is the essential idea of creation.

This results inevitably from what has gone before. If God created for Himself, He would feel a need; therefore He would not be absolutely free.

Consequently, He creates without regard to Himself, and with regard to the creature alone.

Now this exercise of will is the supreme manifestation of LOVE. This solves the enigma of creation.

Of love there are two sorts. The first is that whose highest manifestation is seen in the affection of the sexes. This is always egoistic. It arises from either sex being imperfect without the other; and it is the straining of one sex towards that other which will complete it, because alone it is unable to realize perfectly its nature.

Such love as this is not to be spoken of with respect to the motive of creation, for it has its foundation in an imperfection of nature. But there is another sort of love of which we have a sketch in paternal affection. A love rising out of a nature complete in itself, and pouring its benefits on the head of the child, not for any advantage the child can afford, but out of pure unselfish beneficence. This is the love which, in its highest perfection, exhibits itself in the act of creation. Such a disposition is only conceivable in a being serene and satisfied, because its own aim attained, its own nature is accomplished, and its freedom is therefore absolute. This creative love is therefore the plenitude of liberty making an act of liberty. It is the determined act of will by which liberty manifests itself as liberty; it, and it alone, resolves the difficulty of knowing how that infinite power can realize itself without altering its character; for the power of liberty subsists entire in love.

Love, then, is the principle of creation, or, in other words, its motive; which is equivalent to the statement that creation has no *à priori* motive, but that it is purely gratuitous.

To create is to love, to will the creature for itself. The creature is therefore willed as its own end. God wills that the creature should be. He wills it in the interest of the creature. He wills its good, and its good consists in the realization of its being.

In the sphere of relations and of finite existences, to do

good to any one is to facilitate the free development of his being; in the absolute sense, it is to give being. Creative love therefore implies the realization of the creature.

But realization is impossible without liberty. The free creature can alone say of itself "I am." In a word, the free creature is the only one with veritable being.

Love, in itself, is liberty making an act of liberty; considered in its effect, it is liberty making free creatures.

To render this clearer, let us restate it, somewhat modifying the expression.

The motive of creation is the love of God for His creature. God wills, then, the good of His creature; but the love of God is a perfect love.

To will the good of the creature is to will it to resemble God. But God is absolutely free. If God wills His creature to be like Him, He wills it to be free. Its good consists in the reality of being, and the reality of being is only consistent with liberty.

The creature is therefore made free. But liberty is potential. To create a free being is to place before it the problem of its destiny.

The free being is only that which makes itself free. This is true of the finite being as it is of the Absolute. Freedom consists in the exercise of the will in overthrowing every opposition which restrains the development of the nature of the creature. The freedom of the Absolute consists in the exercise of will in manifesting or not manifesting itself.

God wills man to be free, but the emancipation of himself is in man's own hands.

We arrive now at the second Christian hypothesis, which indeed is not a hypothesis, but a rigorous deduction from its first axiom:—

God has made man in His own image, *i.e.* He has given him a free will.

Man and God being placed face to face, one as contingent, the other as absolute, the contingent lives as contingent and the absolute as absolute. To live as absolute, is to be at once the power and principle of life; to live as contingent is to live as effect, without ever being able to live as principle.

Man's freedom is willed and given potentially, and on purpose that he may exercise it, so as to reach that perfection of development to which he, as contingent, can attain. He can exercise that liberty, and so progress to that term, or he can refuse it and remain stationary, or even retrogress, by enslaving himself.

He can do either because he is free to will.

He is called to realize his liberty by becoming the principle of his own actions, his own centre, his own end, and thus to distinguish himself from his Creator.

But in constituting himself free in this manner, in proclaiming his independence, does he not put his own existence in contradiction with the divine will, and thus deny God? That is quite possible.

Man must emphasize himself, and consequently must distinguish himself from God. He must recognize these two terms, himself and God, as terms distinct, not only in thought, but by an act of will, for man must will himself, and by willing himself constitute his personality.

However, he must do this without separating himself from God, without excluding God. He must will himself, but he must at the same time will God.

For man to will God, to personify God, and not to distinguish himself, is to lose himself in mysticism.

For man to will himself, to make himself the centre, and

not to distinguish God, is to become, what I have called elsewhere, a personal autocrat; in other words, a practical atheist. To distinguish one's self sharply from God, without breaking the link which unites us; to constitute one's self one's own centre, without forgetting that God is the centre of all personalities, such is the problem. God is the sun around Whom all creatures revolve, but each revolves around his own axis. Break the solar attraction, and he shoots into infinite and outer darkness.

To distinguish one's self from God, and to separate one's self from Him, are two very different things.

The only manner of distinguishing without separating is to will that God should be, and to will one's self to be,—but not apart from God, but for Him—that is, to love God.

Thus, the law we seek, the manner in which the creature can preserve its liberty whilst manifesting it, is the love of God. God loves us, and He is our model. The supreme law is a reflexion of the supreme fact. Love is the rule of rules, the key to all mysteries. To obey God is to realize our liberty, and to obey God is to love Him.

In love, the two terms, the subject and the object of love, are perfectly distinct, though they mutually interpenetrate. By loving God, the creature constitutes itself in its complete personality, as the idea of liberty requires, without for a moment forgetting the existence of God on one side, and the existence of itself on the other.

Before advancing to the third hypothesis of Christianity, let us briefly recapitulate our argument.

The motive of creation cannot be found in the nature of the Absolute, for an inherent motive would destroy the idea of the liberty of the Absolute.

The motive must therefore be sought in the possible creature. We find in this idea, which is the idea of love,

the only reason which could induce a perfect being to create.

The power, wisdom, and goodness of God exhibit themselves in Creation, but He does not create with the intention of manifesting His power, wisdom, and goodness; His motive is not to acquire a superfluous glory, but to make another being happy. But happiness is the manifestation of well-being, and God wills the well-being of His creature, and that creature knows when it is accomplishing the will of God when it feels happy.

The perfection of well-being is to love God; the condition of well-being is liberty.

Consequently the creature is primitively free. It is therefore primitively indetermined; it is called to compose its own destiny, to produce its own nature or to fix its relation to God, which is the same thing; for its nature and its destiny depend wholly on the relation in which it stands towards God.

It is indetermined, but the indetermination is not absolute, since its creation is not purposeless.

Being free, it may become what it will, but it ought to become what God wills it; that is, the liberty which it has potentially it should make effective. It can only make this effective by willing itself, that is its liberty, and it can only fulfil its liberty and establish its personality by maintaining its relation to God.

The act of will constitutes the personality of the creature. Personality is, in fact, only a free being emphasizing and recognizing itself as such. Every man makes his own personality, he is to that extent his own creator. Personality is not an attribute, but an act of force.

When the creature takes full possession of the liberty it has received it becomes a person. This decisive act may

be accomplished in many ways. But this act is what God wills, for it is what constitutes the well-being of the creature.

But this cannot take place apart from God. The well-being of the creature can only be effected by recognition of God and by maintaining union with Him by love. To be, and to be for itself, the creature must distinguish itself from God by an act which unites it to Him. This act is love.

By the love of the creature for its Creator, all the problems of reason are resolved. The work of creation is completed. God, the Absolute, Who, by His essence, is All, abases Himself, by creation, to the sphere of relations; He consents to be not-All, that He may re-become All by the act of His creature.

CHAPTER VII

THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE INCARNATION

ἵνα τοὺς δυο κτίσῃ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς ἕνα καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, ποιῶν εἰρήνην.
—EPH. ii. 15.

The difficulty of obtaining a rational idea of God—The idea traverses two stages, one constructive, the other destructive—The first process, the idealizing of God—The second process, the emancipation of the idea from all relations—The true rational idea of God one of negation—The rational idea opposed to the Ideal—Are philosophy and religion necessarily antagonistic?—The hypothesis of the Incarnation conciliates both—Christ is the Absolute and the Ideal—conciliates reason and sentiment—Belief and Reason necessary to one another—No system of thought without a postulate—The postulate of the Incarnation may be turned into a demonstration—Elucidation of the difficulty of identifying the Absolute with the Ideal—and of considering God as a Person.

WE have seen that man cannot realize his personality, and obtain his liberty in its entirety, except on the condition of acknowledging and loving God.

To acknowledge God he must make an act of will; to love God he must make an act of sentiment or of faith.

Here we encounter a difficulty which has been already indicated. There is a contradiction between the idea of God formed by the reason, and the idea of God desired by the heart. When Simonides was asked by King Hiero to define God, he asked a day to consider; at the end of that day, instead of giving his answer, he demanded two more, and when these were expired, he requested four; "for,"

said he, "the more I consider the subject, the more I find the difficulties double upon me."

These difficulties arise from the rational idea of God having to traverse two stages, very different, the first constructive, the latter destructive.

Let us consider the first process.

Our conception of God being derived from ourselves and the objects affecting us, we can form no idea except one made up of materials furnished by our experience and reflection. Therefore we select whatever powers and qualities we find amongst ourselves, and consider to be most commendable; we separate them from everything gross, material and imperfect, and heighten them to the utmost imaginable pitch;—the aggregate of all these makes up our first rational conception of God.

Consequently our idea of the Deity is that of the archetype of our own minds.

And as we perceive that virtue assumes a multitude of diverse forms, this variety discovered in intelligent beings convinces us that the most perfect Being is He who unites in Himself the greatest number, or the sum total, of all these perfections. By generalization of this sort, Plato, Descartes and Fenelon were led to the most comprehensive idea of God as the focus of all perfections of which His creatures are radiations.

But this conception of God is entirely humanistic. To say that He is infinitely powerful, infinitely wise, infinitely just, infinitely holy, is but the raising of human qualities to the n^{th} power.

These qualities are simply inconceivable apart from the existence of the world and man. If we give Him these qualities, save for the sake of bringing His existence within the scope of our faculties, we must allow that before the world

was they were not; because, apart from the existence of the world and man, these qualities are simply inconceivable.

Power is the exercise of superior force against a body that resists. Suppress the idea of resistance, and the idea of power disappears. Wisdom is inconceivable apart from something about which it can be called into operation. Goodness implies something towards which it can be shewn. Justice cannot be exerted in a vacuum where there is neither good nor evil, right nor wrong. Can God do wrong? Impossible. Then it is as unsuitable to apply to Him the term holy as it is to employ it of stick or stone which also cannot do what is wrong.

We pass, then, to the second stage of rationalizing on God.

The God that we have been considering is personal, and an ideal of perfection, with infinite attributes.

But this conception is defective, if not wrong; for it has been formed out of our empirical faculties, the imagination and the sentiment, and is simply an hypothesis dressed up in borrowed human attributes.

The idea of infinity which rejects every limitation, leads to the denial of attributes to God. For, if His intelligence be infinite, He does not pass from one idea to another, but knows all perfectly and instantaneously; to Him the past, the present and the future are not; therefore He can neither remember nor foresee. He can neither generalize nor analyze; for, if He were to do so, there would be some detail in things, the conception of which would be wanting to Him; He cannot reason, for reasoning is the passage from two terms to a third; and He has no need of a middle term to perceive the relation of a principle to its consequence. He cannot think, for to think is to allow of succession in ideas.

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He is therefore immutable in His essence; in Him are neither thoughts, feelings, nor will. Indeed, it is an abuse of words to speak of being, feeling, willing, in connexion with God, for these words have a sense limited to finite ideas, and are therefore inadmissible when treating of the Absolute.

The vulgar idea of God is not one that the reason can admit. He is neither infinite, nor absolute, necessary, universal, nor perfect.

He is not infinite; for God is infinite only on condition of being All. But a God meeting His limitation in nature, the world and humanity, is not All. Also, if He be a person, He will be *a* being, and not merely being.

He is not absolute; for how can He be conceived apart from all relations; if He be a person, He feels, thinks, wishes, and here we have relations, conditions imposed on the Absolute, and He ceases to be absolute.

He is not necessary; the idea representing Him as necessary is the result of a psychological induction: but induction cannot confer on the ideas it discovers the character of necessity.

He is not universal; for, an individual, however great, extended, powerful, and perfect, cannot be universal. What is individual is particular, and the particular cannot be the All.

He is not perfect; for how can He be perfect to whom the universe is added. It was necessary, or it was not necessary; if necessary, He was imperfect without it; if not necessary, He is imperfect with it.

Thus we begin rationalizing on God by making Him our Ideal of all human perfections, and then we endeavour to form an idea of Him apart from these relations. We suppress them one after another, as being accidents and contradictions, and hope thus to conclude the essence of God, and we attain only a blank.

Voltaire said, "We have no adequate notion of the Divinity; we creep along from guess to guess, from possibilities to probabilities; and we reach very few certainties. Is this supreme artizan infinite? is He everywhere? is He in one spot? We have no scale, no standpoint for judging. We feel that we are under the hand of an invisible Being; that is all, and we cannot take a step beyond. There is an insensate temerity in man endeavouring to divine what this Being is, if He be extended or not, if He exists in one place or not, how He exists, and how he operates."[1]

Plato would not say, "God is being," but merely, "God is above being."

Thus the science of God is reduced to a simple enunciation of His existence; which is a result as indifferent to man, as an affectional attraction or a moral influence, as if He were denied altogether.

For the suppression of qualities is the suppression of the idea of being. The sky is extended and blue: take from it the accidents of extension and colour, and it is not, at least, to us. So, when we put aside all determinations of God, God is to us a frost-bitten reality at best, practically nothing, and we are left indifferent whether He is or is not.

To be rigidly logical the Deist should say nothing of God; he cannot even predicate His existence without to some extent anthropomorphizing Him. "If there be a God," said Pascal, "He is infinitely incomprehensible; since having neither parts, nor limbs, He has no relation to us."

Force, in like manner, can only be conceived in its relation to matter. Let matter drop out of consideration, and the idea of force has instantaneously disappeared. I can form no notion whatever of force in vacuum. Introduce a particle of matter, and it both realizes itself

[1] Dictionnaire philosophique: art. Dieu.

and is conceivable by me. Once it was supposed that the space between the atmospheric envelope of the earth and the sun was void. That idea has been abandoned as untenable, for it was perceived that the transmission of force, whether as light, heat or electricity, without a medium, was impossible.

If we attempt to give a rational description of God, we find it only possible to do so by negatives. We labour to emancipate the idea of the Deity from all relations, and the result is that we reduce Him to an axiomatic point, without parts and magnitude, and in Himself nothing. The defect in every theosophic system has been the admission of a relative conception into the scheme. The most gigantic efforts have been made to abstract the notion of God from all contingencies and yet preserve its reality; but the heel of the argument by which it was held has always been outside of abstraction, and in that it has been vulnerable by the shaft of criticism.

S. Augustine, the story goes, was pacing the shore, meditating on the nature of God, and endeavouring to form a crisp definition thereof. He passed and repassed a little child engaged in pouring sea-water out of a cockle-shell into a hole in the sand.

"My son," asked the bishop, "what are you attempting?" "I am about to empty the ocean into this hole." "That is impossible." "Not more impossible," replied the child, "than for you to compress the Infinite within the circle of your skull." And he vanished.

The intellectual conception of God becomes entirely distinct from the Ideal of perfection, for perfections are only human attributes raised to the highest pitch; and as the idea of God ceases to be the Ideal, it ceases to exercise any influence on man's heart. In face of a God known only as

a series of negations he is like the earth under an unveiled sky, radiating off all his warmth into vacuum and freezing into stone.

Here there is a problem of the highest difficulty.

In order to realize his nature man must love God, but he cannot love Him, because he can know nothing of Him. Yet a voice within him bids him love and worship God. Aristotle said that man was a political animal, he might have added, he was a religious animal also. He must form an ideal, and reason forbids that ideal to be God; for that ideal is essentially relative and human.

It is impossible for him to find in God consolation and peace, if God be of a nature wholly different from his own. He cannot partake of the satisfaction of a Being who is not identical in kind with himself. Everything that lives finds rest and contentment only in its own nature, in its own element. Consequently, if God is to complete and express man's nature, He must be the ideal of man in his entirety, not of his hard reason alone, but of his warm affections also.

Reason is rigid and bloodless, neutral, impartial and composed. It formulates law, and applies it without compunction, iron-hard and ice-cold, to the quivering flesh. It traces the nerves of man's necessities, not for the purpose of satisfying them, but that it may know them, look on them, and pass by on the other side.

The God of reason cannot be the object of religion.

Here then is an opposition. The object of reason on one side, the object of sentiment on the other; the rational ideal and the religious ideal at opposite poles.

We have seen in the first volume what have been the alternatives to men seeking their Ideal, now in religion and then in philosophy.

We have seen the religious ideal, uncorrected and unbalanced by the reason, rush into abysses of passion; and men in following it lose themselves in mysticism or in sensuality. The raptures of ecstatics, their visions and trances, are a phenomenon resulting from the prosecution of an unregulated religious passion; the orgies of Mylitta, Atergatis, and Atys arise from the same source. On the other hand, philosophy withdrew the idea of God from the range of the emotions, and left man pulseless and despairing.

The antinomy was inevitable; religion was sensuous, and philosophy was impracticable.

But is conciliation impossible? We have already seen that apparent antagonisms are not necessarily contradictory.

"To declare war against religion, in the name of philosophy," says Victor Cousin, "is a great mistake; for philosophy cannot replace religion, and in attempting to do so it manifests its ambition and its incapacity. On the other hand, it is no less folly for men to wage war against philosophy in the name of religion, and to attract to Christianity by calumniating reason, degrading intellect, and brutalizing man. Religion and philosophy are two powers equally necessary, which, thank God, cannot destroy each other, and which might easily be united for the pacification of the world and the benefit of the human race."[1]

It is at this point that Christianity steps forward and presents its great hypothesis of the Incarnation, as the only possible mode of escape from the dilemma, and of solving the problem.

Christianity asserts that God who, as we have seen, condescends to create, has condescended further, to meet the exigencies of the nature He had made, by conjoining the

1. Preface to Pascal: by V. Cousin. Paris, 1847.

infinite to the finite, "by taking of the manhood into God."

That this hypothesis is paradoxical cannot be denied. It is a contradiction of terms; for it asserts that the abstract, infinite and eternal God has become contingent, finite, and mortal. As Alexander Natalis elegantly puts it, "Deus, factus est homo; Filius æterni Patris, filius hominis; Verbum, infans; Vita, mortalis; Lux, in tenebris."

I said that the existence of the world is irrational, so is the dogma of the Incarnation.

I do not say that either is impossible. The existence of the world is a fact, a super-rational fact; so also, may be, the Incarnation is a fact above reason.

Take an illustration which may suggest its possibility.

Matter is necessary for the manifestation of Force. It has been supposed, not without show of reason, that matter is itself not distinct from force, but is a mode of force. That is, force alone exists, it materializes itself, not by entering into a foreign substance, but, by entering into a modification of itself, it exteriorizes and manifests itself. Thus the Incarnation is the manifestation of the Love of God, which is itself a mode, or a Personality, according to Catholic language, of the Absolute.

If the hypothesis of the Incarnation be true, God is still all that the reason can conceive of Him. He is also all that the heart can desire in Him.

If he were God alone, He would not be the ideal of man's heart, and therefore not an object of religious devotion.

If He were Man alone, He would not be the end of man's reason, and therefore not an object of philosophic thought.

But as the complete Ideal, He is God in man, and man in God, axis, centre, and circumference of all that is and all

that can be. To the world of ideas and feelings He is what the centre of gravity is to the world of matter.

As Newton was led by the observation of the fall of bodies to the earth, whether at England or at the Antipodes, to conjecture the existence of a centre of gravity, so we, observing the fall from opposite directions of sentimental and rational conclusions, may produce their lines till they meet, and call that point of junction Christ.

Indivisibly Man-God, He is, as Man, the new Adam, the universal Man, who contains, without confounding, says S. John Chrysostom, all men, all humanity; of whose nature He is the archetype and perfection; so that all the manifestations of human sentiment, thought, desire, and action, must be unified and synthesized in Him.

But this universal conciliation can only be supposed to operate in virtue of His being God as well as man, so that He may efface, in the unity of love and of reason, all those diversities which are produced by the apparent contradictions and finite manifestations of man.

Christ, comprehending in one the two natures, human and divine, being the union of the relative and the absolute, is therefore the living realization of that Ideal, infinite in itself, and infinite in each of its terms, which marks the phases of His eternal work.

Mediator between the create and the uncreate, which are united in Himself, He is, in His Church, which is His body, the eternal harmonizer of all individual reasons in the unity of the Divine reason, or the Word made flesh, conceived and realized by the Spirit of infinite love, in whom all love is also universalized.

To him who accepts the dogma of the Incarnation there can be no real antagonism between reason and sentiment, philosophy and religion. The supposition forbids the

possibility of their being mutually destructive. To consider reason to be hostile to revelation is to regard God as divided against Himself, labouring to destroy His own work. Reason is a gift of God and faith is a gift of God. Each has its own sphere. Combat between them, as Leibnitz says, is God fighting against God.[1]

Each is necessary to man; each in its own sphere. Faith is the conviction of the heart, and it is absolutely impossible that a thesis which is opposed to it can be veritably demonstrated. Truth is That which is. I arrive at Truth through my sentiment. I put together two sentimental truths and conclude a third, the third is a rational truth. A rational truth cannot contradict a sentimental truth. That which is cannot overthrow that which is.

The last Council of the Lateran, held under Leo X., established dogmatically that philosophic verity and theological verity are always in accord: "Cum verum vero minime concordicat, omnem assertionem veritati illuminatæ fidei contrariam omnino falsam esse definimus."[2] S. Thomas Aquinas, in like manner, always full of respect for the rights of reason, concludes that the light of faith cannot eclipse the light of intelligence; and that philosophy and religion cannot be ranged in hostile ranks.[3]

How comes it about that they do clash? For practically we find philosophy attacking Christianity, and the Church arming herself against philosophy.

This is the result of reason and faith attempting to invade each other's territory.

If reason attempt to operate without belief of some sort as material, it is making bricks without straw. If faith attempt to build without reason as its architect, its structure is without cement and will fall to ruins at a touch.

[1] Essais de Théodicée, No. 39. [2] Concil. Lat., sess. 8.
[3] Boet: de Trin., qu. 2, art. 3.

Reason is dependent on faith, and faith is helpless without reason. A belief of some sort underlies every system of thought. If we bore as deep as we can through systems, the deepest thing we reach is an undemonstrable thesis, which is accepted and believed in as a verity. It is the primary substance which is unaffected by the most corrosive acid so long as it remains uncombined.

Reason has to deal with facts, but it cannot deal with things as facts till they have been asserted. Until they have been cognized, they are non-existent; they begin to exist relatively to our reason only when they have been cognized, that is, when they have become beliefs.

Every logical act of the intellect is an assertion that something is. Each major premiss is a belief, each minor premiss is a belief; each conclusion is a belief, but this alone is a rational belief; and an argument is an enchainment of related beliefs.

Belief is the distinguishing of the existent from the non-existent, it is the predication of reality, and on this reality depends the possibility of reasoning. We may deny all other things, and yet leave our logical forms intact, but if we deny belief, with the denial, not only does the thing abolished disappear, but argument disappears as well.[1]

Some truths are irrational, some are rational. An hypothesis is always irrational. The primary beliefs we start from, the identity of the exterior world with the ideas we form of it, our own personality, and the like, are irrational, but they are the basis of scientific and metaphysical argument, and the conclusions derived from the assumption of these hypotheses are rational verities. But, if we assume a God, that assumption will be an irrational truth, and we can

[1] See a very able article on "The Universal Postulate," in the *Westminster Review*, N. S., vol. iv. 1853.

deduce from it the verity of our primary beliefs, and then they become rational truths. Or, starting from these primary beliefs I may argue the existence of God, and thus His existence becomes a rational truth.

In the first volume I have shewn that philosophical systems are divided into three groups; the school which starts from the exterior world, as really existing, that which argues from the reality of personal consciousness, and that of the sceptics who refused to argue from assumptions.

Thus, the Ionic school and that of Pythagoras laid down the existence of the Universe as an indisputable fact. The Eleatics distinguished the essence of being from phenomena. Protagoras made man the measure of all things, and Socrates and Plato followed his lead. The same antagonism re-emerged in the Epicurean and Stoic schools, and the new sceptics trod them both under foot with a denial of the first axiom of both, declaring that it was sheer impossibility to arrive at truth from internal consciousness or from sensible observation. Descartes re-affirmed the conscient self as the only true foundation on which philosophy could be reared; Hobbes and Hume place all knowledge in the evidence of the senses; Kant returned to the Cartesian thesis, and rooted his system in rational intuition. Fichte and Hegel continued his work. The Positivists, at once inconsistent and Catholic, despairing of attaining Truth by metaphysical argument, reject all evidence that is not sensibly knowable, and then accept both reason and sensation as the criteria of truth, and base their philosophy, not on one, but on two undemonstrable hypotheses.

Christianity is, in like manner, based on hypotheses which are beyond the possibility of demonstration, without assuming other hypotheses. If I take the Incarnation as an irrational verity, I can argue from it to other truths which

are rational. Or starting from the existence of the world and the facts of human nature, I can argue up to it.

My course, in the first five chapters, has been to shew from the constitution of man and his nature that such a dogma is essential to him. In the sequel I shall argue from the Incarnation to its logical consequences.

But before proceeding with my argument, I wish to say a few words which may remove some of the difficulties besetting the conciliation of the rational idea of God, and the sentimental Ideal.

According to the hypothesis Christ harmonizes both; that is, in Him both are true.

The rational conception of God is that He is; nothing more. To give Him an attribute is to make Him a relative God.

The sentimental conception of God is that He is the perfection of relations; the tendency of sentimentalism is to deny that He is absolute.

Both are true and both are false; both are true in their positive assertions, both are false in their negations.

Before the world was, God was the Absolute, inconceivable save as being. We cannot attribute to Him any quality, for qualities are inconceivable apart from matter.

Properly speaking, the name of God is not to be given to the Absolute before creation; the Absolute is the only philosophical name admissible, and that is unsatisfactory, for it is negative; but the idea of God before matter was must be incomprehensible by material beings.

This transcendent principle, superior to the world and to all thought, is the fixed, immanent, immutable Being, force in vacuum, unrealized, unrevealed.

By love, the Absolute calls the world into being, and becomes God, that is—let me be clearly understood—He is

at once absolute and relative, and as relative He is God, and clothes Himself in attributes. Towards creation He is good, wise, just; nay, the perfection of goodness, wisdom and justice, the Ideal of the heart.

The creation is the first step, the Incarnation is the second. The first leads necessarily to the second; it is the passage from relations simple to relations perfect; it is the bringing within the range of man's vision the Divine Personality. I know that the question has been ventilated, whether personality implies limitation, and therefore makes it impossible for the Deity to be a person. It has been asserted that to precise the idea of I-myself is to distinguish one's self from others; and that, as nothing can exist outside of God, God cannot distinguish Himself from other things, and therefore He cannot be personal.

But to this I answer, that our ideas of personality are purely relative. Human thought can only attain God in His relations to the world, and the limits of our knowledge are not the boundaries of reality.

If one wishes to make the personality of God an express philosophical proposition, without abandoning the idea of personality being necessarily relative, one may say that God constituted Himself a person by the act of creation. Those who deny the divine personality probably deny creation.

God is not a person in the human sense, which is exclusive of other personalities. He is immutable, all-inclusive, absolutely free, intelligent and loving, that is, He is personal, because the world exists, and by its existence He becomes relative.

Thus, the proposition that every personality is limited and relative does not exclude the Divine personality. But this thesis, taken in itself, is very contestable; it reposes

on a confusion of the idea of universality, infinity and absolutism, and on an abuse of the facts of conscience.

Man, it is quite true, only recognizes himself as a person by excluding other persons; but it does not follow that this relation is essential to personality. One might say with the same right that personality implies conscience of a body, which is true in the same sense.

There is therefore no rational motive for contesting the Divine personality.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DOGMA OF MEDIATION

" Versteh ! Unendliches und Endliches, das dir scheint
So unvereinbar, ist durch Eines doch vereint."[1]—RUCKERT.

The advantage of the Hegelian trichotomy—dread of Hegelianism—unreasonable—Hegel's method destined to reconcile philosophy to religion—The finite and the infinite supposed to be irreconcileable—The Incarnation consequently rejected as absurd—The true idea of the infinite—of space and time—The ideas of space and time inapplicable to God—relative only—The Word the equation between the Infinite and the finite—He is the Mediator as well.

THE Hegelian method has this paramount advantage, that it complements all other philosophical systems. If we establish the reality of the phenomenal, material and finite world, we establish at the same time its opposite, the super-phenomenal, immaterial and infinite, and also the link, man, touching simultaneously the material and the immaterial. If we start from man, his vague consciousness of the supernatural and his vivid apprehension of the natural point him out to be the axis of two moments, leaning unduly to the latter, may be, but nevertheless conscious of the former, and thus establishing the reality of the Boundless and the Bounded.

[1] " Understand ; infinite and finite, what appears to thee
So irreconcileable, are yet reconciled through One."

If we start from the Absolute, we have at once the opposite, the phenomenal world, and its conciliating, double-faced moment, man.

Hegelianism has created unnecessary alarm in some religious minds. M. Saisset misunderstands Hegel, and holds him up to scorn.[1] The Père Gratry, one of the most eminent theologians of the Gallican Church, thinks that the mention of his trichotomy is sufficient to entitle him to be called an atheist.[2] M. Lewes has fallen into the same mistake.[3] Yet Hegel was himself a Christian, and, in his obscure and uncouth way, he laboured to reconcile his philosophy with Christian dogma. That he did not make himself intelligible is not astonishing to any one familiar with his style; that he failed to perfect the union, was due to his Lutheran prejudices.

Aristotelianism was, in the same way, dreaded as subversive to Christianity. Tertullian called the Stagyrite the patriarch of heretics, and a French council at Paris in 1209 proscribed his writings. Nevertheless, S. Thomas Aquinas mastered his method, and Aristotelianized Christianity.

In like manner, if I am not mistaken, Hegel is destined to play a conspicuous part in the reconciliation of modern thought to the dogma of the Incarnation. He supplies a key to unlock the golden gate which has remained closed to the minds of modern Europe.

It is incorrect to assert, as is done repeatedly, that Hegel lays down the identity of contraries. He teaches that every thesis implies and contains an antithesis and its mediating moment, which is their synthesis. That Hegel

1 Modern Pantheism, vol. ii. treatise 7.

2 Philosophie du Credo, p. 26; Logique, vol. i. p. 194.

3 History of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 545.

was the first to create this method is not pretended. He was anticipated by Heraclitus, who taught that contradictory propositions may be consistent.[1] And S. Augustine, in his Confessions, says, "You have taught me, Lord, that before you gave form to inform matter to distinguish it, it was not anything; it was neither form nor body nor spirit, nevertheless it was not altogether nothing, but the mean between being and not-being."[2] S. Clement of Alexandria, S. Vincent of Lerins, and Lactantius, without stating the foundations of the Hegelian method, act upon it and presuppose it. The Hegelian trichotomy, fully apprehended, casts a flood of light over the argument of S. Paul, and makes intelligible to us what was probably only obscurely seen and vaguely felt by himself.

Perhaps one of the greatest impediments to the acceptance of the dogma of the Incarnation is the apparent impossibility of conceiving the union of two contradictions in one person, of the finite and the infinite in Christ.

As M. Larroque says: "To the dogma of the divinity of Jesus is attached that of the incarnation, which, more properly, may be said to be only another expression of the same. If Jesus is not God, it is clear that God was not incarnate in His person. Hence it is unnecessary to insist at length on what is impossible and contradictory, viz., that the infinite and perfect essence should be circumscribed and limited in a finite and imperfect essence; in other terms, that the Divinity should be added to the humanity, or, if the expression be preferred, the humanity should be added to the Divinity; or that the same being should be, at the same time, God and man. From the point of view

[1] Ἡρακλεῖτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι.—*Arist. Ethic. Nic.* lib. viii. 1.

[2] Confess. lib. xii. c. 3, 4.

of the dogma of the Incarnation, Christ, as God, is an infinite and perfect spirit; but as man, veritable and complete, he is made of soul and body, finite and imperfect as is everything belonging to our nature. Consequently, theology is led to sustain that the human soul of Christ does not comprehend God any better than do we. It follows that, in spite of the intimate union of the two natures, and, on the other side, of the very reason of that union, there is at once, in the same person, two beings, one of whom does not know the other, and in the same individual two distinct personalities, which is downright nonsense."[1]

This objection rests on the assumption that the finite and the infinite mutually exclude one another, and that, therefore, their synthesis is impossible. A few considerations on the nature of infinity will make it apparent that synthesis is by no means as absurd to suppose as M. Larroque thinks.

When we say that God is infinite, we do not mean that He is of immeasurable size and duration, but that He is beyond all space and time. He is neither in space nor in time; for this reason He is eternal and infinite, and therefore He is also incomprehensible.[2]

The difficulty lies in admitting the possibility of any being existing outside of space and time,—a difficulty so great at first sight, that it is not surprising that persons should have taken infinity to consist of extension through unbounded space and time. They suppose space and time to be realities, having true existence, and herein lies their

[1] Patrice Larroque: Examen critique des doctrines de la Religion Chretienne. Bruxelles, 1864. T. i. p. 165-169.

[2] Jules Simon: La Religion Naturelle, c. 2. Leibnitz: Nouveaux Essais. Balmez: Fundamental Philosophy, bk. iii. Aristotle and Descartes held the same opinion of time and space.

mistake. There are, in this world, only three manners of being—substance, quality, and relation. In other terms, we can conceive substances, the diverse qualities of these substances, and the diverse relations in which they stand to one another. Space is therefore either a substance, or a quality, or a relation. Substance is either a body or a spirit, or an union of both. Space obviously does not come within this category. It is therefore not a substance, nor is it the quality of a substance. For if it were, there would be some objects or some qualities which were without it, or which had qualities opposed to it. We are therefore brought to conclude that it is a pure relation in which one substance stands to another substance, and nothing more.

If we suppose for a moment that space exists, and that God placed the world in it, why did He place it in the spot it occupies instead of any other spot, all space being alike, and no one point being preferable to any other point? God acted without having a reason, for if space *is*, His choice of a place was arbitrary; but God cannot act irrationally. Therefore space is not. Supposing space to exist, *per se*, there is no escape from this dilemma.

If there were no body with extension, there would be no space; space would be *possible*, because the existence of bodies would be possible; but it would not become *real* till bodies were produced.

According to Descartes, the essence of body is in extension; and as we necessarily conceive extension in space, it follows that space, body, and extension, are three essentially identical things. Extension without a body to extend is a contradiction; for a body is because it is extension, and extension is not a body, because we are supposing that there is no body.

Leibnitz also thinks that space is "a relation, an order,

not only between things existing, but also between possible things if they existed."[1]

We say of a body that it is above or below, before or behind another. For these qualifications to be intelligible, it is clear that void space is not sufficient; it must be occupied, and that by two different bodies: for all these expressions designate the relation one bears to the other. All idea of size is also relative; we say that one thing is greater or smaller than another by comparing them. Take a stick a foot long. Is it long or short? The question is absurd. It is long compared with another stick an inch long; it is short beside one a yard long. Size is therefore nothing *per se* but the comparison of bodies.

What has been said of space applies also to time, which is the order of succession, as space is the order of contiguity.

If everything were immovable, there would be no time; if all moved in the same order, simultaneously, there would be no time; but let one thing move, and another remain stationary, and time appears. Thus time implies, like size, a duality, a comparison. Time and space are closely allied; that which engenders time is movement; thus both are engendered by duality. Extension and movement are comprehended in a common term: duality, or the simplest form of multiplicity.

Time is duration; but duration without something to endure is an absurdity. There can be no time without something existing, whose relation to something else it expresses. Time has no proper existence, and separated from beings, is annihilated. Hence it follows that the infinity we attribute to time has no rational foundation. Infinite time is impossible, indefinite duration is possible.

[1] Nouveaux Essais, l. ii. c. 13.

Time commences with mutable things; if they perish, it perishes with them. There is no succession without mutation; and consequently, no time. Time in things is their succession. Time in the understanding is the perception of this mutation. It is nothing absolute in itself; it is the relation borne by beings to one another in the order of succession.

When there is no perception of mutation, there is no knowledge of time. The chaplain who was shut into the black hole for an hour, according to the author of "Never too late to Mend," thought he had passed a twelvemonth in pitch darkness. When Doctor Faustus was borne on Satan's wings through the abyss—

> "How long the time in passing through
> The murky darkness, Faustus never knew;
> For, in that gloom, there was no change to tell
> Of time—but unendurable
> Whether a second or a century,
> For there eternity had ceased to be
> Articulate."

If art did not furnish us with the means of measuring time, we would easily lose the faculty of appreciating it. When travelling in Icelandic deserts at Midsummer, during a fortnight of cloud, I made a day. I was without watch, and the sun was invisible. I rode till tired, then encamped, woke when refreshed, and rode again, and arrived at an inhabited fjord after what I believed to have been fourteen days, but which proved to have been only thirteen.

According to an Arabian tale, a Sultan was persuaded by a dervish to plunge his head into an enchanted basin full of water. Instantly the Sultan found himself at sea swimming to save his life. Wearied with battling with the waves, he reached a shore on which he flung himself. There he was found, and made a slave of. After years of

captivity, he escaped, fled over the deserts, and arrived in Cairo. There, famished and houseless, he became a tailor, and made garments to gain a livelihood. He married, had a family, and so years rolled by. One day he was accused of some crime or other, and was sentenced to death. He mounted the scaffold, the executioner brandished the sabre, and . . . the Sultan raised his head out of the water, to see himself surrounded by his guards, with the dervish beside him. The Sultan, in a quart of water, had lived twenty years in one minute.

It is perhaps natural that those who have to struggle incessantly with space and time should deceive themselves as to its nature, and erect what are mere relations into positive existences. So the ancients personified and deified Time. Many philosophers, without exactly going so far as to anthropomorphize Time, have at least given it substance. But Leibnitz, in his controversy with Clarke, demonstrated conclusively the non-existence of time and space as entities, and shewed that they are only the relation of succession or of co-existence existing between things; and that consequently such expressions as infinite time and infinite space mean the indefinite and nothing more. We can understand the infinity of a being, but not the infinity of a relation.

When we apply the term infinite to God, we mean that He is neither in time nor in space, but is altogether outside of them. When we say that God is everywhere present,

> "Out beyond the shining
> Of the farthest star,
> He is ever stretching
> Infinitely far,"

and that He is everlasting, "the same yesterday, to-day and for ever," we understate the idea of infinity. Time and

space *are not* to the Absolute, and are terms wholly inapplicable to Him. To the Absolute, the plenitude of being *is*, without succession and without co-existence, without duration that is, and without extension, or without time in which to endure, or space in which to extend.

We may fix two points anywhere, draw a line between them, and divide up the line into any number of portions, and each portion bears a relation of a half, a quarter, an eighth, and so forth, to the whole; and each is equal to, greater or less than, another portion, but neither the whole nor any part bears any relation to infinity. We cannot say that the line is a fraction of infinity, we cannot say that it is greater or less than infinity—for infinity belongs to an order with which comparison of length is out of the question.

It is the same with time; time *is* to us, but it *is not* to the Absolute. To Him there is no past, no present, no future, or past and future are at once present.

Now—understanding the Infinite thus—is the union of the finite and the infinite an absurdity? No. It is absurd only to those who mistake the infinite for the indefinite. It is absurd to say that a thousand square miles are one with a square yard; and that the life of the centenarian raven and that of the May-fly are indissolubly united; but it is not absurd to say that two natures which are opposite but not contradictory are harmonized in one, that God, in Himself, outside of time and space, should, when entering into relation with man, become subject to those relations, without which He would be incognizable by man. As time and space have no real existence, and are relations only of co-existence and succession existing between men and between material objects, to become subject to time and space does not touch or affect in any way the nature of God, or infinity, it touches and affects the nature of man alone.

And if the infinite be the opposed moment to the finite, a conciliating moment must be sought. For here we have distinct ideas contrasting and yet implying one another. At least, we say of the finite that it is an idea which implies, not the indefinite, but the infinite, of which it is the negation;[1] and of the infinite that it is the negation of all limitation and finality.

As God is the plenitude of being, He is the plenitude of life without succession in it, and of thought universal. In Him how many ideas are there? But one, for there is in Him but one eternal act. But this idea necessarily contains all possibilities. It contains, therefore, the idea of the finite. All that is, and all that can be, existed eternally in the idea of God. And with Him eternity and instantaneity are one. Thus the idea of God contains eternally the infinite and the finite: the infinite as essence, and the finite as effect.

Between the essential infinity and the realized finality there is opposition of natures; they are radically inverse. Nevertheless the finite is possible, because the infinite *is*. But how can the Infinite pass to the finite, the Absolute call the limited into actuality? Only through the Idea. True to our method, we must find the relation, not of the finite to the infinite, which is impossible, but of the infinite to the finite, or of the cause to the effect. But the effect can only be in reciprocal relation to the cause, on condition that it be equal to it, and that is impossible if creation be the sole effect. The equation is imperfect, how is it to be perfected? By the Word or Idea, who is Himself the relation balancing the equation, who is Himself the mediator between the infinite and the finite, without confusing either, but preserving the distinction by the very fact of His uniting them.

[1] Cf. Descartes: Réponses aux cinquièmes objections (3me Med. sec. 4).

The Word, then, is the mediator between these antinomical factors. By Him the Infinite calls into existence the world of finalities, and the finite ascends towards God. It is not that in Christ, the two natures, the divine and the human, the infinite and the finite, are juxtaposed, so that in Him on one side is the man, and on the other side is the God, they are absolutely united so as to be indissolubly one without confusion of nature, any more than there is absorption of North pole and South pole, the axis of the earth uniting them. It unites by separating them.

Christ is not simply God and man, but is God-man indivisibly and simultaneously; that is to say, He is at once the infinite, or the idea of the divine personality, and the finite, or the idea of the created personality. In Him the two personalities are not only welded together, and brought into reciprocal communion, but are emphasized and distinguished at the same time. Without Him the Absolute could not have called the finite into existence, for there would be no mode of passage from the timeless and spaceless, the imponderable and immaterial Being to matter, subject to extension, duration, and gravitation; apart from Him man could not enter into relation with God, for he would be the finite dislocated from the infinite, without connecting bridge.

Thus the dogma of the Incarnation is a necessary consequence to those who rightly comprehend the finite and the infinite. Without it, there is no possible relation between them, the Incarnation is the only conceivable conciliation.

But that this notion of Christ should appear in its full grandeur, let the metaphysical idea be vivified by the contemplation of its application to living realities.

If we rise from the mathematical point, the sole possible expression of matter in its condition of absolute indivisibility,

to the immensity of the sidereal universe, from the ultimate chemical atom through all degrees of the mineral reign, from the first vegetable embryo to the most complete animal; if, passing onwards to man, we follow him from a whimpering babe to the conception of his unlimited personality in God through Christ, tracing the laborious stages of the progressive development of humanity in history, what does this magnificent panorama of creation exhibit to us but the marvellous ascension of the finite under the form of the indefinite towards God, the Infinite? Christ is to humanity not merely the Son of Mary, but the veritable Son of Man, resuming in Himself the entire creation, of which He is the protoplast and the archetype. Thus, this conception of the whole visible universe in its projection towards the infinite, from the atom and the germ to the Man-God, is the complete equation of the infinite; and from this point of view Christ is the Ideal of creation; whilst from the Divine point of view He is the Idea of the creation. By Him the Idea was realized in creation, and by Him creation is raised towards the Infinite.

God, the infinite Being, arrives at the finite only through the eternal Word, the mediating moment; the creature, or the finite, can only lift itself towards the infinite by means of the same mediator. He is their point of junction and communion; and this point of junction manifests itself by the association of the activities of the finite and the infinite for the reconciliation of the whole order, the things in heaven and the things in earth, all opposites wherever opposed, in one all-enfolding Idea.

God operates through the Word, and man reaches the Father through Christ. In Him the action of God and the action of man meet, are focussed as in a lens, and diverge orderly.

By the conception of Christ as the eternal equation of the finite and the infinite, one obtains a clear notion of the grandeur of the mystery of mediation. He is not merely the regenerator of man, He is the peacemaker between man and man, man and all nature, and man and God; the link between man and man, and man and nature, and man and God.

CHAPTER IX

THE EVIDENCE FOR THE INCARNATION

SALADIN. ——*I must think*
That the religions which I nam'd can be
Distinguish'd, e'en to raiment, drink and food.
NATHAN. *And only not as to their grounds of proof*
Are not all built alike on history,
Traditional, or written. History
Must be received on trust—is it not so?
In whom now are we likeliest to put our trust?
LESSING'S NATHAN THE WISE.

Private Judgment the basis of Certainty—Man accepts some truths by conviction, other truths on authority—Historical evidence always disputable—evidence of an historical religion especially so—The evidence of miracles unsatisfactory—Prophecy no evidence to the divinity of Christ—Scriptural evidence weak—1. Scripture lays no claim to inspiration—2. It is full of inaccuracies—3. And of discrepancies—4. Uncertainty of authorship—Difficulty of proving from Scripture the Divinity of Christ—The weakness of Protestantism—The authority of the Church—The evidence of our own Nature—The legitimate position of the Bible.

AS I have shewn in a former chapter, Certainty is based on Private Judgment; that is, man's reason is the measure of truth to himself. He is satisfied of the truth of a proposition only when it has been demonstrated to him, and that demonstration has taken hold of and convinced his reason.

But there are truths which are not absolutely certain,

and which man accepts on authority, which he admits as probable, though unable to verify them. Thus, the untravelled and unscientific man believes that there is such a continent as Africa, that the earth revolves around the sun and upon its own axis, that the comets move in parabolas. But the certainty to him is not absolute, for it is not based on his own power of verification; it is comparative certainty only.

Thus man believes in truths of two kinds, in those of absolute certainty through direct conviction, and in those of comparative certainty through conviction of the trustworthiness of the authority which propounds them.

If man refused to believe those truths which were not made evident to his reason, he could not live among his fellows, nor could he make the slightest progress in civilization.

There may be, indeed there must be, truths which he cannot verify, and to deny these because of this impossibility of verification is to enclose himself within an orbit as narrow as that of the brute. At the same time, everything propounded on authority is not to be received, but must be weighed in the balance of private judgment, which thus becomes once more the ultimate criterium of the trustworthiness of authority.

Historical facts are, by their nature, removed from the possibility of verification, and in estimating them we have to bring the critical faculty, or reason, into play. Historical statements can never therefore be demonstrated to be absolutely true or to be absolutely false. The utmost that can be said of them is that the balance of probability is for, or against, their veracity.

This doctrine applies necessarily to those historical statements which form the backbone of a traditional religion;

and it applies to them with special force, for out of religious dogmas duties spring, which weave themselves around us, and govern more or less our whole lives.

The dogma of the Incarnation is one which, if true, is entirely removed from the possibility of verification; it was removed entirely from the possibility of verification when Jesus Christ stood among His apostles. For to verify is to bring within the compass of the mind, and grasp in all its bearings, some dogma which is propounded. But, inasmuch as the human mind cannot embrace the Divinity, the relative cannot estimate the Absolute without ceasing to be relative; it would be impossible therefore for any man to predicate of Jesus Christ that He was God, however great may have been the miracles He performed, and however sublime may have been His ethical teaching.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau has observed that "the facts of the life of Socrates, of which nobody doubts, are much less satisfactorily proved than are those of Jesus, which are so widely disputed." For what reason? Because the admission of the facts of the life of Socrates does not entail any obligation on the conscience, whereas those of Jesus are of the greatest consequence; they are the foundation of a religion and of an ethical code. Consequently it is of importance to know on what evidence the doctrine of the Incarnation reposes.

The evidence must be either in our own nature, or it must be authoritative: that is to say, we may be convinced because this dogma completely satisfies the wants of our spiritual being, and seems to us to be the only solution to the difficulties besetting the elaboration of our own individuality and the development of society, or because the authority on which we receive it is so strong that it is unassailable.

The only authority that is unassailable is that of God

Himself. Do we receive testimony to this dogma direct from God? The answer depends entirely on whether we accept the dogma of the Incarnation or not. Was Jesus God? If He were, His word carries its guarantee with it. If He were not, it is worth nothing as evidence.

How are we to know that He was God? The usual answer given to this is—by the miracles He wrought.

But to this answer two objections arise. How can a miracle prove Him to be God? and, what sufficient evidence have we that He really wrought miracles?

If God had designed to work a miracle, it may justly be argued, He would certainly have given, or suffered to be acquired, a preliminary knowledge of the laws on which the miraculous derogation would take effect. But man, even now, knows so little of the world, that he is at all moments arrested by facts in disaccord with those laws which he does know, facts which are only explained by laborious study, and a more profound exploration of the nature of things. Moreover, a miracle which took place at a certain place, at a certain time, and which was to serve all humanity, must have been subjected to several or some witnesses. But the testimony of men, of history, of tradition, is never infallible; and the guarantee to us of the fact of the miracle is a fallible guarantee after all.

The knowledge indispensable for proving the reality of a miracle was wanting to the men of the time when Christ came; and the human witnesses might always be mistaken, or err involuntarily, or wilfully pervert the truth to suit their own ends. We may therefore assert that we cannot philosophically affirm that there is anything in the world, or in ourselves, which supposes the eventuality of a miracle called to prove a religious dogma.

The miracles performed by Christ are brought forward

by some as evidences of His Divinity, but the testimony to these miracles is Scripture, which, as I shall presently shew, will not bear such pressure put upon it. Supposing that the four Gospels were written by those under whose names they pass, the evidence is not in that case of the most complete description. It is evidence which we should unhesitatingly reject in profane history; and which Protestants do reject, when they refuse to believe the miracles wrought by the saints, by relics and by privileged images, many of which rest on better evidence and stand the test of criticism more surely than do those of the Gospel. Take the miracle of Cana of Galilee for instance. No names are given of the parties at the feast; we do not know whether the writer describing the incident was present himself, or whether he heard it from an eyewitness. The transformation of the water can only have been known to the servants, for they filled the water-pots and poured them out in wine; but we have not their evidence. Whether they really drew out wine, when they had poured in water, or whether they produced wine from some other source, we have no opportunity of knowing. And what is remarkable also, is that the president of the feast and the bridegroom did not know that a miracle had been performed; the ruler charged the bridegroom with having reserved the best wine till the first supply was exhausted, and the charge was not denied.

The miracle of the recovery of the nobleman's son, again, —and the same may be said of almost all others—rests on no evidence. We have not the testimony of the father to the cure, we do not know what the sickness really was, and the recovery might have been a coincidence.

Nor is the argument from prophecy more satisfactory,

for it may be urged with equal justice, on the opposite side, that the narrative was accommodated to the prophecies.

The miraculous conception was believed by Joseph on the authority of a dream, evidence which would not satisfy any one now, if offered to prove identity, say in the case of a natural birth. The Virgin conceives and bears a son. Why? Because, it may be very fairly argued, of the Messiah of prophecy, it was announced by Isaiah, or rather was thought to be announced, that a virgin should do so;[1] and the compiler of the narrative desired to adapt the history of Jesus to the prophetic sketch. A star heralds the birth of Jesus. Why? Because Balaam the soothsayer had foretold there should rise a star out of Jacob. Wise men come from the East with gifts of gold, frankincense and myrrh for the young child. Why? Because in Isaiah it had been proclaimed that "Gentiles shall come to thy light and kings to the brightness of thy rising;" "all they from Sheba shall come: they shall bring gold and incense." Why was there a flight into Egypt? The Evangelist gives the reason, because of the prophecy "Out of Egypt have I called My Son." Why was the potter's field bought? The Evangelist says, because Jeremiah the prophet had said, "they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of Him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did value; and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me." In the first place, it was Zachariah, and not Jeremiah, who acted thus, and, in the second place, the verbal ambiguity in the Hebrew, the word translated "potter" really meaning "treasury," suggested the notion of purchasing the potter's field.

[1] The prophecy of the Maiden's son in Isaiah relates to a child in whose nonage the land of the two kings, whose alliance was so dreaded by Ahaz, was to be deserted; and the Hebrew "*The* young woman" points her out to be some maiden known to Isaiah and Ahaz.

When, in addition to this, it is argued that most of the assigned prophecies are irrelevant, forced, and fanciful, or may be, and are still explained by the Jews in an entirely different sense, the proof drawn from the prophecies is left without demonstrative value.

Nor is the historical evidence much more conclusive.

Justus of Tiberias, who was born about five years after our Lord's death, wrote a Jewish History, and if the miracles of Christ, His death, and resurrection, had created much interest, Justus would probably have alluded to them; but Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who read the book, tells us that it contained "no mention of the coming of Christ, nor of the events concerning Him, nor of the prodigies He wrought."[1]

The statement in Josephus that Christ rose the third day, as had been predicted by the prophets, as also His other prodigies, is an interpolation.[2] It occurs in the middle of a chapter, and has no connexion with the context. It is preceded by the account of chastisement administered to the Jewish populace by the soldiers of the Roman governor, and is followed by an indelicate story of a lady whom the priests of Isis sold to a debauchee, and persuaded that she was receiving the embraces of the god Anubis.

Two authorities are assumed to establish the truth of the Incarnation, if we set miracles and prophecy aside. These are the Church and Scripture.

Properly speaking, Scripture is merely an early expression of the belief of the Church, but as it has been by some

[1] Μυρόβιβλον, Cod. xxxiii. Rouen, 1653.

[2] Antiquities, bk. 18, c. 3.

supposed to be a distinct, and even an antagonistic, authority, we shall consider it separately.

In the first place, the objections to regarding Scripture as an infallible authority are weighty and hardly to be evaded.

1. Scripture makes no claim to be considered as a book. It is a *fascis*, not a rod; neither does it claim, in whole or in part, to be inspired. The writer of the third Gospel plainly speaks of his undertaking as suggested by like undertakings on the part of many others; he thinks himself justified, as well as they, in "compiling his narrative," ἀνατάξασθαι διήγησιν, by reason of the opportunities he had, referring obviously to human opportunities. He does not claim to be inspired, to have had a revelation, nor even a knowledge of the facts at first hand.

There is one passage which is repeatedly quoted as conclusive for Bible authority, and that is 2 Tim. iii. 16, "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction," &c. But the important word in this sentence, on which the proof depends, is by no means certain. It rests on the authority of some MSS. codices, but not on all; and the real meaning of the passage seems to be "every sacred writing given by inspiration of God is profitable for teaching," &c., and we are left in the dark as to what writings are inspired, and as to the extent to which inspiration goes. We call Dante and Shakespeare inspired, and their writings may be also applied with authority to teaching, reproof and correction, if that text be our sole guide.

If the Scriptural Infallibility doctrine be true, the Bible ought to contain an inspired catalogue of the sacred writings, and a statement of the limits by which inspiration was bounded. An authorized copy ought also to have been

preserved, that all might know exactly what the words are of which Holy Scripture consists.

But, on the contrary, the canon of Scripture was not settled till late; some of the works now contained within its covers were rejected by some Churches and received by others, and certain works received by some Churches have been cast out of the Canon. On what authority, except that of the printer, do men claim inspiration for "Solomon's Song" and refuse it to the "Book of Wisdom?" Why are the Epistles of S. Paul quoted as canonical and the Epistle of his fellow-labourer S. Barnabas rejected?

There is not extant a single original of any of the Old or New Testament writings. We possess copies only, made by men who had no claims to infallibility, which do not agree together, and in some places are at variance, so that it is impossible to pronounce with certainty what is the original and correct text of any book. If the Divine Spirit prevented the authors of our Scriptures from falling into any error, surely it was leaving the work incomplete, if those infallible writings were left to the inaccuracy or carelessness of copyists. It is well known that the Puritan divine, Dr. Owen, clung with desperation to the theory of the antiquity and inspiration of the Hebrew punctuation as the only safeguard for the certainty of the sense. We know that in India the most scrupulous care has been taken to preserve every word of the Vedas, its true signification, and its pronunciation; and treatises, called Vedângas, were composed to the number of six to preserve the Vedas in all their purity. Of these the first four, Sekshâ (pronunciation), Chhandas (metre), Vyâkarana (grammar), Nirukta (explanation of words), and the last, Kalpa (ceremonial), are the most important.

Nothing of the sort supplements the Christian Scriptures;

but if the infallibilist theory be the true one, some such guarantees become morally essential.

2. What makes this theory more improbable is the fact that the majority of quotations in the New Testament vary from the Old Testament text. The advocates of plenary inspiration attach great importance to the manner in which these quotations are made; the phrases ἵνα πληρωθῇ, "that it might be fulfilled," καθὼς γέγραπται, "as it is written," Θεὸς εἶπεν, "God said," and the like, are taken to indicate the sanctity and importance of the Old Testament text as the word of God. But when we compare the passages quoted with the Hebrew text, we find the most striking discrepancies. Some of the citations are taken from the Septuagint translation, and adhere to that version where it is incorrect. S. Paul actually changes the meaning of a text and gives it as a prophecy: "Wherefore He saith, When He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, and *gave* gifts unto men,"[1] whereas the Hebrew and the LXX. give "*received* gifts for men."[2] The reference "He shall be called a Nazarene" is not found in any prophecy; and S. Jude quotes an apocryphal work, the Book of Enoch, as prophetic.

3. There are also great discrepancies and contradictions in accounts of various transactions, in historical details, in names, in genealogies, in numbers and in science. So great are some of these discrepancies that it is impossible to reconcile them so as to satisfy an objector. Take an instance; the accounts given us of the Resurrection.

In S. Matthew (xxvii. 60) the Sepulchre in which the body of Christ was laid as a final place of burial, belonged to Joseph of Arimathæa, who had caused the new tomb to be dug in the rock. In S. John (xix. 41, 42) this new sepulchre is not only not indicated as the property of Joseph,

[1] Eph. iv. 8. [2] Ps. lxviii. 19.

but it is spoken of as a place of provisional deposit, chosen solely because it was near the place of crucifixion, and because the Sabbath drew nigh.

In S. Matthew (xxviii. 1-6) one angel appeared to two women in the midst of an earthquake; he appeared to them seated outside the sepulchre on the stone which had closed it. In S. Mark (xvi. 1-6) one angel, or rather a young man, appears inside the tomb to three women, and there is no earthquake. In S. Luke (xxiv. 2-10) two angels appear to several women; and there is no earthquake. In S. John (xx. 1, 11-13) the number of angels is two, and there is but one woman.

In S. Mark, the three women, Mary Magdalene being one of them, came to the sepulchre with the intention of embalming the body of Jesus at the rising of the sun, in S. John, on the contrary, it was still dark when the Magdalen came to the tomb and found it empty. It is impossible to reconcile these accounts by supposing that she came twice, for if this latter account describe the first visit, she would not have returned later with spices, and wondered "who shall roll us away the stone from the door of the sepulchre?" (S. Mark xvi. 3.)

4. Another difficulty in the way of accepting the Biblical Infallibility theory is, that the authorship of the Old Testament books, and of some of those in the New Testament is doubtful.

Papias, a companion of S. Polycarp, is the first to speak of the Gospels. He says of S. Matthew that "he compiled the sayings of the Lord in the Hebrew language;" and of S. Mark, that he "set down the words and deeds of Jesus, though not in order," as he heard the preaching of the Apostle. Such a description does not tally with either of the first two Gospels as we have them. Our first Gospel

contains, undoubtedly, a preponderance of discourses of the Lord, but not discourses exclusively; and the present Gospel of S. Mark does not give a continuous history. Papias, as recorded by Eusebius, makes no allusion whatever to S. Luke or S. John, as authors of our Lord's history.

Justin Martyr, who wrote between 140 and 160, speaks of the Memoirs of the Apostles, and says that they recorded everything concerning Jesus Christ, and that these memoirs were called Gospels, and when he cites "the Gospel" his quotations do not coincide with parallel passages in any of those we have.

The earliest recognition of the Gospel of S. John that we know of, is that of the heretic Heracleon (*circa* A.D. 150), who is said by Origen to have written comments upon it. Theophilus of Antioch is the first orthodox writer who specifies the Apostle John as the author of the fourth Gospel.

When we come to examine the Gospels to discover what testimony they bear to the Divinity of Christ, we find them singularly deficient. The three first have not a passage on this point, nor a single word identifying Jesus with God, nor calling Him God. He is named "the Son of Man" and "the Son of God." The first of these expressions in no way implies the divinity of Jesus; it is used frequently to designate the prophets; and in the Sermon on the Mount all those who are peacemakers are called "sons of God," as well as all those who do good for evil.[1] The same evangelist calls God the Father of men,[2] and S. Luke calls men the sons of the Most High, the sons of God.[3] If the Evangelists give men the name of sons of God, it is impossible to conclude from them that they give that title to Christ in any other light. In Exodus (iv. 22) God calls

[1] S. Matt. v. 9, 45, 48. [2] vi. 25, 26. [3] S. Luke vi. 35, xx. 36.

the people of Israel "His first-born son" (1 Chron. xvii. 13); God, in predicting the birth of King Solomon, calls him His son; and in Job (i. 6; ii. 1; xxxviii. 7) the angels are called sons of God. The Bible even gives the name of God to created beings; in Exodus (vii. 1) Moses is called a God to Pharaoh; in chap. xxii. 28, the judges are designated as gods; and (Psalm lxxxii. 1-6) the name of gods is given even to those who "judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked."

It is therefore quite possible that when the Evangelists used the expression Son of God in reference to Christ they used it with no intention of making Him God.

There are also numerous texts in the three first evangels which *seem* difficult to reconcile with the idea of His Divinity. I need only give references.[1]

On the other hand, the author of the fourth Gospel puts forth higher claims for Christ. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God;"[2] "He made Himself equal with God;"[3] "I and My Father are one;"[4] "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father. . . . I am in the Father, and the Father in Me."[5] "O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was."[6] "And Thomas answered and said unto Him, My Lord and my God."[7] The first Epistle of S. John says also "We know Him that is true: and we are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life."[8]

[1] S. Mark x. 18; S. Luke xviii. 19; S. Matt. xix. 17; xvi. 15, 16; S. Mark viii. 29; S. Luke ix. 20; xxiv. 19; S. Matt. xx. 23; S. Mark x. 40; xiii. 32.

[2] St. John i. 1. [3] v. 18. [4] x. 30. [5] xiv. 9, 11.
[6] xvii. 5. [7] xx. 28. [8] 1 John v. 20.

S. Paul, also, is sufficiently explicit. He speaks of "Christ who is over all, God blessed for ever;"[1] he says of Him that "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God;"[2] "By Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible—and He is before all things, and by him all things consist."[3] "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."[4] "The glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ."[5]

There are, however, passages in the fourth Gospel and in the Epistles of S. Paul, which, I will not say, present a different notion of Christ, but which are apparently inconsistent with the passages quoted above; thus, Jesus declares that He can do nothing of Himself,[6] that He came not to do His own will, but the will of Him that sent Him;[7] that He speaks nothing of Himself.[8] In chap. viii. 40, He is represented merely as a prophet; "Ye seek to kill Me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of God." When the Jews reproached Him with making Himself God, He excused Himself by quoting the psalm which "called them gods unto whom the word of God came;"[9] and after the Resurrection He speaks of the Father as "My God and your God" when addressing the Magdalen.[10]

S. Paul also presents Jesus not as God, but as sent from God; "the gift of grace is by one man, Jesus Christ;"[11] "The head of every man is Christ,—and the head of Christ is God."[12] "Then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all

[1] Rom. ix. 5. [2] Phil. ii. 6. [3] Col. i. 16, 17.
[4] Col. ii. 9. [5] Tit. ii. 13. [6] S. John v. 19, 20, 38.
[7] vi. 38. [8] vii. 16, 28. [9] x. 30-36.
[10] xx. 17. [11] Rom. v. 15. [12] 1 Cor. xi. 3.

in all."[1] "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."[2] "There is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus."[3] In S. Peter's first sermon, recorded in the Acts, Christ is spoken of as "a man, approved of God by miracles and wonders and signs which God did by Him,"[4] Who was raised up and exalted by God.[5] S. Stephen speaks of Him as a "prophet like unto Moses," and he calls Him "the Just One."[6] At Cæsarea, S. Peter addressing himself to Gentiles, speaks in language which implies that Jesus was inspired, was an envoy of God, but not necessarily God Himself; for he says "God was with Him."[7] "It is He which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead."[8]

To resume what has been said, of eight witnesses in the New Testament, six, *i.e.* SS. Matthew, Mark, Luke, James, Peter, and Jude do not identify Jesus with God. Three, to wit the Evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke, have, on the contrary, texts which express belief in His humanity alone, and S. Luke in the Acts puts similar language into the mouth of S. Peter. Two only, SS. John and Paul, speak of Jesus as one with God, but even they have ambiguous or seemingly contradictory passages.

So much for Scripture as an infallible authority. To any one who already believes in our Lord's Incarnation, the passages quoted will not offer much difficulty, for the bringing into prominence of one side of the doctrine is not a negation of the other side; but to one who is simply an inquirer groping for an authority which will make him embrace Christianity instead of Buddhism or Mahomedanism, the Scriptural evidence is by no means conclusive:

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 28. [2] Eph. i. 3. [3] 1 Tim. ii. 5.
[4] Acts ii. 22. [5] Acts iii. 13, 15, 22. [6] vii. 37, 52.
[7] Acts x. 38. [8] x. 42.

it fails, on examination, to satisfy the demands of ordinary scientific reasoning.

In this is the great weakness of Protestantism. In their impatience of the authority of the Church, the reformers threw the proof of Christianity on a collection of documents bound together; they assumed it to be infallible, and its authors to be inspired—a claim not put forth by the authors themselves for writings which they never intended to serve as demonstrations of the faith.

The reformers invited to the perusal of these documents, urged their careful examination, assured inquirers that the proof was decisive, and then anathematized all who declared that they could not see the proofs, and that the evidence produced would not bear the tests of ordinary historical and scientific inquiry. "The more Protestantism has been developed into its own characteristic propensity," says a writer in the *Westminster Review*, "the more atheistic is the aspect of public affairs. It has not known at all better than its Romish rival how to combine religious earnestness with tolerant justice, and has become just only by passing into indifference to religion. Its divines often attack Romanism by insisting on the vast spread of unbelief within the pale of that Church; while they are astonishingly blind to the very same phenomenon within all the National Protestant Churches. This is not a recent fact, as some imagine. Indeed, since the Restoration, it is difficult to name the time at which it may reasonably be thought that the existing English statesmen had any grave and practical belief in the national religion. Montesquieu, who passed for a freethinker in France, found in England (about a century and a quarter ago) he had far too much religion for our great-grandfathers. Equally in the Lutheran Churches of Germany and Sweden, also in the Calvinistic Churches

of Switzerland and elsewhere, the same phase of events has presented itself: the clergy tend either to lose all spiritual character, or take refuge in Unitarianism; the laity, in proportion to their cultivation, have been prone to entire unbelief." [1]

Of the second authority for the Incarnation, *i.e.* the Church, I shall have to speak in another chapter; as evidence to the Incarnation it is not worth much, as evidence, that is, which is logically convincing, whatever may be its moral cogency to enchain belief.

The narrative of the Gospels may carry conviction to some minds, the testimony of the Church may take hold of and satisfy others, but if so, what is it that really convinces? It is the fact, or, if the expression be preferred, the *idea* of the Incarnation commending itself to the soul of man. That idea, looking upon the soul of man, bears its own guarantee with it, and thus, and thus only, through the head or through the heart, enchains consent.

What then to every Christian is the evidence for the Incarnation? It is not Scripture, it is not the Church, it is not history, prophecy or miracle. It is his own nature crying out to see God face to face and live.

By the evidence of man's own nature I mean this:—

If I find that such an union of Divinity with humanity is necessary to me, that my nature may find its complete religious satisfaction;

If I find that such a dogma alone supplies an adequate basis for morals;

That such a dogma alone establishes the rights of man on a secure foundation;

That such a dogma alone enables man to distinguish between Authority and Force;

[1] New Series, vol. xiii. p. 137.

That such a dogma can alone conciliate my double nature, rational and sentimental, and my double duties, egoistic and altruistic;

That such a dogma alone supplies an adequate incentive to progress;

Then the conviction to my mind becomes a certainty.

These are points which cannot be crushed into one chapter, but will be worked out in the sequel.

It is on points of this nature that conviction must be formed, and then a place for authority will be found. Conviction is never the correlative of authority, whether lodged in a book or a church. If the mind is to be convinced it must be by a process independent of all compulsion. As religion is personal, and not between man and man; it must spring up from a root within man's own breast; it is not like the bind-weed trailing over every plant, strangling all and rooted in none.

> "Trust the spirit,
> As sovran Nature does, to make the form;
> For otherwise, we only imprison spirit,
> And not embody. *Inward evermore*
> *To outward.*"

We believe on the testimony of authority after we have assured ourselves of the trustworthiness of authority; measuring authority by the standard of our personal convictions. Our convictions are to us absolute truth; they are purely our own. Just as every man must see for himself, so every man must believe for himself. Acceptation of truth is a purely personal, individual act. Our convictions are the facts assured to us on the testimony of our own nature, our own senses, or our own reason. We may believe that there are other facts of which we are not ourselves cognizant, and these we believe on authority. But such

beliefs must succeed convictions; they are the stones laid upon the foundations. Consequently, those who attempt to make Bible or Church authority the starting-point of religion fail inevitably. Bible authority and Church authority may assist in universalizing our belief, but they cannot strike in us the spark of conviction.

The Bible has its place and its authority, as we shall see presently; and in its place it is unassailable, and its authority is overpowering. As a vehicle for enlightenment and for enlargement of the sympathies, it has perhaps the highest place and is of the truest service.

"Such a position and agency alike the constitution and requirements of man and its own nature assign to it. It claims an oracular character, no more than the freedom of our souls could admit such a claim. It nowhere assumes to be an infallible canon, but line upon line would teach us otherwise. It has neither the subject-matter, nor the tone and form of an inflexible standard and absolute guide. Much the greater portion of it could not by any exercise of ingenuity be represented, or misrepresented, as a fixed stereotyped pattern, after which to conform human life. A large portion is devoted to the history of a marvellously privileged, but withal a very wicked nation. It contains the narrative of the lives, the doings and sayings, the thoughts and utterances of men of like passions as ourselves; and of one LIFE 'in all things made like unto His brethren,' yet 'without sin;' but even this only as seen through the vision of men themselves sinful. It reveals a centre Life, the wonder and the joy of ages—One who spake, indeed, with authority, yet appealed ever to the latent life and suppressed law—of which He Himself was the hidden Head and Fountain—that yet lingered within the breasts of those about Him, making them still human.

But these features, which as much disqualify it from being an infallible rule, as such a rule is unnecessary and undesirable, in nowise render it less adapted to the uses for which it is required and intended. Quite the contrary. The life-law, overborne and silenced, cannot be stimulated and roused to self-assertion by a mere rule, however perfect, but only by the pleadings of the same law, working freely in a corresponding sphere; and this is what the Bible, as being the words of 'holy men of old, who spake moved by the Holy Ghost,' displays to us." [1]

So also has the Church its place and its authority. It is not the place or authority of Church or Bible to strangle reason, defy criticism, and fetter inquiry, for reason is a faculty given to man by God for the purpose of criticising, and thereby distinguishing error, so that he may reject it; and of inquiring, so that he may find truth under the veil which ignorance or error has cast over it.

The place of the Church is to declare authoritatively to every man that his own partial view and individual judgment are not the whole truth, and the complete measure of truth, but that the whole truth is the syncretism of all partial aspects.

[1] Westminster Review, N. S. vol. xvi. pp. 422, 423.

CHAPTER X

CATHOLICISM

'Ο τοῦ Θεοῦ γὰρ υἱὸς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν δι' ἡμῶν κηρυχθείς, οὐκ ἐγένετο Ναὶ καὶ Οὔ, ἀλλὰ Ναὶ ἐν αὐτῷ γέγονεν.—2 Cor. i. 19.

Catholicism the religion of inclusion—a consequence of the Incarnation—The conciliation of Reason and Faith—of Individualism and Solidarity—The conciliation of all philosophies—of all Religions—of Paganism—of Sectarianism—Catholicism demands universal toleration, its opposite is intolerance and persecution.

CATHOLICISM is, as its name implies, that which is universal, inclusive (καθολικός), and is opposed to that which is particular and exclusive.

A more appropriate name could not have been chosen for a religion which, recognizing an incarnate God as the universal conciliator, comprehends in itself, divested of their negations, all that is positive, and therefore true, in every religion, past, present and future.

If the hypothesis of the Incarnation be granted, as I have already laid down, this universalization of all faiths and philosophies follows as a logical consequence. Catholicism is therefore necessarily the synthesis, in its universal and indivisible unity, of all fragmentary truths contained in every philosopheme and religion, theory and rite, hitherto opposed; of all the thoughts, wills, and sentiments of the

human race, thus harmonizing man's nature within himself, where hitherto there was antagonism; uniting all men, one with another, where there was discord; and attaching all humanity to God.

It holds together indivisibly all aspects of the many-faced individual and collective life of mankind by its Ideal, who, being simultaneously love, knowledge, and activity, responds at once to all the faculties and all the harmonies of the heart, the reason and the will, concluding all in infinite charity, absolute verity, and supreme happiness.

In this chapter I propose to consider the conciliation by the Ideal of all those antinomies I have signalized in a former chapter, and that conciliation I call Catholicism.

In the first place, then, we will consider the unification of the Rational and Sentimental antinomy, of Individualism and Solidarity.

"God," said Plato, "has given us two wings to raise us to Him, love and reason." Their hymen is accomplished in the Ideal.

"To know God is to love Him," said one saint. "To love God is to know Him," observed another. Thus, the unity of science and charity reveals itself to the soul.

Love is the sense of the universal and indefinable, and reason is that of the particular and defined. The incarnate Word, being absolute reason and love, manifests His nature to us through the two faculties which constitute us. The perfect conception of the Ideal implies the simultaneous action of heart and head, the first conceiving Him as infinite love, in order that He may become for the second absolute verity, so that reason may be the intelligible form of universal charity, and love may be the living sentiment of infinite intelligence.

Every one of us has in himself a twofold revelation; every creature is, as the apostle says, the manifestation of a divine perfection.[1] This revelation, or determination of the Deity in ourselves develops itself in sentiments, thoughts, and desires. But this personal revelation in each is also relative to all, and each revelation may become the property of all by communication, so that all these sentiments may be united, all these thoughts may be added together, all these wills may move in concert. Man being both an individual and a social being, feels, thinks, and wills for himself, and also for society. His feelings, thoughts, and will act outwards upon a wide circle, and set other feelings, thoughts, and wills in motion, whilst those of other men excite and stimulate his own.

If God, placing the attributes of each man under the seal of an eternal limit, had said to him, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no further," each man, enclosed within this insurmountable barrier, might have questioned the Divine Justice for having refused to him what was given to another. But God has, on the contrary, made the talents of one to be the property of all, so that "none of us liveth or dieth to himself,"[2] and has given to all an unlimited power of acquisition, for the purpose of perpetually assimilating the gifts of others.

Humanity is not like a bundle of sticks, a cluster of hardly outlined microcosms, nor an arithmetical addition of integers, but is a body constituted, after the fashion of the human body, of adapted members, living, throbbing and moving as one.

The charge has been brought against Christianity that it is a religion of selfishness or of unbalanced individualism,

[1] Rom. i. 20. [2] Rom. xiv. 7.

as its aims are the salvation of the individual soul. This is true and not true. Inasmuch as man has personality he must be more or less selfish in his interests; inasmuch as he is a social being, he must be more or less altruistic. Christianity sets before man both objects, the salvation of himself and the salvation of the race, but it blends the one with the other so indissolubly that it is impossible to distinguish the act of religious self-seeking from the act of religious self-forgetfulness. The life of the Christian Ideal was one of complete self-renunciation, yet, as S. Paul says, it was for the joy set before Him that He endured the cross, despising the shame. The well-being of one depends more or less on the well-being of all, and the advantage of one is the advantage of all. As a mediæval writer puts it: "In a well-ordered house, all share in the work of all, and in the profit of all. If the brother works abroad, the sister attends to the house at home. One brings money in, another lays it out in household matters, and the work of each advantages the other, and the gain of one benefits all. So is it in the house of Christ. One reads, another fasts; one prays, another gives alms, and another again suffers corporal or spiritual infirmities. Does each labour and endure for himself alone? By no means. You profit by my reading, I by your fasting, one receives advantage by the almsgiving of another, and the suffering of one is profitable for example to the other. I am a partaker in the treasure of my brother. We partake in the prayers and merits of all—of all in earth and all in heaven, of those whose prayers are clogged with human infirmity here, and of those who are made perfect in the presence of God. This is a great solace to the faithful. For if any one is detained through infirmity, or has no leisure for pious acts and prayers, he may remember the many sacrifices offered in the Church, and say, 'I am a

companion (partaker) of all them that fear Thee and keep Thy commandments" (Ps. cxix. 63). By the union of love and pious intent you partake in the good things of others. If weak in body, or otherwise hindered in austerities, think of the many Religious in fastings, sackcloth and ashes. If weak in soul, think of the many who have waxed valiant in fight, and have conquered. For the Church is the Communion of Saints, in which all good things are common to all, not one special faith for the rich and another for the poor, one hope for the prince and another for the people; but, as in a city all share in the same rights of citizenship, in the same streets, the protection of the same walls, the same fountains, walks, and markets, so is it with us. And he who builds a beautiful house, builds for the whole city to admire, and he who erects a conduit sets it up for the advantage of all the citizens."[1]

God, the principle and the end of all, gives Himself to all to multiply indefinitely His gifts one by the other, and to distribute them, thus illimitably augmented, through each to all. Associated in this work of universal solidarity, we reunite all the scattered fragments of God's perfection manifested in ourselves.

Man cannot possibly be absolute, he is altogether partial and relative. The good, the beautiful, and the true to one man may be very different from the good, the beautiful, and the true to another man, but the aspect seen by each man is an aspect of the Absolute. One aspect alone, if insisted on to the negation and exclusion of other aspects, is erroneous—erroneous inasmuch as it negatives and excludes, but in itself it is true. To recompose the whole body of truth, it is necessary to accept every aspect, and to weave them together into an indissoluble unity.

[1] Marchantii Hortus Pastorum. Paris, 1628.

Individuality, the more emphasized it is, the better it is for the social welfare; for individuality is the perfecting of a member of the whole body. Of course, if one be emphasized at the expense of others, there is wrong done to, and injury sustained by, the body; but the perfection of solidarity will consist in the simultaneous development to its highest pitch of the individuality of every member of society.

Individuality consists in the will acting with unrestrained energy in the prosecution of the determinations of the individual sense of the good, the true, and the beautiful; and as the good, the true, and the beautiful have as many aspects as there are men to observe them, and as the welfare of society consists in the accumulation and unification of all these aspects, it follows that the development of individuality and the perfection of solidarity are indissolubly united, and that the encouragement of individuality in no way derogates from the social weal. Consequently the prosecution of a selfish end, as men call that held up to the Christian, is not detrimental to the general well-being; and, on the other hand, it has been made abundantly evident by experience that self-renunciation for the general welfare is calculated to bring individuality to a very exalted position of perfection and dignity.

Secondly, Catholicism is the harmonization of all ideas, of all the doctrines which form the different philosophic systems of antiquity and of modern times.

Christ, according to the Catholic hypothesis, is the Incarnate Reason, and all human reasons are radiations from Himself. "He is," says Justin Martyr, "the Sovereign Reason of whom the whole human race participates. All those who have lived conformably to a right reason, have

been Christians."[1] Therefore, adds S. Augustine, Christ is present wherever there is truth, wisdom, and justice, in East as in the West, among the infidels as among the faithful.[2] "Do you not know," said Malebranche, "that reason itself is incarnate to be at the disposal of all men, to strike the eyes and ears of those who can neither see nor hear except through their senses?—Reason, by becoming incarnate, has not changed its nature in any way, nor lost its power. It is immutable and necessary: it, alone, is the inviolable law of minds."[3]

The Word made flesh, the Divine Reason incarnate, is then to be considered both as the exterior doctor, historical and visible, and also as the interior doctor, spiritual and invisible, "the light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world;"[4] or to use the words of S. Bonaventura, "He is the interior teacher, and one can know no truth except by Him who speaks, not vocally as we do, but by an interior illumination. He is Himself in our souls, and He diffuses the light of true and living ideas over all the abstract and dark ideas of our intellect."[5]

Such is the doctrine of all the Fathers;—Christ is at once an object of faith and of reason, of religion and of philosophy. He, as immutable and veritable Truth, concretes and synthesizes and vivifies every partial and contingent verity; and those who deny Him, separate truths, and fall in consequence into error. "They have not one idea," says Chateaubriand, "which we do not possess, but they cannot follow us into the regions of evangelical light. It is not that our sight is limited, it is that theirs is partial. We perceive all

[1] Apolog. 1 and 2.

[2] In Joan. Evan. c. 8. tr. 35.

[3] Vme. Entretien, 9, and Traité de Morale, ii. c. 4.

[4] S. John i. 9.

[5] Lumen Ecclesiæ, vol. i. p. 42.

that they perceive, but they do not see all that we see." "That is truly and properly Catholic; as the force and significance of the name declare, which truly comprehends all universally," said S. Vincent of Lerins. That which is truly Catholic is not the profession of one doctrine to the exclusion of other doctrines, but is the co-ordination of all ideas, of all possible doctrines, maintained invariably undivided in the infinite conception of Christ, which includes all without excluding any, and adopts all into an unity which forms of them an homogeneous and complete whole. Outside Catholic unity there can be only negation and exclusion, which, breaking the bond of this spiritual community, particularizes that which Catholicism had universalized, decomposes that which it had combined, and reproduces thus the same ideas in broken particles, in torn shreds, but with all their relations displaced or suppressed, and becomes thereby no longer absolute verity, but a selection of relative ideas, incomplete because all ideas are not admitted, and false because all those which are excluded are denied.

S. Clement of Alexandria, starting from the principle that the Catholic Faith is the syncretism of all practical verities professed before and after Christ's advent, applied this principle to that which preceded His coming, and shewed that the Mosaic law and the Greek philosophy were to Christianity what partial verities are to the union of all verities. On this account he founded an exhortation to the Greeks to leave their doubt and to embrace a Gospel which contained all their philosophies and blended them into one with all the verities of Mosaism.

The same idea is thus expressed by Grotius in his book on the verity of the Christian Religion: "Among the heathen there were not wanting men, who taught singly those things which the Christian religion holds univer-

sally."[1] And the Catechism of the Council of Trent teaches the same doctrine.

Let us put what has been said in a simple form perfectly intelligible to all.

Philosophy is spiritualistic or sensational. What does the Cartesian doctrine affirm? That the consciousness of man is the evidence of Truth. What does the sensationalist affirm? that the evidence of Truth is derived through the senses. Catholicism affirms both these premisses.

Does the spiritualist deny that the senses convey evidence of reality? In that denial he ceases to be Catholic.

Does the sensationalist deny the personal consciousness to be the criterium of verity? In that denial he ceases to be Catholic.

The Pantheist affirms that God is in Nature, that He is the ground, the force of nature. It is the fulness of God which flows into the crystal of the rock, the juices of the plant and the life of the animal. The fern, rustling in the forest glade, springs out of God, deriving its greenness and its beauty from Him. The first bud of spring and the last rose of summer, the glittering April shower and the falling snowflakes of December, the sun that glows in the blue sky and the harvest-moon that silvers o'er the farmer's shocks, the dove that complains among the stonepines, the lark that twitters on high, are all expressions of God. The violet blooms of God, the rose blushes with His indwelling presence, the lily is redolent with His fragrance. The Catholic accepts all this; to him also nature is the radiation of the perfections of God, is the manifestation of God to man. But he does not halt at that statement, rest satisfied in that feeling. He supplements it with a belief in a personal God. The Pantheist, by denying the personality of

[1] De Veritate Relig. Chr. lib. i. c. x. note.

God, is driven to deny Him intelligence, and free-will to man. Pantheism in what it affirms is Catholic, in what it denies is error.

Deism affirms the existence of God apart from nature, outside of it. It sees in creation not the presence of an immanent God, but of One who called it into being, stamped it with His seal and left it to run its course. We say that two things are distinct when we can form a distinct idea of each by itself, without however imagining that they can subsist in this isolation; and we say that two things are separable, when we can conceive them as existing and subsisting in isolation. Thus, the idea of a clock is distinct and inseparable from the mind of the maker, but the clock itself is distinct and separate. This world is either the idea or it is the workmanship of God. If we say that it is the idea,—then we are Pantheists, if we say that it is the work, then we are Deists.

Not only is the world the clock, but we are all clocks, says the Deist. We cannot exist without God, who is our cause, but we exist outside of Him, and are separate and distinct from Him, for we are free and can resist Him.

The Deist is Catholic when he affirms the creation of the world by God, and the existence of free-will, but when he denies the immanence of God in creation, he falls into negation, which is error.

But how, it may be asked, can two such opposite theories as Pantheism and Deism be reconciled,—they mutually exclude one another? I may not be able to explain how they are conciliable, but I boldly affirm that each is simultaneously true, and that each must be true, for each is an inexorably logical conclusion, and each is a positive conclusion, and all positive conclusions must be true if Christ be the Ideal and the focus of all truths.

Rationalism makes knowledge the only basis of certainty, it affirms that the intellect of man is capable of ordering and weighing evidence, of discriminating between what is faulty and worthless, and what is valuable and sound. By means of reason he arrives at absolute certainty. This the Catholic allows readily, he adds also that there is another means of attaining certainty—Feeling or sentiment. This the Rationalist denies,—a negation again, which is error.

The Materialist points out that every process of thought is due to action of a material organ, and that thought is the corrosion of the vascular neurine in the brain. Thought is a mode of force. Certain constituents are combined in the brain, and these are held together by chemical cohesion. A reaction takes place, the cohesive force is liberated and takes the shape of an idea; man acts upon the idea and resolves it into muscular force, which impresses itself on materials outside of him, and is produced from change to change for ever.

The Catholic accepts this, but he adds, there is a supernatural order of which the Materialist takes no account, which in fact he denies, and in that denial falls off from Catholic unity and the recognition of the Absolute. He asserts one truth, but by ignoring or refusing to admit the opposite truth falls into error.

What is Atheism? In itself nothing;—a denial of a positive idea. Every negation involves a position. And if every positive idea be a reality, a negation is nothing.

Secondly; Catholicism is the fusion into one of all religions. I shall have more to say in the sequel on the satisfaction of the religious instincts by Christianity, and I will here deal but generally with the subject.

Every religion is the expression of a want of man's spiritual nature, however uncouth or exaggerated may be the form it assumes. This uncouthness or exaggeration is due to negation of correlative wants. The want itself is the strain after a truth, the hunger of the spiritual nature. The Incarnation assumes to satisfy every one of these wants, and therefore must become a web, of which all philosophies are the warp, and all religions are the woof.

"As there are two natures in Christ," says the Abbé Gabriel, in a very remarkable book which has been approved at Rome, "there must be in Christianity two elements; 1st, a common, universal, infinite element, like the divine nature;—this is what the apostle calls 'the Spirit,' and the Catechism of the Council of Trent calls 'the soul of the Church,' and 2nd, a finite, human and progressive element, like human nature:—this is what the apostle calls 'the letter.' But, just as the human nature and the divine nature are indissolubly united in the person of the Word, so the infinite and the finite elements are indissolubly united in Christianity.

"The letter is all that is defined in Christianity, in its morals, its dogmas, its ritual, its constitution and its discipline. The soul of the Church is the verity in universal charity which inspires with spirit and life the outward morals, dogmas, ritual, and discipline. One without the other is the soul without the body which manifests it, the dead letter without the spirit vivifying it.

"Moreover, as a consequence of the union of the two natures in the incarnate Word, the divine nature penetrates the human nature with its spirit, and the human nature participates also in the prerogatives of the divine life. Thenceforth the latter, in itself limited, becomes infinitely dilatable and extensible, without in any way losing the in-

variable fixity of its positive orientation; and the spirit, in itself indefinable, determines itself without losing anything of its character of universality.

"Morality, dogma, ritual, and discipline dilate and develop in the formulæ and their applications, without ceasing to be immutable in their principles and in their essence. And the spirit of infinite charity, which is their life, formulates itself into graces and gifts multiplied in the mystery of its indivisible unity.

"What then does Christianity effect? It gathers up into itself, as a focus, all the truths dispersed in all modes of worship, which are so many successive steps measuring the progress or decay of man in his victory over matter, of which Catholicism is the complete expression. The Word, being the union of the finite with the infinite, resumes in its universal conception all the religious beliefs and philosophies in whatsoever of them is true, and is therefore destined to unite all verities in universal charity which is its principle, its end, and its law.

"The Church did not begin at Bethlehem, but dates from the first man, or rather, eternal in its dogmas, in its life, it was before all ages. It was the Word who illumined Adam and his descendants, the patriarchs before and after the deluge, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, all the prophets, and the Hebrew people. They were all members of the Church. Nay, more; all the verities, so numerous, scattered among the heathen, were but radiations of this divine Word. All the just of paganism, in as far as they professed these verities, were members therefore of the Church. Consequently, the Church sums up in herself all the verities before as well as after the preaching of the Gospel.

"Always new, though some six thousand years old, the

Church, since the Incarnation, is nothing other than the Word Himself, in whom is all Truth. Thus, the verities which can be met with in all sects, for the last two thousand years, are radiations of the Word. There also, the Church is, where a living verity is found, and all those who with good faith follow the law which they have known or or have been able to know, are members of the body of Christ, or of His Church.

"At bottom, all the difference between Catholics and sectarians may be resumed in this:—the former profess the universal unity of all verities wherever dispersed, confessing the indivisibility of the Word and of the universal Church; the latter, on the contrary, shatter the unity of Christ, by following their own peculiar interpretations." [1]

From this it follows, as an inevitable corollary, that toleration is Catholic, that a man who professes himself a Christian and is intolerant of the beliefs and worships of others, is contradicting the essence of his religion, is violating his profession. "Pax hominibus bonæ voluntatis" is the moral law of Christianity in its all comprehension, and every member of the Church is bound in principle to say of himself, that he is

> "intolerant to none,
> Whatever shape the pious rite may bear,
> Ev'n the poor Pagan's homage to the sun
> I would not harshly scorn, lest even there
> I spurn'd some elements of Christian prayer." [2]

Christianity is, in fact, the reintegration of all scattered religious convictions, and this accounts for the adoption by the Church of so many usages belonging primarily to paganism, and for the doctrines of the Creed resembling in so many

[1] Gabriel: Le Christ et le Monde, Paris, 1863, p. 12-14, 24-26.

[2] Hood: Ode to Rae Wilson.

points the traditions of heathendom. In most religions we find many of the ingredients of Christianity displaced, confused and mutilated may be, but certainly present, as,—the unity of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, creation, the fall, the immortality of the soul, resurrection, the judgment, sacrifice, prayer, baptism and communion. "The use of the temple," says M. Gilliot, "of churches dedicated to saints, and adorned with branches of trees on certain occasions, incense, lamps, tapers, votive offerings made upon convalescence, holy water, asylum, festivals and ember seasons, calendars, processions, the benediction of land, sacerdotal vestments, the tonsure, the marriage ring, turning to the East, devotion to images; even, may be, the strains of the Church, the Kyrie Eleison,—all these customs and many others are of oriental origin, sanctified by the adoption of the Catholic Church."[1] And Le Maistre says: "It may be demonstrated that all ancient traditions are true; and that all paganism is but a system of corrupted and displaced verities; and that all that is needed is to wash them, so to speak, and to put them in their proper places."[2]

It has been the fashion of Protestants to cast it in the teeth of the Roman Catholics that their ceremonies are distinctly traceable to heathenism, but these objectors are perhaps unaware that the articles of their belief are also to be deduced from Paganism, that the ancient Egyptian, Persian, and Indian faiths contain nearly all the articles of the Apostles' Creed. Worship is the external expression of belief; if it be justifiable to hold beliefs of heathenism, it is legitimate to use the same methods of giving those beliefs utterance.

Catholicism therefore contains paganism entire, down to

[1] Gilliot: L'Orient, l'Occident et le Nouveau-Monde.

[2] Soirées de S. Pétersbourg, xie. entretien.

its most adulterated notions, polytheism and idolatry. It contains them, as truth contains error; that is to say by adopting all that is positive in them, and leaving out whatever is negative. Error, as I have already shewn, is negation, division introducing antagonism in the bosom of verity. What is Polytheism, but division introduced into the idea of God? That which is affirmative in it is the idea of God, and that Christianity embraces. It only rejects that which is, in itself, nothing, the negation which breaks up the unity of this indivisible verity.

What, again, is idolatry in all its forms, but division pluralizing unity, and transporting the idea of God and His worship from the infinite to the finite, and therefore a negation of the Absolute by the erection of a relative object into the Absolute, an opposition of the finite to the infinite? That which is positive in idolatry, the idea of worship due to God, Catholicism has absorbed and assimilated, rejecting only the negation which cuts up the indivisible unity of this eternal verity. "Behold then!" exclaimed Bossuet, "Religion is always uniform, or rather, it is always the same from the beginning of the world.

"What a consolation for the children of God! the Catholic Church unites within herself all the authority of past ages, and all the ancient traditions of the human race from its origin."[1]

In like manner Catholicism contains all the positive ideas enunciated by the sects. If, from the standpoint of the Ideal, nothing exists, and nothing can exist, outside of Catholicism, if it is of the essence of Catholicism to be all that is and all that can be, that is to say, to comprehend in itself all that man can love, know and practise, Catholicism must contain everything that heretical and schismatical

[1] Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle, ii. art. i. c. 31.

bodies believe and affirm. It will, however, affirm in totality what they affirm in part; it will believe all that they admit, but it will believe a great deal more besides.

This fundamental notion of the Ideal of Catholicism has been thus expressed by Le Maistre in his 'Letter to a Protestant Lady:'—"It is now," he says, "eighteen hundred and nine years that a Catholic Church has been in the world, and has always believed what it believes now. Your doctors will tell you a thousand times that we have innovated; but if we have innovated, it seems strange that it needs such long books to demonstrate it; whereas to prove that you have varied—and you are only of yesterday—no trouble is needed.

"But let us consider an epoch anterior to all the schisms that now divide the world. At the commencement of the tenth century, there was but one faith in Europe. Consider this faith as an assemblage of positive dogmas:—the Unity of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Real Presence, &c.; and to simplify our idea, let us suppose the number of positive dogmas to amount to fifty. The Greek Church, having denied the procession of the Holy Ghost and the Supremacy of the Pope,[1] has therefore only forty-eight points of belief; thus, you see, we believe all that she believes, although she denies two things that we hold. Your sixteenth century sects pushed matters much further and denied a host of other dogmas; but those which they retained are common to us. Finally, the Catholic religion includes all that the sects believe,—this is incontestable.

"The sects, be they what they may, are not *religions*, they

[1] I shall shew in another chapter that this is a mistake of Le Maistre, the dogma of the Supremacy of the Pope is a Negation, not a Positive assertion; it is a negation of the equal authority of others.

are *negations*, that is to say, they are nothing in themselves, for directly they affirm anything they are Catholic.

"It follows as a consequence of the most perfect certainty, that the Catholic who passes into a sect, apostatizes veritably, for he changes his belief, by denying to-day what he believed yesterday: but the sectary who passes into the Church abdicates no dogma, he denies nothing that he believed; on the contrary, he begins to believe what previously he had denied.

"He that passes out of a Christian sect into the Mother Church is not required to renounce any dogma, but only to avow that beside the dogmas which he believed, and which we believe every whit as truly as he, there are other verities of which he was ignorant, but which nevertheless exist."

Let us illustrate this truth in the same way that we illustrated it in reference to philosophy.

Catholicism proclaims the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. Arianism appeared, and, abandoning more or less completely the first of these two terms, it reproduced the second alone. What did Arianism affirm? The humanity of Christ. Catholicism equally affirms this, it believes all that Arianism believed. What did Arianism add to that article of faith? A negation of the first term, *i.e.*—Nothing.

Catholicism proclaims the co-existence of grace and free-will, that is to say of divine and human action, the first the initiative of the second, as the Increate is necessarily the origin of the create. Pelagianism started up and left on one side, more or less formally, the first of these two terms, and reproduced the second alone. What did it affirm? The existence of human liberty. Catholicism had affirmed it long before and believed in all that Pelagianism held.

What then did Pelagianism add to this article of belief? A negation of the first term, *i.e.*—Nothing.

Catholicism proclaims the double necessity of faith and good works. Luther arose, and omitting the second of these two points, admitted the former alone. What did he affirm? The necessity of faith. Catholicism has insisted on this with unchanging voice. What did Luther add? A negation of the second point, *i.e.*—Nothing.

Finally Catholicism proclaims the Sacraments, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, the Real Presence, &c. Protestants reject these; in other terms they substitute for them simple negations, which are nothing.

As every heretical or schismatical sect retains this or that verity which suits it, to the exclusion of other truths, and as this process takes place from a thousand different points of view, it is sufficient to add together the articles separately admitted by these communions, mutually antagonistic, to arrive at the sum of all Catholic verities.

Also, it is sufficient to strike out the points which each rejects, or to subtract them from the total, to arrive at zero, and thus to shew that there is no one phase of truth which they do not deny.

In the first case they conclude directly for Catholicism, which is the entirety of which they are the fragments, in the second they conclude indirectly, by shewing that outside of Catholicism is nothing but a process of disintegration of all belief.

CHAPTER XI

PROTESTANTISM

MEPHISTOPHELES: "*The spirit I that evermore divides.*"—GOETHE'S "FAUST."

The affirmation of self and of God two duties—Mediæval Catholicism affirmed God but neglected the affirmation of self—Protestantism the affirmation of self—Division and opposition the source of all misery and error—Distinction not division—Christian ethics consist in the affirmation of distinctions without division and opposition—The distinction of God and His relations by meditation, prayer, and worship—Luther denied these modes of affirming God—The affirmation of ourselves depends on our affirmation of God—Immorality the division between higher and lower natures—Duty to our neighbours consists in recognition of their rights and non-interference with their liberties—The negation of moral duty by Luther—He was disposed to sanction adultery—The evil of opposing religion to morality—Calvin denied free-will and therefore denied duty—The reformers denied the holiness of God—The system of negation and division carried on—Deification of negation—Opposition of the Church to God—Comte—Neo-Hegelian opposition of man to man—and negation of the Absolute—Subjective Christ opposed to historical Christ—and negation of the reality of the personal Christ—The Protestant spirit one of universal negation and opposition—it has opposed all truths, religions, and philosophies, scientific and æsthetical.

CREATION is the manifestation of Love, the Incarnation is the perfection of that manifestation, the link between God and man is therefore love.

Man's function being to affirm himself and to affirm God, love and reason have in him their proper offices. By reason

he asserts his own individuality, by love he declares God and maintains his connexion with Him, and through Him with all other men.

The exaggeration of love is the confusion of relations, the negation of diversity.

The exaggeration of reason is the opposition of relations, the negation of unity.

The rock on which Roman Catholicism has struck has been the exaggeration of love. Protestantism has gone to pieces on the negation of unity.

In its concentration of attention on God, in its passionate devotion to Him, in its reiteration of His existence, as all in all, attesting Him in humanity as the basis of charity, in science as the basis of truth, in art as the Ideal of perfect beauty, in morals as the source of virtue, Romanism has exhibited a tendency to forget individual man. It has bidden each man dissolve his personality in God, and disappear as an entity, that God may be all in all. "I am all and you are nothing," Christ is supposed to have said to S. Catharine of Sienna in one of her revelations. That was the practical maxim of the Mediæval Church,—the negation of self before God; and this has been the cause of the self-devotion and self-sacrifice of so many millions of ecstatics and ascetics.

In its concentration of attention on self, in its declaration of the infallibility of private judgment, Protestantism has ended in atheism. It has broken the link connecting man with man, and the fracture of that link has been the negation of the Absolute and the deification by each man of his own opinion.

If Catholicism be the principle of inclusion, Protestantism is the principle of exclusion. The first is the system of conciliation of all verities, the second is the opposition of all verities to their mutual exclusion.

Division, separation and antagonism has been the cause of all the misery and error the world has known and felt. "Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand," said our Lord.[1] This divine sentence is written in letters of blood on every page of history. Those extinct nations who have left their mighty ruins to encumber the soil at Babylon, Nineveh, Persepolis, Memphis and Rome, died through the division of men against men. If we enter into the chamber of our souls, we find them a prey to troubles, struggles, inconstant desires gnawing at our peace, and we find that we are in division within ourselves. From that internal division, discord has broken out in society, in science and in art, in all orders of human activity. Thence is it that empires, thrones, peoples and individuals are broken and disappear.

Division is the precursor of death. It begins in man's body with a rupture of the unity of operation, its manifestation is sickness, its triumph is mortality. It begins in man's soul with an opposition of his passions and his principles, his love and his reason, it produces moral disorganization and ends in vice. It begins in a nation with the conflict of liberty against authority, it causes revolution, and it ends in political death, the death caused by a despotism of authority or a despotism of licence.

Let the difference between division and distinction be clearly apprehended; for therein the secret lies. Distinction is a duty, division is a crime. I cannot realize my liberty without distinguishing myself from God and from my fellow-men; but if I oppose myself to God and to my fellows, I introduce division.

Now, the defect of the Roman Catholic system has been

[1] Matt. xii. 25.

the neglect of distinction, of drawing out man's personality. And the defect of the Protestant system is the conversion of distinction into division. The former has produced an artificial unity, the latter has precipitated mankind into universal contradiction.

The whole theory of Christian ethics is an application of the law of love as the link, and of reason as the differentiator. There are duties owed to God, to one's self, and to other men. The duty owed to God is the recognition of Him.

We recognize God by an act of the will, and by an act of faith.

We recognize Him by meditation, prayer, and worship. By meditation, prayer, and worship we emphasize the personality of God, and place ourselves face to face with Him, we declare that He is, just as when we place ourselves opposite the sun we conceive the idea and assert that the sun is.

Meditation is an abstraction of attention from one's self, to fix it entirely on God, it is the will insisting on His reality. Prayer is the assertion of the two personalities, the personality of God and that of the suppliant. It is the affirmation of the existence of a link uniting the two individualities.

Worship is the subjection of the personality of the worshipper to the object worshipped; it is therefore the affirmation of the relations the two personalities bear to one another.

Consequently Meditation, Prayer, and Worship are three duties owed to God by every Christian; he cannot pretermit one without negativing or ignoring the reality, the link, or the relation. The first is an act of faith, the second an act of hope, and worship is an act of love. By meditation he expresses his belief in God, he brings out his vague convictions and gives them shape and consistency, by prayer he gives voice to his trust in God, and by worship

he pours forth into the lap of God all the treasures of his affection.

Atheism is the negation of God or of the duty owed to God, it is either speculative or practical; speculative if it denies the existence of God, practical if it denies the relations. Speculative Atheism is the boldest and most consistent form of negation, but practical Atheism is the commonest, because many who shrink from denying God directly, are ready to deny Him obliquely.

If meditation be the affirmation of the existence of God—and meditation need not be lengthy, one rapid flash of thought is sufficient—to neglect it is practically to deny God.

If prayer be the affirmation of the link between God and man, to neglect prayer is to disallow the link; and the link severed, the two personalities are opposed and become actively hostile, so that the idea of God is destroyed or at least is passively ignored.

If worship be the affirmation of the superiority of God to man, of the relation in which man stands to God and God to man, the former being the relation of freewill, the latter the relation of grace—with the abolition of worship the relations disappear, and the relations disappearing the distinction disappears and man resolves himself into the Absolute, so that we have every man proclaiming himself to be God, or at least passively regarding himself as infallible.

These duties to God Luther emphatically denied. He said, "When the monks sitting in their cells meditated on God and His works, when inflamed with the most ardent devotion they bowed the knee, prayed, and contemplated heavenly things with so much delight that for much joy they shed tears;—Here was no thought of women nor of any other creature, but only of the Creator and His marvellous works. And yet this thing, most spiritual in the

judgment of reason, is according to Paul a work of the flesh. Wherefore all such is religious idolatry, and the more holy and spiritual it is in appearance, so much the more pernicious and pestilential it is."[1]

That, practically, prayer and worship have ceased to be regarded as duties, or, at all events, are but little professed among Protestants, is evident to any one visiting a country which handed over its people to the Reformers.

Our duties to ourselves flow from our recognition of God. For what are the duties we owe to ourselves but the development of our higher powers, the disengagement of the I-myself from the constraint of passions, and the distinguishing of myself from others by the realization of my personality.

Immorality is the negation of my higher nature; the affirmation of my animality alone and its opposition to my spirituality to the exclusion of the latter. To live for passion is to assert with the Hegelian poet,—

"Rien n'est vrai que le plaisir,"[2]

that is, pleasure which is sensual.

Our duties to others are derived from our recognition of God. For as our duty to ourselves comes from Him who has given us rights, and imposed upon us the obligation to accomplish those rights, so are we bound to acknowledge the equality of rights and duties in other men, and therefore our obligation to recognise them and allow them free scope.

Interference with the rights of others is preventing the growth of other individualities, and is therefore a crime.

Protestantism has disturbed the moral order by the

[1] Comm. in Gal. cap. v. ver 20.

[2] Herwegh: Ode à l'Ironie.

introduction of one or other of two negations; the Lutheran denial of duty, or the Calvinistic denial of free-will.

The doctrine of duty is the doctrine of moral obligation to God, to develop our own natures and to leave others unmolested to the free expansion of their natures.

This doctrine of free-will is the doctrine that God does not compel any man but leaves him free, that the link of authority between Him and man is moral, not effective.

By the negation of duty, Luther upset the idea of responsibility, and by the negation of free-will Calvin brought about the same result.

To the doctrine of duty, Luther opposed the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Catholicism holds both doctrines equally and harmonizes both. But Luther says, "In spiritual or divine things which regard the salvation of the soul, man is like the pillar of salt into which Lot's wife was changed; yea, he is like a trunk and a stone."[1] "Thou seest how rich is the Christian; even if he will he *cannot* destroy his salvation by any sins how grievous soever, unless he refuse to believe."[2] "Be thou a sinner and sin boldly, but still more boldly believe and rejoice in Christ. From Him sin shall not separate us, no, though a thousand thousand times in every day we should commit fornication or murder."[3] "If in faith an adultery were committed it were no sin."[4] And Melancthon says, "Whatever thou doest, whether thou eatest, drinkest, workest with thy hand, teachest, I may add shouldst thou even sin therewith, look not to thy works, weigh the promise of God."[5] Sir William Hamilton quotes the following hor-

[1] Luth. in Gen. c. xix. [2] Luth. de Captiv. Bab. tom. ii. vol. 264.
[3] Epist. Lutheri, Jena 1556, tom. i. p. 548. [4] Disput. tom. i. p. 523.
[5] Quoted in Moeler's Symbolism, from which also I have taken the above references.

rible passages, "God pleaseth you when He crowns the unworthy, He ought not to displease you when He damns the innocent. All things take place by the eternal and invariable will of God, who blasts and shatters in pieces the freedom of the will. God creates in us the evil in like manner as the good. The high perfection of faith is to believe that God is just, notwithstanding that by His will He renders us necessarily damnable." "We cannot advise that the licence of marrying more wives than one be *publicly* introduced. . . . There is nothing unusual in princes keeping concubines, and although the lower orders may not perceive the excuses of the thing, the more intelligent know how to make allowance."[1] As Sir William Hamilton truly says, "Not content to reason against the institution (of celibacy) within natural limits and on legitimate grounds, his fervour led Luther to deny explicitly, and in every relation, the existence of chastity, as a physical impossibility; led him publicly to preach (and who ever preached with the energy of Luther?) incontinence, adultery, incest even, as not only allowable, but if practised under the prudential regulations which he himself lays down, unobjectionable, and even praiseworthy. The epidemic spread; a fearful dissolution of manners throughout the sphere of the Reformer's influence was for a season the natural result. The ardour of the boisterous Luther infected, among others, even the ascetic and timorous Melancthon.

"Polygamy awaited only the permission of the civil ruler to be promulgated as an article of the Reformation, and had this permission not been significantly refused, it would not have been the fault of the fathers of the Reformation if Christian liberty has remained less ample than Mahom-

[1] Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1834.

medan licence. As it was, polygamy was never abandoned by either Luther or Melancthon as a religious speculation; both, in more than a single instance, accorded the formal sanction of their authority to its practice—by those who were above the law; and had the civil prudence of the imprudent Henry VIII. not restrained him, sensual despot as he was, from carrying their spontaneous counsel into effect, a plurality of wives might now have been a privilege as religiously contended for in England as in Turkey."[1] The grossness of Luther's mind cannot be ignored by any one who will take the trouble to read his sermon on matrimony, preached publicly before a large congregation, but which it is impossible to quote.

The same sort of teaching has continued to prevail amongst those who have adopted the principles of Luther. Man is held to be so utterly corrupt that there is no need for him to attempt a reformation of himself, whatever is to be done will be done by the free grace of God, or by the formation of an internal conviction of the goodness of God. Said Bishop Beveridge, "I cannot pray but I sin, I cannot hear or preach a sermon but I sin, I cannot give an alms or receive the sacrament but I sin, nay, I cannot so much as confess my sins but my very confessions are still aggravations of them." "God justifies the sinner freely and imputes to him righteousness without works. . . . The justification of a sinner has no connexion with his own personal obedience either to the moral or ceremonial law, in the act of his justification his own performances are not taken into account."[2] "It is absurd for the ministers of

[1] Essay on the Scottish Kirk. Sir W. Hamilton bases his opinion in part on a Disputatio sive consultatio, anno 1531, die 23 Augustii a Phil. Melancthone de Digamia Regis Angliæ.

[2] Sermons by Rev. S. Cooper.

the Gospel to propose to the sinner to do his best by way of healing the disease of his soul and then to come to the Lord Jesus to perfect his recovery. The only previous qualification is to know our misery, and the remedy is prepared."[1]

Tracts containing statements like the following are scattered broadcast over the land:—"The only qualification a man has for being saved is his being a sinner. The one thing that gives him a claim upon the Saviour is the simple fact that he is a sinner. Dear reader! Take your place as a thoroughly bad good-for-nothing sinner, and then say, 'Saviour, thou art mine, *for* I am a sinner.'"[2]

To the evil of this teaching a Protestant writer bears testimony. He believes in Protestantism, but is disturbed by seeing how perniciously the popular teaching of justification is turned into a negation of morality. "The popery of human nature," he writes, "gladly accepts such views of religion as leave men undisturbed in the enjoyment of the pleasures of sin for a season. . . . The vast majority are very willing to be told that right belief will save their souls alive. If so, all is well. They have no misgivings as to the correctness of their belief. They may go in peace. These are indeed glad tidings of great joy, and he who proclaims them will always be a welcome preacher to the many who frequent the broad and easy way of a mere nominal religion. . . . It is not meant to question the sincere and earnest piety of the preachers themselves in the present day. To their own Master they severally stand or fall. But their own guilelessness may make them less watchfully alive to the moral mischiefs so much requiring repentance and amendment of life, which

[1] Dr. Hawker's Works, vol. vi.

[2] Tract by Religious Tract Society.

actually prevail in the hearts of those whom they exhort."[1]

"When this doctrine shall be once thoroughly understood," writes a barrister in his 'Tracts of an Anti-Tractarian,' "the whole gang of coiners, pickpockets, receivers of stolen goods, brothel-keepers, housebreakers, and all the attendant train of criminals, may go on sinning in security within the scope of a covenant which procured for them pardon and peace from all eternity, and the blessings of which 'no act whatever' can possibly frustrate or destroy. . . . The daily increasing crowds of the ignorant and uninquiring which are gained over to the new school of faith act fearfully on the national welfare."

I would not have it supposed that the doctrine of faith is not held by Catholics as sincerely as by Protestants, but with the former, faith is the very first step in their religious system upon which all the moral code depends. Faith is the recognition of God. That recognition must be made before the dogma of duty can be evolved from it. The Lutheran establishes the first principle and hacks away all its consequences, nay, he opposes it to its consequences.

The Calvinistic theory is not more satisfactory. As I have pointed out in the former volume, it also is the negation of moral obligation.

Free-will being denied, man acts as the Creator moves him. He commits sin or does what is right because God wills him to sin or to be just; God is responsible, not man. "We assert," Calvin taught, "that by an eternal and unchangeable decree, God hath determined whom He will one day permit to share in eternal felicity, and whom He will damn. In respect to the elect the decree is

[1] The Missing Doctrine, 1865, pp. 4-5.

founded in His unmerited mercy without any regard to human worthiness, but those whom He delivers up to damnation are, by a just and irreprehensible judgment, excluded from all access to eternal life." As faith was considered by Calvin a gift of Divine mercy, and yet as he was unable to deny that many are represented in the Gospel to be believers, in whom Christ found no earnestness and no perseverance, and whom therefore he does not recognize as elect, Calvin asserts that God intentionally produced within them an apparent faith, that He insinuated Himself into the souls of the reprobate in order to render them more inexcusable.[1]

With Calvin there is a negation of moral authority and of conscience. God rules by force, and when Calvin framed his model republic of Geneva upon these principles, he tolerated no liberty of conscience, but drove the Catholics to hear his preachers, imprisoned the irreligious, and clipped the hair and ruffles of the vain.

The salient difference between Protestant ethics and Catholic moral law is that with the former, religion and morals are distinct and opposed, with the latter they are combined. Luther in numberless passages of his writings insists on the separation; he puts them as wide apart as the east and the west, he opposes them as light and darkness. He teaches that the moral law should not be suffered to take up its abode in our consciences to stiffen them into a sense of responsibility. When the question was put to him, "What need is there then of moral law?" his answer was, "For the sake of civil order." He called morality the Law, and faith he termed Grace, and insisted that the pursuit of the former incapacitated man for receiving the latter.

[1] Calvin: lib. iii. c. 2, v. 11.

"These two things," said Luther in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, "must ever be separated one from the other in our minds and our hearts, that the conscience when it feels its sins and is terrified may say to itself, Now thou art of the earth, therefore let the lazy ass then work, and serve, and ever carry the burden imposed upon it. That is to say, let the body with its members be ever subjected to the law. But when thou mountest up to heaven, leave the ass with its burden upon the earth. For the conscience must have nothing to do with the law, works, and earthly righteousness. The law must remain out of heaven, that is to say out of the heart and the conscience. On the other hand the freedom of the Gospel is to remain out of the world, that is to say out of the body and its members." And he goes on to shew that the law, or morality, is the state or civil rule, that morality is simply obedience to the law of the land and immorality is therefore no violation of God's law, nor affects the conscience in any way.

The logical consequence of this doctrine was the negation of the sinfulness of sin, and therefore the negation of the holiness of God. And to this extent the followers of Luther actually did proceed.

Melancthon, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, in the edition of the year 1525, hardily asserted that God wrought evil and good indiscriminately, that He was the author of David's adultery, of the treason of Judas as well as of Paul's conversion. In writing to the Landgrave Philip of Hesse (1530), Zwingli asserted that God is "the author, mover, and impeller to sin," and that He uses the instrumentality of man to produce injustice, "He it is who moves the robber to murder the innocent."[1] In

[1] Zwingli de Providentiâ, c. vi. "Movet latronem ad occidendum innocentem, etiamsi imparatum."

numerous places also Calvin declares that God instigates man to the commission of what is evil, and that man's fall into crime is ordained by the providence of God.[1] Beza, after Calvin's death, was not satisfied with repeating that God incites, impels, and urges to evil, he even added that "the Almighty creates a portion of men to be His instruments, with the intent of carrying out His evil designs through them."[2]

If Lutheranism and Calvinism have not led, wherever they have been embraced, to a general dissolution of morals, this is due to the fragments of positive truth which they have retained, and to the fact that men are often better than their profession, and that none are rigidly consequent in what they do to the principles they claim as their guide.

I. have quoted at length the sentiments of the principal Reformers to shew that their systems, when not positive, are negations of Catholic teaching on morality; that they introduce a schism between religion and duty.

The true successors of the Reformers are those who carry division and opposition into realms of thought and feeling they left intact. Their great work was the separation of authority and liberty, of the Church and the Scriptures, of religion and morality. The Mediæval Church had doubtless allowed authority to overlap and suffocate liberty, and had made tradition supersede Scripture; but the Protestant Reformers lifted liberty and Scripture into the glare of day, and trod authority and the Church into the dust,

[1] Calvini Instit. lib. iv. c. 18, sec. 2; lib. iii. c. 28, sec. 8.

[2] Bezæ Aphorism. xxii. "Sic autem agit per illa instrumenta, ut non tantum sinat illa agere, nec tantum moderetur eventum, sed etiam incitet, impellat, moveat, regat, atque adeo, quod omnium est maximum, et creat, ut per illa agat, quod constituit."

and they put asunder that which had hitherto kept a holy wedlock, religion and morality.

The successors of these schismatics—the word exactly expresses their character of dividers—are those who elevate schism or opposition into the only realities.

"We know nothing to be true," says Bruno Bauer, "but that negation is universal."[1] "Negation is eternal," says Proudhon,[2] as the fundamental principle and conclusion of his philosophy. But, say others, when we deny all, we ought to deny that negation itself, and this negation constitutes all that we know as positive. Thus out of nothing something comes.

"The grandeur of human nature," observes M. Renan, "consists in contradiction."[3] "Contradiction is the sign of truth."[4]

This doctrine has been applied to every branch of science, to history, politics, and social economy. It has been applied to God Himself.

"God," says M. Vacherot, "is man's shadow projected into heaven." "We adore the great, the all-powerful Negation," is the religion of Feuerbach.[5] This negation in its concrete form is evil, impiety, hatred of God, horror of men. It is what the Christian calls Satan, the personification and principle of division, that "Spirit of contradiction" which Faust bids "lead the way" to utter ruin and annihilation.

"Adversary of the Eternal!" exclaims M. Proudhon, "be on my side, Satan, whoever you may be, I will take your word and ask for nothing more."[6] "Come, Satan come,

[1] Bauer: Critique des Evangiles synoptiques, preface.
[2] Proudhon: Révolution sociale démontrée, &c.
[3] Renan: Etudes sur le poëme de Job, p. 62.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 67.
[5] Feuerbach: Das Wesen der Religion. Leipz. 1849.
[6] La Révolution au 17^{me} siècle.

the calumniated of priests and of kings, that I may embrace you, that I may clasp you to my breast! I have known you for long and you have known me. Your works, O blessed of my heart! are not always beautiful and good, but they alone give us a knowledge of the universe, and prevent it from being an absurdity. Without you what would justice be? an instinct; reason? a routine; man? a beast. You alone animate and fecundate toil, you ennoble wealth, you excuse authority, you place the seal on virtue. Hope on, proscribed one! I have only my pen to place at your service, but it is worth millions of bulletins."[1]

Others again deny the Absolute by identifying the human race with Him; or rather, let me say, they raise Humanity to the pitch of Deification. These are the Positivists, who affirm the link between man and man which Catholics hold, viz., Charity, but deny God and, with Him, the link uniting man to Him. They may be said to affirm the Church and to oppose it to God. The human race, conceived as a continuous whole, without beginning of days or end of life, past, present, and future, is the "Grand Etre" of Auguste Comte. If there be a Supreme Providence, the best, and indeed the only, way of rightly worshipping and serving Him, is by doing our utmost to love and serve that other Great Being, whose inferior Providence has bestowed on us all the benefits that we owe to the labours and virtues of former generations. Inasmuch as we know nothing of the Supreme Being, supposing there be one, we cannot worship Him, but as we do know the Great Being, Humanity, we can serve and worship it. It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, embraces the manifold present, and descends into the interminable future.

[1] De la justice dans la Révolution, viii^e. étude, c. v. sec, 42.

Of the vast unrolling web of human life, the part best known to us is irrevocably past; this we can no longer serve, but can still love; to the present we are attached by a thousand threads, the making or unmaking of the future is in our hands. The golden rule of morality is to live for others. To do as we would be done by is not sufficient for the founder of the religion of Positivism, we should endeavour not to love ourselves at all. Nothing less will satisfy him, as towards humanity, than the sentiment addressed by Thomas à Kempis to God; "I will love Thee more than myself, and myself only for Thee." The good of others is to be the only inducement on which we allow ourselves to act; and we should endeavour to suppress all our personal desires, every feature of egoism, for the love of others. Every indulgence, even in food, not necessary to health, he condemns as immoral. All gratifications, except those of the affections, are to be tolerated only as "inevitable infirmities."

Such is an outline of Comte's remarkable system, which he afterwards developed into a complete religion with elaborate ritual, liturgy, and hierarchy, a religion in which the object of worship and praise, and to whom sacrifice was to be offered, is the Human Race.

In this we have one half of a truth, the Catholic doctrine of the social Christ, the universal Man, bound together by the tie of charity, but separated from, and opposed to, the personal Christ, the God-Man.

Another school, of which the Neo-Hegelians are the chief, and most conspicuous apostles, deify man individually in opposition to other men and to the negation of God.

"My task," said Feuerbach, "is to affirm man, who has been denied for two thousand years by religious and scholas-

tic sophists. The knowledge, the conscience, man has of God is nothing but a name by which he designates the science of himself. His God is the soul manifested: man adores himself and cannot do otherwise." "Man's God is only his idea of himself." "You believe that love is an attribute of God, because you love yourself; you believe that God is a wise and good being, because you know nothing better than wisdom and goodness; you believe that God exists because you exist yourself, that He is a being because you are yourself a being." Thence he develops a scheme of Christianity as the worship by man of himself in his different attributes.[1] This is that Brocken Spectre called God, of which M. Vacherot speaks, and M. Marr following his lead says, "Teach man that there is no other God but himself, that he is the alpha and omega of all things, the superior being, and the most real reality." "Philosophy," thinks M. Proudhon, "does not deny the Absolute, it simply eliminates Him. Alone, the Revolution looked Him in the face and said to itself, I will conquer Him. Is it war we proclaim against God?—Be it so, let us make war upon Him."[2] "Let us drive the eternal Father back into His remote heaven," exclaims the same writer; "His presence amongst us hangs on a thread. The Revolution does not mince matters with the Deity."[3]

But in this divinization of man, there is a truth, the truth that each man is made in the image of God, and is to some extent a reflexion of the perfections of God. It deifies those human attributes which Christianity gives in their perfection to the Man Jesus. But it denies the Absolute. It makes each man his own God, and introduces universal discord and variance into the family of men.

[1] Feuerbach: Das Wesen des Christenthums. Leipz. 1849.

[2] De la Justice dans la Révolution, vi^e. étude, c. 11, sec. 12.

[3] La Révolution au 19^e siécle, p. 292.

There is another school of theorists whose Deity is "the God of pure reason, a bare abstraction, outside of time, space, movement, life, and all the conditions of reality: the God whom, in their speculative soaring, Plato, Plotinus, Malebranche, and Fénélon pursued in vain as a real Being; the God whose activity is without movement, whose thought is without development, whose will is without choice, whose eternity is without duration, whose immensity is without extent. This God, whom a contemporary represents as relegated to the desert throne of his silent and void eternity, has no other throne than the mind, no other reality than the idea."[1]

This also is true, as has been already shewn, true of the Absolute apart from creation, in His side turned from all relations with the world and with men. But this is only one truth, and it is converted into the denial of that other side, the relative aspect of God, as Creator and Incarnate, the highest expressions of the knowable Deity.

There is also the subjective God, the result of the grand imaginative instincts of humanity, as M. Renan calls Him, created by man's thought, but without reality. An idea, nothing more. M. Renan calls by this sublime name the secret and interior motive of all his great aspirations. God is to him the highest type of science and art. He is the truth that he conceives, the beauty he imagines. "Humanity," says M. Renan, "is not composed of wise men and philosophers. It is often mistaken, or rather it often deceives itself on facts and persons. But it does not deceive itself on the object of its worship: that which it adores is really adorable; for that which it adores in the characters it has idealized, are goodness and beauty." "Man makes the

[1] Vacherot: La Métaphysique et la Science, ii. p. 539.

sanctity of that which he believes in, as he makes the beauty of that which he loves." "The word God being in possession of the respect of humanity, this word having a long prescriptive right, and having been used in beautiful poems, should not be abandoned, lest the habits of language be upset. Tell the simple to live on aspirations after truth, beauty, and moral goodness, these words will be to them without sense. Tell them to love God, not to offend God, and they will understand you at once. God, Providence, immortality, are so many good old words, a little heavy may be, which Philosophy will interpret in the most refined sense, but which it can never replace with advantage. Under one form or another, God will always be the summary of our supra-sensible wants, the category of the ideal, that is to say the form under which we conceive the ideal, as space and time are the categories of bodies, that is, the forms under which we conceive bodies. In other terms, man, placed before beautiful things, good or true, goes out of himself, and suspended by a celestial charm, annihilates his paltry personality, is in ecstasy, and lost. What is this but adoration?"[1]

What is this but the Christ, the ideal God-Man, minus His reality. M. Renan affirms all that man desires to be very good, except one important demand, without which his affirmations are nothing worth, the reality of the Ideal.

Such then is the Protestant spirit carried out to its ulterior consequences, a spirit exclusive, negative, combative. It begins by opposing religion to morality, and liberty to authority, it pursues its course and opposes man against God, and man against man. It denies the Church, the universal Christ, and then it affirms the Church and denies

[1] Etudes d'Histoire Religieuse, 1864, preface, pp. 334, 419.

the personal Christ. It denies the relative God, by opposing to that idea the notion of the absolute God, and then it idealizes the God-Man, but denies His reality. It denies the existence of virtue or of vice, and then it affirms their identity. And finally, it denies everything in a paroxysm of spleen, and says that nothing is but Negation.

Rational truths and æsthetic truths are the sisters of moral and religious truths. These four segments make a complete circle. Catholicism unites all, or professes to do so. Protestantism opposes all to one another, at least in theory.

The inevitable consequence of the introduction of the Protestant spirit into a country has been that it has invaded the social relations to break them up, by setting man against man. I speak with confidence, that any one who has had opportunities of contrasting Protestant with Catholic society will admit, that, in the latter case, mutual confidence, trust and sympathy, is a prominent characteristic, whereas, in the former, suspicion, distrust, and alienation are its most salient features. And this is inevitable, for the base of the Catholic system is unity, whereas, in the other system, the fundamental principle is division.

And this it is which has produced that peculiar phenomenon of Protestant religionism—snobbishness, vulgarity. Cross the Gemmi from the Valais into the canton of Berne, and you pass from courtesy to a brutality of manner not unlike that so common in our own land. Go from the Catholic Rhine into Calvinist Holland or Lutheran Prussia, and the ill weeds of blackguardism stare you in the face at once. Why is it so? Because the Protestant is taught, as an integral part of his religion, to make himself and his own opinion the criterium of right for every one else; he is therefore taught to set himself above every one else, to defy

every one else, to hate the man who is wiser, richer, and more powerful than himself, and to spurn from him the ignorant, the poor, and the weak.

The Protestant spirit is not confined to sectarian bodies, it has invaded the Roman Church. If Anglican bishops in their charges attack all those religious truths to which they are themselves colour-blind, Roman prelates assail all those scientific truths of which they are themselves ignorant, as though they were inevitably destructive to religion. That same narrow spirit animates equally the Roman curia and the Puritan press, the Inquisition and the "Church Association." It is that same spirit which urges Pius IX. to proclaim his own personal infallibility, and which makes the sects split and splinter into smaller and yet smaller fragments, till each man's opinion becomes his only truth, and every man becomes his own god.

The principle of Persecution is by its very nature un-Catholic. The development of the spirit of intolerance in the Roman communion inevitably followed the introduction of the autocratic principle,—the erection of the Papacy into a spiritual sovereignty. One evil led to another. Whether compulsion be used to make a man believe twelve articles of belief when he can only mentally grasp three, or to make a man surrender nine because the persecutor can only tolerate three, is immaterial, the principle is identical, the setting up of the belief of one man as the measure of belief to other men—a principle eminently Protestant. Consequently, Philip II. of Spain was more of a Protestant than a Catholic at heart, and William the Silent, ready to tolerate all religions, was a truer Catholic than his foe.

Luther and Calvin introduced the wedge to drive apart religion and morality, and Puritanism has forced apart religion and æsthetics. The beauty of holiness is taught to

be not one truth, but beauty to be one thing and holiness another thing, and both to be contrary the one to the other.

To any one with artistic taste, poetic feeling, and refined perceptions, there is something inexpressibly sad in passing from a Catholic to a Protestant country, it is like passing from sunshine into mist, from mountain variety and beauty into fens, well-drained, cut into square fields, but intolerably monotonous.

Few, unless they think over it, are aware how much they are indebted to Catholicism for the lovely ideas and pleasant memories which relieve the dreariness of their common life. The poets involuntary derive beautiful imagery from it, painters delight in it, architects build inspired by it. What would foreign travel be without Catholic sights? Few are uninfluenced by the beauty of that religion which bathes so large a portion of the Continent in rosy light; and it is only with a shudder that we pass into a Lutheran State or a Calvinistic Canton, to a leaden religious sky, and a people with ashes, white and ghastly, strewn over their lives. What would France, Belgium, the Rhine become, if Protestantized?

> "Great God, I had rather be
> A Pagan suckled in some creed outworn;
> So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
> Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn."[1]

What is a grand old minster when it has fallen into Protestant hands? A shell. The spirit which vivified it is gone, and it looks thenceforth a corpse; beautiful still, with a beauty derived from the life which once animated it, but now dead and slowly decaying.

Not only has Protestantism divided morality from religion, and religion from beauty; it has not suffered truth to

[1] Wordsworth.

stand intact. Religious truth is shivered into a thousand bits, and truth is set against truth. The Tridentine anathemas were hurled against no positive belief, but every Protestant Confession has been charged with explosive material to kill the faith of the simple, and to mangle that of men with wider compass. The Protestant public clamours "ad leones" for all who dare assert that there are men beyond the mountains, and the rulers of the Establishment, with rough impatient hand, cast out all who see further than themselves, or believe more strongly than do they.

> "Like the base Indian, who threw a pearl away
> Richer than all their tribe."

CHAPTER XII

CHRISTIANITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

"Would'st thou possess thy heritage, essay
By active use to render it thine own."—GOETHE'S "FAUST."

The will the individualizing faculty—Individual will and collective will—The tendency of society to destroy individuality—Yet individuality is necessary for social advance—The rights of man were ignored before the appearance of Christianity—The slave had no rights logically or really—The poor had no place—The woman had no rights—nor had the child—The dogmatic basis of right laid down by Christianity—Christianity a social revolution—Testimony of the Apostles to its liberal character—Equality in the Church—The union of Church and State interfered with the emancipation of individuality—The doctrine of equality of rights ignored in the Middle Ages—Exaggeration of authority to the annihilation of liberty—Da Vinci freed science from authority and made observation the test of truth—Luther made the individual judgment the criterium of religious truths—Descartes made it the basis of philosophic certainty—Rousseau founded morality on the individual conscience—The French Revolution established politics on individual right.

OUR first sentiment is faith in our own existence, our second is belief in our liberty, our third is to hold ourselves capable of accomplishing that liberty, our fourth is to will to do so. This will follows upon the three first intuitions, because they express conviction in our real possession of ourselves in spite of the objectivity of the exterior world. To will is to bring our force, our energy

into play, it is to impose our personality on what is outside of us.

The will belongs to the very highest faculties of the soul, to those faculties whose place nothing can supply, which constitute the I-myself, and insulate me in the midst of my genus, *Homo*.

Will may be individual or collective, according as it proceeds from one person or from an agglomeration of individuals, as a family, a tribe, or a nation.

Collective will, which takes centuries to grow and centuries to act, is the most powerful: it holds the sceptre of the world. It was by this that Rome conquered the earth, it was by this that European sovereignties crushed feudalism, it was by this that revolutionary France triumphed at the moment when Europe, leagued against her, found her without army, without money, a prey to civil war and to the horrors of factions.

In the individual, will never reaches such greatness; but although the collective will is the concourse of a multitude of individual wills, there is in the will of each when it has reached a certain degree of excellence a sort of irresistible attraction which does not fail in the end to become the centre to a circle of more pliant and undecided wills. Then its power, multiplied by all these, acquires a force which surpasses the sphere of individuality.

In nature everything tends towards agglomeration, to centralization; men melt into one another, and their personality disappears in the mass. Tin ceases to be tin and copper to be copper, and the result is brass. Society is a gulf swallowing up individualities, it is a Maelström sucking in every man who comes within the attraction of its vortex, the stronger the personality of him who is absorbed, the more battered and crushed will it be in the churning of

that whirlpool. Empty casks and hen-coops alone survive. Individuality is as necessary to be developed and raised to its highest pitch as is solidarity. But we have supposed that social perfection is attainable only through obliteration of individuality. Marbles are made by shaking together in a bag a hundred or a thousand unshaped pieces of material. They lose all their edges and come forth perfectly alike, and all excellently adapted to be the toys of children.

Division of labour augments production, but crétinizes the labourer. Perfection in anything requires a speciality of attention, and this despoils man of the integrity of being. "Extreme subdivision of labour," writes Michelet, "has specialized the workman, and penned him up in this or that narrow sphere, and made him a thing isolated in his action and capacity, as impotent in itself, if separated from the whole, as a wheel apart from a machine. They are no longer men, but portions of men, who link their action together and work like a single engine. This continuing has gradually created strange classes of men, sickening to the sight, because one perceives in them at the first glance the ugly impress of a narrow speciality of work; that is to say, the complete subjection of personality to some miserable detail of industry. Aristotle, in his politics, says, as a calculating naturalist noting exterior signs, 'The slave is an ugly man,' and doubtless the slave of antiquity was ugly, bent, and often made hump-backed by his burden; but yet, with all that, he varied his labours, exercised his different physical faculties, preserved in them a certain equilibrium, and remained a man: he was the slave of a man. But what, alas! shall we say of him who, bound down to some minute occupation, the same, and the same for ever, the serf of a miserable product of manufacture, is

the slave of a pin—of a ball of cotton. And then how many slaves, moreover, has this single pin, in its different parts, head, shank, and point, who, doing but one single thing, must confine their activity and their mind to that measure."[1]

I have known a man work twelve hours a day making dolls' eyes, and he might not vary their colour. In twenty-five years he had made millions of dolls' eyes, all cerulean blue; and these were the years in which he might have created himself. He had no time for that, he was chained like a galley slave, not to a cannon ball, but to blue dolls' eyes.

I live in a little country curacy amongst two hundred rustics, "whose talk is of bullocks." Their thoughts, their feelings are raw and contracted, for their minds and hearts are in the clay they dig from infancy to decrepitude. I should disbelieve in man as a progressive being, if the express did not rush past my windows twice a day.

Individuality is that which distinguishes man from the beast, and where individuality is not given scope for development man returns to his animality. "Beast thou art, and unto beast shalt thou return!"

"It is not by wearing down into uniformity," are the golden words of Mr. J. Stuart Mill, "all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it, and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life becomes rich, diversified and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely

[1] Michelet: French Revolution, tr. Bohn, 1864, p. 451.

better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others."[1]

In order that man's spontaneity may have power to develop itself, liberty is absolutely necessary, liberty of thought, liberty of action, liberty of speech. Interfere with these rights, and you mutilate man in his most vital part. He may become a machine, a bit of a machine, but not a man. To become a man his reason must be given room to stretch upwards and his sympathies to expand. Ignorance is the wrap which stifles the life of his mind, as King John stifled Jews in a leaden sheet; and selfishness, which is a form of ignorance, is the Borgian iron coffin of charity and sympathy.

Before Christianity appeared, the rights of man were ignored, and the development of individuality was impeded. For these rights were not acknowledged, as the sole basis on which they can rest—dogma—was not allowed. Force prevailed, violence held rule; and it was a *sauve qui peut* for individuality. If great discoveries were made, great characters appeared, it was because there was an excess of spontaneity in the days when mankind was young.

The advent of Christ was the inauguration of a social and a moral revolution; it was the introduction of a gospel of deliverance to the captives of the world's bondage as well as to those of the senses.

That coming brought good tidings of joy to a portion of the human race to which the world had hitherto given nothing but contempt and wrong—the slave, the pauper, the woman, and the child. It lifted the poor from the dunghill and set him among princes, it proclaimed the

[1] Mill: On Liberty, c. 3.

deliverance of the captive, it consecrated woman, it crowned the child. It raised up that great mass of suffering humanity over which the rest of the world had trodden for ages; it raised it up, with all its ignorance and barbarism, its wild passions and helpless weight, its piteous sufferings and traditionary wrongs, to plant it before the eyes of the rich, the powerful, the wise, the free, and declare that it had equal rights, inalienable rights, to be conceded graciously, or to be wrested forcibly, to riches and power and wisdom and liberty.

What was the slave before the Incarnation set him free? He was a piece of property like land and cattle. He could not insist on rights to freedom and to the fruit of his toil, for he did not know that he had rights; he had no basis on which to found them. His master had a right to make him work, to flog him when idle, to brand him when disobedient, to crucify him if he ran away, on the same ground as he claimed a right to make his ox plough and then to eat it.

"Simia quam similis turpissime bestia nobis."

If I may chain the ape and kill it if I please, why may I not chain the Negro and kill him when I please. Slavery was taken for granted to be a necessity in Greece as truly as was the right of possessing land. Doubt as to the equity and advantage of such an arrangement never entered into a Greek mind; the idea of another state of things was impossible to conceive. There is no perfect household state, according to Aristotle, that does not consist of slaves and freemen, the slave being but an animated instrument, as an instrument is a slave without a soul.[1] The Stagyrite has, in fact, left us a complete theory of slavery, as an institution founded on the nature of social

[1] Polit. i. 3; Eth. Nic. viii. 11, 6.

order. It is equitable, he argues, as corresponding to a natural law, one large portion of the human race being born slaves, just as some birds are born to be barn-door fowl and dogs to be chained to kennels; that portion, the barbarian, has not the wit of a Greek, he is an inferior animal altogether, made not to command but to obey. There is but a shade of difference between the slave and the domestic animals.

The master stands towards his slave in the relation of a workman to his tools, and therefore cannot love him, for there is nothing in common between them, and no equality between the parties.

According to the old Roman legislation there was a penalty of death for him who should kill a ploughing-ox, but the murderer of a slave was called to no account whatever.[1] Cato the elder, a bright example of Roman virtue, saw nothing immoral in breeding slaves for the market like dogs or horses, and when his slaves grew old and useless he cast them out of his house.

In the old republican times of Rome, there was no recognition of the slave as having rights in any way equal to those of the master, though the censor was empowered to inflict a penalty for excessive cruelty.

It was almost the same with the poor. "Could you possibly let yourself down so low as not to repel a poor man from you with scorn?" was said by a rhetorician of the imperial times to a rich man.[2] "What is the use too," says a popular poet, "of giving anything to a beggar? One loses what one gives away, and only prolongs the miserable existence of the receiver."[3] And Virgil, in his beautiful

[1] Colum. vi. præf. 7. [2] Quintil. Decl. 301, iii. 17.
[3] Plaut. Triuumm. i. 2, 58, 59.

passage describing the peace and repose of the wise man, introduces as one of the features his being exempted from feeling pity for the necessitous person.[1] The condition of the poor can hardly be described more elegantly than in the following words, which I quote with pleasure: "When we attempt to inquire about the poor, in ancient times, the most ominous thing that meets us is the deficiency of records. Here and there at intervals we may discover some track of their existence, some bloody footprint marking where man has been and struggled; a wild outbreak against intolerable oppression; a servile war; a cry of famishing multitudes; and then a long death-like silence. This is all.

"They have shewn themselves in their misery and impotence, and then vanished. For a moment a helpless hand has been raised above that tumultuous and stormy ocean, and then the waters have covered it again. They are a race without name, memorial, or relic. They have left nothing by which they may be remembered on earth. Their history has never been written. The most barbarous tribes have bequeathed tokens of their existence for the curious to investigate; some rude monument or cluster of graves in the wilderness; a weapon of war, or an article of domestic use; the deeds of the chief, or the wisdom of the sage, embalmed in tale or song,—but these are a people who have lived and died in silence. Spread through all lands, and numerous in every age, they have done nothing to perpetuate their memory. They have had neither champion nor teacher; they have left neither token nor monument; in life and death they are as if they had never been. Now there is something more profoundly expressive in this great and solemn silence regarding a vast portion of

[1] Georg. ii. 499.

the human race, than if we were furnished with the most minute details of their condition and sufferings. It is as much as to say that for age after age their claims, their wants, their miseries, their very existence, made no impression on the rest of the world; that they were unable to effect anything for themselves or make their presence felt, and so have passed away the objects of a cold and merciless indifference."[1]

This was inevitable; superior power constituted right, and beneath the heel of the mighty the weak and the poor were pulverized. But with the Incarnation, right became dogmatic. The rights of man are at the present day acknowledged on all sides, though their exercise is not everywhere allowed; but that which constitutes rights and that which constitutes them equal in all men has been forgotten.

This is the basis of rights now:—They are derived from God; men are responsible to God for their exercise. All men are brethren with equal rights, for all men are sprung from one father and one mother; and all men are one family in Christ the universal Man.

Has the Australian savage a right to live and appropriate the results of his toil in the face of the active and intelligent English colonist? If that savage be only a tail-less ape, the colonist may shoot him and seize on his store of kangaroo-meat; but if that savage be his brother, derived from one primeval stock, and deriving his rights and responsibilities from the same God-Man, then his life and his kangaroo-meat are his own, and he cannot be robbed of either without violation of God's law.

The state of woman was not much better than that of a slave. She was the property of the man because she was

[1] Dr. Maturin: Two Sermons, Dublin, 1866.

weaker than man, and right must be either dogmatic or forcible. Right if not dogmatic is nothing at all, and right if dogmatic is equal for all. The National Assembly of 1789 proclaimed the rights of man, but without founding them on any principle. They therefore reposed merely on the will of the Assembly, and when the Assembly became the Convention, superior force constituted the only right that was acknowledged.

Aristotle boasted of the advantage to the Greeks over the barbarians, that woman amongst them had been raised to be the real helpmate of man, and not degraded to the level of the slave.[1] But that position was accorded her not as hers by right, but as rendered necessary. Socrates endeavoured to place the relations of man and wife in a higher, purer light, but utility as its end appears in his description of the compact. "God has given to woman a nature adapted to the cares within doors, to man one suitable for out-door cares. He has prepared the soul and the body of man to support cold and heat, long journeys and expeditions; He has given less strength to the woman. As He has confided to her the nutrition of the new-born infant, He has inspired her with more tenderness for the new progeniture than He has man. He has destined her to look after the goods brought home, and He knew that fear is not a bad guardian, therefore He has given to her a soul more timorous than her husband's. Knowing also that the workman outside must sometimes defend himself against aggression, He has endowed man with more intrepidity. Nature not having made either of them perfect, they have need of each other, and their union is the most useful, because they mutually complete one another. We must therefore fulfil as best we can the duties God has

[1] Polit. i. 1, 5.

assigned to each of us. What nature has prescribed, the law has approved by uniting man and woman. If God gives them a community of children, the law imposes on them the government of the house, and the law declares honourable the functions which God attributes specially to each of the two sexes. In fact, it is more honest for the woman to remain within than to gad about without; it is more shameful for the man to shut himself within than to occupy himself with exterior cares."[1]

But as the object of marriage was utility, the law and custom allowed of practices inconsistent with a recognition of the woman being free of her person. Citizens, says Plutarch, should not be jealous and exclusive about the possession of their wives, as the object of marriage is the production of sturdy soldiers, but rather should share them with others, an oldish man ought to give up his wife to a younger for a time, in order to have children of her; and so it was accounted a proper thing, as Polybius tells us, for a husband who had already several children by his wife to lend her to his friend. Therefore, in Sparta, if a man was desirous of children without burdening himself with a wife, he would borrow his neighbour's wife for a period; and this promiscuousness was carried so far that three, and sometimes four, Spartans, had one woman for a wife in common.[2]

In Rome the wife held an honourable place at her husband's side, but she was, nevertheless, entirely dependent on her lord. In the earlier times, the will of the father of the household was despotic, with right of life and death; Egnatius Mecenius put his wife to death for having drunk

[1] Xenophon: Econ. c. vii.

[2] Xen. de Rep. Lac. i. 8; Polyb. Fragm. in Script. Vet. Nov. Coll. ed. Hav. ii. 384.

wine, and was not called to account for the act. The husband alone had the property; all the family earnings were his. Full marriage "with the hand" took place either by "coemption," where the husband acquired his wife by an imaginary sale, or by "usus," on her having remained a full year uninterruptedly with him. Confarreation, which was a religious rite binding the parties in the sight of the gods, was superseded by the less binding marriage, and in the reign of Tiberius only three patricians were to be found who were issues of a marriage by confarreation, and who could as such be eligible to the sacerdotal dignity of Flamen dialis.

That the child should be the property of the father who had procreated it, and fed it, was an idea so natural that the right of the male parent to punish his child with death, or to refuse to bring it up, and expose it when born to die of cold or be devoured by beasts, was almost universal.

There was an Icelander, Thorir by name, subject to Berserkir rages, before the introduction of Christianity into the island. His fits disqualified him from becoming a great chief in his frith, and sorely grieved him. It happened that a neighbour, Thorgrim of Kornsá, had exposed a man-child lately born to him, and Thorir heard its wailing as he journeyed, musing on his affliction. Then the thought struck him that he would save the life of the infant. "I will pray to Him who created the sun, for I trust Him as the most powerful One, that He will relieve me of my infirmity, and for His sake I will save the babe from death and will cherish it as my own."[1]

This in all probability is what passed through the Icelander's mind:—The God who made me, made also that child. If I have a right to live, that child has a right to live. If

[1] Vatnsdœla Saga, c. 37; ed. Werlauf: Kopenhagen, 1812, p. 150.

it be pleasing to God that I should exercise my right, it must be pleasing to Him that it should exercise its right. Thus the right of the child was founded on a logical basis. But that basis was not altogether satisfactory, for the argument would apply equally to all living things. The cow, the sheep, the plant, have life conveyed to them by God, it must therefore be pleasing to Him that they should complete that life. Tarquin violated an equal right to life when he cut off the poppy heads as when he executed the nobles.

But Christianity anchored all the rights of men on a dogmatic rock, and the parting of the cable which attached them to it could alone be their wreck. Founded by a Carpenter, proclaimed by fishermen, spread abroad among the Gentiles by a scholar who voluntarily accepted the condition of a working-man, it addressed the glad tidings of social regeneration to the poor, the down-trodden, and the despised. Appealing to the slave, it broke his chains on the anvil of the Incarnation, to the poor man, it told him that he was ennobled by the purple blood of Christ, to the woman, it bade her be pure like the Virgin-Mother of the God-Man, to the child, it said "of such is the Kingdom of Heaven," throwing its ægis over childhood and casting the desecrator of innocence, with a millstone about his neck, into the bottom of the sea. Appealing to the multitude, it asserted the rights of individualism, vindicating the claims of reason against superstition, of sentiment against hard logic, in presenting an Ideal to which the heart could cling and in which it could find rest, an Ideal Man far higher than an Apollo, a Jove, or an Osiris, an Ideal Woman above a Venus, a Juno, or an Isis. It appealed to conscience as a ground of personal responsibility, and of right to be exercised freely. "We are escaped as a bird out of the snare of the fowler the snare is broken and we are delivered."

But it must not be supposed that the social revolution, which even the Jews suspected must result from the preaching of Christ,[1] was to be accomplished at once. The Twelve hardly knew at first that the logical result of the Incarnation—supposing them to have held the hypostatic union—was the equality of the rights of Jew and Gentile; but S. Paul saw clearer, and his system was one of generic universality. His sentiment, like that of Plutarch, virtually overthrew the barrier of national and individual exclusiveness; with him there was neither Greek nor Jew, neither bond nor free, neither male or female, but all one in Christ Jesus.[2]

When Christianity appeared on the scene, the world had forgotten that man had any rights, any dignity, any object higher than lust and rapine for which to live. Christianity came to declare the dignity of that human nature which God had made in His image, and which Christ had assumed, and which was therefore doubly ennobled. It came to declare in the face of an autocracy the absolute equality of all men in the sight of God; and, in the presence of slavery, to testify that liberty is man's inalienable prerogative. Roman civilization was crumbling into a mass of loathsome putrescence, from which all that was high, noble, pure, and honourable, was disappearing. By recalling man to the divinity of his origin and of his vocation; by raising him from the sensualism of the brute and setting him in the liberty of a moral and intelligent being, Christianity flashed before the eyes of imperial autocracy, as a power which would infallibly disturb the existing relations of master and slave, of despot and subject.

Read by the sombre light of Roman policy, the writings of the Apostles are full of significance.

[1] "He stirreth up the people." Luke xxiii. 5.

[2] Gal. iii. 28; Col. iii. 11.

With God there is no respect of persons, says S. Paul,[1] barbarian, Scythian, bond or free, all are one in Christ;[2] for "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."[3] "The creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God."[4] "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage."[5] "Ye are bought with a price; be ye not the servants of men."[6] "Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience?"[7] "Brethren, ye have been called into liberty; only use not liberty for an occasion of the flesh."[8]

Noble also is the appeal of the great Apostle of the Gentiles to Philemon, when he sends him back his runaway slave Onesimus: "He departed for a season, that thou shouldest receive him for ever; not now as a servant, but above a servant, a brother beloved, specially to me, but now much more unto thee, both in the flesh and in the Lord." Our Lord had said, "The truth shall make you free," and "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed;"[9] and S. James taught men to look into "the perfect law of liberty."[10] S. Peter also says that Christians are to submit to tyranny, as it were under protest, "as free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants of God."[11]

It is true that many of these passages refer to moral rather than civil liberty; but the principle is the same—if man is directly responsible to God for the morality of his actions and the use he makes of his faculties, it follows that slavery, which places him at the complete disposal of another man, interferes with the freedom of his actions and

[1] Eph. vi. 9. [2] Col. iii. 11. [3] 2 Cor. iii. 17.
[4] Rom. viii. 21. [5] Gal. v. 1. [6] 1 Cor. vii. 23.
[7] 1 Cor. x. 29. [8] Gal. v. 13. [9] John viii. 32, 36.
[10] Jas. ii. 12. [11] 1 Pet. ii. 16.

impedes the development of his powers, and is therefore a violation of God's law. And in the plainest terms S. Paul expresses the antagonism of Christian principles to the despotism of civil government, when he exclaims in words to be echoed with bitterness by many an after generation, "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places."[1]

Thus Christianity taught men that they were free and that they were noble; and whatever might be their ranks and relative positions in the world, it boldly declared that in the eye of God, and in His Church, all stood on one level. It knew nothing of castes and privileged orders. All were bound by the same duties, to all were extended alike the same hopes, the same means of grace. "The word caste," says M. Guizot, in his 'History of the Civilization of Europe,' "cannot be applied to the Christian Church. A system of caste, and the existence of hereditary succession, inevitably involve the idea of privileges. The very definition of a caste implies privileges. When the same functions, the same powers, become hereditary in the same families, it is evident that privileges follow, and that no one can acquire such functions and powers unless he is born to them. This, in fact, is what has taken place wherever religious government has fallen into the hands of a caste, it has become a privilege; no one has been permitted to enter it but the members of families belonging to the caste. Nothing of this has occurred in the Christian Church; on the contrary, she has ever maintained the equal admissibility of all men, whatever their origin, to all her functions, to all her dignities. The ecclesiastical state, particularly from the fifth to the twelfth century, was open to all. The Church was recruited

[1] Eph. vi. 12.

from all ranks, from the inferior as well as from the superior —more commonly from the inferior. She alone resisted the system of castes; she alone maintained the equality of competition; she alone called all legitimate superiors to the possession of power. This is the first grand result naturally produced by the fact that she was a corporation, and not a caste."

In the Church, worldly rank and position had, theoretically at least, no place. With the same rite and the same words, the same privileges were accorded to the infant of the tramp wrapped in a tattered shawl, and to the baby prince swathed in gold brocade. So in every sacrament, the Church ignored temporal distinction, and viewed each Christian as a Christian only, a child of Him with Whom is "no distinction of persons." To this day, when earth is committed to earth, ashes to ashes, and dust to dust, the deceased is prayed for, whether brought in a frail deal shell at parish expense from the workhouse, or from the palace in the crimson velvet and gold cased coffin of royalty, whatever the deceased may have been, beggar or prince, he is the "dear brother here departed" of the parish priest and the parish sexton.

At the first glance it is sufficiently difficult to account for the strong antipathy exhibited towards Christianity by the Roman State. The Pantheon had niches enough to accommodate any number of new gods, and liberty was freely accorded to any person who chose to believe anything.

But Christianity was not a mere importation of foreign gods and foreign mysteries. It had a mission beside that of changing the popular creed. Its mission was the enfranchisement of humanity. When a great Roman died, it was the fashion for him to manumit a number of his slaves.

When Christ gave up the ghost He set at liberty all mankind. That Christianity was a religion teaching political principles which would infallibly subvert the government of Rome, was perceived by the shrewdest Roman emperors; and these were invariably its most inveterate persecutors.

When Alexander the Great, drunk with Bacchic wine, slew Clitus at a banquet, "There is no law above the will of the monarch," whispered a flatterer. Such a doctrine was sweet to a despot. But when Theodosius sent commissioners to slaughter the inhabitants of Antioch for having mutilated his statues, they were met by a bare-footed, ragged, hairy man, a hermit, and sent back to the tyrant with a message of other sort; "Go and say from me to the emperor: you are an emperor, but you are a man, and you command men who are your fellow-creatures, and who are made in the image of God. Fear the wrath of the Creator if you destroy His work. You, who are so much displeased when your statues are overthrown, shall God be less displeased if you destroy His?"

Man is made in the image of God. He has rights and duties which it is not lawful for the State to forget and to override. God is no respecter of persons. Such were the notes of the Gospel message which jarred on the ear of despotism. The idea of the equality of men was odious to an aristocracy; that of the meanest slave having God-given rights which might not be trampled on without incurring Divine wrath was hateful to the lords of misrule. No wonder that the Felixes trembled before the apostles of liberty, for they felt that their doctrine circumscribed and limited their powers.

When Constantine established himself on the throne, he saw, as clearly as any emperor who had preceded him, that the constitution of the Church and that of the State were antagonistic. Either the State would become democratic,

or the Church must be infected with the political views of the emperor, and become autocratic.

He therefore forced a concordat on the Church, offering her recognition by the State, and freedom from persecution, and demanding in return that she should touch lightly on the rights of men, suppress her efforts to obtain liberty for every individual, and devote herself to some other portion of her task.

The crown, by assuming the nomination of bishops, held in its hands the power of bribing the Church into acquiescence in its claims.

The result of this concordat was soon evident. The Church had sold her birthright for a mess of pottage. She lost her ancient vigour. The crown, naturally enough, appointed to the episcopal thrones men whose sympathies were with the royal prerogative rather than with the popular right. The Episcopacy, from having been the ornament of the Christian Church, became her disgrace. Prelates fawned on the monarch who had lifted them into their thrones, and suffered them to trample with impunity on the liberties of their subjects. And in his turn the sovereign put his sword at the disposal of the Church for the extermination of heretics.

What can be more humiliating than to see the Council of Toledo craving leave of the king to rob Jewish parents of their children, that they might be brought up Christians, and then pronouncing Anathema Maranatha against any man who should be so presumptuous as to propose marriage to the queen, should his gracious majesty die before her and thus leave her a widow!

Few scenes in history are so instructive as that in the Olive garden, when Simon Peter smote off the ear of Malchus. He, the chief of the apostles, the representative of the

Church, had armed himself with the sword. The moment of trial came. The brave champion of Christ brandished his weapon, and the tip of an ear fell to the ground. Surely that scene should be a lasting lesson to the Church, that the assumption of the sword by its pastors must ever be inefficient and ever contemptible. The tribunal of the Church is man's heart, and conscience the sole executor of her mandates.

Throughout the Middle Ages individual liberty was scarcely recognized except by the great theologians of the Church; it was a theory, a principle, but was never practised.

The Church had been too deeply engaged in symbolizing the beliefs of the world and rectifying them by the Absolute, for her to pay much attention to the rights of man.

She had been prevented from doing so by her union with the State on one side, and on the other by the growth of the theocratic system within her bosom.

She did worse than forget these rights, she trampled on them, and brought her subjects into a condition of bondage far more terrible than that of heathenism; for she chained thought which in the slave had been free.

Morals, physics, politics, religious dogmas, rested on authority. A system of ethics had been deduced syllogistically from the sacred writings, to be applied by rules of casuistry. Political principles were derived from the same source. The human mind had its rule in the decisions of the Church or of the approved doctors on every subject. Thought and action which were not according to norm were put down with the strong hand.

Then came a change. A warm breath passed over that frozen sea in which thought lay stiff and stark, like Ugolino, in the icy fetters of an unbending orthodoxy. The emanci-

pation of Individualism, which had been arrested, was recommenced.

One morning I passed a road-maker at work. A spring had bubbled up in the middle of the hard-trodden path, and the workman was engaged in beating stones into its bore and choking it with clay and gravel. He triumphed —the spring had disappeared, and I continued my course. But in the evening, on my return, after the road-maker had left his task for the rest of night, I found the water bubbling up once more, busily undoing his work, rolling away one stone, then another, clearing its throat and purifying its channel.

It was a picture of Christianity. Throughout the Middle Ages cart-loads of rubbish had been emptied into the open fountain of man's individuality, it had to all appearance been choked, and the way was stamped hard over it. But in the sixteenth century it broke out again, and it is running still. It has not yet accomplished its work however, it has left undone much that has to be done, and it has done much that it ought not to have done.

Theory had taken the precedence over observation in the Natural Sciences, which had been elaborately piled up into a gorgeous fabric of fantastic extravagance. Scientific fancies were accepted on the authority of Galen, Pliny, S. Isidore, and Peter Lombard, and taught dogmatically in the schools—

> "Those ancient homesteads of error,
> Where the old falsehoods moulder and smoulder,
> And yearly by many hundred hands
> Are carried away in the zeal of youth,
> And sown like tares in the fields of Truth,
> To blossom and ripen in other lands."

Leonardo da Vinci, long before Bacon, laid down the maxim that experience and observation must be the founda-

tion of all reasoning in science; that experiment is the only interpreter of nature, and is essential to the ascertainment of its laws. This was the commencement of the movement in Natural Philosophy; it was followed by the publication of a work on the principles of equilibrium by Stevinus, in 1586. Six years later Galileo's treatise on Mechanics appeared, a fitting commencement to his brilliant career of astronomical discovery.

When Halley's comet had drawn its line of light over the sky in 1456, Europe was panic-struck. Calixtus II. issued his ecclesiastical fulminations; but the comet pursued its course undeterred by the thunder of the monarch of the three realms. Among the clergy there were, however, those who had more correct cosmic ideas than Calixtus. Cardinal de Cusa ventured to adopt the heliocentric theory in opposition to the authority of the Church, which had affixed its imprimatur to the geocentric theory.

But Copernicus, the Dane, was the first boldly to refute the received doctrine. Bruno of Nola advanced to the conception of every star being a sun, with opaque planets in revolution around it. For teaching the rotation of the earth he had to flee to Switzerland from his Dominican convent, and thence to England, whence also he was driven for his heresy. Seized by the Inquisition, and burnt alive at Rome in 1600, he died with his torturers' jeers in his ears, bidding him go to the imaginary worlds he had so heretically feigned.

"If the doctrine of Copernicus be true, the planet Venus ought to shew phases like the moon, which is not the case;" so had said the objectors to the heliocentric theory.

Galileo made a telescope, and for ever settled the question, by shewing that the expected phases do actually exist. In the garden of Cardinal Bandini at Rome, in

1611, Galileo publicly exhibited the spots upon the sun. He had observed them the preceding year. Goaded on by the opposition his astronomical discoveries were bringing upon him, he published a tract to shew that the Scriptures were not intended as a scientific authority. He was sentenced by the Inquisition for having taught that the earth moves, and that the sun is stationary; and fearing the fate of Bruno, he recanted. Condemned again in 1637, for reaffirming his convictions, he was thrown into the prisons of the Inquisition, where he lost sight and hearing, and dying, was refused burial in consecrated ground.

But the work was done, experience had been proclaimed the basis of science, and authority was overthrown.

The reform of Luther was another insurrection of individualism against an oppressive authority. In that lay the secret of its success. The human spirit felt its need of expansion after long compression. It was not the love of novelty and change which wrought that mighty convulsion, the doctrines of the reform were not new, they were identical, as far as they went, with those held by the Catholic Church; but the reforming movement responded to a demand for liberty, indistinct, scarcely expressed, obscurely felt, perhaps, but it was through that that the movement obtained its impetus, in spite of the contradictions of its chiefs, their vagaries and outrageous follies, and in opposition to the prevision of philosophers who weighed only the doctrines they professed.

The Reformation marked the outbreak of individualism against authority in the order of dogma. Everything knowable being at that time matter of faith, reason was forced to attack the principle of authority in its citadel.

What matters it that the promoters of that convulsion

had, at the outset, but a vague idea of their purpose? The history of the Reformation shews us that its governing spirit was not criticism, but the passion for liberty.

The onward movement was arrested for a while by the Reformers taking their stand upon the authority of the Bible. They opposed the hypothesis of the Book to that of an incorporated society. But the circle of liberty has been constantly enlarging beyond the limits of the sacred text, within which only a dead remnant devoid of power remain entrenched, and consume one another with their faction fights, like the Jews in the Holy City on the eve of its fall.

The work of Luther was thus the establishment of private judgment as the measure of religious truth.

The work was carried on in another field by Descartes. Descartes, groping about him for some character which should give reality to his thought and his existence, and finding none other except the double fact of thought and existence, whose evidence was irresistible, was led to make this evidence the sign of all certainty. "Having remarked," said he, "that there is nothing in this: *I think, therefore I am*, which assures me that I say the truth, unless I see very clearly that to think I must be, I judged that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is some difficulty in distinguishing which are those we conceive distinctly."[1] And again, "I am assured that I am a thing that thinks; but do I not also know what is requisite to make me certain of anything? Certainly, in that knowledge there is nothing which assures me of the truth, except the clear and distinct perception of what I say, which perception of truth would not be sufficient to

[1] Discours de la méthode, 4e partie.

assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that something I conceived equally clearly and distinctly should prove false. Nevertheless it seems to me that already, I can establish as a general rule, that all things which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are true."[1]

Such is the grand modern principle, which, applied to morals and politics, was to produce a complete revolution. It would be to exaggerate the glory of Descartes to attribute to him a knowledge of the various applications which were to be made of a rule so fecund in results.

Thus, whilst the Reformation subjected the interpretation of Scripture and matters of faith to private judgment, Descartes, putting these things on one side, gave to private judgment the compactness of a formula, and the authority of a demonstrated verity. He reduced to the last precision that principle, vaguely felt and working in a cloud during the Reformation; but he displaced its centre and changed its application.

The principle of Descartes is emphatically the principle of liberty. Liberty is the power of taking a determination and of conforming one's actions to it. In psychology, liberty is confounded with will, for the question of knowing whether I am free is no other than that of knowing if I can exert my will, and this again is no other than the principle of assertion of individuality.

When Descartes makes evidence the rule of his judgment and of mine, he recognises that he and I can judge. The principle of evidence, supposing the faculty of judging and assuring the exercise of judgment, is therefore that of liberty, just as the principle of authority is its opposite, taking from me my own power of judging and forcing my acquiescence in a superior judgment.

[1] Méditations touchant la philosophie première, 2nde méd.

This fruitful principle of liberty, which is only the principle of reason, and which must not be confounded with caprice, was sure to be transported sooner or later into the region of moral philosophy.

A century passes, and Rousseau with vigour lays down this principle as the groundwork of morality. Instead of seeking, like the Scottish school, the principle of good outside the individual, in utilitarianism, Rousseau found it in himself,—in the moral conscience. "I do not draw the rules which I prescribe to myself," says he to the Savoyard vicar, "from the principles of high philosophy, but I find them written by nature in ineffaceable characters at the bottom of my heart. I have only to consult myself on what I wish to do: all that I feel to be good is good, all that I feel to be bad is bad: the best of all casuists is the conscience. Conscience is the voice of the soul, the passions are the voice of the body. Conscience cannot be deceived; it is the true guide of man—it is an innate principle of justice and virtue, upon which, in spite of our maxims, we measure our actions and those of others as good or bad, and it is to this principle that I give the name of conscience."[1]

Thus Rousseau completed the reaction inaugurated by Descartes against Scholasticism. He committed the judgment of the actions of men to the individual sense, disengaged from all the subtleties of a false science; he maintained a tradition which, beginning with Leonardo da Vinci through the Reformation, and carried on by Descartes, was to complete its course in the French Revolution.

From morals to politics is an easy passage. One would have supposed that Rousseau, having sought the principle of morality within, would have discovered there also the

[1] Emile, lib. iv.

principle of right. But he did not do so. In his famous *Contrat Social*, he subjected individual right to the sovereignty of number, constituted, it is true, by the will of all. The social man possesses rights only that he may abdicate them!

But the National Assembly did that which Rousseau had misdone. To its constitution it prefixed its famous declaration of "The Rights of Man." Before the French Revolution, the governing power had its obligations, but the governed were without rights.

The principle of individual right recognised, the condemnation of the ancient order of things followed. Undoubtedly that famous declaration does not contain a complete doctrine; but if the Constituent Assembly did not rise to the idea of duties as the correlative of rights, the reason is that a scientific system cannot be produced by an assembly. But it did its work. It introduced into the world of facts what hitherto had not left the domains of pure speculation.

To sum up in few words the substance of this chapter.

Liberty is necessary for the development of individuality.

Liberty is the faculty of exercising freely man's inalienable rights.

Before Christ came those rights were not recognised, the only right known being authority, founded on force.

By the Incarnation man's rights are based on dogma, and their exercise is a religious necessity.

The liberty to exercise them had been disallowed throughout the Middle Ages by the growth in Christendom of a theocracy, and through the union of Church and State.

The emancipation of liberty begun with the preaching of the Gospel, but interrupted during the Middle Ages, was

recommenced in the sixteenth century, and has been continued ever since.

The development of the principle of individualism, or in other words of liberty, has passed through five stages:—

1. Leonardo da Vinci made the individual judgment the appreciator of scientific facts.
2. Luther made that same judgment the criterium of religious, *i.e.* of sentimental, dogmas.
3. Descartes made private judgment the basis of philosophic certainty.
4. Rousseau founded morality on the individual conscience.
5. The French Revolution established politics on individual right.

Thus the work which ought to have been done by the Church has been begun, and is in progress, outside of her.

That work flows logically from the Incarnation, as logically as do the religious and moral dogmas of Christianity; if the movement has been abrupt and often disastrous in its consequences, the reason is to be found in its having been wrought apart from the Church, that is, through a negative, instead of a co-ordinative process.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF THE INCARNATION

"Sail on!" it says, "sail on, ye stately ships,
And with your floating bridge the ocean span;
Be mine to guard this light from all eclipse,
Be yours to bring man nearer unto man."—LONGFELLOW.

The Ideal Man must have a double aspect, individual and social—The social Christ is the Church—a necessary consequence of the Incarnation—The characteristics of the individual Christ must also characterize the social Christ—The marks of the Church—the marks also of its members—The Communion of Saints a consequence—The organization of the Church—The object to be secured by organization is the preservation of all rights—The Church contains the ideally best organization—The election of bishops—essential to the welfare of the Church—the assembly of councils also essential—The State interferes and assumes the right of nominating bishops—The history of the struggle in France—Had not the rights of the Church been invaded there would have been no Papacy, no ecclesiastical tyranny, no Reformation—Summary of argument and conclusion.

MAN is individual and social. The perfect man is he whose individuality is most completely developed, and whose solidarity is also most completely developed.

Christ, according to the Christian hypothesis, is the ideal man.

Therefore He is the ideal of individuality and solidarity. Therefore Christ must exist as a man individually, and as a society universally.

There must be the personal Christ, the ideal man, and there must be the social Christ, the ideal society.

The Incarnation necessitated the Church. Destroy the idea of the Church and you lop the dogma of the Incarnation of half its reality, you make it inconsequent.

If we have an ideal of a perfect man, we have an ideal of a perfect society; and if Christ be the satisfaction of our wants, we must find in Him the ideal society as well as the ideal personality.

That we have such an ideal, none can deny; every one has a theory of government, and a theory is the development of a preconceived ideal. The sentiment of liberty and the desire for order are the principle of every government, and we must find this satisfaction in Christ.

Every form of government the world has seen has been an idol of the ideal which shall harmonize and balance authority and liberty. Men have tried patriarchal government, theocracies, monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, intelligent despotisms, constitutional royalties, and none have proved completely satisfactory. In a lifetime men will sway from one extreme to another; we have seen it in France, one day a republic, next day imperialism.

Through all the aberrations of the human mind and the Utopias of socialism, the pursuit of the ideal is conspicuous.

"Ordo ducit ad Deum," said one of the greatest geniuses of the Church and of Humanity. Order is necessary for man, for without it his liberty is not assured to him, and without his liberty he cannot accomplish his destiny.

If there be a society of Christ, a prolongation of His personality, it must be organized, so as not to be a house divided against itself, but in unity.

As God is immanent in the world, keeping all the varieties of being in it bound into an indissoluble whole, so Christ is immanent in the Church, gathering all differences into one entirety and operating continually the renovation of the spiritual creation.

Religion, as its name implies, is a tie uniting man with man and all men with God. That tie is charity, which is represented as double, love towards our fellows and love towards God.

The assertion that "outside the Church is no safety," means that outside of truth is no truth. Truth is, in itself, eternal, immutable, and infinite, like life. This infinite verity is therefore in God, it is God Himself manifested, or the Word incarnate. What is the Church? It is Jesus Christ, the social Man, existing wherever there is a sparkle of truth. Wherever there is truth there is Christ, wherever Christ is there is the Church, the circle moves with its centre. Consequently, "outside the Church is no safety," means nothing more nor less than that apart from truth is nought but error.

I said that Christ was the centre and the circumference of all truth. He is the centre in His personality, He is the circumference in His Church.

Wherever truth is, there is the Church, I have said. Let us now see what are the characteristics of the Church, which is the body of Christ, inasmuch as it is the body of all who are members of Christ, and all are members of Christ who hold a truth and do not break or ignore the link that attaches them to the Absolute.

The Church has the marks of unity, sanctity, catholicity, apostolicity, and infallibility. Such, at least, are the marks attributed to her by all Catholic theologians.

If these be the characteristics of the Incarnate Word,

they must also be the marks of the Church, which is Himself in a social aspect, and what is more, they will also be the ideal of perfection for every man who is a member of the Church. These are consequences rigidly following one another. Christ is not here and the Church there, but the Church is the exterior manifestation of Christ in all ages, and everywhere. In whatever world there are intelligent, pure, and lovely beings, the assembly of these beings, or their Church, can be the manifestation of the Word alone. "The Church triumphant, militant, and suffering, wherever it may be and whenever it may be, is but the triple face and action of the Word, always indivisible. One can see, therefore, that the characteristics of the Church must be the characteristics of the Incarnate Word, immanent in her."[1]

The Divine Word having taken possession of humanity by all its phases of being, by body and spirit, by reason and feeling, by its justice and its love, they are united by Him into one, as the world is an unity though filled with multiplicities of operation, mineral, vegetable, and animal existences, modes of force and forms of matter.

Everything in Christ is, as we have shewn, brought into an indissoluble unity through the union of the finite with the infinite, the divine with the human. Therefore *Unity* is the essential and constitutive characteristic of the Church.

This unity embraces all men, all ages, all lands, it extends beyond time into eternity, it is at once reposing in heaven and militant on earth. This unity, embracing all, is called *Catholicity* or universality.

But this catholic unity is only the manifestation of the holiness of God, either in Himself or in His creatures. The Word is the expression of that absolute perfection.

[1] Gabriel: Le Christ et le monde, p. 28.

He manifests it not only in His terrestrial life as an historical personage, at Bethlehem and on Calvary, but also in all the saints of the old law, in all those leading good lives among the heathen, in the saints of the new law, in all Christians who perpetuate it. He manifests it by His perfect justice and perfect love, held by Him in equilibrium. Every sanctity, every perfection is in Him who is the ideal of perfect relations.

The imitation of Him and the realization of that ideal which destroys all sin, that is all conflict and opposition, constitute the *Holiness* of the Church.

Unity, universality, and sanctity, are only the characteristics of the Word, manifested in the Church, in which they are perpetuated, because He received a divine mission, and He is thus marked with the ministry of apostleship, which, though transmitted from generation to generation from His hands, does not cease to be the sole priesthood of Christ, continued through His Apostles. Whatever there was in Him is and must be perpetuated. If there was holiness in Him, that mass of gold must be drawn out into eternity. If in Him there was justice, that must remain stamped for ever on the brow of humanity; for Christ is not the person only, but the universal Man as well. So also, if Christ was a priest, the priesthood must be for ever, not merely in Himself in heaven, but among men. It is this prolongation of His sacerdotal office which constitutes the *Apostolicity* of the Church.

One holy, catholic and apostolic, the Church is always the exteriorization of the Word, in whom are contained all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God. As the Word is God, He is the Divine Truth, the immutable and eternal Word of God, the indefectible Verity. Infallibility is, therefore, His characteristic, whether He be in

the bosom of the Father, or whether He speaks to men, through His Body, which is the Church. Consequently, *infallibility* is assured to the Church.

Thus all the characteristics of the society are characteristics of the Individual Christ. In this Body, each of its members must participate more or less in the prerogatives of the whole; each faithful must bear in him the marks of Christ. He must be one, holy, catholic, apostolic, and infallible, through the unity, sanctity, universality, apostolicity, and infallibility of Jesus Christ manifest in him.

I have already shewn that the mark of man's high calling is to emphasize his own personality, to liberate himself—that which is really himself—from all bonds, and constitute his individuality in the face of all men, and in the face of God, but without opposing it to other personalities, or ignoring the personality of God. By this distinguishing of himself, man becomes *one*, by so doing without invading the rights of others he becomes *catholic;* in this universal unity he continues the *apostolic* mission of Christ, which consists in reproducing the ideal in himself, as enjoined by his Master, "Be ye perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," and thus becoming himself *holy*, and inspiring others with a love of the same perfection. And he will be *infallible* in all that comes under the determination of his judgment, not infallible in contradicting the determinations of others, but in his positive convictions and logical conclusions.

Thus, every one of the faithful is an individual irradiation of the Christ, as the Church is the collective manifestation of Him. Each man, though distinct from Christ, is nevertheless Christ. There is a multitude of members, and all, by that reciprocal communion, all—whether living

or dead, all, whether of the past, the present; and indeed all who will be in the future, are but one.

Such is the sublime mystery of love, which makes of One many, and of many One, the radiant image of the ineffable mystery of God in His essence, manifesting Himself in all His creatures by the Word, which is the expression of Himself.

If the Word were only God, the uncreate, He could not be the mediator between the creature and God. If He were only man, He could not link all men into an indissoluble whole. But that union of the finite and the infinite, of the created and the uncreate, present everywhere, in heaven and in earth, binds the Church triumphant and the Church militant into one common life, which is none other than the life of Christ; such is the doctrine of the communion of saints.

That common union of an innumerable multitude of personalities in one life has its figure and its symbol in the visible world. What, in fact, is this universe but variety contained in an all-comprehending unity? The distinction of individualities subsists in a permanent manner. There is no confusion between the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal, and reciprocally each species is distinct; and so is each variety of plants and animals distinct from all other species and varieties.

The nature, the form, and the properties of each remain invariable. Moreover, the individuality of each being of the same nature remains completely distinct. No two leaves are exactly alike, one rose is not to be confounded with another rose; each gnat and each eagle is distinguishable from each other gnat and eagle. And yet in the midst of all this permanence of individualities there is indivisible unity. The entire universe is but one body, and has but

one life. The same substance composes the minerals, the plants, and the animals. The beauty and order of creation consists in the emphasizing of separate individualities and their unification in a mighty whole.

> "Nothing useless is, or low,
> Each thing in its place is best;
> And what seems but idle show
> Strengthens and supports the rest."[1]

So is it in the spiritual world. The work of each individuality is the distinguishing of itself from every other individuality and from God, and yet maintaining the union of all individualities in one body through Christ.

But in the physical life all is limited; a being occupying one place by that fact excludes all others; a being containing in itself a given quantity of matter excludes all others from the possession of the same matter. In the spiritual world the inverse is true; through an intimate and profound communion all partake in what belongs to one. We all partake in the fulness of Christ, and in the abundance of one another. This is solidarity and reversibility. None live apart from the common life of Christ, who is "all in all;" none act but through Him, none think apart from His thought, none love but with His love; life, action, thought, and love are seized on and produced according to the form of the personality of each, that they may be poured forth upon others; this is the doctrine of the communion of saints.

"As we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office; so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another."[2] Christ is "the head over all things to the Church,

[1] Longfellow: The Builders.

[2] Rom. xii. 4, 5.

which is His Body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all."[1] "For, as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? But now hath God set the members every one of them in the body as it hath pleased Him. And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet but one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again, the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much more, those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary; and those members of the body, which we think to be less honourable, upon these we bestow more abundant honour; and our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. For our comely parts have no need; but God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked; that there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the Body of Christ, and members in particular."[2]

[1] Eph. i. 22, 23.

[2] 1 Cor. xii. 12-27.

I pass now to the organization of the social Christ—the Church. Organization there must be, or there would be no society.

The ideally best form of government is that in which organization and function combine to secure, in the highest degree, the well-being and happiness of the individual citizen. Man being a social animal, government of some sort is necessary. For man has rights which others are constantly disposed to infringe, and the infringement of rights is the dissolution of society.

For the preservation of the bond, government is required. In itself, all human government is an evil, but it is a necessary evil. As to organization, that is the best in which the sovereign power is vested in the aggregate of the community, each citizen having a share in the making, and a share in the application, of the laws. It has taken Europe many centuries of bitter experience to learn this, and all Europe has not learned it yet.

Now the Church was the first corporate body to set an example of a representative government, and it is no matter of surprise that despotism should have hated the sight, and have forced on the Church an alteration of her constitution. To that alteration of her constitution we must attribute the evils which accrued to religion in the Middle Ages, and from which it is not clear at the present day.

Whenever government is in the hands of a section of the community, it will be used to promote the interests of that section, and to the detriment of outsiders. When the supreme power is monopolized by one, as in despotism; by a few, as in aristocracies; or by the many, as in existing democracies; separate interests are created for the one, the few, or the many, and are brought into opposition with the interests of the whole.

All this was obviated in the early constitution of the Church. So struck were some of the pagan emperors with the Church system, that one, more keenly alive to the social influence of Christianity than others, declared that he had rather hear of the revolt of a province than of the election of a bishop; whilst another, more liberal-minded, ordered that the prætors should be chosen by the people by vote, in the same manner as the Christians elected their bishops.

As every man has natural wants, so has every man spiritual requirements. As there is a tendency in one man to encroach on the natural rights of his neighbours, so is there a tendency in one man to deny the spiritual rights of his neighbours; this, the Protestant spirit, the setting up of the "I-myself" as the rule for every one else, is the great danger to the unity and concord of religious humanity.

To preserve to all men their prescriptive religious rights, to prevent one man from trampling on the convictions of another man, an organization is necessary which shall represent all men. If it be the representative of a few it is a religious aristocracy, if of one it is a theocracy.

The only possible mode of conciliating all rights, and of assuring to all men the free expression of their religious wants, is to intrust to all the election of their officers. Then the officer is responsible to all, he is the representative of all.

This is precisely the scheme of self-government adopted by the Church. No other scheme could comport with the object of the organization; nay, more, every other scheme must violate some rights, and allow the few or the many to constrain those who did not see or feel as themselves.

The Church was a city (civitas) organized on the soundest basis of common advantage. Every member was an elector. The bishops were chosen by the vote of the people, but the election was confirmed by the bishops of the province. On the death of a bishop, the clergy and laity of the diocese proceeded to elect a successor. They then presented their candidate to the metropolitan, who convened the bishops of the province, and submitted the nominee of the diocese to their approval. The concurrence of the bishops was required because the new prelate would act officially with them, and the theory of the ecclesiastical constitution was, that all who had anything to do with the officer should have a voice in his nomination. Thus, the prelate represented neither the laity exclusively, nor the priests alone, nor the episcopal interest only.

If it be necessary for the ideally best social organization, that every member should be represented, and he is represented if he exercises a vote; it is also necessary for the promulgation of its laws, for the ventilation of its wants, and for the preservation of its discipline, that its representatives should meet for discussion and for determining the laws and usages of the society. And that, and that alone, can be the mode in which the society will speak authoritatively. Œcumenical Councils are therefore another first requisite for the well-being of the society.

When any matter of difficulty or doubt arose in a diocese, a synod was called, in which it was discussed and decided by the vote of the majority. If, however, the matter affected the neighbouring dioceses, a provincial convocation was summoned, and in it the matter was ventilated, and argued, and finally voted upon. If, however, the whole Church was interested in the question, the whole Church met to debate it by its representatives in a General Council,

which was thus the voice of the whole Church, that is of Christ in His social aspect. And because Christ, individual or social, must be infallible, therefore the decision of an Œcumenical Council, accepted by the whole Church, is infallible.

For convenience in legislation, the bishoprics were grouped into provinces, and the provinces into patriarchates; but such arrangement was *de bene esse* alone. Thus the archbishop exercised jurisdiction by the voluntary assent of the bishops constituting his province, and the patriarch was the freely chosen head, *primus inter pares*, of a cluster of archbishoprics, which voluntarily submitted to his rule. The thirty-third canon of the Apostolic Constitutions lays down the doctrine of primacy thus: "It behoves the bishops of every people to know who among them is to be held as first, whom they may esteem as their head, πρῶτον ὡς κεφαλήν, and they are not to do anything without the knowledge of all, that there may be unanimity." The Council of Antioch, reviewing this canon, gave the name of metropolitan to the first bishop in each province: "It behoves the bishops of each province to know which bishop is to be metropolitan" (Can. 9). The Council of Laodicæa named the metropolitan as president at the election of bishops (Can. 12).

The thirteenth canon of Laodicæa (360-70) enjoins that the selection of the bishop is to be made by the people over whom he is destined to bear rule. The tenth canon of the Council of Rome, held under Innocent I., alludes to the same practice which prevailed in the patriarchal see. The Council of Milevis having deposed Maximinianus, Bishop of Vaga, sent letters to the people of that diocese to elect his successor. The Council of Carthage, in 407, ordered that when a body of heretics joined the Church, they should

elect a bishop to preside over them, unless they were resident in an already constituted diocese.

The Council of Constantinople, in 861, decreed in its twenty-second canon, that kings and great men have no authority or right to nominate patriarchs, metropolitans, or bishops, but that it is their duty to recognize those who have been canonically chosen.

In the fifth century Pope Zosimus condemned the usurpation of two bishops who had been consecrated without the suffrages of their dioceses (Ep. 3). Celestine I. wrote to the bishops of France, that no one was to be made bishop without the consent of the clergy and people and senate. S. Leo, in his 89th Epistle, lays down the same rule as being one that prevailed throughout the universal Church, and he says, "Qui præfuturus est omnibus ab omnibus eligatur." A similar statement occurs in several of the letters of S. Gregory the Great; and again we find Gregory VII., the famous Hildebrand, insisting on the same rule as late as 1076.

It was not without a struggle that the Crown wrested from the Church her rights, and it did so only by brute force. The history of the subjection of the Church in France will illustrate what took place in other countries as well. The second Council of Arles (circ. 445) ordered that the ancient rule should be somewhat modified in the French Church; that the metropolitan and the bishops should nominate three candidates, and propose these three to the clergy and people, who should elect one of them.

The second Council of Orleans (533) ordained in its seventh canon, that the metropolitan of the province should be elected by the laity and clergy of the diocese and by the bishops of the province conjointly, and that the bishops should consecrate him.

The Council of Clermont (535) decreed that none should rise to the episcopal or archiepiscopal office by ambition, but solely by his merits; that holiness of life, and not wealth, should render him eligible, and that advancement to the sacred office should not be due to the favour of a few, but to the suffrages of all; that he who was to be bishop must of necessity be chosen by the clergy and people, and must be ordained by his metropolitan, or with his consent.

The second Council of Orleans, in repeating this old law, added that it was but right and reasonable that he who is to preside over men should be elected by them.

The third Council of Paris (557) made the same rule, and protested that the Crown must not be suffered to wrest the right of nomination of bishops from those whom Catholic tradition and the practice of the universal Church had recognized as the true and lawful electors.

The fifth Council of Paris (615) decreed that an appointment to a vacant see made by other than the people and clergy, with the concurrence of the archbishop, should be null and void. King Clothaire, understanding that this canon was levelled against royal interference, refused to ratify it at first, and only yielded by adding a codicil of his own to the effect that the nominee must receive confirmation from the sovereign before the bishops might lawfully consecrate.

In the third Council of Valence (855) it was declared that, to prevent the preferment of ignorant or unfit persons to bishoprics, the king should be petitioned to permit the people and clergy of the vacant diocese to elect their own bishop, and that should the king desire any one to be elected, he must submit his qualifications to examination by the canonical electors.

In or about 880; the Church of Beauvais having been vacant for some time, Archbishop Hincmar and the prelates of the province of Rheims proceeded to election, and chose one Odo. The clergy and people had chosen another, named Odoacer, who had been rejected by the bishops as an incompetent person. The bishops, apprehending royal interference, wrote to the king, begging him not to meddle, but to leave the province to settle its own ecclesiastical affairs, and stating that as soon as a bishop had been consecrated he should be sent to the king to receive from him institution into the temporalities of the see, of which the throne was the guardian, as the Church was of the spiritualities. The king, Louis III., wrote sharply back, to say that it was his intention to govern ecclesiastical as well as civil matters, and that he ratified the nomination of the people, Odoacer.

Hincmar answered him, that the king had no authority to nominate, that, according to Catholic rule, the nomination lay with the people, the clergy, and the bishops, and he added that he, as metropolitan, should inhibit Odoacer, if the king persisted in intruding him into the diocese of Beauvais. Louis at once invested Odoacer with the revenues of the see, and Hincmar thereupon excommunicated him, and wrote a circular letter to all the priests and faithful of the diocese forbidding them to acknowledge the man appointed by the Crown.

It seems that at one time a charge had been brought against this same Hincmar, that his appointment had been influenced by Court pressure; and in one of his epistles he indignantly denies the charge, and declares that he was canonically elected by the votes of the people and priests of Rheims, and by the unanimous choice of the bishops of the province.

The Capitularies of Louis the Godly (816) left the clergy and people their ancient liberty of choosing their bishops. The seventieth letter of Adrian II. (868) is addressed to the Bishop of Embrun, rebuking him severely for having consecrated a bishop to Vienne other than him who had received the suffrages of the diocese.

In 950, Bishop Atto of Vercelli wrote a treatise on the persecutions and sufferings of the Church. He divides these into three, of which the second is the interference of the Crown with the election of bishops. He says that in his day princes had usurped a prerogative which was not theirs by the law of God nor of man; that they violated the constitution, the inalienable rights, and the sacred liberties of the Church, by interfering with the appointment of bishops. Kings appoint, not for virtue, but for wealth, parentage, and political services; the proper qualifications for the episcopal office in royal eyes are not holiness, love of the poor, zeal for God, but a bribe, a recommendation by some influential courtier, or relationship to a favoured statesman.

The Council of Rheims, held in 1049, before Pope Leo IX. on the occasion of his consecrating the abbey church of S. Remi, passed a canon forbidding nominations made otherwise than by diocesan election. This council was convened because the Crown had in several instances usurped the nominations and had flooded the French Church with incompetent persons, and men who were mere courtiers and servants of despotism.

By degrees the right of the people was refused, as the king assumed to represent the lay voice, and the clergy were considered as the proper electors; then the right was withdrawn from the clergy generally and was limited to the chapter, which being nominated by the Crown

was filled with creatures of its own, who would not throw out the candidate recommended by the king. But in 1517 a concordat was made between Francis I. and Pope Leo X., in virtue of which the chapters were despoiled of this privilege, and the nomination was vested in the Crown, subject to the consent of the Holy See. The parliament of Paris refused to enregister this iniquitous bargain, till forced to do so by repeated orders of the king. Public prayers were offered up to obtain its abolition, and the States-General protested energetically against it, whilst the voice of the Church was silenced by the king forbidding for the future the assembly of the decennial councils in which the Church had hitherto proclaimed her rights.

The Crown having uncontrolled power over the Church, exercised this power to fill all benefices at its disposal with those whose interest in the welfare of religion was subordinate to their devotion to the State, and to crush out all liberty of opinion and freedom of action.

In 1789, when the *cahiers* were sent into the States-General containing the grievances of the nation, a repeal of this iniquitous law was demanded, and a restoration of the ancient rights of the Church. In the celebrated civil constitution of the Church drawn up in 1790, the nomination of the bishops was restored to the Church, and was made by way of election. In two particulars alone did it contravene ancient precedent, and these were serious. It imposed no religious condition on the electors, so that Jews, Protestants, and infidels had votes equal in value to those of the Catholics. Thus, in Strasbourg, where Calvinists and Jews were in the majority, they would appoint the spiritual governor over the churchmen, a flagrant injustice. Also, those most immediately under the

authority of the bishops, viz. the clergy, had no influence in directing the election, and could not *veto* an unsuitable candidate.

In 1802 the constitutional Church was overthrown, and the appointment to bishoprics was made by Napoleon I.

I have entered at some length into this subject of the constitutional character of the Church, because it is one essential to her well-being. Had this not been invaded by the State, there would have been no Papacy, no spiritual tyranny, and no Reformation.

There would have been no Papacy.

When the Church was overborne with violence and the power of princes, she was obliged to seek an authority to oppose against secular interference. Rome became a power because a power was needed to counteract the growth of monarchical despotism. If there had been no invasion of Church rights, there would have been no appeal court. Spiritual tyranny was the outgrowth of the union of Church and State; union is not the proper word, the defloration of the Church by the State. Nobly had the saints struggled to maintain independence for thought, and freedom from constraint even for those in error. "Let us never be insolent when the times are favourable," had said S. Gregory Nazianzen, "let us not think of exiles and proscriptions, drag no one before the judge, let not the whip remain in our hands."[1] "Religion," said Tertullian, "forbids to constrain any to be religious; she would have consent, and not constraint."[2] "I can be severe on you in nothing," wrote S. Augustine to the Manichæan heretics, "but I ought to bear with you now as I bore with myself at a former time, and

[1] Orat. v. 36, 37. [2] Ad Scapulam.

treat you with the same patience which my neighbours shewed towards me, when, furious and blind, I struggled in your error."[1] S. Ambrose refused to communicate with the bishops who had persecuted the Priscillianists. S. Martin rejected the communion of those prelates in Spain who had wrested from the emperor an order to execute heretics. "If violence be employed to sustain the right faith," said S. Hilary,[2] "the wisdom of the bishops must oppose it; they must say, God will have no forced homage, what need has He of a profession of faith produced by violence? He must be sought with simplicity, served by charity, honoured and gained by the honest exercise of our free will." "We cannot," said Cassiodorus in the name of Theodoric, "command religion, for no man can be made to believe against his will."[3]

That spiritual tyranny which caused the revolt of the sixteenth century could never have flung its upas branches far and wide had there been no confusion of temporal with spiritual powers. The hateful union of Alexander the Sixth and Ferdinand the Catholic, gave birth to the Spanish Inquisition. For what purpose? To mow all religion flat. Every doctrine of the Reformation is to be found in Catholicism, and it is idle to talk of the dogmas of Protestantism, of the Protestant faith as if in any point different and opposed to Catholicism. Every truth held by Lollard, Hussite, Lutheran, and Calvinist is found embedded in the creed of the Church. The sixteenth century was a period at which the production of these dogmas into prominence was essential to the welfare of religion. They were parts of the faith which had been overlapped, and were growing sickly and stunted,

[1] Epist. contra Manichæos. [2] Ad Constantin. i. 6.
[3] Cassiod. lib. ii. ep. 27.

a clearance for them was necessary, that they might have air and sun. Had not Church and State been united, these dogmas would have grown in their places and served to enhance the perfection of that flower carpet of belief with which the Church mantles the earth. There is no schism in the meadow; the golden-cup, the daisy, the red-robbin, and the blue-bell flower side by side, and make a subtle splendour of colour. Why should daisy rage against golden-cup, and blue-bell insist on the eradication of red-robbin? The Inquisition on one side and the Protestant reformers on the other thought otherwise. The Papacy declared, We will tolerate beliefs only at a certain level, some shall be pushed out of sight, and others shall be flaunted in the glare of day, anathema to those who do not accept our decision and keep justification by faith in the background and give prominence to salvation by works. The Reformers declared, We will tolerate no more dogmas than three or four, said one; five or six, said another; anathema maranatha to those who hold other doctrines than those we authorize. So Alva butchers in cold blood all heretics who say three or four instead of ten or twelve, and William of Orange posts his soldiers beyond the cathedral doors of Haarlem to massacre the Catholics who have had the hardihood to keep the feast of Corpus Christi which is an abomination to Calvinists.

There would have been no Reformation.

For the constitutional character of the Church would have saved the Church from falling into these abuses which demanded reformation. When the free circulation of the blood is impeded, congestion and mortification result; so the disturbance of the relations of the members of the Church, and of the current vivifying all in one Life,

having been checked, corruptions were the necessary consequence.

A more striking lesson from the history of Christianity can hardly be drawn than that indicated by the lapse of missionary enterprise from the hands of a state-fettered hierarchy into those of monasticism. The spirit of independence which had energized the Church in her days of self-government was diverted at the dawn of the Middle Ages into another channel. Hitherto the hierarchy had been the power converting the world, but when it seated itself in golden fetters on the steps of the throne, it ceased to be a missionary agency, and Europe was converted by hermits and monks, men escaping from the slavery imposed on the priesthood and laity by a degenerate prelacy, that they might live together after the pattern of the primitive Church, obeying rules of their own adoption, and electing superiors to whom they might tender a free and cheerful obedience.

To gather up in few words the substance of this chapter.

I have shewn that if Christ be the Ideal, He must be the ideal Society as well as the ideal Man.

That ideal Society is the Church. It must have all the characteristics of Christ, for it is one with Him.

Every member of the Society must participate more or less in the characteristics of Christ.

His characteristics are unity, sanctity, universality, apostolicity, and infallibility.

These are therefore characteristics of the Church, and more or less of each of its members, that is to say, they form the ideal each man is bound to endeavour to realize.

The Church is the communion of saints, or in other

words it is the union of all who exercise their functions in all times and places, bound into one by union with Christ.

The Church being a society must be organized.

Organization has for its object the assurance to every man of the recognition of his rights and liberties.

Therefore every man must participate in the appointment of the superiors of this organization.

Constitutional government is therefore of the essence of Church organization.

The state has interfered by violence with this liberty, and the result has been a demoralization of the Church, ending in rupture or indifference.

And I conclude, that till the union of Church and State is utterly annihilated, till, that is, moral authority and effective authority have been distinguished and dissevered, the Church can never meet the requirements of mankind nor fulfil her mission in the world.

As Christ individually suffered martyrdom by the princes of the world, so He, in His social capacity, has undergone His passion through the tyranny of the Crown exercised on His body, the Church; may be, that Passion will shortly be over, and even as there took place, according to the Gospel, a resurrection of the Personal Christ, so we shall witness a resurrection of Christ in His social character.

Far be it from me to assert that there is necessary opposition between the Church and the State. As long as the State confines the exercise of its authority to matters strictly within its sphere, and as long as the Church forbears from interference in political matters, there will be no clashing of interests. The office of the Church is to insist on the dogmatic basis of the rights of men,

and on the consequent equality of those rights. The office of the State is to maintain those rights inviolate. Among the primordial rights of man is that of spiritual independence. If the State invade this right, antagonism springs up. If the Church persuades the State to use compulsion, that is, to violate a spiritual right—confusion is the consequence.

CHAPTER XIV

THE INCARNATION AND AUTHORITY

"*Chose étrange, que nous avons donné la liberté à tout le monde, excepté à Dieu!*"—M. DE LAMARTINE.

Moral and effective authority mutually destructive—A theocracy destructive of the dogma of free-will—The Papacy and its results—Subordination of temporal to spiritual authority—The separation of spiritual and temporal authorities—Temporal authority is justifiable when exercised in its own domain—but immoral when it invades religion—Spiritual authority can only devolve from God—Man cannot delegate it—because man cannot make another represent God to him—No moral obedience due to the temporal power when it invades spiritual rights—The representation of authority in the Church necessary—The priesthood necessary—Confusion of functions between priest, magistrate, and soldier ruinous to authority—Authority lodged in the whole Church—but devolves from Christ—it is absolute and it is limited—Ecclesiastical authority must be confined to the declaration of religious truths—Infallibility resides in the whole body—Fallibility in negation—Are members of branch churches bound by negations?—The duties of Catholics.

IF the reader will recur to chapter iv., he will see that a distinction has been laid down between moral and effective authority.

By moral authority is meant that authority which is persuasive, and to which obedience is morally due; whilst by effective authority is meant that authority which is of force, and to which obedience is only due out of compulsion.

I have shewn that it is impossible to unite these two authorities, because they mutually destroy each other.

I have shewn that the action of God upon man is moral, and moral only; that by constituting man free, He has refused to exercise effective authority over him, and that an ecclesiastical or political society claiming Divine Authority must exercise moral authority only; for the moment it exercises compulsion it ceases to represent God, and resolves itself into effective authority which is human, all human, and not at all Divine.

In this chapter I propose to shew what is the bearing of the dogma of the Incarnation on this distinction between authorities, and how it conciliates what otherwise must remain conflicting.

First, let us see whether a theocracy is deducible from the Incarnation. Almost all priesthoods have endeavoured to unite temporal power with spiritual power; and when they have succeeded, a theocracy has been the result.

Almost all governments, kings, emperors, and republics have endeavoured to unite the spiritual power with the temporal power; and when they have succeeded, an autocracy has been the result.

Theocracy is consequently an absolute government carried on in the name of the Absolute.

An Autocracy is consequently an absolute government carried on in the name of the governmental will dominating the Absolute.

Theocracy supposes, as its metaphysical principle, the co-action of God over man for the accomplishment of His law, since it exercises this co-action only by the name and the authority of God, for the execution of His designs. It is then, in principle, absolutely contradictory to the theory of free-will, which allows man to be at liberty to follow his

own determinations in chosing that which is right or that which is wrong. It is based on a false relation between man and God. It is consistent only with a negation of free-will and a doctrine of fatalism. From it flows a complete system of constraint. Man being no more free before God, is not free before His representative, the pope, the direct representative; the king, the indirect representative, deriving his authority by papal procuration, through institution, concordat and the like.

This is tyranny elevated into divine necessity, since man not being free not to obey the law, the representative of God is not free not to exact obedience to it. Liberty of conscience is at a end; for the representative of the Deity formulates what the conscience is to accept, and cuts off all opportunities of expressing doubt or disbelief, as sacrilege and profanity. Liberty of science is at an end; for science runs counter to received religious dogmas; it must do so, for religious dogmas are on one side of the world of truth, and scientific demonstrations are on the other side. As a theocracy is founded on dogma alone, it must wage perpetual war on science, which is founded on demonstration. The Inquisition is the logical consequence of a system of government in the name of a God of compulsion.

The Papacy is the great Christian theocracy. Confusing moral authority with effective authority, it was forced to abdicate the former, and resolve itself into a despotism over men's souls and bodies. Temporal sovereignties were subordinated to the spiritual sovereignty, which became the apex of a vast pyramid weighing down humanity by Divine right. Nicholas II. (A.D. 1059) assumed this supremacy when he took upon himself to confirm the Duke of Calabria and Sicily in his possessions, for which the Duke swore fealty to the Pope. Alexander II. did likewise when he

sanctioned William the Norman's invasion of England; so did Alexander III. when he gave a grant of Ireland to Henry II.; so did Innocent IV. when he bestowed the kingdom of Portugal on the Count of Bologna (1245). In 1265, Pope Clement IV. sold the Southern Italians to Charles of Anjou for a yearly tribute of eight hundred ounces of gold, declaring that he should be excommunicate if the first payment were deferred, and that for the second neglect the whole nation would incur interdict, *i.e.* deprivation of sacraments and divine worship.

The power that could confer could also take away. In 1076, Gregory VII. deposed the Emperor Henry IV. from his throne, releasing his subjects from their allegiance, and urging the princes of Germany to elect a new emperor, in these words, "In behalf of Almighty God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, I deny to Henry the government of the whole realm of Germany and Italy, and release all Christians from the bond of the oath which they have made or will make to him, and forbid any one to serve him as if he were a king." Alexander III. did the same to the Emperor Frederic I. in 1168; Innocent III. to the Emperor Otho IV., 1210, and to King John in 1212; Gregory IX. in 1238, and Innocent IV. in 1245, did this to the Emperor Frederic II.; John XXII. to Louis of Bavaria in 1333, and Pius V. to Queen Elizabeth in 1569.

Another case exhibits the assumption of the twofold power of giving and taking away dominions in one and the same act. When the crusade against the Albigenses, authorized by the third Lateran Council (1179) had been accomplished, and Toulouse and the adjoining country had been wrested from the Count of Toulouse, it was a question what should be done with the conquered territory. The Pope's legates for a while held provisional possession of

the country, until Innocent III. conferred it by bull on Simon de Montfort, and declared the Count of Toulouse for ever deprived of his rights to it. Boniface VII. wrote to King Edward I., that the kingdom of Scotland was the special property of the Roman Church, and that therefore he must not touch it. Innocent III. declared that God had ordained the Pope as Christ's Vicar, to have power "over all nations and kingdoms, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, and to build, and to plant."

The next Pope, Boniface VIII., bestowed Sardinia and Corsica upon James, King of Arragon, under condition of a yearly payment of 2,000 marks to the Apostolic Chair, by a decree beginning with these words, "Being set above kings and kingdoms by a divine pre-eminence of power, we dispose of them as we think fit," &c. In 1302 he published his famous bull "Unam Sanctam," which contains the following propositions: "We are taught by the words of the Gospel that there are in his (Peter's) power two swords, the spiritual and the temporal:—each, therefore, of these is in the power of the Church.—But one sword ought to be inferior to the other sword, and the temporal authority to be subject to the spiritual power.—For the spiritual power has to institute, and to judge the earthly power, if it be evil.—Therefore if the earthly power err, it will be judged by the spiritual power. But if the spiritual power err, the inferior will be judged by his superior. But if the highest err, no man, but God alone, will have power to judge it.—Moreover we declare, affirm, define, and pronounce, that it is altogether necessary to salvation that every human creature should be subject to the Roman pontiff."

The twenty-third proposition of the Syllabus of the present Pope, Pius IX., affirms that the Popes have never

exceeded the bounds of their power or usurped the rights of princes.[1]

The twenty-fourth proposition of the Syllabus confirms to the Church the right of coercing obedience. As this coercion can only be exercised where the mediæval principle of subordination of the State to the Church is maintained, and as the number of governments upholding this principle are becoming yearly smaller, this proposition is but the sanctioning of centuries of barbarity, persecution, and violation of rights. "Alas!" says the Jesuit Schneemann, "the State does not always fulfil its duties towards the Church according to the divine idea, and, let us add, cannot always fulfil them, through the wickedness of men. And thus the Church's rights in inflicting temporal punishment and the use of physical force are reduced to a minimum."[2]

"It was from the spirit here manifested," says Janus, "that Pius IX. in 1851 censured the teaching of the canonist Nuytz, in Turin, because he allowed only the power of spiritual punishment to the Church. And in the Concordat made in 1863 with the Republics of South America, it is laid down in the eighth Article, that the civil authorities are absolutely bound to execute every penalty decreed by the spiritual courts."[3]

The temporal sovereignty being subjected to the supremacy of the Church, as the price of its vassalage the spirituality gives it the power of promulgating civil and political laws. If the sovereignty be deposited in a monarchical government, the constitution must recognize in the Crown a fictitious infallibility, a divine right to do wrong with

[1] The Syllabus condemns the following proposition, "Romani Pontifices et Concilia Œcumenica a limitibus suæ potestatis recesserunt, jura Principum usurparunt."

[2] Stimmen aus Maria Laach: Freiburg, 1867.

[3] Janus: The Pope and the Council, English trans. 1869, p. 11.

impunity, and a chain of consequences follows. The royal power becomes hereditary, for peoples become property of the monarch like land or cattle, to be left from father to son. A privileged aristocracy to support and give splendour to the throne, rejoicing in immunities and endowed with pensions, follows. Heresy is pursued as a crime. The duties of conscience are made legally obligatory when regarded as useful to the State. Rights of individuals disappear, and all live on the bounty of the monarch, who is only responsible to the priest who reigns in the name of the Absolute, and who confided to him his stewardship.

That such a theory hangs logically together there can be no question. When doctrine is such that each of its parts exists as a condition of all, when all are co-ordinated, and suppose one another respectively, that doctrine has the highest degree of probability desirable; for inconsequence is the penalty closest allied to error, as consequence is the most certain mark of truth.

And if the dogma of man's free-will be denied, Papal supremacy in things temporal and spiritual is a complete and compact system from which there is no escape.

But if free-will be admitted, Roman Catholicism is inconsistent. The Church has asserted, proved, defended, and suffered to maintain free-will, and yet during ten centuries she has practically denied its exercise by the theocracy of the Pope. She has admitted the social principles of serfage, of inequality, of absolutism, and of compulsion, and yet from her pulpits she has preached liberty, equality, and fraternity. These are holy words in a holy place, well enough in dogma, in metaphysics, and in ethics, but they are pernicious and false in politics and as social principles!

The Church has placed man face to face with God, and has declared him to be free and responsible to God for all

his actions, and yet she refuses him liberty of conscience! She has taught that all men spring from a common father, that all are redeemed by One into whose mystical body they have been grafted, and in which there is neither rank nor special privilege, and yet she has made some men slaves to others! She has urged men to seek God wherever He may be found, and she has shut the door of science!

Her system has been an illogism. Her social and metaphysical principles do not accord. If we start from theocracy, we arrive at fatalism; and slavery and compression are right. If we start from God willing man to be a free agent, we arrive at liberty of conscience, political, civil and religious liberty.

> "Spontaneously to God should tend the soul,
> Like the magnetic needle to the pole;
> But what were that intrinsic virtue worth,
> Suppose some fellow, with more zeal than knowledge,
> Fresh from St. Andrew's College,
> Should nail the conscious needle to the north?"[1]

If we destroy liberty in an intelligent and rational being, and who, being intelligent and rational, is free to exercise his intelligence and reason, we destroy the moral responsibility of his acts. We destroy the moral relations between him and God. We destroy free-will, which is the faculty of exercising that responsibility; we destroy the dogma of Grace, which supposes the effusions of supernatural power to enable man to accomplish those things for which he is responsible to God.

But the dogma of free-will is at the very base of Christianity. If that be destroyed every other dogma goes with it.

God leaves man perfectly free to abuse his liberty if he wills. Even when a man resolves on doing what is wrong,

[1] Hood: Ode to Rae Wilson.

committing a theft, an adultery, a murder, God does not withdraw from him the muscular power and force necessary to accomplish the crime; on the contrary, the current of life from the Absolute continues unintermitted to the contingent even when he does that which is wrong. There is no attempt at constraint on God's part; man is entirely free to use or abuse God's gifts.

But a theocracy endeavours to force a man to do what is right, in spite of God's witness against it. His authority, nevertheless, is moral and not effective.

And what is the link between God and man, and between man and his fellows. It is love. Can love be forced? Can you make a man love God by threatening him with the galleys if he refuse, and make him love his neighbour on penalty of breaking on the wheel? Compulsion will make man hate God and religion, but persuasion will make him love both. If the Church is to bring mankind, broken loose from her fold, escaped through her torn net, to the feet of God, it must not be with thunderings and earthquakes and fires, but with the still small voice of persuasion.

Nor is bribery much better than constraint. By making religion "worth while" to a man, you do not make him love it, you teach him to despise it.

If a theocracy be a flagrant contradiction in Christianity to the first principles of Christianity, governmental autocracy, which makes the religion subserve the State, is not less so.

In a theocracy, the pontiff derives his authority immediately from God, and the king draws his authority mediately from God through consecration by the pontiff. Thus the king represents the Absolute to his subjects, and all to

whom he conveys authority exercise in theory the authority flowing from God, the source of all authority.

Since the Reformation a new theory of governmental authority has been broached, upon which our modern sovereignties are based. This theory is the delegation of authority by the people to the monarch. The theory has not been properly worked out, it was caught up as a makeshift to serve as a base for political authority, the old principle of divine right communicated by the Pope through consecration having been dismissed.

The theory is right, but it has not been dissected with sufficient clearness, and those rights which are alienable have not been sufficiently distinguished from those which are inalienable, and moral and effective authorities have been confused.

According to the new, and I believe the correct theory, authority is right delegated to another. The liberty of the citizen is the faculty of doing what he ought. Right realizes duty, it is the exercise of the moral law in opposition to every contrarient will; it is duty continued. And because duty is identical in its principle,—for the same moral responsibility weighs on all men, the equality of right ensues.

The constitution of the public power is subordinated to the right of the individual. Consequently, no privilege is permissible, no institution is licit which cannot justify itself before the bar of reason.

After right come rights, and after duty come duties. From the duty to live incumbent on me, arises the duty of watching for the conservation of the organs which serve my intelligence, and thence the right of acquiring and making mine such property as is necessary for my preservation. Right and duty are the same idea under

two aspects. Every duty in me creates a right over another.

But duties are of two sorts. There are the duties every man owes to God, and there are the duties he owes to his fellows. Those due to his fellows are, it is true, due to God, and he is responsible to God for discharging them: but there is this difference between these duties,—those he owes directly to God, worship and prayer, he cannot alienate; he alone can execute them, because he alone is responsible for their execution. But the duties he owes his fellows, non-interference with rights of property, rights of labour, freedom of person, he can delegate, and these he must delegate, because social organization is a necessity, and requires the concurrence of all.

And government, to whom he hands over the protection of these rights, exercises authority by virtue of this delegation. But his religious duties he cannot delegate, therefore government can exercise no authority in matters of religion.

Again, observe, inasmuch as man is morally bound to respect the rights of his fellows, the authority of government in all matters social and political is moral. The right of a government over the individual is proportionate to the rights he has conferred on it, and as he cannot transfer his moral obligations, *i.e.* his religious responsibilities, to other shoulders, it follows that a government can have no right whatever over religion and matters of conscience.

It is over all matters pertaining to the regulation of society that government can exercise a justifiable authority; for these rights are the only ones man can confer, and he can confer them only to enable himself to have liberty, and government to have mission.

Whenever, therefore, government touches religion, and endeavours to enforce any point of conscience, it contravenes right.

Man cannot delegate what he does not possess. In all his religious acts, he is responsible directly to God. In all his social acts, he is responsible to men; he is responsible to God, but to men also—and when the action is between man and man, he can delegate the adjustment of these relations to a king or a president or a government of what sort pleases him. But the adjustment of his relations to God he cannot delegate; for to delegate them is to transfer the direct relation to the person substituted for God, but no man has a right to substitute another man for God. He has no authority to do this. God may do it, and God alone can do it.

The king, in one of our modern constitutional monarchies, in which the Church is subordinated to the State, assumes to order the relations between man and the Absolute. But to exercise this office he must have received special authority from God. But no one will pretend that this is the case. Henry VIII. assumed to be pope and king in one, that is to exercise authority as supreme head in things temporal and things spiritual, but such assumption was blasphemy against God, and an invasion of the rights of men. Men confer on the king his authority in things temporal, but men cannot confer on him authority in things spiritual; for by so doing they would delegate to him to represent God to them, and that is a right men do not possess, but God alone.

From this it follows that when the Crown rules anything touching religion, such regulation is not morally binding on consciences.

For instance: the Crown forbids a certain doctrine to be held or taught, say the doctrine of the Real Presence. Is a member of the Church bound to give up his convictions, and abstain from preaching that doctrine?

To make the answer clear, let him ask himself, Who gave the Crown authority to decide doctrine? Did God? No, the tradition of authority by consecration from the Pope has been abandoned. Did the people? Certainly not: the people cannot delegate to the Crown the power to represent God.

Therefore the Crown in deciding a doctrine is invading a territory over which it has no moral right.

Let us suppose another case. Believing in the Real Presence, a priest expresses his belief by outward gestures and by adorning the altar with lights and flowers. Now supposing the Crown had decided that genuflexions, lights, and flowers, were illegal, is the priest morally bound to abandon them?

Certainly not: it is his duty to God to give full expression to the belief of his heart, and no power on earth has moral authority to interfere with this right. If the law punishes him, it is doing precisely what the Inquisition did in condemning Galileo, infringing a right of conscience over which it has no authority.

From what has been laid down it follows that the only condition consistent with Christian principles, in which the Church and the State can stand to one another, is that of entire and absolute separation of authorities.

That the only authority compatible with Christian principles which the Church can exercise, is moral authority, through persuasion.

That the only area in which the State can exercise authority that shall be justifiable is that of social and political relations.

We will now consider the sort of moral authority lodged in the hands of the Church.

As has been said in the last chapter, the Church is an organized body. As an organized body it has officers. As the ideal society, its officers are, or ought to be, the representatives of all members of the society. These officers,—the clergy, represent, therefore, the human side of the social Christ. In the society they are what in His person was His organic apparatus. This is the Presbyterian theory. But this does not satisfy the doctrine of the Incarnation. This theory is perfectly satisfactory when applied to a purely human organization; but it breaks the analogy when applied to a spiritual organization. For the social Christ is like the personal Christ, double, of two natures, one outward and visible, the other inward and spiritual, one human, the other divine.

The priesthood, therefore, is the representative of the human element of the Church, but it is also the representative of the divine element. It partakes of the fallible and of the infallible.

Inasmuch as it represents the human element, it will be chosen constitutionally by the Church; inasmuch as it represents the divine element, it will attach itself to Christ, and partake of His divinity and authority.

A revelation necessitates a priesthood. If the Incarnation be true, it was a revelation. If a revelation, it necessitated a body of authoritative teachers.

Every truth we do not learn by our own experience is to us authoritative. If the king of Oude believes in water

being frozen he does so on authority: that is to say, he accepts the word of a teacher.

As the Incarnation is a fact of the past, it cannot be believed by us, except on authority. If we believe it, it is on the authority of some teachers, or body of teachers.

If the Incarnation be necessary to all men, that body of teachers must be perpetual. Therefore, from the time of Christ to the consummation of all things there must be a hierarchy authoritatively teaching the dogmas of Christianity.

Autotheism attempts to do without the priest. The personal autocrat who affirms the existence of God identifies himself with God. There is no protection for the beliefs of others. To acknowledge only one's own belief, and to repudiate the beliefs of others, is to make one's self Absolute; being absolute, one has no need of faith, religion, and sacerdotal institution. If religion be of the individual alone, the priesthood is not necessary; but if religion belong to many, it is necessary to preserve the community from breaking up into a multitude of autotheists.

Humanity has always required the priest. The soldier representing defence, the magistrate representing order, and the priest representing the link with the Absolute, are three institutions which form themselves spontaneously in society. If the universality of these three institutions does not convince men of their necessity, their spontaneity demonstrates it. They may be disguised, but they cannot be annihilated.

Not to create an army is not to destroy the soldier. The soldier is fundamental; one may change the mode of institution, but not the institution.

The magistrate and the priest are found at the origin of societies. If faith in God be essential and true, it is

a social question, and if a social question it must have its representation.

Man can no more be robbed of the representation of his faith than he can be of the representation of justice and of defence. The Emperor of China cut off the heads of all the learned men in the Celestial Empire, and with the disappearance of the representatives of science, science disappeared. Destroy the priesthood, and the tradition of the Incarnation dies out. Societies are the successive and permanent representation of man and of God. In that they represent man, they necessarily represent God. Man feeling that he is not the first cause, and that God is the principle of all human action, he represents himself by the soldier and the magistrate, and he represents God by the priest.

If the priesthood be abolished, the principle which is God is abolished also, for He ceases to be witnessed to. The priest will always reappear under one form or another, wherever there is any belief in God; either as a visionary, or a sorcerer, or a spiritualist. Man must believe, and rather than not believe, he will believe in an absurdity.

The three social institutions of soldier, magistrate, and priest, have their dangers as well as their utility. Let the utility be preserved and the danger be suppressed.

The functions of soldier and magistrate are but the same function divided, for if the magistrate has no force, he is nothing. So also, if the soldier has not justice, he is only blind force. These two functions united constitute temporal authority.

If the temporal authority be not determined, and the magistrate and soldier become priest, the empire is changed into a tyranny, and we have a governmental autocracy of the modern type trampling on religious rights.

If the functions of the priest be not determined, and he becomes soldier and magistrate, the empire is transformed into a tyranny, and we have a theocracy.

Thus, soldier and magistrate on one side, and priest on the other, are the representatives of the liberty of peoples, subject to the condition that there be no encroachment by either on the functions of the other, that there be no confusion of powers, and that each exercises his office with recognition of the Absolute.

As Christ is God as well as Man (by hypothesis), His word is authoritative and infallible; and His authority is moral only. As the Church is the social aspect of Christ (as has been demonstrated), it must also be authoritative and infallible, and her authority must be moral only.

But how is she to speak authoritatively, and how is she to declare the truth infallibly?

The Church being Christ, authority is not here or there, nor is infallibility here or there, but authority resides in the whole body, and infallibility resides in the whole body. Authority and infallibility are not derived from an order of the Church, nor from one member of the Church, but from the centre of the complete society.

If authority and infallibility had their seat in one member, a pope, the Church would not be Catholic; for the centre of truth and authority would be displaced, it would be thrown to a point in the circumference, which is impossible without constituting the Pope God.

If Christ be the centre from whom all authority and all truth radiate, authority and truth will be diffused throughout the whole circle of the Church, which is His circumference.

But as a society can only exist by organization, authority and infallibility must have its representatives. The

ecclesiastical body are the representatives of authority and infallibility.

They represent authority; but that authority can only be moral. "He spake as one having authority, and not as the scribes," was said of Jesus; and so it must be with the priest, His representative.

Authority will be of two sorts, direct and indirect. Direct authority will come immediately from God, indirect authority will come mediately from God through the body of the faithful.

When a priest or bishop exercises authority, he exercises direct authority, but inasmuch as his authority is circumscribed within certain limits, as of his diocese or parish, he exercises it under the correction of the body. Thus, his authority is of God, but his jurisdiction is of man. The faculty is divine, but the exercise of the faculty is humanly regulated.

That human regulation is divine also, but mediately so.

We see that it is analogous in the constitution of the State. Every man has a right to live and acquire property, but society imposes restrictions, necessary restrictions, without which society could not exist. The power to restrict is in this case mediately divine.

Thus, in the Church, the authority to represent Christ must devolve directly from Christ, but the organization of that authority must derive from the society.

Destroy the idea of limitation of authority—of jurisdiction conferred by the society, and you destroy the idea of the Church as a human society.

Destroy the idea of the immediate devolution of authority, and you destroy the idea of the Church as a divine society.

If the Church be not a human and at the same time a divine society, it is not an aspect of Christ, Who is both man

and God; and if Christ be not a community as well as a personality, He is not the ideal of man, social as well as individual; and if He be not the ideal, He is not the God-man; that is, He is not perfect in both natures.

The idea of ecclesiastical authority is one from which so many shrink, because it has been frightfully abused through its union with effective authority, that it is necessary for us to see clearly of what nature it is and what are its limits.

There is no reason whatever why it should be dreaded any more than scientific authority. Scientific authority is the authority to declare the truth in matters of scientific research, and this devolves immediately from God. Every man who establishes an absolute truth in the domain of his investigation, Sir Isaac Newton when he declared the dogma of gravitation; Kepler when he declared the true law of planetary motions; Halley when he asserted the revolution of the sun round its own axis; Römer when he laid down the rapidity of the transmission of light, spoke with direct divine authority; that is, they announced the truth discovered by observation and reason. But no scientific man who speaks out of his domain speaks with authority; a botanist cannot dogmatize in acoustics, nor can an astronomer declare truth in anatomy.

So in spiritual matters, the Church has authority to speak dogmatically, but she has no authority to declare the truth in any other sphere, scientific, metaphysical, or political.

Again, her authority is limited to the declaration of the truth, she may not oppose one truth to another truth, but her office is to declare the whole body of truth. Her authoritative creed is the encyclopædia of the belief of all her members, of all Christians, of all humanity indeed, past, present and to come, in *matters spiritual.*

As the Incarnation is a fact of the past, it is her mission to assert the dogmatic truth of an historical event.

If it be necessary for all men to acknowledge that event to be a fact, it is necessary that there should be an authoritative witness to it.

The Church is infallible inasmuch as it is Divine; infallible in the domain of supra-sensible truths. It is fallible when it dogmatizes on any other truths.

Wherever the Church expresses Christ, it is divine, immutable, and true; wherever it expresses man it is human, and fallible, and changeable.

Thus, the organic constitution of the Church has been disturbed. That is the human side; but the divine side has remained unchanged.

No member of the Church can declare the whole truth. No portion of the Church can declare the whole truth. The whole truth can only be declared by the œcumenical Church.

No member of the Church may deny a dogma which he cannot believe. He may say, I do not believe that doctrine. But he may not say, That doctrine is false.

No branch of the Church may reject as false dogmas received by other branches of the Church. For there is really no such a thing as a branch of the Church. The Church must be one or nothing. The branch is nothing but a group of individualities; they are of the Church, and fit harmoniously into their places, but if they begin to fall together for the purpose of denying what *is* to other individuals and tracts of the Church, they are in schism.

What every individual and every part of the Church is morally bound to do is to believe what is within its own focus, and to allow what is beyond its own horizon.

Every individual and every part of the Church is infal-

lible in what he or it believes and declares, but is fallible in everything else.

When any individual or portion of the Church denies a dogma held by any other portion of the Church, such a denial is a practical denial of the infallibility of the Church, therefore it is a denial of the infallibility of Christ, therefore it is a denial of the divinity of Christ.

Is then a member of a branch of the Church bound by any negations of that branch? Is, for instance, a Greek bound to disbelieve in the double procession of the Holy Ghost, is a Roman bound to disbelieve in the infallibility of the entire Church, because the expression of infallibility has been assumed to the detriment of the whole, by one man; is an Anglican bound to reject the dogma of Invocation of Saints?

Certainly not. A negation is nothing. If the Greek Church denies the double procession, the Roman Church denies the œcumenicity of the Body of Christ, the Anglican Church denies the Invocation of Saints, none of these denials affect their members. For men are members, not of parts, but of the whole. They are bound to the whole by affirmation; negations are not links, they are the rupture of links.

As things are now, there is schism, brought about by negation; possible in the Church, because it has its human, imperfect side, which having become corrupted through union with effective authority, has fallen into decomposition.

But every additional step in beliefs taken by any man, or any admission that truths may lie beyond his limited horizon, approaches him to the ideal of all-conciliation.

Schism is negation, and negation is nothing in itself. Therefore negation cannot bind any man's conscience.

If any man declares all that is within the range of his own belief, and admits as possible all that is believed by others, he is very near to the realization of Catholicity.

If any man declares all that is within the range of his own belief, and accepts as true all that is authoritatively declared by the representatives of all mankind, he is a Catholic. He may not be able himself to believe, but he believes the measure of truth to be universal and not individual.

This is the function of the Church, to declare authoritatively all truth; and every man is morally bound to accept all as true, some articles because they are within his own apprehension, some because they are within the capacity of others

CHAPTER XV

THE DOGMA OF GRACE

"To him who will sin, the way is open; to him who will keep the law, divine grace overflows."—TALMUD: SABBATH.

The relation between man and God—Deism admits the relation of origin alone—Pantheism confuses the factors—Christianity preserves the factors and determines the relation—Man free to accept life, reason and grace, or to reject them all or severally—Protestantism vitiates the relations—Catholicism maintains them—The mode of God's operation the same always—Vitally, intellectually, morally—He acts mediately—the medium material—The sacramental system the materialization of grace—Grace given at every time of life to meet all necessities—Loss to the ignorant through the mutilation of the sacramental system.

GOD being the absolute, and man the contingent, God lives as the essence and source of life, and man lives as the effect, and never as the principle. Deriving his life from God, he may become the source of life to another, but not the absolute cause of life.

His life is a reflexion of God's life, and he may reflect it on another, but he cannot constitute himself the ultimate principle from which all life flows.

Such is the relation between God and man, a relation that cannot alter, God the cause, man the effect; God the principle, man the derivative.

The Deist admits this relation as the original, but not as

the permanent condition of man. He allows that man exists through the fiat of the Creator, but there his connexion with God ceases; from the point of junction their respective lines diverge and become more and more distant. The relation is that of son to father. Man receives from the Deity his being; but having received his being, his Father participates no longer in his action and in his life. God is the principle, but not the continuation of his life. Man has his liberty, which he realizes, making it his own in principle and in fact, without the co-operation of God. He individualizes himself, but it is in exile. The intercommunion between him and his Maker is not; for they are separate. Deism may be a philosophy, but it cannot be a religion.

The Pantheist, on the other hand, confounds God and man in an unity of being; not because the absolute is the principle and power of life, and because the life of the contingent is really the life of the Absolute, transformed into another personality; but because all distinction between the cause and the effect is denied or misunderstood; the contingent is in the absolute, and the absolute is in the contingent; they cannot be disengaged, and consequently they cannot be distinguished. The absolute is not one and the contingent another; one is not principle and the other effect, but the All-Being is all in one, cause in effect, and effect in cause; a chaos of relations. If the Pantheist recognizes a distinction, he should recognize that a relation exists between them, that the absolute and the contingent must stand to one another, one as cause, the other as effect, one as principle and force of life, the other as possessed of communicated life, which is nevertheless its own life, because it is life.

The Deist charges the Pantheist with maintaining a

relation without affirming the distinct personalities of those related, and the Pantheist rebukes the Deist with asserting a distinction in personalities and not maintaining their relations.

The Pantheist denies man his liberty, making him but a portion of the τό Παν; or it allows him absolute liberty without responsibility, by absorbing the absolute in the contingent, by sinking God in man.

Christianity alone conserves intact the distinction between the Absolute and the contingent and the perpetuity of their relations.

This is the subject of consideration in this chapter.

We have seen that the dogma of free-will is of the essence of Christianity. God is the author of man's whole being, and He gives to him in potentiâ the faculties of manifesting his complete personality; these faculties he is perfectly free to use or to abuse.

The theory of free-will is the relation between man and God; the relation between God and man is called the theory of grace. At bottom, free-will and grace are only the same idea seen from two different points of view.

The theory of grace, like that of liberty, supposes 1st, a cause, which is God; and 2nd, an effect, which is man. God is always cause, man is always effect. God lives, acts, and wills as cause; man lives, acts, and wills as effect.

Every act of God is causational, every act of man has the character of effect. This is the base of their life, and this is the reason of the operation of God upon man.

When we consider the liberty of man, we see that he is free to accept or to reject the life that has been given to him. He cannot communicate to himself life, because he is not the principle of life, but he can use or abuse

the life which is his, having been given to him, because he is an effect.

It is the same with his intellectual faculties. He can atrophy them through wilful ignorance, or he can develop them by constant effort. His life and his mental faculties are talents to be put out to usury, or to be buried in the earth; but they are not given man to bury, but to make the most of, and in this consists his duty.

It is the same with his emotional powers. He has the capacity of loving God and loving man. He may concentrate all that love on himself; and destroy its very nature; by so doing he ceases to be religious and social, and thus snaps those cords which would draw him onward to perfection.

Grace is to the moral force what the principle of life is to the living force. Just as man has not the principle of life in himself, is not the cause of life, so he has not in himself the principle of morality, he is not the cause of moral force.

If he is effect in one, he is effect in the other. If he be not the principle of vital force, he is not the principle of moral force. The law is one. God is in all things cause, man in all things is effect.

In science, man is not cause. He does not lay down the laws of nature. He makes his theories, and has to adapt and readapt them as his experience enlarges. There is a law of nature, and towards that law he feels his way; that law may be discovered, but it cannot be imposed by him.

Grace is the relation of God to man's moral nature, as truth is His relation to man's mental nature, and life is His relation to man's animal nature.

In all these relations man is free, free to interrupt and

destroy the connexion; to cut off the relation to his animal nature by suicide; to his intellectual nature by persistent ignorance; to his moral nature by rejection of grace.

And just as man may accept and abuse one relation, so he may accept and abuse the other relations.

He may accept his life, but refuse to accept intelligence and morality; then he lives merely as an animal.

He may accept his life and his reason and refuse grace; and then he lives merely as an intelligent man.

He may accept his life and grace and refuse reason; and then he lives as a mystic.

He may accept his life, his reason, and grace; and then he lives his perfect life—as a Christian.

There is no constraint; he is perfectly free. The Absolute, in all his relations with man, is an incessant appeal to life, to science, and to good; and man is the voluntary reponse to good, to science, and to life.

Thus, man is free by and in the Absolute; and grace, far from being the destruction of the liberty of man, is the cause of his liberty; for, just as he has life only because there is a Principle of life, and has intelligence, only because there is a Principle of intelligence, so he has a moral life, only because there is a Principle of goodness.

The liberty of the human conscience is thus solidly established, since it is necessitated by the very relation man stands in to God, by the nature of man, and by the nature of God.

Deism suspends the communication of the life of the absolute to the contingent, from the moment of the birth of the latter; Pantheism destroys the link between the absolute and the contingent by fusing them into one mass; Anthropotheism by placing in man a factitious absolute, and thus denying the real absolute.

Deism artificially separates the factors, Pantheism and Autotheism confuse them. Consequently the metaphysical principle of liberty is not to be found in these systems; the only scheme which establishes without break liberty under the Absolute, and makes liberty consist in morality, is Christianity.

But not every form of Christianity. Protestantism falsifies the theory of relations, Luther by his doctrine of free-will, and Calvin by his doctrine of grace. In principle they admitted the link between God and man, but their peculiar dogmas destroyed it, for neither Luther nor Calvin went back to metaphysical principles, but halted at their theories. Luther, in his treatise *De servo Arbitrio*, denied free-will, Calvin affirmed the doctrine of predestination, and arrived, like Luther, at the negation of free-will.

These solutions of the question are the complete destruction of the link between man and God. For if man has not liberty before God, if grace is fatal to him, it results that he lives and acts, not as a person with a will, but passively; and if passive, the life of the contingent is nothing but the life of the Absolute, who lives and wills in the other; and the other has neither distinct personality nor being. This is the Pantheistic consequence following certainly from the Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrine; and this accounts for the fact that Pantheism dominates the intellect in all Protestant countries. Their religion has secretly prepared them for it.

Catholicism alone lays down the distinction between God and man, whilst it preserves inviolate the link by its theory of grace, an incessant effusion of the principle and power of the moral life, and by its theory of free-will, which is the voluntary acceptance or refusal of the principles of moral life. Thus grace is the relation of God to man, and free-

will is the relation of man to God; and one supposes the other.

We come now to the mode in which God operates upon man. First with regard to the animal life. God gives man his life, the germ of his life, at the outset, but the preservation of that life demands an incessant assimilation of vitalizing material, that it may continue to live, grow, and perfect itself.

The child enters the world with its vital force within it, but it needs food, or that life will expire. Food is to it fuel to supply the central fire with its latent caloric.

Thus man, to preserve that life which God has given him, is obliged to consume material substances in which is chemical force which he may transmute into vital force. His link with God is through the thousand substances which sustain the life within him. Every animal and every herb maintains the same relations to the Absolute. There is so much of the life radiated from the Creator wrapped up in so much matter. By consuming the material, this life is assimilated. Refuse food, and you break the threads which attach your life to the Absolute; and its connexion broken, it dies.

So with the intellect. The faculty of knowing is given to it, but the material is scattered here and there. The mind without material could not grow. Nor could it grow unless that material were intellectualized, if I may use the word, by God. For if the world of nature were not subject to law, thought would find in it nothing on which to reason. Every change would be a surprise, but as it would be purposeless, with the surprise, all its action on the mind would cease. On the contrary, the world of matter is penetrated through and through with thought, and it thus becomes a vehicle for the conveyance of thought to the mind.

It is the link between the intellect of man and the mind of God.

So with the heart. The faculty of loving is given man at his birth, but the objects on which it can beam, and from which it can recover its warmth, are around him. Place a man in a desert island, and he will look about him for some object which he may love, a parrot or a goat. Enclose him within stone walls, and he will expend his affection on the mice and spiders; even, it may be, on the cold cell itself. The Incarnation is the carrying out of the analogy. Man, if he must love men or other creatures, must also love God; and that he may love God, God must materialize Himself. He has materialized His life in the elements of consumption to nourish the life of man; He has materialized His intelligence in the works of Nature to educate the reason of man; He has materialized His love in Christ to draw out and to nourish the charity of man.

But as Christ in His material presence was only for thirty-three years on earth, and men live, generation after generation, with the same want, the sacraments are, according to Catholic theory, a prolongation of the Incarnation, a materializing of grace, to bring it within the compass of man's affections. On this point I shall speak in another chapter. I wish here simply to insist on the materializing of grace being according to analogy. Everything has its outward and visible form and its inward and spiritual grace, the bread we eat, the flowers we study, the objects we love, and the sacraments we use.

Vital force might be conveyed to us without a gross medium, but, as a fact, it is not. If there be angels they will draw their life from the source of life without its having passed first into matter, and become as it were incarnate. They may know without any creation, which is a manifesta-

tion of the thoughts of the Creator, His ideas written on the world He has called into being; to them no Incarnation is necessary, for they can love directly, without need of an exteriorization of that love; but to us it is not so, double in our nature, being composed of body and soul, and these compounds being so united that lesion of one wounds the other, God operates upon us through a medium. He gives vital force through food, intellectual force through the study of His works, spiritual force through sacraments.

Everything may become a sacrament of good, as everything may be made a sacrament of evil. As the trail of the serpent is over all the flowers of earth, so has the shadow of the ascended Christ fallen over them all and sanctified them. The mountain peak glowing with the last evening light, the pine reflected in the still green lake, the dew dripping flowers at morning and the high-soaring lark, are all sacraments, or may be sacraments to us—sacraments of the beauty and goodness of the Creator. But there are other sacraments conferring moral force; sacraments which make the Incarnation not a mere history of the past, but an ever-present, living, earnest reality to the Catholic.

As the life man has to preserve requires constant nourishing, as the mind requires a constant supply of intellectual nutriment through observation, reading, or listening,—and what is literature but the materialized thoughts of the writers, and what are words but embodied ideas?—so the moral life requires constant moral nutriment, that is grace. And as the moral life is exposed to various dangers, and to times of sickness, and fits of exhaustion, it needs a variety of means of grace to sustain and stimulate it at all times. This is what the Church provides in all her sacraments and pious rites. There is a constant overflow of divine grace through material channels.

A writer on the visions of the Old Testament thus elegantly illustrates the idea. I condense his words.[1]

He is speaking of the visions of Zechariah. The prophet had been shown a series. One represented the rebuilding of the Church, another shewed the priesthood of Christ, and then came one exhibiting the sacramental system of the Church. He saw in vision "a candlestick all of gold, with a bowl upon the top of it, and seven lamps thereon, and seven pipes to the seven lamps, which are upon the top thereof."[2]

The lights, says Fernandez, are the different estates of Christians, the pipes conveying the oil which nourishes these lights are the sacraments, and the olive branches whence the oil distils are the two natures of Christ. The little child gathers its sweet innocence, its simple faith and pure love, through the channel of Baptism shedding the golden oil of divine grace into the clean vessel of its simple heart. The youth goes forth to new trials against the world, the flesh, and the devil, and he requires more of the divine assistance than did the child; whence does he obtain his strength, but through the channel of Confirmation distributing the golden renovating oil. In the battle of life every day, the flagging soul requires a renewal of the moral life, and it is quickened and invigorated by the golden oil flowing through the channel of Communion. The penitent bewailing lost grace, whose lamp is dying out, whose vessel is clogged and stained, needs the golden stream rolling through Penance to cleanse the defiled vessel and quicken the expiring flame. Those who desire to enter on the marriage state and preserve the virginity of the clean heart, need powers and grace to protect them from

[1] Fernandez: in Visiones Vet. Test., Lugduni, 1617, p. 779 et seq.

[2] Zech. iv. 2, 3.

falling into sensuality. And again through the channel of Matrimony gushes the precious oil.

Those who seek to minister to the spiritual wants of others, need special grace and authority.

> "Unless Thou fill me with Thy light,
> I cannot lead Thy flock aright;
> Nor, without Thy support, can bear
> The burden of so great a care,
> But am myself a castaway."[1]

But, lo! through the channel of Holy Order the anointing oil is shed. Lastly, the period of sickness and the hour of death have their special trials and needs of grace, and it is supplied through Holy Unction.

Commentators have regarded the parable of the good Samaritan as typical of Christ and mankind. He brings man to the house of His Church, and He gives to the host, His ministry, the two pence of the two great Sacraments of the Gospel to be his stay and support, "and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee," commissioning His Church to multiply means of assistance to weak and ignorant souls, as it may deem expedient.

Whether it be so or not, this is certain—the Incarnation is the descent of God from the unapproachable regions of the Absolute to the lowest depths of man's spiritual needs. Let that be granted—and if it be not granted, the value of the Incarnation is naught—and the whole sacramental system flows from it inevitably.

Man needs the help of God continually, and continually therefore is that help given; but it is given according to the law of man's nature and the law of God's Incarnation, that is, grace becomes embodied in an outward, material

[1] Longfellow: The Golden Legend.

form. Man receives every other gift of God in an outward, material shape. He receives moral force thus also.

This is the principle which renders, not merely the sacraments grace-giving, but those numberless other gifts of the Church grace-giving also—scapulars, holy water, images, and the like.

Our Reformers abolished a host of means of grace; with rude hands they hacked away all the lower steps of the ladder that reaches to heaven, by which the ignorant and the feeble could lift themselves and look up. And now they have cast themselves in a sullen despair upon the earth; it is no gate of heaven to them, but a pillow of stones, which they will hug, and on which they will die, without a mounting hope or a descending angel.

CHAPTER XVI

EMMANUEL

"I gazed upon Christ, the Saviour of man,
In streaming snow-white garment wand'ring,
Giant great, over land and sea;
His head reach'd to the heavens,
His hands were stretch'd out in blessing
Over land and sea; and as a heart in his bosom
Bore He the sun ruddy and flaming,
Shedding beams of mercy, beauteous and bliss-giving,
Lightening and warming, over land and sea."

HEINE: PICTURES OF TRAVEL.

Prayer the affirmation of the link between God and man—affirms grace—Grace must coincide with the law of the Incarnation—An historical Christ does not satisfy the needs of man—Man needs a Christ immanent in the Church as an object of worship—This is also necessitated by the nature of the Incarnation—The Real Presence in every Christian—in all Sacraments—in the Eucharist—Impossibility man labours under of avoiding localization of the Deity—Christ, as God, is everywhere present—as Man is localized—These ideas do not contradict one another, both are true—The worship of the localized Christ springs up at once—This doctrine in accordance with the law of the Incarnation—Emmanuel, God with us in many ways.

BY prayer we affirm the link between ourselves and God, we assert our own free-will, and impetrate the grace of God. If we had not free-will, we should not pray. We pray for assistance because we know that we can do wrong as well as right, and we want assistance to enable us to do what is right. If we are fatally ruled in all we do, prayer is out of the question. Consequently prayer is illogical to

a Pantheist, a Mohammedan, and a Calvinist. They may worship, but they may not pray, or they are inconsequent.

The Catholic is obliged to affirm the link between himself and God; he does so by prayer, thereby he affirms his own free-will and its correlative, grace. And as grace, to coincide with the law of God's dealings, must be double, must have a divine side and a material manifestation, he affirms the sacramental system.

Christ was Himself the sacrament of grace for thirty-three years. Now that He is no longer sensibly present, He continues to exist amongst us, conveying grace, according to the same law.

This is what His name Emmanuel implies, a perpetual presence of God with us, of God ever present in His Church to convey grace and to receive homage.

An historical Incarnation does not meet all man's requirements. God made flesh two thousand years ago is a fact of the past, interesting to the religious antiquarian, but of no practical importance to the Christian. The dealings of God with man after that event are precisely the same as they were before.

It was a golden spot in the world's scroll, diminishing in lustre as the future unwinds, and soon to be rolled up in oblivion; not a golden thread illuminating the whole history of man.

Christ was born, God incarnate, lived and died, rose and ascended, and Christianity scrambles on without Him in the light of that event, becoming dimmer as generations succeed generations. Four thousand years hence men will walk in darkness again. The faith required to hold the fact of the Incarnation is historical belief; and as historical facts become remote faith diminishes in intensity.

The Lutheran doctrine of Justification by faith does not

hitch in to the Incarnation, it would apply as well without that event, and unite man and God whether He had been incarnate or not.

Protestantism is a religion of looking back to the past, not a religion of the present. Two thousand years ago Christ was in His Church, and we are two thousand years off from Him. "The history of religion," says a modern essayist,[1] "according to the ordinary Protestant view, is an immense anti-climax. Judaism is a half success. Christianity is a catastrophe." In the Twelfth Book of Milton's Paradise Lost, the Archangel Michael draws out for Adam the long history of his posterity. In grand pictures taken from Scripture, the four thousand years of preparation pass in review. All progresses in expectation of the promised Deliverer. He comes, He dies, He rises triumphant, and ascends into heaven. Adam exclaims in rapture:—

> "O goodness infinite, goodness immense!
> That all this good of evil shall produce."

But his raptures are premature; he has the curiosity to ask Michael what shall follow the preaching of the Apostles. Great and glorious things doubtless, while Michael draws his prophecy from the Acts of the Apostles. He tells of the descent of the Holy Ghost, the gift of tongues, and miracles,—

> "Thus they win
> Great numbers of each nation to receive
> With joy the tidings brought from Heaven; at length
> Their ministry perform'd, and race well run,
> Their doctrine and their story written left,
> They die."

But as soon as Michael—Milton's Michael of course—leaves Scripture, and takes his Protestant view of history,

[1] In Spirit and in Truth: Longmans, 1869, p. 329. A very masterly essay, taking the scriptural argument, which it is not my place to adopt.

how changed is the scene! Scarcely are the Apostles dead, when wicked men

> "The truth
> With superstition and traditions taint,
> *Left only in these written records pure,*
> Though not but by the Spirit understood.
> Whence heavy persecutions shall arise
> On all who in the worship persevere
> Of spirit and truth; the rest, far greater part,
> Will deem in outward rites and specious forms
> Religion satisfied."

And so the world goes on, "under its own weight groaning," till the day of doom.

The reader must be of a very genial temperament who, with this philosophy of history in his mind, can exclaim with Adam—Milton's Adam of course—

> "Greatly instructed I shall hence depart
> Greatly in peace of thought."[1]

Such a view is, I need hardly say, inconsistent with the dogma of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is a descent of God to the level of human necessities; man wants the presence of Christ as much now as he did two thousand years ago; he wants Christ not merely on paper, but living in fact as a person in the midst of His Church. He needs a perfect ideal life, and that he has in the history of Christ contained in the Gospels, but he wants something more than that, an ever-present object, before which he may pour out his prayers, of which he may ask grace, upon which he may lavish his love, towards which he may direct his worship.

This is what the idolater and fetishist sought, and as idolatry and fetishism are present everywhere where worship is offered, idolatry and fetishism must have their expression in the Christian Church.

1 Milton's Paradise Lost, book xii.

Idolatry and fetishism were expressions of the desire felt by every man to fix his attention on some one point, to have some sensible presence of God, to which he could turn as to a centre of devotion.

These forms of worship were appeals to God, and God's answer was the Incarnation. But if Christ was only Emmanuel for thirty-three years, the heart appeals still to God, for it feels the same want, and if man feels that want still, and it is still left unsupplied, the Incarnation was incomplete —it set man a moral exemplar and thus satisfied one longing, but it afforded man no satisfaction to his craving for an object of worship. There are two alternatives, those two between which the heathen world swung,. Polytheism or Deism, Idolatry or Indifference. Christianity must slide into one of these unless that want be met.

It may go back into polytheism and idolatry under the more modern form of anthropotheism, or it may settle itself into a philosophic deism, which leaves man without union with his God, and therefore without a religion.

But if love be the link uniting the Creator and the creature, the creature cannot manifest its complete activity without loving its Maker, and as it cannot love the abstract God of reason, God is assumed to have become Man to give him that object on which he could expend his love for the ideal of all that is good, and true, and beautiful. But if that Ideal be removed from him, he is left as before with the same desires unsatisfied. Consequently there must be a prolongation of Christ's presence—His objective presence —in the midst of His Church. He must be our Emmanuel as well as the Emmanuel of the shepherds of Bethlehem. This is what Catholicism teaches to be the nature of the Eucharistic presence. Catholics believe that the fulness of times brought with it the fulness of God's sensible presence

amongst men, and that amongst men He lived the ideal life, the model of all perfection, to be a perpetual model. Christ's ideal life did not end two thousand years ago. It is perpetuated in the Church. His life is reproduced more or less faintly in every Christian. If the Word took our nature, wherever that regenerate nature is, there is Christ. He is not only, as God, present everywhere at every point in space; He is besides immanent, living, acting, in the midst of us, in each one of us, in the human and created order, to bring us back to the divine and supernatural order. It is He who lives in us, prays in us, suffers in us, and merits in us. "I was an hungered, and ye gave Me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave Me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took Me in: naked, and ye clothed Me: sick, and ye visited Me: I was in prison, and ye came unto Me. Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these My brethren, ye have done it unto Me."[1] When Saul persecuted the Christians, Jesus is said to have reproached him with these words: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me? And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest."[2] What was done to the Church was done to Him.

Christ has a Real Presence in every Christian through all ages, as moral perfection. There is not an act of charity, of heroism, of self-denial, of purity, which is not the result of His permanent action, and consequently He ceases not to live visibly among us as our Moral Guide. S. Paul speaks of forming Christ in us, that is of making the Ideal of moral perfection shine out of us through the veil of our imperfection,—

"Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo,"

said the heathen poet, and it is truer a hundred-fold of

[1] Matt. xxv. 35, 36, 40. [2] Acts ix. 4, 5.

Christians. It is not the spiritual nature of God which is alone in us, but the human nature also. Thus every Christian is a supplementary Gospel of the Incarnation, with something human and imperfect, and something also divine and ideal.

Every man is like a pool reflecting the sun. He is the reproduction of Christ, whether he be Christian or heathen, Catholic or Protestant; but in one, the image is clearer and more radiant than in another, because there is less disturbance of the harmony of a nature in union with God. Every interference with the development of his nature, by negation of personality, of the link between the personalities, or of the relation of the personalities, breaks up the image, and the mirror is clouded. To reproduce Christ, the Ideal, the affirmation of the being of God, of one's self, and the exercise of the link, which is love, by use of free-will and acquisition of grace, and the affirmation by worship of the relations in which God stands to man, are absolutely necessary.

When God crowns our merits, He crowns Himself, for we are one with Christ, we in Him—that is, in His body the Church—and He in us, by conformation to the Ideal. There is no imputation of merits; the good we do, Christ does in us, and He cannot do it in us, except by our distinguishing our personality from His.

This is the mystery of the Passion, the descent of Christ into negation and opposition, and out of negation and opposition a restoration to unity.

Thus the Incarnation, as regards the moral life, is not a thing of the past, but of the present. As a means of conveying moral force, or grace, it is not a thing of the past, but of the present. Christ lives on in His Church as the Grace-dispenser. The gospel of His life is ever taking

new forms and fresh developments, in the patriot, in the resolute explorer, undaunted by difficulties, the emancipator of the slave, the political reformer,—it was not run out at His crucifixion; wherever there is a moral beauty, a dignity, a heroism, it is an aspect of Christ's life working out in His body the Church or in His members.

And as His garment is of many colours, so is that of His grace, which nourishes the moral life. In a thousand ways, through the voices of men, through the press, through the orchestra, and the stage, through whatever is beautiful in act and noble in conception, He breathes the stimulating force into the soul of man. But especially does He do so through those consecrated channels which He historically in person, or still mystically in His Church, may have instituted. In these specially, for they were appointed for that particular purpose, and for none other, whereas all the other means, devices of men, are not designed for that end.

It is thus that Christ is in all the sacraments as the Grace-giver. They are not forms only, but the forms through which He works, just as all force operates through matter. Spiritual gifts may be given without a medium, but it is according to analogy that a vehicle should be used. Protestants cannot do away with a medium. They have, however, reduced all sacraments to two, the preacher and the Bible. If they derive good from a sermon, the minister has been to them the outward and visible sign through which it has reached them. And what is the Bible? So much paper—mashed cotton rags, and so much ink—treacle and lamp-black, but the transformed rags and the blackened treacle are to them the *materia* of spiritual grace.

But as we have a body formed of the dust of the earth

as well as an animating soul, it is according to analogy that a sacrament should be formed on the like principle, and be adapted to things with a material and an immaterial substance, body and soul. It is according to the analogy of God's other dealings with us, as I have already shewn.

And now we arrive at the satisfaction of the desire man has for an object to which to address himself in prayer, an object on which to focus his thoughts and rivet his attention.

God is present everywhere and in all things,—that is at once an axiom of reason and an article of faith. He is above, below, before, behind, nay, He is within me; "Whither shall I go then from Thy Spirit; or whither shall I go then from Thy presence? If I climb up into heaven, Thou art there: if I go down to hell, Thou art there also. If I take the wings of the morning and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there also shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me. If I say, peradventure the darkness shall cover me, then shall my night be turned to day."[1]

That God is everywhere present a Christian must believe —it is of the nature of God; that union with Him is available to the devout in all places and at all times, He is also bound to believe. Nevertheless he desires to have God's presence specialized;

> "Jehovah, shapeless Power above all powers,
> Single and one, the omnipresent God,
> By vocal utterance, or blaze of light,
> Or cloud of darkness localized in heaven;
> On earth, enshrined within the wandering ark,
> Or out of Sion, thundering from His throne
> Between the cherubim."[2]

[1] Ps. cxxxix. 6-10. [2] Wordsworth: The Excursion.

God's answer to that want was the Incarnation. Why did not the Syro-Phœnician woman and the leper turn their backs on Christ, and worship Him everywhere, instead of where He visibly stood? Because it is a natural instinct which cannot be suppressed, to localize God. The Deist, when he prays, raises his eyes to heaven; the Pantheist, if he worships, adores God in the flower. The heathen lifts his hands to the sun, or bows before an idol. If the spirit of worship has wholly deserted Protestantism —I do not say the spirit of prayer,—it is because the specialization of God has been discountenanced. The Protestant will pray, because he feels that he needs something, but he will not worship. He is incapable of adoring immensity. And if worship be a necessity, he must have an objective presence of God to adore. That objective presence is Christ in the Holy Eucharist. As the virtuous man is a perpetuation of Christ's moral life, as the sacraments are the perpetuation of His grace giving, so is the Eucharist Christ perpetually present to receive our worship and homage. Such is the Catholic doctrine.

"In the Eucharist we have something for the senses, something which tells us that God is present in a special manner, not from necessity, *but from love*, and for our sake; yet, at the same time, this object that meets our senses and touches our hearts has no meaning or power except over those who live by faith. It is well worth a Protestant's calm consideration that the very mystery which is the object of the most elaborate and splendid Catholic ceremonial, is called by Catholics pre-eminently *Mysterium fidei*, the mystery of faith."[1]

It is like the pillar of cloud we read of in Exodus, a light and brightness to some, but darkness and confusion

[1] In Spirit and in Truth, p. 317.

to others. It is like Christ Himself when He was on earth. Some saw and believed, others saw and disbelieved. He had no form nor comeliness, and He was struck and reviled. So is He in His presence among us now, without majesty of appearance, scoffed at and trampled under foot.

Yet in this is He still our Emmanuel, as the object of our worship, and as thus lifted up, He draws all men to Him.

Take the following description of a solemnity of the Church, and judge whether in it the idea of worship is realized with an intensity and truth, found nowhere but in the Church. In vain have we thrown open our churches for worshippers, no worshippers will come; but when we restore to our altars the presence of our Incarnate Lord, under the form in which He is content to dwell "with us," then our churches will fill from morning to night with those whom love draws to follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth.

The passage I quote describes the very beautiful devotion practised in the Roman Church, called Exposition, or the Forty-Hours' Prayer.

"The Church is richly adorned with tapestry and hangings, while the daylight is excluded, not so much to give effect to the brilliant illumination round the altar, as to concentrate and direct attention towards that which is upon it, and make it, like the Lamb in heaven, the lamp and the sun, the centre of light and glory to the surrounding sanctuary. After a solemn mass, and a procession, the Blessed Sacrament is enshrined and enthroned above the altar. Around it is disposed, as it were, a firmament of countless lights, radiating from it, symbolical of the ever-wakeful host of heaven, the spirits of restless life and

unfading brightness, that keep watch round the seat of glory above. At the foot of the altar kneel immovable, in silent adoration, the priests of the sanctuary, relieving each other day and night, pouring the prayers of the people, as fragrant odours, before it. But look at the body of the Church! no pews, no benches, or other incumbrances are there; but the flood of radiance from the altar seems to be poured out upon the marble pavement, and to stream along it to the very door. But not during the day will you see it thus: the whole, except during the hours of repose, is covered with kneeling worshippers. Looking at the scene through the eye of memory, comes nearer to the contemplation of a heavenly vision than aught else that we know.

"It seems to us as though on these occasions flesh and blood lost their material grossness, and were spiritualized as they passed the threshold. Softly and noiselessly is the curtain raised which covers the door, and passed uplifted from hand to hand in silent courtesy, as a succession of visitors enter in; they who in the street just now were talking so loud and laughing so merrily, here they steal in with slow pace and gentle tread, as though afraid to break upon the solemnity of the scene! For before and around them are scattered, without order or arrangement, persons singly or in groups as they have entered in, all lowly kneeling, all reflecting upon their prayerful countenances the splendour from the altar; and as they pass among them to find place, with what careful and quiet steps they thread their way, so as least to disturb those among whom they move, and then drop down upon their knees too in the first open space, upon the same bare stone floor, princess and peasant, priest and layman, all equal in the immeasurable distance between them and the eternal object of their

adoration. In no other time or place is the sublimity of our religion so touchingly felt. No ceremony is going forward in the sanctuary, no sound of song is issuing from the choir, no voice of exhortation proceeds from the pulpit, no prayer is uttered aloud at the altar. There are hundreds there, and yet they are engaged in no congregational act of worship. Each heart and soul is alone in the midst of a multitude—each uttering its own thoughts, each feeling its own grace. Yet are you overpowered, subdued, quelled into a reverential mood, softened into a devotional spirit, forced to meditate, to feel, to pray. The little children who come in are led by a mother's hand, kneel down by her in silence, as she simply points towards the altar, overawed by the still splendour before them; the very babe seems hushed to quiet reverence on her bosom. The hurried passer by who merely looks in, cannot resist the impulse to sink, if only in a momentary genuflexion, upon his knees; nay, the English scoffer, who will face anything else, will not venture to stalk as elsewhere up the nave heedless of other's sacred feelings, but must needs remain under the shadow of the doorway, or steal behind the shadow of the first pillar, if he wishes to look on without partaking."[1]

I do not say that such a rite is congenial to all minds, but I do say that it is distinctly an act of worship, and that this worship is addressed to Christ. It cannot halt at the symbol, for it is through the symbol that it reaches Christ, the God-man, at once spiritual and material, infinite and finite, everywhere present and local.

I do not say that worship cannot be addressed to him anywhere, in the closet, on the high road, in the mountain solitude, and in the crowded thoroughfare. He is God, and

1 Wiseman: Minor Rites and Offices.

therefore He can hear and receive His creature anywhere and at any moment. But He is man also, and therefore He has His finite, local, material manifestation. Those who worship Him localized do not deny His ubiquity and omnipresence. Those who worship Him in vague immensity must not deny His local presence. These are two aspects of Christ, the object of worship—that which is infinite and divine, and that which is finite and human; and these are not contradictory.

It is the same with charity. How shall we exhibit love to God?—By our love to men. Suffering mankind is Christ suffering, and every act of mercy shewn to man is received by Christ. Every sufferer is Christ localized to accept our love. If Christ specializes himself to be the recipient of our charity, it is certain that He can specialize Himself to receive our worship. Though he accepts our love in the person of the poor, He does not accept our worship in their person, that is evident. Then He must have some other, but analogous, method of receiving our devotion and homage. "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world," said Christ, and the promise, according to the theory of the Church, is fulfilled. He is with us in the body of His Church authoritatively, with us in the person of His poor to receive our charity, with us in the sacramental species to dispense His grace and to receive our worship. Thus is He Emmanuel to the end of time.

A modern traveller, writing his impressions of Western France, makes the following remark: "I do not think I ever went into a Roman Catholic church anywhere without seeing two or three female figures. It has a conventional look. A query will come into one's mind whether it is not a part of the business of the priest to maintain and

keep up this air of life by a steady infliction of small penance upon female members of the flock. Poor women sin a little bit, so often, and so easily; and then it is so useful to send them to Church—does them good and has a pleasing effect."[1]

No, it is not that which sends them to the Church, it is the Sacred Presence on the altar which draws them with the cords of love. I have seen the market woman leave her basket on the portal step, the soldier, the peasant, and the little child enter and pay their "visit" to the blessed Sacrament,—an act of love and homage to Him Who made Himself of no reputation that He might win men through their weakness.

I was standing in the churchyard of Ventonne on the mountain side above the Rhone, watching the sun go down in glory over Sion. Strange sounds issued from the interior of the sacred building, and I entered it softly. I found an idiot woman, with thin straggling grey hair, great blear eyes, and wan cheeks, kneeling at the chancel steps, wringing her hands, sobbing and praying. Apparently some one had injured her, some boys had pelted her with stones, and she had fled to the presence of her Emmanuel, to pour out into His sympathizing ear the story of her troubles.

I was at the Cathedral of Sion on Sunday morning. A poor woman came in, radiant with joy, a piece of good fortune had befallen her—a cow had calved, and she brought a sprig of flowers, and gave it to the sacristan to insert in the vase beside the tabernacle, as she knelt to thank her Lord.

To the Christian He is Emmanuel, God present to him in his joys and in his sorrows. In the deepest

[1] Louth: Wanderer in Western France, 1863, p. 307.

griefs, man puts out his hand as he sinks to catch Him; in the greatest joys he looks to his Emmanuel to rejoice with him. He is Emmanuel to the child, to the youth, to the adult, and to the aged; God with us in work, in relaxation, at meals, and in sleep, with us in all temptations to hold us back, with us in all good to urge us on, with us in life to be our guide, with us in death to open to us immortality.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DOGMA OF THE ATONEMENT

"Wherefore bends the Just One, bleeding
'Neath the Cross's weight laborious?"—HEINE.

Sacrifice the expression of Love—not necessarily involving an idea of pain—The dogma of original sin signifies the prevalence of opposition and contradiction—The Protestant doctrine, the negation of all good in man; The Catholic doctrine, the opposition of good faculties—The Incarnation the reconciliation of all oppositions—The Passion its necessary climax—Why suffering was necessary—Descent into the midst of every antagonism, sin and death—The Atonement is the restoration and reconciliation, completing the work of the Incarnation—Suffering touches a chord in man's nature—Justification the restoration of man by his co-operation—The Protestant doctrine different, the imputation of merits—The doctrine of vicarious suffering a Protestant theory—It makes God unjust—Summary.

LOVE is unselfish. He who loves another delights in giving to the object of his love that which has not cost him nothing. Perhaps no more beautiful example of the primitive and true idea of sacrifice exists, than in the mutual oblation of husband and wife. The husband can enjoy no pleasure without desiring to make the wife participate in it. If he leave her for an excursion, his letters home descriptive of what he sees, the flowers he collects for her, the memorials of scenery he purchases to present to her, are all sacrifices. And the wife finds her pleasure in

the daily prevision and preparation of surprises for her lord. Every craftily compounded dish, every mended shirt and darned stocking is a holocaust. The joy of married life consists in this mutual sacrifice, this self-abnegation, this seeking satisfaction in the pleasure of the other.

With what singleness of heart will not the mother surrender her time, her rest, her pleasure to her little child! The father takes no account of the cost to himself of his son in food and clothing.

Parents are for ever performing sacrifice to their children; and they find their delight in so doing, for sacrifice is the floriation of love.

When love is mutual there is no pain in sacrifice, it is a continued delight; but when one of the hearts is estranged, then anxiety and suffering step in. The husband tries a variety of gifts to please the wayward wife; he descends to great privations if only he may recover her smiles. The wife tries all devices to reclaim the chilled heart of her husband; there is nothing she will not deny herself, the very necessaries of life, to buy back the truant:

When love is unruffled, there is no estimation of cost in the value of the present; the withered forget-me-not is more precious than the pearl necklace. But when there is estrangement it is different. Then the strayed love must be bought back, and bought back at great cost and suffering to the heart that loves still.

If we apply this idea to God and man, and it must be so applied to all personalities which are related to one another, we shall see that to man unfallen, sacrifice and worship would be the joyous expression of adoring love and praise, without any admixture of the ideas of pain and suffering, such as we commonly associate with the term "sacrifice."

"All devotional feeling," it has been truly said, "requires sacrificial expression." If man had never fallen, the most perfect sacrifice on his part would have been the outpour of his exuberant love in incessant worship, and the most perfect sacrifice on God's part would have been the satisfaction of man's every want by new and newer manifestations of His unfathomable love.

The idea contained in heathen sacrifice has been pointed out in the first volume. It was a compensation for some wrong supposed to have been done to God, or a bribe offered to an unpropitious Deity. The idea of expiatory sacrifice was also heathen. God was regarded as a hard, rigidly just Judge of men, who could not have mercy even if He would without violating His attribute of justice.

None of these views are admissible to a Christian, for they militate against the fundamental dogma of the Incarnation, which is the manifestation of the perfection of Divine Love.

If the idea of pain has tinged the original idea of sacrifice with purple, it is because man does not live in perfect harmony with God, there is discord in his own being and dissonance with others. But this may be regarded as an accident, an alteration of the primary idea, in which there is no pain, but unmixed happiness. And, observe, that in love there must be two personalities, or it is resolved into egoism which is not love, but the shadow of it. There is a constant approach and assimilation of the two individualities, but never a fusion of one in the other. If pain enter into the idea of love and penetrate its expression, sacrifice, the reason is to be found in the contradiction of one personality to the other, which contradiction cannot be rectified without suffering, and which will cease directly it is brought into harmony with the other personality.

It is this contradiction and opposition in man which is called by Christians "sin," original and actual.

Before proceeding further with the consideration of sacrifice, it will be necessary to examine the nature of sin, and especially of original sin.

According to the Christian theory man, when made by God, was perfectly good. He was like God, in that he had a free-will. He used his will awrong, he diverted it from the straight line of obedience, and fell under the power of contradiction, opposition, and negation. Originally man and woman were one—the male and female nature combined into one body; then these were separated, not to be opposed, but that a link of love might be called out to attach the two together, and bring them into one, without for all that abdicating their individualities,—perhaps as a sort of figure to man of the relation in which he stood to God. And man's nature was then in perfect tune. His intellect and affections gave ideas complementary-coloured, and his animal nature did not rebel against his spiritual nature; nor did discord enter into the only social relation that existed, his union with the woman.

But when, by an act of will, he opposed God, all was altered. The harmony was dissolved, the Sabbath was broken; in man the animal nature resisted the mind, the reason opposed the sentiment; egoism and solidarity presented opposite interests, man tyrannized over woman, and woman demoralized man; society rose up against the individual to tread him into a dead level of commonplace, and the individual fought with society and strove to subjugate it to his will—

> "And storms confused above us lower,
> Of hopes and fears, and joy and woe;

And scarcely e'en for one half-hour
Is silence in God's house below."

Every evil that the world groans under is caused by this antagonism of interests; the passions binding the strong mind and dragging it from its pinnacle into the mire; the mind battling with its body as with a wild beast, and taming it with wrathful austerities; the intellect casting out the affections into the cold, to the intent that they may die; the feelings overwhelming the mind in flowers, and reason yielding to the lethargy—

"Why are we weighed upon with heaviness,
And utterly consumed with sharp distress,
While all things else have rest from weariness?
All things have rest: why should we toil alone,
We only toil, who are the first of things,
And make perpetual moan;
Still from one sorrow to another thrown:
There is no joy but calm!
Why should we only toil, the roof and crown of things?"[1]

Nation against nation, peoples against kings, rich against poor, brother against brother, man with a rope round his neck destroying himself, man turning his back on Paradise and denying God.

"From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust, and have not; ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain; ye fight and war, yet ye have not;" or, as Dante says—

"They smite each other not alone with hands,
But with the head and with the breast and feet,
Tearing each other piecemeal with their teeth."[2]

All the natural faculties remain, but not united like the cells of the honey bee, but opposed, out of control, thrown into confusion.

[1] Tennyson: Lotos Eaters.

[2] Dante: Inferno.

Free-will is impaired, but not destroyed; rather let us say, it is distracted. Man is out of harmony with himself, with mankind, with creation, and with God.

The reconciliation needed is not to be sought in God, but in man. Man must be brought into harmony with God, not God with man; the turbid, troubled pool must become limpid and still before it can reflect the sun overhead, the sun has not to be rectified by the pool.

Original sin is a fact as well as a doctrine, it causes perplexity to the Deist as well as to the Christian. We cannot deny that discord does exist in the world of men, and we cannot have learned the alphabet of our own nature if we deny that there is conflict within ourselves. But this is nothing else except original sin.

The word has an ugly sound; it is a horrible fact; but it is not so bad as it has been drawn. The exaggeration to which the fact has been dogmatically developed must be briefly stated.

According to the language of the Augsburg Confession, man is "born with sin, without fear of God or confidence in Him;" in the language of the Formulary of Concord, he has lost all, even the slightest capacity and aptitude and power in spiritual things; he has lost the faculty of knowing God, and the will to do anything that is good; he can no more lead a good life than a stock or a stone; everything good in him is utterly obliterated. There is also a positive ingredient of sin infused into the veins of every man. Sin is, according to Luther, of the essence of man. Original sin, transmitted from father to son, is not, as the Church teaches, the loss of supernatural grace co-ordinating all man's faculties, and their consequent disorder; it is something born of the father and mother. The clay of which we are formed is damnable, the fœtus in the mother's womb is

sin, man with his whole nature and essence is not only a sinner, but sin. Such are the expressions of Luther, endorsed by Quenstadt. Melancthon and the Formulary are equally explicit. Man receives from his parents a congenital evil force, a native impulse to sin; there is substituted in the place of the image of God an "intimate, most evil, most profound, inscrutable, ineffable corruption of our whole nature, and all its powers," which is implanted in the intellect, heart, and will. The results of this view, as regards the whole condition of the heathen world, and the gradual lightening of consciences and preparation for the Incarnation, on which the Fathers insist, contradict of course alike the witness of history and the instincts of our moral nature. Heathen virtues are scarcely even "splendid vices." Melancthon calls them "shadows of virtues;" he says that all men's works and all their endeavours are sins, that the constancy of Socrates, the chastity of Xenocrates, the temperance of Zeno, are vices. Luther himself says that men's works, however specious and good they may appear, are probably mortal sins, a doctrine which Bishop Beveridge accepted, as shewn by the passage quoted in a former chapter.

Calvin clenches the matter by observing that from man's corrupted nature comes only what is damnable.[1] "Man," says he, "has been so banished from the kingdom of God, that all in him that bears reference to the blessed life of the soul is extinct."[2] And if men have any glimpses of better things, it is only that He may take from them every excuse when He damns them.[3]

[1] Oxenham: On the Atonement, 1869, pp. 211, 212. Moeler's Symbolik, bk. i. c. 2.

[2] Institutes, lib. ii. c. 2, sec. 12.

[3] *Ibid.* sec. 18.

Opposed to this pessimism is the Catholic doctrine of original sin, which is simple and natural, and commends itself to common sense, whereas the other is difficult and revolting to the moral conscience.

The doctrine of the Church on this subject is what has been already laid down, the introduction of schism into man and into the world. This condition is transmitted from father to son.

The fathers of the Council of Trent attribute to fallen man free-will, representing it, however, as very much weakened, and in consequence teach that not every religious and moral action of man is necessarily sinful, though it is imperfect. When Racine read before Louis XIV. his grand strophes—

"Mon Dieu, quelle guerre cruelle !
Je trouve deux hommes en moi ;
L'un veut que plein d'amour de toi
Mon cœur te soit toujours fidèle,
L'autre à ta volonté rebelle,
Me révolte contre ta loi.

Hélas ! en guerre avec moi-même
Où pourrai-je trouver la paix ?
Je veux et n'accomplis jamais.
Je veux, mais (O misère extrême !)
Je ne fais pas le bien que j'aime,
Et je fais le mal que je hais ! "

"Ah!" exclaimed the king, "those are two men that I know very well." And so does every one, though he may not choose to confess it; even Faust when about to surrender himself to Satan:—

"Two souls, alas! are lodged within my breast,
Which struggle there for undivided reign :
One to the world, with obstinate desire,
And closely cleaving organs, still adheres.
Above the mist the other doth aspire,
With sacred vehemence, to purer spheres."

There is this difference between the Christian doctrine of the Fall and that of Greeks and Romans. The latter placed their Golden Age in the past, and made man gradually deteriorate, and held out no hope of renovation for the future; whereas the Christian believes that the Fall is a thing of the past, out of which mankind is being gradually recovered, with perfection in full view on the horizon. Man is a house divided against itself. He is a beautiful instrument whose strings are in discord; a chime

"Of sweet bells jangled out of tune;"

a city wrecked by an earthquake. Then comes the Incarnation. He is provided with the Conciliator, with One whose note is so clear and true, that he can raise the pitch of all his strings by that, and thus restore the lost music of the world.

As man had used his free-will for a wrong end, and had warped it, the example of another free-will, that never turned aside from what was right, becomes to him the rule by which his own crooked will may be straightened.

The Incarnation is the crowning act of that love which alone explains creation. It is God sacrificing Himself to man to restore the relations between them disturbed by man's fall; to infuse into him the spirit of order, whereby all those disorganized faculties, so very good in themselves, may fit into each other and form a complete synthesized whole; and man may not only be brought into a state of peace with himself and peace with God, but also society may be restored on the true foundations of universal charity.

To meet man and obtain his love, by which alone this reconciliation can be effected, the love of God feels on and on through life, through want and suffering, through contradiction and opposition, through error and violence, into

the abyss of negation which is death, to pick up the broken thread of man's affection and restore the circle of charity.

By Atonement is meant the at-one-ment, the reconciliation of those who are estranged. God was not estranged from man. God is perfect love, it was man who had lost himself in a darkness of negation, and God's love, like a beam of light, shot down the gulf to fall on his face and illumine it when he lay in the shadow of death and despair.

The passion of Christ, which is a dogma following the Incarnation in the creed of the Church, is its necessary consequence. If Christ be God, made Man in order to restore the world to that condition of harmony which was shattered at the Fall, it is necessary, not merely that He should enter into the world, but that He should penetrate all its phases of disorganization. Thus He must enter into all oppositions, to stand between them and bring them together again.

As the Incarnation is the manifestation of perfect love, there can be no compulsion exercised by the God-Man from without on two conflicting elements. He must mediate between them, not force them into unity.

And as the contrariety of the elements in man and in society is the cause of all suffering, Christ must enter into this contrariety and undergo its consequence, suffering, before He can remove the contradiction.

As in man's own nature there is antinomy, Christ must feel that antinomy. And thus He is represented in the Gospels as endowed with two wills, and the conflict appears in the agony in Gethsemane, when He prays that if possible the cup may pass from Him; "nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt." There is the opposition, but there is also the reconciliation.

As in society there is antinomy, Christ must feel that antinomy. And thus He undergoes His Passion among

the Jews and Romans. Jerusalem was a microcosm of iniquity; it contained within its walls the adulterous king, the unjust craven judge, the envious priests, the fickle, blood-thirsty people. To enter the shadow of its houses was to suffer pain. But it was not the sin of Jerusalem alone into which Christ must be held to have plunged; for it was not to reconcile Jerusalem alone that He is supposed to have died. He must in some mysterious and inexplicable manner have entered into the sin of all the world, into that dissolution of all humanity, individual and organized, which is sin.

Entering into this whirl of antagonism, in which all relationships are broken, all union is shattered, and everything is dishonoured, the spiritual enslaved to the physical, the material itself made subject to the law of decay, the conquest of the material over the physical, Christ must have suffered more acutely than man can conceive.

When any refined and sensitive nature is brought in contact with evil, it suffers. I have seen the clean maidenly soul receive its first knowledge of evil, of the horrible dissolution of the moral and animal lives; it has quivered with agony and shrivelled up as the sensitive plant, but it has not been itself injured. The knowledge of evil has been to it as the shadow of the passing cloud, darkening but not staining.

Let any delicate-minded man pass an hour in a public-house amongst the coarse topers, it will be to him an hour of poignant suffering. Let an artist open his treasures to a man of a practical turn of mind, that is, a man as low as he well can be; and the vulgar appreciation will cause all the fibres of his higher nature to thrill with pain.

But to elevate and purify what is jarring, gross, and base, it is necessary to descend to the level of those natures

without surrender of one's own nature. To rescue the fallen woman, the sister of charity has often to seek her in her den of infamy, to recover the drunkard the priest has sometimes to enter the beer-shop, to refine the taste of the vulgar the organizer of the popular concert has to descend to inartistic music. No principle is surrendered, but the condescension causes pain, for the higher nature trembles and suffers when brought in contact with that which is inferior, not because it was by nature inferior, but because it is degraded. The contact of man with bird and flower causes no shudder because bird and flower occupy their true position in the scale of creatures, but the contact of man with degenerate man revolts, because the latter has fallen out of his place in the rank and has broken the order of beings; he is a note out of tune, a discordant colour, a faulty step in an argument.

And what is death? That also is opposition. Life is the exact balancing by force and material expended of force and material acquired. When the balance is disturbed sickness ensues, when the latter predominates to the exclusion of the other death results. As I said in the first chapter, the law of organic life and that of inorganic matter conflict in man. Life is motion, the constant reparation of the body wasted by exertion. When the law of inorganic matter has thrown insurmountable obstacles in the way of the renovating stream, death ensues, matter has conquered life.

Death is to the body what sin is to the soul, a degradation, through the lower power mastering the higher. When the animal nature treads out the life of the spiritual nature, man is lowered to the beast;—that is sin.

When man's egoism is so exclusive that it encases him in an impenetrable cuirass, living for himself alone, he

falls from the condition of a social man to that of a selfish barbarian;—that also is sin.

In both cases there is a negation of what is nobler; the lower is opposed to the higher quality, fights with it and overpowers it.

Death is of precisely a similar character, it is the inferior, mineral law conquering the superior, physical law.

If Christ was to be the reconciler of all oppositions,—and this is what He is assumed to be,—then His Passion is an inevitable result, rendered inevitable by the fall of man. He must descend into sin to bring together again into peace and good will the animal life and the spiritual life, egoism and solidarity. He must descend into death to reunite in mutual peace the law of inorganic matter and the law of physical life.

What is the dogma of the Resurrection but the consequence of this hypothesis, the work done which by the Incarnation Christ is believed to have undertaken? In His own risen body both laws are reconciled; It can live on for ever, there being no more opposition. In our own risen bodies both laws will be reconciled, we shall live for ever, because, through the work of the Universal Conciliator, the opposition will have ceased universally.

Again, the Incarnation is the manifestation of perfect love, but perfect love cannot halt at anything short of the extreme disintegration wrought by the Fall. Christ must sacrifice Himself wholly to man, or His love is not sufficient to draw man to Him. He must enter into man's joys and man's woes, to meet him at every turn of the winding lane of life. Love is not satisfied till it has made every sacrifice that is in its power to make, and no more complete sacrifice can be imagined than that of honour, ease, and finally of life.

The narrative of Christ's life is therefore one of continuous sacrifice, of emptying Himself of everything in the overflowing Passion of His love, counting all as nought if only He might catch man's eye and draw him towards Himself.

He came to seek and to save that which was lost. Such is reported by the Evangelist to be the account He gave of His mission.

He came to seek in the grotto of Bethlehem for the love of little children, in Egypt for the exile from fatherland, in the workshop of Nazareth for the labouring man, in the desert for the solitary, in the crowd for the busy traffickers, in the temple for the priest, in the synagogue for the student, by the sea-side on the grassy flats for the hungry, on the shore to which the disappointed fishers drew their empty nets, for hearts heavy with failure; at the marriage feast for the light-spirited, by the gate of Nain for the bereaved, on the mountain top for the ascetic, by the well for the weary, in the garden for the agonized soul, in the palace for the calumniated and misunderstood, on the pavement for those whom men deride and maltreat, on the stairs for those whom men reject with contumely, on the cross for those in acute bodily suffering, in death for those at their last gasp.

He came to seek, by every means love could devise, nothing too self-sacrificing, nothing too costly, nothing too trivial: Peter was sought by a look, Matthew by a word, the Samaritan woman by her pitcher, she with the issue of blood by the fringe of His robe; some by their own infirmities, others by their fears for those they loved; the palsied by his stiffened joints, Jairus by his little daughter, Bartimæus by his darkened eyes, the centurion by his fevered servant, the sons of Zebedee by their drag-net,

Judas by the kiss, the thief by his cross, the soldier by His pierced side.

What more effectual method for eliciting love? And love it was necessary to obtain, for by love alone can man's relation to God and consequent restoration to unity be effected.

There was no necessity, some theologians have taught, for Christ to have died; but as S. Bernard says, "Perhaps that method is the best, whereby in a land of forgetfulness and sloth we might be more powerfully and vividly reminded of our fall, through the so great and so manifold sufferings of Him who repaired it."

"Pain is one of the deepest and truest things in our nature; we feel instinctively that it is so, even before we can tell why. Pain is what binds us most closely to one another and to God. It appeals most directly to our sympathies, as the very structure of our language indicates. To go no further than our own, we have English words, such as condolence, to express sympathy with grief; we have no one word to express sympathy with joy. So, again, it is a common remark that, if a funeral and wedding procession were to meet, something of the shadow of death would be cast over the bridal train, but no reflection of bridal happiness would pass into the mourners' hearts. Scripture itself has been not inaptly called 'a record of human sorrow.' The same name might be given to history. Friendship is scarcely sure till it has been proved in suffering, but the chains of an affection riveted in the fiery furnace are not easily broken. So much then at least is clear, that the Passion of Jesus was the greatest revelation of His sympathy; 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.' And hence fathers and schoolmen alike conspire to teach, that one reason why He chose the road of suffering was to knit

us more closely to Himself. For this He exalted His head, not on a throne of earthly glory, but on the cross of death. It is, indeed, no accident of the few, but a law of our present being, which the poet's words express:

> 'That to the *Cross* the mourner's eye should turn
> Sooner than where the stars of Christmas burn.'

For all, in their several ways and degrees, are mourners. The dark threads are woven more thickly than the bright ones into the tangled skein of human life; and as time passes on, the conviction that it is so is brought home to us with increasing force."[1]

The dogma of Justification is closely allied to that of the Atonement.

According to the teaching of the Church, Justification is the exaltation of man from a state of sinfulness to that of grace; an annihilation of the will opposed to God, which throws man into anarchy, and the contraction of fellowship with Christ, for the renewal of the inward man and the restoration of mankind to the primeval state of humanity.[2] "They all agreed (at Trent)," says Pallavicini, "on the signification of the name Justification, that it was a transition from a state of enmity to a state of friendship, and of adoptive sonship to God."[3] To man is *imparted*, not *imputed*, the grace of God, to rise from his condition of negation, opposition, and universal antagonism into a state of unity, tranquillity, and charity.

"The death of Christ justifies us," says the Master of Sentences, "by exciting His love in our hearts." "We were reconciled to God, when He already loved us. For

[1] Oxenham: Doctrine of the Atonement, 1869, pp. 290-292.

[2] Concil. Trid., sess. vi. c. 5, 7.

[3] Lib. viii. c. 4, p. 259.

He did not begin to love us from the time we were reconciled to Him by His Son's blood, but before the world, and before we existed. How then were we reconciled to God when He loved us? On account of our sins we were at enmity with Him, who had love towards us, even while we showed our enmity against Him by working iniquity. . . . Christ, therefore, is called a Mediator, because standing between men and God, He reconciles them to God. But He reconciles them, by taking from the sight of God what offends in man, that is, by destroying sins which offended God and made us His enemies." And again, "He reconciled all believers by His death to God, since all were healed of their iniquities who by believing God loved the humility of Christ, and by loving imitated it."[1] Nothing can be simpler. Man in a state of discord, by faith accepts Christ; his love to God is restored. He stands on another footing, or turns in another direction; he no more contemplates his shadow, but faces the sun. To recur to an illustration already used, He accepts Christ's life as the pitch pipe to the relaxed chords of his own being, and he spends the rest of his days in tuning up string after string to harmony with that note.

But the Protestant doctrine is quite another thing.

As Luther had denied man free-will, and the smallest capacity of doing good, co-operation on his part is an impossibility; the whole work must be done for him. And so it is. Terrified by the preaching of a law he is powerless to obey, he listens to and grasps at the merits of Christ, and is thus justified. His repentance, such as it is, springs out of fear, not love. Justification, according to the *Formulary*, is simply acquittal from sin and its eternal penalties "on account of the righteousness of Christ which is

[1] Pet. Lombard: Sentent. iii. 9.

(not imparted but) *imputed* to faith," and that, while by reason of their corrupt nature men continue to sin, sinful acts are not sinful in the justified; and consequently Luther lays down the revolting doctrine that fornication, adultery, theft, and murder, committed by the justified are no more sinful.

The doctrine of vicarious suffering is one which was introduced at the Reformation, to account for the death of Christ, the Catholic dogma of sacrifice having been abandoned or put on one side.

The Reformers taught that the Almighty had laid down a law that punishment must be the penalty of sin, and that to liberate man from the law, Christ took upon Himself the penalty for the sin of the world, and suffered instead of man. It was not, as had often been taught before, that His obedience was an acceptable sacrifice, but that it was accepted by God instead of the penalty due from us, which we, with a nature so hopelessly corrupted, could never ourselves pay. As our sins were excessive, excessive suffering was due to God, and this Christ endured instead of us. He was punished and accursed in our place. Quenstadt maintained that for God to pardon us without satisfaction is against His nature, His veracity, His sanctity, and His justice; yet he explained, that "by a certain kind of relaxation of the law," another person is substituted for the debtor. In other words, though it is matter of indispensable justice to the nature of God to punish sin, it is immaterial whether He punishes the right person or the wrong one. Suffering is His due, and He will have it. "It is not too much to say that the Lutheran view of the Atonement, with whatever occasional similarities of language, is a complete innovation in all its essential points on that previously held, and in a sense directly calculated to dis-

credit the whole doctrine in the eye both of reason and of religion."[1]

Calvin retained the new ideas of a substituted obedience and punishment, and he expressly asserted that our obligation of suffering for our sins and the curse entailed were transferred to the Son of God; and, as the pangs of death on the Cross did not seem to him sufficient, he added, with Quenstadt and Gerhard, that He expiated the requisite tortures in the flames of Hell.

Some theologians have attempted to justify this vicarious suffering by instancing the law observable in the world of penalty for misdeeds not always falling on the doers of evil.[2] Louis XIV. sacrificed five thousand lives in the marshes of Maintenon to convey water to his fountains at Versailles, and the penalty fell on the widows and orphans. Louis XV. ruined the exchequer, and Louis XVI. lost his head for the misdeeds of his ancestor. Such being the law, the penalty fell on Christ instead of us. But surely this is not law, but the violation of law through the disorganization of society. What sort of justice would that be which because A had stolen a sheep hanged Z? It would be the acme of injustice. To make the disorder of justice the rule for God, is to subordinate Him to the evil in the world. When Grotius put the question whether it was unjust that Christ should be punished for our sins, he answered it in the negative; because, as he said, it generally happens that there is malversation of justice in the world, and because, as a fact, God did visit His most innocent Son with the bitterest torments and death, and God cannot

[1] Oxenham, p. 216.

[2] See for the argument in favour of vicarious suffering, "The Philosophy of Evangelicism," 1867.

be unjust. That is, what is unjust in man is just in God. But it is begging the whole question to say that it was not unjust because He did so punish the just for the unjust.

If the inequalities of the earth are the law of God's dealings, alas! for the new heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness, when righteousness is equivalent to injustice.

Both the Protestant doctrines of original sin and vicarious sacrifice have no positive element in them, they are mere negations, upon which a horrible system has been erected, repugnant to the essence of Christianity and to the moral sense. The Protestant doctrine of original sin is the negation of all trace of good in man. The doctrine of vicarious sacrifice is the negation of divine justice.

To sum up in few words the Catholic doctrine as deduced from the premises already laid down:—

The Incarnation being the perfect manifestation of Divine Love, Christ must exhibit the most perfect self-sacrifice.

The object of the Incarnation being the restoration of man's disorganized nature, Christ must descend to the depths of this disorganization in order to reconcile what is opposed.

As all the faculties of man are positively good and only negatively evil by their being disordered and opposed, Justification is the restoration of these faculties to their proper order.

But this can only be effected by man recognizing and loving God.

Therefore Christ in His infinite love condescends to seek man in every phase of life, and even in death, to obtain his love, and thus lead him into the way of reconciliation.

The Atonement is the perfect reconciliation of man in himself, and man with man, and man with God.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CHRISTIAN SACRIFICE

"Quid retribuam Domino, pro omnibus quæ retribuit mihi?
Tibi sacrificabo hostiam laudis, et Nomen Domini invocabo."
—Ps. cxv. (cxvi.) 12, 17.

The Holy Communion the application of the Atonement—The Resurrection of the body one result of the Atonement—The Eucharist not a commemoration of the death of Christ only—The necessity man feels of offering Sacrifice—As the link between man and God is love, of which sacrifice is the expression, the restoration of love is the restoration of sacrifice—Love the motive of asceticism—Love the motive of action in the material order—also in the spiritual order—The love of man to God necessitates the Eucharistic sacrifice—That sacrifice identical with the sacrifice on Calvary—Christ, as head of humanity, combined in His Passion the idea of sacrifice to God with that of sacrifice to man—The idea of sacrifice an enigma to those who do not love—The idea of compensation creates ritual splendour—The love of the Church for Christ overflows in rite and symbol.

WE have seen the Sacrifice of Christ under one aspect alone, that of an atonement, and we have seen that by atonement is not meant the payment of so much suffering to the Almighty as expiation for the sins of men, but the sacrifice to man of everything, as a complete epiphany of the love of God; the descent of God into the anarchy of human nature to restore to that nature its lost principle of cohesion and order, by which alone it can reach its perfection.

The coherence of the sacramental system with this dogma is obvious.

If Christ came to restore to man what was lost by the fall, by placing him in a true relation to God, by means of which all his other relations will fall into place, it is evident that the introduction of this new principle into man is a first necessity; and that this new principle can be nothing other than Christ Himself, perpetually present in His Church for this purpose.

The law of the Incarnation is the indissoluble union of the material and the spiritual in all Christ's operations upon man.

The material is nothing without the spiritual, and the spiritual has accepted the condition of acting through the material. The Holy Communion therefore, in the Christian system, is the application to men of the atonement of Christ.

Let me place the argument syllogistically.

Christ is God and man, the spiritual and the material united. In Him this union was effected for the restoration of man, in whom the spiritual and the material are at variance.

To reconcile the spiritual and the material Christ must touch both.

Therefore His atonement must be applied sacramentally.

Also, Christ came to restore the harmony between man's opposed spiritual faculties.

Therefore Christ must enter spiritually into man.

Christ came to restore the harmony between man's opposed physical and material natures, *i.e.*, to give life, by restoring the equipoise between the renovation and the waste of his body.

Therefore Christ must enter materially into man.

But it is impossible to separate the spiritual from the material in Christ, for they are indissolubly united.

Therefore again the application of the atonement must be sacramental.

It will be objected to this that Christ came, not to save men's bodies, but their souls.

This is a contravention of the whole system.

Is there, or is there not, an opposition in men's bodies? In another word—Do they die? This cannot be doubted.

Then there is antinomy in their bodies.

If Christ took a human body, it must have been to restore the equilibrium between the opposing forces in the human body. For He came to be the universal Conciliator.

Death is a phase of opposition. He came to destroy all opposition. Therefore He came to destroy death.

But He could not destroy death without taking upon Himself a body. And He could not infuse into us the principle of conciliation between the opposing forces except by contact with our material bodies. Therefore He must be present with His Church in some material fashion by means of which He can effect the regeneration of our bodies.

The renovation of our moral life is the effect of the conciliation wrought by Christ acting spiritually on our spiritual natures. The restoration of our bodies, *i.e.* the resurrection of the dead, is the effect of the conciliation wrought by Christ acting materially on our material bodies.

The dogma of the Resurrection depends necessarily on the dogma of the Incarnation, and sacramental communion is the logical link and efficient cause, the link uniting the body of man with the body of Christ, and the cause of the resurrection of man by union with Christ.

As Christ is double, His action on men must be double.

As man is double, he needs a double action for his proper restoration.

As Christ is indissolubly one, so His mode of acting on men must be spiritual and material at once; that is, it must be sacramental.

The popular idea of the Eucharist is that it is a commemoration of the death of Christ. No doubt by a stretch of the imagination the ceremony may remind the communicant of Christ's Passion. But it must be allowed that it is scarcely possible to devise any more unlikely method of reproducing the scene on Calvary. The white cloth on the table, the paten and chalice muffled in linen, the priest wandering about the altar in his surplice and scarf and hood, the communicating of the kneeling recipients—in what single feature does it revive the event of Good Friday, the three crosses, the black heavens, and the piercing cries of the sufferer?

A crucifix, or the lection of the Gospel narrative of the Passion, is far more calculated to revive the memory of the atonement. Nothing more incongruous and irrational than the Protestant theory of the Eucharist can well be conceived.

That the Eucharist is a commemoration of the sacrifice of Christ is distinctly taught by the Church, but not that it is a commemoration to the assistants alone. The Catholic theory is that it is a sacrifice to God, the offering to God the Father of the life and passion of Christ.

This is the dogma to be considered in this chapter.

Sacrifice, I have said, is the language of love, the expression of mutual attachment. Thus the death of Christ was the culminating instance to men of a life of love manifest in self-abnegation for their sake. It was the sacrifice offered by God to man to recover his heart.

Directly man begins to love God, the want breaks out within him of offering sacrifice to God. As he realizes how great was the love of God to him, how marvellous was His self-oblation, the desire becomes so imperious that he is ready to resign everything, he yearns to suffer even, in order that he may speak through his actions his gratitude to God. He knows well enough that all he can offer in return for what has been done for him is nothing, and yet he cannot restrain himself from making what return lies in his power.

"Love so amazing, so divine,
Demands my love, my life, my all!"

As the mute stutters when excited, and is tortured with desire to give utterance to the passion which boils in his veins, so is man in an agony of impotence when inflamed with love to God, desiring but unable to express his passion except rudely and inadequately. The self-maceration of ascetics arises from no other cause; the Catholic recluse who imposes austerities upon himself does not suffer; he joys in his penances, because they ease his soul of its inextinguishable love. He knows perfectly well that God does not desire pain, and loves not to see him suffer, but he is impelled by the force of his own nature to follow S. Peter, who, when from the ship he recognized his Lord, deserted companions, brothers, and means of subsistence, and plunged into the sea to swim towards Him.

This explains what must otherwise appear inexplicable to those who have made the acquaintance of ascetics,—their joyousness of spirit. There is no gloom and sadness. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι λυπηρὸν, said S. Chrysostom of the cœnobites in his day, and it applies equally to those in our own. Rogers says of the monks of the Great S. Bernard,—

"They were as gay, as free from guile,
As children; answering, and at once, to all
The gentler impulses, to pleasure, mirth;
Mingling, at intervals, with rational talk
Music."

And Tasso, in apostrophizing a Benedictine abbey, exclaims:—

"What delightful silence, pleasant abode, and how *chearful.*"[1]

This is perfectly true, the ascetic is the happiest man in the world. Do you doubt it? Visit a Trappist monastery or a convent of Carmelite nuns, and you will be convinced by their radiant countenances and beaming eyes.

That which constitutes the ascetic is love; and the true ascetic always overflows with charity:—

"Vast was the love which from your chalices,
Mysterious monks! with a full heart ye drew:
Ye loved with ardent souls! Oh, happy lot for you!"[2]

"It is always a question with me," says a Protestant traveller who visited the Trappist convent of La Melleray, "what is the basis of this overflowing warmth of affection which monks always shew to any one of us wanderers of the outer world whenever we happen to throw any little tenderness into our manner towards them? I find this invariably the case. Perhaps it is that these men are always walking along their path of life with the words, Love of God, Love of their fellow-creature on their lips, and that thereby a certain stock of sensibility is created, which is ready to overflow at any moment upon any one who, by word or act, touches the spring, or utters the 'Open Sesame.'"[3]

[1] "Silenzi amici, e vaghe chiostre, e liete!"

[2] Alfred de Musset: Rolla.

[3] Louth: Wanderer in Western France, p. 263: compare also M. Algernon Taylor's Monasteries of France.

In the purely material life, the object man sets before him, and the motives that determine him, are furnished by the sensations of his organism or by his passions, which may all be resumed in love, concentrated on self. But that he may act in the higher spiritual order, he needs a new principle of action, not blind like that of his animal nature, nor placed in himself, but conscient, free, and external. This principle is love, but love of a different kind. In the first order, the end is self; in the second, it is God. In the first the motive of determination is pleasure; in the second, it is sacrifice, the outward form of love.

In the history of the human race, the first of these two orders is represented by pagan antiquity. Love could not attach itself to the infinite. Intellect could do this; but this infinite was only, like thought itself, an abstract, metaphysical infinity, and not a living, real, personal God. Consequently the only means by which the spiritual nature could attach itself to God, was by love of the only sensible manifestation it knew, the world; and it darkened into Pantheism. This is the sole form of religion possible in which the affections can find play, outside of Christianity in its full acceptation.

If modern feeling in Protestant countries has turned to Pantheism once more, it is because the Reformation destroyed the significance of the Incarnation. "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him." The ideal of the spiritual and moral life having been given exclusively by science, it became an exercise of the intellect, not an aspiration of the heart. Consequently it was something to be concluded, not to be loved. Pure science attempted to determine the notion of God and of our relations with Him. This inspired all initiators of philosophic religions. But this thought of the Infinite being only ob-

tained by the negation of the finite, God, thus negatively conceived, became the ideal of Buddhism, the Being absolutely incomprehensible, the Great Nothing.

Christ came. At once the axis of human life is displaced. To science succeeds love, not to the exclusion of reason, but to its harmonization with the truths of the heart. To love God, to love mankind, to love all creation is the revelation of Christ. This religion combines mysticism, positivism, and pantheism. For what is mysticism but the love of the Ideal alone? What is positivism but the love of humanity alone? What is pantheism but the love of creation alone? They are three passions, like the three primary colours; but Christianity combines them into pure light.

This love, which is possible now that God is Incarnate, is the motor of the spiritual life, the cause of unity. "It appears manifest," says Bossuet, "that man is the delight of man." "There is no real key to the heart but love. Love is the law of the heart. It is this which moves its most secret inclinations and energies," and this love is possible in the spiritual order, only because God is Man; and as Man, He is an object to which love may attach itself, and as God, He is the ideal which may exalt and fill up the highest imaginings of love. If man seeks the object of love within himself he deifies himself, or trusting to reason forms a negative God which he cannot love. But under the Gospel, he can look out, and everything is transformed into a medium of love. The universe is to him a book written within and without, to reveal to him the invisible perfections of God.

In Jesus Christ, he sees God entering into and pervading humanity. Thus, by love, the two poles of his life are united; one placing him *en rapport* with the world of infinity; the other, with the world of finalities. He sees

in the material universe the expression, of which God is the sense; in humanity the body, of which God is the soul.

The law of Christ is the complete manifestation of the law of universal love everywhere destroying contradictions and producing unity. Love sees all in One, and One in all. It sees God in all His creatures, humanity in God, the spirit in the letter, the essence in the accidents, force in matter, justice in charity, reason in faith, each in all. It unites all, but confounds none. It distinguishes, but does not separate. Nay, it distinguishes that it may unite.

By uniting all men with one another and with God, love produces in man the unity of his own being, and thereby, serenity, order, life, joy, and happiness. Man thus replaced in the plenitude of his unity, reproduces it in all the acts of his life. Loving God, he hears, sees, feels, tastes Him everywhere; he loves all men, because they are the creatures of God, he loves all creation, because it is the language of God.

As peace consists in the reduction to unity of all discordant elements, not the obliteration of any, of Christ may be said what was spoken of one who carried out His spirit, S. Benedict,—

"Ipse fundator placidæ quietis."

The faculties which broken refuse to transmit light, are welded together into translucent crystal, and rest serene.

I have spoken at some length of the love of God which manifests itself in the heart of man, and which is but the repercussion of the love of God to man, because it is the foundation of sacrifice. As soon as, by faith, man realizes the love of God to him, exhibited in creation and in the Incarnation and Atonement, he desires to return that love, and exhibit his gratitude by sacrifice. But he knows well

that nothing he can "render to his God for all His gifts" are to be measured beside what God has done for him, and he hesitates. The passion in his soul is driving him on, "but whither shall he go?"

The Protestant spirit steps in like a spectre, and lays its icy finger on his bounding heart, and paralyzes him; "You can do nothing but lie still and freeze."

But the Catholic spirit, like an angel of light, with the odours of paradise fanned from its wings, lifts the fevered soul and says, "Up, flee to the altar, there is your sacrifice!" And the soul sees the solution to its perplexity. What offering can it render to its God worthy of that great sacrifice He gave to man, but that sacrifice itself? That is the return man makes to God; he offers to Him the sacrifice of Christ; the best thing he knows, the only thing at all adequate to the occasion. He says to God, You have given me all, I give You back, in the fulness of my gratitude, all that I value highest, and that is Christ incarnate, dying on the cross for me.

This is the signification of the sacrifice of the altar, the Mass. It is the recoil wave of the Divine love.

And this will explain a point in Catholic teaching obscure to some. I will give the explanation in the words of a gifted lady. "All the masses that have been celebrated since our Lord's time till now, and all those that will be celebrated till the Last Day, are only one mass. The multitude of priests is but one priest. The victim is one, the sacrifice is one; for Christ being both priest and victim, and He being eternal and infinite, the sacrifice, priest and victim can be but one and lasting. Tomasa Rossi, the great theologian and philosopher, makes a beautiful comparison on this subject, explaining remarkably well the unity and multiplicity of the holy sacrifice of the mass.

He says that one articulate sound, expressing an idea by means of the human voice, is one and simple when it leaves the mouth of the speaker, but becomes multiplied indefinitely in the air by the sounds which, with perfect likeness of form and substance, strike the surrounding multitude. This is the result of a natural cause, by which unity is multiplied without division. Let us apply this thought to the Word incarnate, and the sacrifice of the cross He once offered for us; that sacrifice which, without ceasing to be one, is multiplied by the numberless sacrifices offered upon the altar, which all of them, everywhere and for ever, communicate to each one of the faithful the effects and merits of the first and only sacrifice of Christ. When, therefore, we assist at mass, we do not assist at a representation of the sacrifice of Calvary, but at that sacrifice itself, which is enduring."[1]

Christ is held by the Church to be the head and representative of the whole human race; and as such His sacrifice has its human aspect, looks up towards God, as well as looks down upon men. Thus it was not only the oblation of God to man, but of man to God. It was the meeting of the father and the prodigal son effected in Christ. It was the leaping up of crippled human nature in a rapture of thanksgiving, as well as a leaning over its sick-bed by God to touch and heal it.

As the head of the human family Christ offered on the cross to God the sacrifice which alone could reconcile man and God, that sacrifice being the rejection of all that was opposed to the will of God and the welfare of mankind. And the will of God is our sanctification, that is the pacification of all that destroys the tranquillity and perfectability of our nature. Sacrifice is the self-devotion of the

[1] Adelaide Capece Minutolo, by Mrs. A. Craven, 1869, p. 49.

whole being, the rightful homage due from the creature to the Creator; the true worship of God must always consist in sacrifice, not necessarily painful; painful when there is any contrariance to the will of God, but when there is complete union between man and God, there will be no immixture of suffering.

Take an illustration. Social life consists in sacrifice, that is in giving and taking. When there is political and social inequality, through injustice of law, there is pain in the relations between the members of the community, but when the interest of one is the interest of all, and *vice versâ*, there will be no suffering in the acts of giving and taking.

The idea of sacrifice, originally one of sweet interchange between God and man, was modified by the introduction of sin into the world, and it acquired a new character of reparation, accompanied by suffering, the grating of love against the rough edges of a disorganized moral nature.

To restore the union between God and man, the link of sacrifice must be repaired, and this man was unable to effect himself. One alone could offer a full and perfect satisfaction and oblation. In the life and death of Christ, the idea received not merely its highest, but its sole adequate fulfilment. As the representative man, Christ was able to restore worship and sacrifice to their original purity. He did so by blunting the adventitious elements; and now the sacrifice, the only perfect sacrifice, is painless.

Worship by sacrifice was not destroyed by Christ, it was restored to its primitive integrity, to be once more the mode of communication to God of the love felt for Him by man. When a cause of estrangement has separated two friends so that their mutual offices of good will have ceased, or rather those performed by one have ceased to be

reciprocated by the other, the removal of the cause of estrangement naturally restores the circle of loving offices; the reciprocation begins again.

As sacrifice was the exchange of love between God and unfallen man, and as, when man had fallen, man ceased to return to God that worship which was God's due, the restoration of man naturally restores the duty of sacrifice. The distinctive and supreme worship of Christians must still, as of old, be a worship by sacrifice, or it would not, strictly speaking, be worship at all.

But since the one great oblation has been offered, to which nothing can be added, and which cannot be repeated, the Christian sacrifice must be, not commemorative only, but identical with that on the Cross. For no other sacrifice is henceforth possible or conceivable. Every Christian prayer, indeed, commemorates the sacrifice of Christ, and is accepted through it; but the central act of worship must be that very sacrifice itself, though the manner of the oblation may differ. If the oblation is the same, the thing offered must be the same also. And therefore the real presence of the divine victim is essential to the reality of the sacrifice.

The full significance of the doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice will no doubt remain an enigma to all who do not love, but the theory need not be unintelligible. The observer may smile at the interchange of trifling presents made by two persons who love one another, but the moment he himself loves, the most trivial offerings are consecrated by affection.

"Let men only learn to love rather than to protest, and the whole conduct of the Catholic Church in the matter of worship will be no longer to them the riddle that it now is. It is altogether founded on the love of Jesus Christ

But love must interpret the conduct of love; cold hearts cannot discover its secrets."[1]

To give and to receive is the law of the world, their balance is life, the destruction of equipoise is death. Give to the hyacinth bulb as much water as it can reproduce in sap to swell its leaves and flowers, and it is vigorous. Steep it in an excess, and it rots. The water you give is your sacrifice to it, and its bloom and fragrance is the return offering to you. Overload a child with benefits, and it becomes selfish and hard; teach it to make return by acts of courtesy, love, and attention, and it grows up full of moral beauty.

When a man has been to some expense, or undergone great hardships, or has sacrificed his health for the good of his native country, or his class, a return is made, he is created a baronet or a peer, a monument is erected to him, or he is honoured with a banquet and an ovation, a street is named after him, or he is presented with the freedom of his city. This is so natural, that not to make return and offer compensation is considered mean and ungenerous.

It would be strange indeed if this instinct found no expression in Christianity.

Christian worship is this expression. It is compensation offered to Him Who, for our sakes, became of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man.

Dr. Newman has eloquently developed this theory in one of his sermons. "The Son of God," he says, "came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But He came in order to make them receive Him, know Him, and worship Him. When He came, He had not a place wherein to lay

[1] In Spirit and in Truth, p. 278.

His head; but He came to make Himself a place, to make Himself a home, to make Himself houses, to fashion for Himself a glorious dwelling out of this whole world, which the powers of evil had taken captive. He came in the dark, in a cave under ground; in a cave where cattle were stabled, there was He housed; in a rude manger was He laid. There first He laid His head; but He meant not there to remain for ever. He came into that cave to leave it:—pass a few generations, and the whole face of things is changed; the earth is covered with His temples. Go where you will, you find the eternal mountains hewn and fashioned into shrines where He may dwell, who was an outcast in the days of His flesh. Rivers and mines pay tribute of their richest jewels; the skill of man is put to task to use what nature furnishes. Go through the countries where His name is known, and you will find all that is rarest and most wonderful in nature and art has been consecrated to Him. Kings' palaces are poor, whether in architecture or in decoration, compared with the shrines which they have reared to Him."

But the Protestant objection to this theory of worship is, that as Christ was on earth in simplicity and poverty, He is best pleased that simplicity and meanness should characterize His service now. Let the houses of squire and parson be snug and luxurious, and even the cottage of the peasant be clean, but let the Church of God be bald, bare, and dusty.

If a mother had denied herself food, worn her patched threadbare gown in the frost, and thin shoes in the wet, that her son might be provided with a good education and be well apprenticed, would it be feeling and right in him, when rich, to repay her with a crust of bread, and condemn her to tatters. Even if she did not want what he

could give her, he would overwhelm her with marks of his love and gratitude.

No doubt God needs not the gifts of His people, but no doubt the withholding of gifts is a sign of a sordid, ungrateful spirit. The reasoning of the Church has ever been,—"My Lord embraced poverty for me; then I will pour out my riches at His feet: for me He humbled himself, then I will exalt Him; for my sake He has exposed Himself to men's neglect, then will I redouble my homage and adoration."

To offer compensation to her Lord is the delight of the Church. She does not lament over broken alabaster boxes and costly spikenard poured out upon Him, as so much "waste," but she opens her gifts to present Him with gold and frankincense and myrrh. To commemorate Christ's self-sacrifice, she has called out all the powers of man. For this her doctors have written, her poets have sung, her architects and artists have laboured, and her musicians have composed. All her efforts have ever been to keep alive in the minds and hearts of her children an affectionate remembrance of what their Redeemer taught, did, and suffered for their sakes.

"Her eyes are homes of silent prayer,
Nor other thought her mind admits,
But he was dead, and there he sits,
And He that brought him back is there.

Then one deep love doth supersede
All other, when her ardent gaze
Roves from the living brother's face,
And rests upon the Life indeed.

All subtle thought, all curious fears,
Borne down by gladness so complete,
She bows, she bathes the Saviour's feet
With costly spikenard and with tears."[1]

Tennyson: In Memoriam.

I cannot refrain from quoting some beautiful words of the late Arthur Henry Hallam which bear upon this subject. He is discussing the poems of Dante and of Petrarch, and shewing how by Christianity love has been enthroned in a way that to the old pagan world would not only have been impossible but injurious. "Plato, it is well known," he says, "inculcated the expediency of personal attachment as an incentive to virtue. He seems to have seen clearly enough the impossibility of governing man otherwise than through his affections; and the necessity of embodying our conceptions of beauty and goodness in some object worthy of love. But Plato had little influence on social manners. Many admired his eloquence, and many puzzled themselves with his metaphysics; but the peculiarities of his ethical system were not appreciated by the two great nations of antiquity. His kingdom was not of that world. It began only when the stone was rolled away from the Sepulchre, and the veil of the Temple was rent in twain. Platonism became the natural ally of Christianity. Mr. Coleridge has said, 'he is a plank from the wreck of Paradise cast on the shores of idolatrous Greece.'" Then, after remarking on the sentiment of erotic devotion which pervades Hebrew literature as compared with that of every other ancient people, he continues, "But what is true of Judaism is yet more true of Christianity, 'matre pulchrâ filia pulchrior.' In addition to all the characters of Hebrew Monotheism, there exists in the doctrine of the Cross a peculiar and inexhaustible treasure of the affectionate feelings. The idea of the Θεάνθρωπος, the God whose goings forth have been from everlasting, yet visible to men for their redemption as an earthly, temporal creature, living, acting, and suffering among themselves, then (which is yet more important) transferring to the unseen place of His spiritual agency the

same humanity He wore on earth, so that the lapse of generations can in no way affect the conception of His identity; this is the most powerful thought that ever addressed itself to a human imagination. It is the που στω which alone was wanted to move the world. Here was solved at once the great problem which so long had distressed the teachers of mankind, how to make virtue the object of passion, and to secure at once the warmest enthusiasm in the heart with the clearest perception of right and wrong in the understanding. The character of the blessed Founder of our Faith became an abstract of morality to determine the judgment, while at the same time it remained personal and liable to love. The written word and established Church prevented a degeneration into ungoverned mysticism, but the predominant principle of vital religion always remained that of self-sacrifice to the Saviour. Not only the higher divisions of moral duties, but the simple primary impulses of benevolence were subordinated to this new absorbing passion. The world was loved 'in Christ alone.' The brethren were members of His mystical body. All the other bonds that had fastened down the spirit of the universe to our narrow round of earth, were as nothing in comparison to this golden chain of suffering and self-sacrifice which at once riveted the heart of man to One who, like himself, was acquainted with grief. Pain is the deepest thing we have in our nature, and union through pain has always seemed more real and more holy than any other. It is easy to see how these ideas reign in the early Christian books, and how they continued to develop and strengthen themselves in the rising institutions of the Church. The Monastic spirit was the principal emanation from them; but the same influence, though less apparent, was busily circulating through the organization of social

life. Who can read the eloquent compositions of Augustine, without being struck by their complexion of ardent passion, tempered indeed, and supported by the utmost keenness of intellect."[1]

This passionate love necessarily exhibits itself in worship. As the son sets his mother's photograph in a handsome frame, and the daughter encrusts the locket containing her hair with gold and gems, so does the Christian adorn and beautify everything that is to him a memorial of his Lord. He builds Him the most beautiful shrine, he decorates it with gold and marble and cedar, he fills its windows with coloured panes and covers the walls with paintings. He makes the service speak to him of Christ, and he glorifies it with organ note and the strain of chorister. Every gesture of the priest preserves some memorial of his Lord; the altar is hung with velvet and gold because on it his Emmanuel rests, the chalice blazes with jewels because in it is the blood shed for him. The Host is elevated amidst swing of censers and a glow of tapers, because It is the bread broken for him. Flowers beautify the sanctuary, for his Lord dwells there; bells peal out in glad announcement that the Christ is coming. All men kneel because He is there.

This is the secret of ritual and the splendour of Catholic worship. Let those who meddle with the practices of public worship to curtail ceremonies, and one by one to extinguish its glories, know that they are offering thereby an insult to the Lord in Whom they say they believe. The prelate who will lavish thousands on the adornment of his palace, or on heavy insurance of his life for the benefit of wife and children, will persecute, and drive from his church, the poor curate who, loving his Lord better than himself, out of his

[1] Hallam's Remains, pp. 274-283.

slender income sacrifices a third to the adornment of the altar.

A savage mob will sack a church where the ceremonial is reverently symbolical of the burning heart consumed with love to Christ, but it will leave unmolested the slovenly priest and the despised altar.

Why? Because neither prelate nor people know the love of Christ that passes knowledge, and in narrow bigotry they will not tolerate what they do not know and understand. The Saracen conqueror burned the greatest library in the world, stored with the wisdom of ages, "because," said he, "I do not understand letters, and therefore they must be bad and worthless"—a true Protestant sentiment!

But even the stranger who has eyes to see and ears to hear, cannot altogether miss the spirit of true Christian worship:—the celebrated Lavater, a Zwinglian pastor, was not too blinded by Protestant prejudice to catch the significance of Catholic ritual; and with his impressions of a Catholic Church I close this chapter.

"He doth not know Thee, O Jesus Christ, who dishonoureth even Thy shadow. I honour all things where I find the intention of honouring Thee. I will love them because of Thee. What do I behold here? What do I hear in this place? Does nothing under these majestic vaults speak to me of Thee? This cross, this golden image, is it not made in Thine honour? The censer which waves around the priest, the Gloria sung in chorus, the peaceful light of the perpetual lamp, these burning tapers, all is done for Thee. Why is the Host elevated, if it be not to honour Thee, O Jesus Christ, Who art dead for love of us? Because It is no more, and Thou art It, the believing Church bends the knee. It is in Thy honour alone that these children, early instructed, make the sign of the

cross, that their tongues sing Thy praise, and that they smite their breasts thrice with their little hands. It is for love of Thee, O Jesus Christ, that the spot that bears Thy adorable blood is kissed. For Thee the child who serves sounds the little bell, and performs his functions. The riches collected from distant countries, the magnificence of chasubles, all have relation to Thee. Why are the walls and the high altar of marble clothed with tapestry on the feast of Corpus Christi? For whom do they make a road of flowers? For whom are these banners embroidered? When the Ave Maria sounds, is it not for Thee? Matins, vespers, prime, and nones, are they not consecrated to Thee? These bells within a thousand towers, purchased with the gold of whole cities, do they not bear Thy image cast in the very mould? Is it not for Thee that they send forth their solemn tone? It is under Thy protection, O Jesus Christ, that every man places himself who loves solitude, chastity, and poverty. Without Thee, the orders of S. Benedict and S. Bernard would not have been founded. The cloister, the tonsure, the breviary, and the chaplet bear witness to Thee. O delightful rapture, Jesus Christ, for Thy disciple to trace the marks of Thy finger where the eyes of the world see them not! O joy ineffable for souls devoted to Thee, to behold in caves and on rocks, in every crucifix placed upon hills and by the highways, Thy seal and that of Thy love! Who will not rejoice in the honours of which Thou art the object and the soul? Who will not shed tears in hearing the words, 'Jesus Christ be praised?' O the hypocrite who knoweth that name, and answereth not with joy, 'Amen!' who saith not, with an intense transport, 'Jesus be blessed for eternity, for eternity!'"[1]

[1] Lavater: Worte des Herzens, für Freunde der Liebe u. des Glaubens, 8th ed. 1855.

CHAPTER XIX

THE DOGMA OF IMMORTALITY

"A man may believe in the immortality of the soul for twenty years, but only in the twenty-first, at some great moment, is he astonished at the rich substance of this belief, at the warmth of this naphtha-spring."—JEAN-PAUL RICHTER.

The basis of Christian hope—Proofs of Immortality inadequate to give certainty—Future life of fame unsatisfactory—Future life desired by the suffering—It is a necessity of the soul—Because the soul cannot satisfy all its desires here—Because the capability of enjoyment is limited here—Contrast between what we have and what we hope for—The Christian heaven corresponds with the desire felt for it on earth—The blunting of the finer faculties incapacitates man for enjoyment—destroys his aspirations—and therefore limits his Heaven—The idea of Hell not necessarily one of pain but of low enjoyment—The idea of Purgatory one of gradual education—The idea of the Resurrection of the body necessarily part of the Christian's hope.

WE have seen what is Christian faith and Christian love; we come in order to Christian hope.

As Gibbon has observed, Philosophy, notwithstanding its utmost efforts, has been unable to do more to satisfy the hope and desire instinctive in man, than feebly indicate the probability of a future life, and therefore it belongs to Revelation to affirm its existence, and to represent authoritatively the condition of the souls of men after their separation from the body.

As I have shewn at some length in my former volume,

the idea of immortality is inextinguishable in man. I said, "In order to form an idea of the destruction of the conscious self, an amount of exhaustion of impressions is required wholly beyond the powers of an uncultivated mind. Man's personality is so distinctly projected on the surface of his consciousness, that the idea of its obliteration is inconceivable without doing violence to his primary convictions."

In a state of health, every man desires to live; he desires, because the instinct of self-conservation is one of the most primary and ineradicable and the strongest in his nature. This desire, at first negative, becomes on reflection, under the pressure of life and its cares and sorrows, a positive desire. But if he desires immortality, he desires to be certified of it, so as not to be left to conjecture alone.

Reason cannot gratify this hope, and all the proofs of immortality that have been collected by philosophers have only served to make it probable, not certain. For reason, not being able to know future life, cannot demonstrate it. Reason can give general, abstract proofs; but the certainty of the eternal duration of one's personal existence cannot be furnished by it, and it is precisely this certainty which is demanded.

To obtain it, a proof, an immediate witness, which may fall under the senses, is requisite. One who has died, of whose death we are well assured,—not any one, but one who is a type and model of all others,—must rise from his grave, as a guarantee to all of their resurrection.

This is what the Resurrection of Christ supplies. The Incarnation was an accommodation of God to all the wants of man's nature, and this, the most imperious of all, the demand for personal restoration to immortal life, is certified to man by the dogma of the Resurrection.

The immortality of the soul is unquestionably one of those primordial beliefs proclaimed by universal instinct, forced into prominence by causes I have detailed in the first volume.

It has survived all the convulsions of human beliefs, and although men have changed their modes of worship and ideas of God, their belief in an immortality awaiting them has never died out.

Plato, convinced of this truth, reposes on ancient tradition as his authority. "This is certain," says he; "that which we call the soul lives. We do not believe that the mass of flesh we burn is the man, knowing that the son or brother whom we bury is really gone to another country, after having accomplished his task in this—one must believe these things on the faith of legislators or ancient traditions."[1]

Socrates, who died a martyr to his convictions, is represented to us, the fatal cup in his hand, discussing the question of questions on the threshold of death. After having retraced his philosophic conceptions on this grand subject, he said to his interlocutor: "Doubtless you regard these stories as the dreams of a delirious crone, but you are mistaken. I would myself despise them, if in our researches we had found anything more salutary and more certain." Such was the foundation of his faith: it was but a *pis aller*. He had the wisdom to see that reason could not establish the certainty of this most important doctrine; and he said touchingly: "One must pass the stormy sea of life on the fragments of truth that remain to us, as on a little boat, unless we be given some surer way, such as a divine promise, a revelation, which would be to us a vessel in which we might brave the tempests."[2]

[1] Plato: De Leg. xii.

[2] Phædo.

Cicero believed in the immortality of the soul. In his treatise on Old Age, he says: "Nature has not set us in this world to inhabit it for ever, but to lodge in it in passing. Oh the bright day in which I shall leave for that celestial assembly, for that divine council of souls!" But turn the page, and read, "If I am deceived in believing in the immortality of the soul, I am deceived with pleasure. . . . If I die altogether, as think some minute philosophers, I shall feel nothing. . . . Even if we are not immortal, it is nevertheless desirable to end our days," &c. And in his Epistles, he says, "Whilst I live, nothing shall distress me, so long as I am free from blame; and if I cease to be, I shall lose all consciousness."[1]

A makeshift to satisfy this desire for immortality is life in the memory of posterity, in the mouth of fame. It is this which Cicero expatiates on in his oration upon Archias, and which M. Comte holds out to his followers as the future for which they are to strive. But this is poor comfort to the dying man. When Bossuet was in his agony, a friend bade him rejoice, for his fame would be eternal. "Fame!" echoed the dying eagle, "what is that to me now? Pray for my soul."

The reasoning of Jack Falstaff is true to nature; fame will never satisfy the want man feels. "Honour pricks me on, yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come on? How then? can honour set to a leg? No. Or an arm? No.—What is honour? He that died o' Wednesday, doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. Is it insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it:—therefore I'll none of it."[2]

[1] Epist. vi. 3.

[2] 1 Part of Henry IV. Act. v. Sc. i.

And Heine yet more coarsely expresses the same sentiment:—

"Graves they say are warm'd by glory,
Foolish words and empty story!
Better far the warmth we prove
From the cow-girl deep in love,
With her arms around us flung,
Reeking with the smell of dung.
And that warmth is better, too,
That man's entrails pierces through,
When he drinks hot punch and wine,
Or his fill of grog divine,
In the vilest, meanest den,
'Mongst the thieves and scum of men."[1]

At best the Elysium of the ancients was a paradise for the great men of earth. "If there be any place for the manes of the virtuous; if, as it pleases sages, great souls are not extinguished with the body, then rest in peace!"[2] Such is the address of Tacitus to the spirit of Agricola. The Norseman opened Valhalla only to the warrior who died in battle; the Indian chief who is the death of many foes alone triumphs in the happy hunting-fields,—but to the simple, the feeble, and the poor heathenism offered no hope; nor can modern infidelity afford consolation.

A French materialist relates the following incident. He visited an almshouse for old women, in which was an aged relation whom he had not seen for many years. He found her bowed down with pain and the weight of age, and nearly stone deaf. As he walked with her in the little court, he perplexed his mind with the question how he should console her. He could not promise her youth and health, or a prospect of recovered hearing; and the old woman's tears flowed, as the sight of her relative recalled

[1] Latest Poems, 13, Epilogue. [2] Tacit. Agricol. xlvi.

to her memory years of activity and happiness for ever passed away. At that moment the chaplain traversed the quadrangle, and, seeing the troubled expression in her face, he caught her eye and pointed upwards. Instantly the clouds broke and fled, and a smile shone out on the withered countenance and dispersed her tears. She was comforted. The sign of the priest had told her that there was a hope to cheer her such as the materialist could not promise. "That man was young, his face beamed with goodness, and why shall I dissimulate my feelings? His action touched me. He wished to console a suffering spirit; and he succeeded; and he could not have failed to be understood, for the old nurse had ever been a zealous Christian. Afterwards, the remembrance of this little scene has often returned to my mind, and I have asked myself repeatedly how one might replace so efficacious a means of consolation, so simple in itself, in a society in which the light of faith shall be completely extinguished. . . . Let us admit that religion offers for the consolation of the afflicted means which will not be admissible when faith is no more; for instance, the finger will no more be raised to heaven, to make people believe in eternal felicity; but these means are attributable to egoistical sentiments, and if they are otherwise attributable, they may easily be replaced."[1]

Descartes, wishing to reconstruct the edifice of philosophy, and seeking for a new point of departure for thought, found what he sought in the fact that thought is seized and clearly perceived by the interior sense; and he laid down the general law, which is the basis of method, that all those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly must be regarded as true.

[1] Sièrebois: La Morale, essai d'anthropodicée. Paris, 1867, pp. 116-7.

The dogmas of religion, as has been already shewn, belong to the sentiment. Christ, according to the hypothesis with which His religion starts, has erected the heart into the criterium of religious truth, has made objective all that was subjective. But the heart is not to act without the reason to regulate its action. The heart is the spring, and reason is the balance-wheel.

If then we are justified by the Christian hypothesis of the Incarnation, in applying the Cartesian maxim to the heart, we may conclude that what things we conceive clearly and distinctly as necessary to satisfy the desires of our hearts, do truly exist.

From which it follows:—

1st. That we must regard as true all those dogmas which it is most necessary for us to admit; and these are verities which have no other limits than the needs of our souls, and the requisitions which we feel imperative for the obtainment of perfect happiness.

2d. That we must demand the utmost we can conceive, that is, whatever is most perfect.

If we open our souls and study their wants, we find that the first and most clearly expressed is this:—We desire the prolongation of our existence after the close of this mortal life.

This present life does not satisfy us, because it is not our ideal. Our desires transcend the power of satisfaction. We find delight in a thousand things, but are incapacitated by circumstances from pursuing them. Our spirits are partial, discursive, and exclusive, and to obtain and assimilate one thing necessitates the abandonment of others. We feel that there are an infinite number of channels of pleasure open to us, but we are obliged to make a selection of one or two among them. We want all, but can embrace only a part.

I will take my own case, and it is the counterpart of others. I have a passion for natural history; but I cannot follow that branch of science without deserting philosophy and theology, which interest me equally. I once studied ornithology, but I have been obliged to abandon that study, because of my imperfection of sight. But I know that the ways of the birds are wonderful, and full of beauty, and I cannot bear to think that when the grave closes upon me it shuts me off from all acquaintance with the marvels of the feathered tribes of the air. Perhaps I love the fine arts more than literature; but though dreams of beauty pass before my mind, I cannot fix them on the canvas, because of the inaptitude of my fingers; if I take the brush, I must lay down the pen. I have a craving for mountain scenery, but years elapse without my being able to see the sun set the Jungfrau in a glow.

Here are a multitude of desires, to know and to feel, to acquire knowledge, and to express my ideas of the beautiful, larger than my powers, to develop which life is too short.

I want another life to finish what is begun here.

"The immortality of the soul," said Pascal, "is of such paramount importance to us, and touches us so profoundly, that one must have lost all feeling to be indifferent as to whether it is or is not." Since philosophy has existed, demonstration after demonstration has been made to prove what every wise man has felt must be, to make life endurable, that the terrestrial life is only an episode, and that after the tragedy of death, we then alone pass into the plenitude of our existence.

The Pantheist teaches that life continues, for it is indestructible, but that individuality disappears. But what is an eternity of life to me if I lose my personality,

and live on as a portion of the universe only, as so much thistle for the ass to eat, or so much phosphorus on the ends of matches? It is myself which is dear to me, which as a thinking, loving personality, must exist in eternity to think all thoughts, and to love all things, infinitely.

"Let him take confidence," says Plato, "who during life has rejected pleasures and the advantage of the body, as strange to him and conducive to evil; who has adorned his soul, not with a foreign garb, but with that which becomes it, temperance, justice, strength, liberty, and truth; he may await in tranquillity the hour of his departure from this world, as being ready for the voyage, when called by destiny."

When a plant has flowered, it withers on its stalk; when an animal dies it returns to the dust; we do not conceive of any other destiny for plant and animal, for they have each reached the highest perfection of which their organs are capable. But it is not so with us. When we have lived, neither are our aspirations satisfied, nor our notions of justice realized, and alone among the creatures which surround us, dragging after us the long chain of disappointed hopes, we cry out for the infinite perspective of immortality beyond the narrow horizon of to-day. "We have a divine hunger," says matchless Jean-Paul; "and this earth offers us only the food of cattle. The eternal hunger of man, the insatiability of his desires, ask another sort of nutriment. How can a great soul be happy here? Those who have been among mountains and are condemned to live in plains die of an incurable nostalgia. It is because we have issued from above, that we sigh for it, and that all music is to us a reminiscence of our home, a ranz-des-vaches to the exiled Swiss. An infinite love supposes an infinite object. If all the

forests were pleasure parks, and all the isles were Fortunate Isles, and all the fields were Elysian, and all eyes were full of joy, oh! then—— But no: then the Infinite Being must have assured us that such felicity would be perpetual. But now that so many houses are houses of mourning, so many fields are fields of battle, so many faces are pale, so many eyes are dulled with tears and closed; when things are thus, how can the tomb be the end of all?"

There are times when the mind and heart are weary of everything life has given, and like Solomon who tried learning and folly, who builded houses, and planted vineyards, and made gardens and orchards, and pools of water, who got servants and maidens, and great possessions of great and small cattle, and gathered gold and silver, and tried men singers and women singers, the heart is forced to exclaim with him, "Whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them; I withheld not my heart from any joy, and then I looked on all the works my hands had wrought, and on the labours that I had laboured to do: and behold all was vanity and vexation of spirit. Wherefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me: for all is vanity and vexation of spirit."[1] And this disgust arises, not because the things enjoyed are in themselves bad, but simply and solely because the imagination transcends them, and its ideal is not as yet attained, and for that reason only it falls sick with disappointed hope. It accepts what is; it distinguishes what is good in it from what is base. It takes the good as an earnest of the very good; but it insists on every comparative necessitating a superlative; and it is for that superlative in the future that it pines.

[1] Eccles. ii. 1-17.

The leaf of life on which man has been crawling about and feeding like a caterpillar, falls behind him a skeleton leaf. The desire for something higher becomes a pain—that heavenly home-sickness of which the writings of the great Catholic saints are redolent, but which every heart probably feels with more or less intensity.

"Through night and darkness from between the clouds
Looks down the moon, and countless sparkles gleam
On us; as when upon a stormy night,
With lengthy journey wearied, from afar
We see the twinkling windows of our home,
But neither roof nor tower, and onward press.
For rest is nigh.
How strangely on my heart
This night a sadness weighs, an aching void.
I want to cry, but wherefore? I would go,
But whither? Home-sick, but where is Home?"[1]

It is a common-place to say that fruition never satisfies. There is always something wanting to make happiness perfect. Duration, but not duration only, perfection also. By a wonderful faculty man's ideas always transcend what is attainable, and thence that weariness of spirit which falls upon him, when he has roved from pleasure to pleasure, and has not found what he has seen in vision.

And then, again, there is in us a want of capacity for enjoying what is beautiful as fully as we desire. Why is it that, as Goethe says, a work of high art always pains us at first sight? It is because we feel ourselves so unable to grasp it, it is like a full blaze on an eye accustomed to the dark, there is a sensation of distress produced till the mind has been modulated upwards into harmony with the object. We feel this with great intensity when exquisite music, or very beautiful poetry is wafted in on our sensitive mind-

[1] Hebel: Allemannische Gedichte. Leipz. 1853, p. 186.

plate. The eye fills with tears. Why does that which is very lovely sadden the heart, sadden it with a pleasing pain? Why, but because it awakens a desire for something beyond the flat horizon of the everyday life we are doomed to live. I well remember, as a boy, being overcome by a sudden glimpse up the Val d'Azun in the Pyrenees. A soft haze which had obscured the mountains rose and dissolved into floss silver in the sky, and through it the sun poured a subdued glory over the snows of the Pic de Gabizos. The scene was more beautiful than I could bear, and I burst into sobs. I have felt the same pain in coming suddenly on a grey rock clustered over with wild pinks above the Lake of Thun. Beauty, like light, is sometimes too overpowering to be borne.

I find the same sensation described by Mr. Gosse, the naturalist, whose feeling for natural beauties breathes out of every page he writes. He says, "Perhaps many have felt—I have often—that there are occasions in which the sense of the beautiful in nature becomes almost painfully overpowering. I have gazed on some very lovely prospects, bathed perhaps in the last rays of the evening sun, till my soul seemed to struggle with a very peculiar undefinable sensation, as if longing for a power to enjoy, which I was conscious I did not possess, and which found relief only in tears. I have felt conscious that there were elements of enjoyment and admiration there which went far beyond my capacity of enjoying and admiring, and I have delighted to believe that, by and by, when in the millennial kingdom of Jesus, and still more in the remote future, in the dispensation of the fulness of times, the earth—the new earth—shall be endowed with a more than paradisaical glory, there will be given to redeemed man a greatly increased

power and capacity for drinking in and enjoying the augmented loveliness."[1]

It is the same with music. An elegant writer thus expresses the same sensation. "A stirring poem will occasionally move one even to tears, but I have known men to lose consciousness whilst listening to a simple melody. Its effect upon the mind and senses is indescribable. I refer now to persons wh hold the rare gift of appreciating the genius of music, not to those who merely fancy they possess it. . . . I often wonder what the effect will be upon those who are unable to comprehend its soul-stirring element when they first hear the strains in the next world? when the spiritual shall be all in all, and they shall see and understand no longer as through a glass darkly. If it is given to us there to remember the thoughts and emotions of mortality, they will wonder how it came to pass that in the years of their earthly life they were so dead to the deepest power the world contained. As everything in heaven will exceed earth as the glory of the Almighty exceeds that of man, so is it impossible to conceive the effect that shall be wrought on us when, for the first time, we hear those strains of celestial melody spoken of by S. John in the New Testament. My friend, but that the soul has thrown off its bonds, its limits of earthly endurance, we should close our ears to the sound, as Moses veiled his face before the Children of Israel when he came down from the mountain."[2]

It is the same with that which is very good. A saintly life, a beautiful example, touch the soul with a longing which causes an ache—an ache because the consciousness of inequality arises within, and a desire is born to rise to

[1] Gosse: Romance of Natural History, 2nd Series, 1861, pp. 303, 343.

[2] Buried Alone, p. 61-3.

the same level; there is a travail of the soul, forgotten in its joy when fruition is attained, but full of exquisite suffering at the time.

"Whene'er a noble deed is wrought,
Whene'er is spoken a noble thought,
Our hearts, in glad surprise,
To higher levels rise.
The tidal wave of deeper souls
Into our inmost being rolls,
And lifts us unawares
Out of all meaner cares."[1]

It is this pain which is felt by the spirits in purgatory; they see the perfection of goodness, and feeling their discord with it, they suffer, till the harmony is produced which alone can give them rest. A pain full of sweetness, but a pain for all that.

"Take me away, and in the lowest deep
There let me be,
And there in hope the lone night-watches keep
Told out for me.
There, motionless and happy in my pain,
Lone, not forlorn,—
There will I sing my sad perpetual strain,
Until the morn.
There will I sing and soothe my stricken breast,
Which ne'er can cease
To throb, and pain, and languish, till possest
Of its Sole Peace."[2]

And this indeed is Christian contrition, the sense of the purity and goodness of Christ, contrasted with the stained and blemished nature of man.

Every sigh of contrition then, as every tear dropped before beauty passing assimilation and virtue as yet un-

[1] Longfellow's Santa Filomena.
[2] Newman: Dream of Gerontius.

attained, is a prophecy of a future where sorrow and sighing shall flee away.

I make no apologies to the reader for quoting a poem at full length by the Bishop of Derry, which expresses with wondrous beauty the idea thrilling all hearts and causing humanity to cry, with loud voice and deep accord, for a new life to complete what is broken and imperfect here.

"Down below, the wild November whistling
Through the beech's dome of burning red,
And the Autumn sprinkling penitential
Dust and ashes on the chestnut's head.

Down below, a pall of airy purple,
Darkly hanging from the mountain side,
And the sunset from his eyebrow staring
O'er the long roll of the leaden tide.

Up above, the tree with leaf unfading,
By the everlasting river's brink,
And the sea of glass beyond whose margin
Never yet the sun was known to sink.

Down below, the white wings of the sea-bird
Dashed across the furrows dark with mould,
Flitting, like the memories of our childhood,
Through the trees now waxen pale and old.

Down below, imaginations quivering
Through our human spirits like the wind,
Thoughts that toss like leaves upon the woodland,
Hopes like sea-birds flashed across the mind.

Up above, the host no man can number,
In white robes, a palm in every hand,
Each some work sublime for ever working,
In the spacious tracts of that great land.

Up above, the thoughts that know not anguish,
Tender care, sweet love for us below,
Noble pity, free from anxious terror,
Larger love without a touch of woe.

Down below, a sad mysterious music,
Wailing through the woods and on the shore,
Burdened with a grand majestic secret,
That keeps sweeping from us evermore.

Up above, a music that entwineth,
With eternal threads of golden sound,
The great poem of this strange existence,
All whose wondrous meaning hath been found.

Down below, the Church, to whose poor window
Glory by the autumnal trees is lent,
And a knot of worshippers in mourning,
Missing some one at the Sacrament.

Up above, the burst of hallelujah,
And (without the sacramental mist
Wrapt around us like a sunlit halo)
One great vision of the face of Christ.

Down below, cold sunlight on the tombstone,
And the green wet turf with faded flowers,
Winter roses, once like young hopes burning,
Now beneath the ivy dripped with showers:

And the new-made grave within the churchyard,
And the white cap on that young face pale,
And the watcher ever as it dusketh
Rocking to and fro with that long wail.

Up above, a crowned and happy spirit,
Like an infant in the eternal years,
Who shall grow in love and light for ever,
Ordered in his place among his peers.

O the sobbing of the winds of autumn,
O the sunset streak of stormy gold,
O the poor heart thinking in the churchyard,
'Night is coming and the grave is cold.'

O the pale and plashed and sodden roses,
O the desolate heart that grave above,
O the white cap shaking as it darkens
Round that shrine of memory and love.

O the rest for ever, and the rapture!
O the hand that wipes the tears away!
O the golden homes beyond the sunset,
And the hope that watches o'er the clay!"[1]

Some modern sceptics have shuddered at the prospect of that eternity to which a Christian clings, because they misunderstand it. The future life is differently viewed by every one, and will, according to the Catholic theory, be different to every one. It will be the ideal of every one; if his idea of happiness be low, his future will be of small value; if high, it will be glorious. Each will have his capacity of enjoyment satisfied, but the capacity of one being greater than that of another, the amount of delight to one will be greater than to another. Just, says an old writer, as at the feast in Shushan the palace, "they gave them drink in vessels of gold (the vessels being diverse one from another), and royal wine in abundance,"[2] so will it be hereafter; every man will be satisfied, but the measure of one will not be the measure of another. This is what some have failed to understand. The future life has been conceived as a dead level of insufferable monotony, so dreary that men—

"Would fain lie down and die,
But for their curse of immortality."

Heine in his bitter, mocking spirit thus writes of it,—

"I scorn the heavenly plains above me,
In the blest land of paradise;
No fairer women there will love me
Than those whom here on earth I prize.

No angel blest, his high flight winging,
Could there replace my darling wife;
To sit on clouds, whilst psalms I'm singing,
Would small enjoyment give to life."

[1] Lyra Anglicana. [2] Esther i. 7.

"Behold," says Jean Reynaud, "on the steps of this strange heaven, the elect seated in order side by side, all in the rank assigned to them according to their short pilgrimage on earth, absorbed, without distraction, in the rigidity of their contemplation, and clothed for ever in their terrestrial bodies in which they were seized by death, as by the fatal seal of their eternal immutability. What are these phantoms engaged in doing? Are they living or dead? Ah! Christ, how this paradise scares me; I prefer my life with its lights and shadows, its tribulations and pains, to that blank immortality with its sanctimonious peace!"[1]

But this is false altogether to the hypothesis of the Incarnation, which requires that the wants of man will find their complete satisfaction in Christ. If M. Reynaud's ideal of happiness be perpetual activity, such he will find to be his heaven.

> "——Some work sublime for ever working
> In the spacious tracts of that great land."

What is pleasure to one man gives disgust to another; to a good, sensible, well-conducted man, the condition of a drunkard is one of misery. Yet to the drunkard there is no ambition to taste the joys of respectability and sobriety. A coarse, brutal nature cannot appreciate, or care to appreciate, the refined pleasures derived from art and literature. A street drab, with no modesty nor cleanliness, and with only animal lust and filthy habits, has no desire to live the life of a decent matron. The sweets of home and all its pure pleasures are beyond her conception; they are above her underground rail of pleasures. To a highly refined mind, the coarse and brutal nature is

[1] Reynaud: Terre et Ciel. Paris, 1854.

awful in its loathsomeness. To the pure and virgin soul, full of heavenly aspirations, the life of a street drab is hell.

We all probably have germs of aspirations after what is pure and good and beautiful, but by repression some destroy these germs, and by cultivation others develop them.

Every faculty we educate opens to us a new horizon. Every faculty we repress narrows our horizon.

If we suppose that life fixes our characters, and determines our aspirations, our future state will correspond with our tastes and characters and desires. There is no reason to suppose that the coarse nature which could make the tour of the Alps to-day and receive no impression of beauty, will be a bit more sensitive ten thousand years hence; nor that the drab will be more inclined to exchange, what Mr. Swinburne calls—

"The roses and raptures of vice"

for "the lilies and languors of virtue." Her spirit is not diaphanous to heavenly love now, a course of sensuality has rendered it more and more opaque, why should it become again translucent in eternity, unless she desire it?

Unless she desire it, I repeat, for where there is the *will* to be better, there regeneration is possible, though it may be through suffering; but where there is blank indifference, there it is impossible.

Take a Wiltshire clown and walk him through the National Gallery; he will yawn. Tell him that with a little attention and effort his mind will open to the beauties of art. He will roar in your face, fat bacon fills his soul with content,—he desires nothing further. Speak of the joys of virtue to a profligate; you are as one telling idle

tales. The idea of a pure life nauseates him; he has not the appetite to try it.

What is the average Englishman of the lower, middle, and peasant class? He has no taste for wholesome and rational amusements, he can only go in for vulgar and noisy sports, such as "kiss in the ring," and the like, which are rude and coarse to a degree. He must have his heavy dinner, he must have his pipe, above all he must have his beer. The ordinary English mind is not educated for anything noble and refined. The Anglican Church, instead of training the nobler faculties, has anathematized them and bid them be cast out as unclean. It is altogether different on the Continent. The Church there has held up the chin of these purer tastes in the flood which would have engulfed them. A French or an Italian peasant seldom forgets that he is one of nature's gentlemen, for, through his Church, the sun and air have been let in on his aspirations after what is not utterly gross, and thus the animal has never been allowed to master the man. But with the Englishman of the lower classes, thanks to three hundred years of Protestantism, it is different. "The great English middle class, the kernel of the nation," says Mr. Matthew Arnold, "the class whose intelligent sympathy had upheld a Shakespeare," which had covered our land with structures of exquisite beauty, which had produced a rich floriation of poetry, "entered the prison of Puritanism, and has had the key turned on its spirit there for two hundred years. He enlargeth a nation, says Job, and straiteneth it again."[1] Give the average Englishman music, it must be of a sort that he and his fellows may be able to roar out some vulgar foolish words as they promenade the terraces or walks, six or eight abreast, knock-

[1] Matthew Arnold: Essays in Criticism, p. 170.

ing out of the way and insulting every decent person—if women or girls so much the better—that they meet. Give him dancing, it must be turned into an occasion of immodesty. Give him pictures, he would rather see some painted Jezebel on the tight rope than all the master pieces of Raphael or Titian. Give him statuary, a group of tableaux vivants at the Shades is much more grateful to his eyes than the fairest of Canova's works. Give him a museum, what are works and stones to him? A Zoological Garden—he will go at feeding time, or to see men or women imperilling their lives by fighting with the beasts, and if torn in pieces so much the more is gotten for the money. Try what you will for the bumpkin and the mechanic, nothing will be appreciated, save what is vulgar and noisy, and coarse; nor will they allow the distinction between enjoyment and beastly excess.

Now to what sort of future do these gross natures look forward? If they have no sense of the intellectual, the beautiful, and the pure here, what possible satisfaction would these afford them hereafter, unless a process of levelling up had first been undergone, and no such process can be gone through unless it be voluntarily submitted to; for God's action on man is by persuasion not by compulsion. And if the desire for anything better has burned out through neglect, there is no reason to conclude that it will be rekindled through an eternity.

Who can tell what anguish may torture the soul, through jealousy and envy of those who are in a different condition? The physical pains which have been imagined as the punishment of hell, are but a figure adapted to rude minds of the exquisite self-inflicted pains of a spirit lost to all appreciation of the good and beautiful, that rages with hate against those enjoying both, without the power of

spoiling their pleasure, and of dragging them into the same degradation.

The future life will correspond with the desires felt in the terrestrial life; if in this life man widens his sympathies, the greater will be his satisfaction hereafter; but if he suppresses all his nobler desires, and lives only for the flesh, he will find hereafter nothing to satisfy him, when the faculty of sensual gratification is removed; for pleasure is only given for a purpose, and the purpose accomplished, pleasure will disappear. If he has been indifferent to God here, he will not miss Him through eternity. If he has destroyed his sense of beauty here, he will be bored with the loveliness of Paradise. If intellectual and spiritual pursuits fail to create an interest here, he will yawn through an eternity of spiritual and intellectual activity. The circle of eternity to one will be the cipher zero to another.

Imagine the Wiltshire rustic looking down from the Jura over the blue lake of Neufchatel to the silver bank of distant Alps hung in mid air, beyond the level marshes of Morat, whilst his feet are deep in anemones, primulas, and gentians. Imagine the London swell at a conversazione of the Royal Society, where all the most wonderful scientific discoveries of the year are being exhibited; both are sullen and disgusted. Neither cares to enjoy and know what to others afford inexpressible delight. The more those around them exhibit their satisfaction, the more Hodge and Sharpie weary and gloom.

But if a desire to enjoy what others enjoy flash across the mind of either, all is changed; through pain the soul struggles upwards, step by step, like a little child acquiring knowledge, through tears and occasional relapses, may be, but at each step some light breaks in on the spirit, some fresh beauty or truth rises into sight.

Such is the idea applied in the Catholic system to the future state. To those who die without a care for anything better, there is an eternity of protracted stagnation, embittered by consciousness of loss, by envy and hate. To those whose souls, however undeveloped and marred, retain some hope and desire of better things, a gradual purgation, a struggling of the spirit to appreciate what it knows to be good, but which jars against its disordered appetites. To those who have put forth all their talents to usury—wave on wave of varied and unending beauty flowing from the inexhaustible fountain of all perfection. We cannot but recognize in this life, some who are incorrigible; men who have deliberately strangled every higher and better principle within, till their natures are bare of life which may be developed; they have lost all taste and all capacity for good, just as those who wilfully neglect to educate their minds in youth are incapable of achieving any intellectual growth in old age. But, on the other hand, there are many whose expansion has been retarded by external circumstances, but who have not lost the capacity for good,—the germ to grow and blossom. Now, progress is the law of the universe. Nothing stands still that has life in it. If progress has been checked here, it must be continued in the intermediate state, a progress by pain from the imperfect to the perfect.

As I said just now, where there is the will to rise, there is the possibility of rising. This is strictly in correspondence with the law of God's dealings with man, as laid down in the second preliminary hypothesis.

God has given man free-will. Therefore He uses no constraint. His action on man is moral.

And by the hypothesis of the Incarnation, it is taught that when the will to return to God and to harmony is present, then the grace to enable the return is given.

Consequently, so long as man has the will to enjoy what is better, the faculty of enjoying it will be given him.

If, then, after death, the desire be strong to see and delight in God, restoration will be wrought out.

If the desire be extinguished in life; there is no reason to believe that it will be restored; for such restoration would be an infringement of the determination of man's free-will.

There is one point more on which I must touch; the resurrection of the body. This follows the law of the Incarnation.

There have always been manifest two concurrent desires in man, the desire that his soul may live eternally, and that his body may remain his own. The former was the idea prevalent among the philosophers, but the latter commended itself to the popular feeling. The idea of the intellectual faculty living on was somewhat cold, and the feelings of the people desired some less abstract life. If their notion of the future state was crude and grotesque, it could not fail to be otherwise, when all their pleasure consisted in sensuality, and their ideas of happiness rarely ascended above the routine of everyday life.

> "Errant exsangues sine corpore et ossibus umbræ;
> Parsque forum celebrant, pars nisi tecta tyranni;
> Pars alios artes, antiquæ imitamina vitæ."[1]

In Paradise, those "regions of joy, delightful green retreats, and blessed grove-covered abodes where happiness abounds, where the air is more free and enlarged, and clothes the fields with radiant light," so beautifully described by Virgil, what is the occupation of the blessed?

> "Pars in gramineis exercent membra palæstris;
> Contendunt ludo, et fulvâ luctantur arenâ;
> Pars pedibus plaudunt choreas, et carmina dicunt."[2]

[1] Ovid: Met. iv. 443. [2] Virgil: Æneid. vi. 641-3.

The custom so universal of burying the dead with honour, is a witness to the prevalence of the idea that the future life is attached to the body as well as the soul.

As Molière says,—

> "Oui, mon corps, c'est moi-même, et j'en veux prendre soin,
> Quenille, si l'on veut; ma quenille m'est chère."[1]

And Heine, in his flippant recklessness—

> "Poor soul doth to the body say:
> I'll never leave thee, but I'll stay
> With thee.
> Thou ever wert my second I,
> And round me clungest lovingly,
> As though a dress of satin bright
> All lined throughout with ermine white—
> Alas! I've come to nakedness,
> A mere abstraction, bodiless
> Reduced to blessèd nullity
> In yon bright realms of light to be.
> In the cold halls of heaven up yonder,
> In leaden slippers wearily.
> 'Tis quite intolerable; stay,
> Stay with me, my dear body, pray!"[2]

And if the resurrection of the body be a positive idea and earnest wish, it will be fulfilled by Him Who is the sum of all our desires, and Who came on earth to fulfil them. The idea of the immortality of the soul does not exclude the idea of the immortality of the body; both ideas are conciliated in Him Who is "Yea" and not "Nay," that is, Who is the category of all that is positive. "Jesus Christ, qui in vobis per nos prædicatus est, non fuit EST et NON, sed EST in illo fuit."[3]

[1] Molière: Les femmes savantes, a. ii. sc. 7.

[2] Heine: Poems, tr. by Bowring, Lond. 1866, p. 505.

[3] 2 Cor. i. 19.

If, then, we may conclude that what we desire imperiously will be placed within our reach by Him Who has come to satisfy our desires, it follows:—

1. That death will not terminate our existence.
2. That our condition after death will be one of happiness.
3. That this happiness will be eternal.
4. That it will be complete.
5. That it will be exactly commensurate with the desire felt by man.
6. That, consequently, it will be graduated.

CHAPTER XX

DEVELOPMENT

Development, a subject ably treated by others—must be considered here—Were all the propositions of the Faith simultaneously or successively evolved?—Probably by degrees—If development be denied, two other theories must be maintained—Scripture an absolute authority—This the Protestant theory—Its impossibility—Or that development was suddenly arrested—This the Anglican theory, unsatisfactory—Development apparent in the Bible—and in the history of the Church—Development of doctrine—of Christian art—of appreciation of nature—of science—of constitutionalism—The limits of development—Conclusion—The prospects of Christianity.

THE subject of development is one upon which I would have foreborne touching, as it has been so ably discussed by distinguished theologians of late years, and I can but go over ground already trodden, but that it fits into and completes the system I am expounding, and I could not omit the doctrine of development without leaving this essay incomplete.

I can but adopt the arguments of others, and shew their application to and cohesion with the dogma of the Incarnation.[1]

I have shewn in the preceding chapters that the dogmas

[1] Newman: Essay on Development. Oxenham: The Doctrine of the Atonement, Introd. Essay. And Blenkinsopp: The Doctrine of Development in the Bible and in the Church. London, 1869.

of Christianity hang upon one another, and follow one another in logical sequence; that if the dogma of the creation be admitted, and a motive be sought for it, that motive can be found in love alone; whence it follows that free-will is a dogmatic consequence which cannot be evaded. From the dogmas of creation and free-will results that of the Incarnation. Accept the Incarnation, and the Atonement follows inevitably, and the Resurrection completes the Atonement. Also, from a right apprehension of the dogma of the Incarnation flow the Church, the Sacramental system, the Real Presence, and the Eucharistic Sacrifice. If any of these consequences be denied, the negation runs back, and corrupts the primary dogmas.

The question arises: Was the whole scheme, in all its logical consequences revealed at once, or was the seed, enfolding within it the whole system, given at first to grow and expand as circumstances demanded?

This is a most important question. As Mr. Oxenham says: "It can hardly be doubted, that one of the most important theological questions of the day, on which many of our detailed controversies will be found to hinge, and into which they must ultimately be resolved, is that of developments in Christian belief. From failing to recognize this great law of revealed as of scientific truth, thousands are prejudiced against dogmatic Christianity altogether, while others hold it with but feeble and uncertain grasp. Nor can we look with any confidence for the return to unity of separated religious bodies, while some rigidly adhere to the principle of a lifeless and unfruitful tradition, and others insist on an exclusive appeal to the bare letter of Scripture. This question will accordingly be found, if I mistake not, to lie at the root of half our religious disputes, and some understanding upon it is

an indispensable preliminary for their appreciation or adjustment."[1]

The question may be stated simply thus: Were all the propositions of the Catholic faith simultaneously or successively evolved?

Now it is evident from what has gone before, that these propositions depend on one another, and the mind has to undergo a process before it can step from one to another.

It is therefore more probable that the natural method should have been pursued. For, observe, if the dogma of the Incarnation be accepted by any man, and if he think it out in all its bearings, he must admit all the consequences which the Catholic Church has deduced from it;—he must do so, for they grow out of one another spontaneously. Any Christian community which starts from this dogma must follow the same course, unless it be prepared to tamper with its foundation, to maim the doctrine of the Incarnation, so as to check or destroy its vital power. If the Anglican Church exhibits a tendency, or rather an impulsion, towards full Catholic doctrine, the reason is that active minds will not allow the dogma of the Incarnation to fossilize in an historical deposit, but insist on carrying it out and applying it in its entirety. The only mode of stopping this action is to formally deny the dogma.

Among the Lutherans an opposite course has been run. Luther vitiated the fundamental dogma, by making Christ an imperfect man, *i.e.* by allowing Him to be the perfect Individual, but not the social Ideal. The consequence is, that the minds of those educated in Lutheran doctrine have denied the Divinity of Christ, and have thus released themselves from the cogency of an argument which must have made itself felt, had they been prepared to admit its premiss.

[1] Oxenham, p. 1.

The admission of the dogma of the Incarnation is quite sufficient to involve all the consequences. I do not say that every man will evolve the whole system, or that five or six generations will do so, as that depends on the mental activity of the person or the age. But it is inevitable that the community based on that doctrine should rush into Catholicism, when the frost of indifference yields, and the streams of thought begin to trickle once more. There will always be some who cannot go as fast as others, because their minds are more sluggish than others; if they would be content with an assertion that they cannot as yet follow the rush, it would be well, but if they attempt to stand against the avalanche, they will not merely fail to arrest it, but will imperil themselves.

This is an intellectual attitude characteristic of Anglicanism. An insularity and a narrow insensibility constitute that temper of mind in which not a few of our best prelates and divines indulge. He who is infected with it is every whit as intolerant as the hip and thigh smiting Puritan. He is never satisfied except in denouncing those waves of religious belief which flow beyond the post he has driven in to limit the rise of the tide, and anathematizing those men whose devout sympathies are above tepidity. Hood ridicules the man who would give another man black eyes for being blind, but surely the folly of the Anglican far exceeds that of Hood's fool, for he attacks the long-sighted person because he is not of as narrow a vision as himself; he is the corn-crake assaulting the lark because it dares to soar above the ooze and fen.

If the principle of development be denied, only two theories remain on which any positive scheme of Christian doctrine can be maintained; first, that laid down by Chil-

lingworth, and accepted in name, but rejected in practice, by nearly all Protestant communities, "The Bible, and the Bible only, the religion of Protestants."

The idea of the gradual unfolding of doctrine, ritual, and religious life, has been rejected as repugnant to the principles of Christianity, and Protestants assume that the Bible contains a complete code of faith and morals; that it teaches all things necessary to salvation, as well as all laws and commandments respecting our duty to God and man, which we are required to obey. That we are to believe nothing which is not found in the Bible explicitly laid down, and that it is to be the rigid rule of all our conduct, and of our worship of God.

Thus the Westminster Confession, drawn up by English and Scotch Presbyterians, has the following:—"The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or, by good and necessary consequence, may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing, at any time, is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men." Again:—"The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and on whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture." The Anglican article is almost as strongly worded:—"Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." An article this which falls like Goliath by its own sword, for it is impossible to prove the

all-sufficiency of Holy Scripture from itself. Nowhere do we find that the Bible makes profession that it contains the whole faith; that it, and it alone, is the deposit of the faith of the whole Church. Had it been so, we should have found it laid down in precise terms in the Scripture. But nowhere does the Bible profess to give us the faith, nor is there a word to shew us that Christ commissioned His apostles to write books to contain the faith as authorized standards of doctrine.

"We might smile at all this as a harmless excess of belief," writes Mr. Blenkinsopp, "as an exaggerated reverence for the Bible, which it is a pity to disturb; but, unfortunately, it is attended by serious consequences; nay, we may say, that it is the fruitful parent of much heresy, and, what may seem impossible, of very much actual unbelief. Men who stake their whole faith on the letters of a book, on the exact words used, on the infallibility of the writer, must necessarily have their faith shaken when they see manifest differences and apparent contradictions between the writers, or in their writings. Equally so when those writers shew themselves to have been ignorant of physical science. Thus, when the facts which modern investigation opens out to us seem to prove that it is impossible that the six Mosaic days were days of twenty-four hours' duration, there are some who straightway conclude that this discovery disproves the truth of the whole narrative of Moses in the book of Genesis, and proves that the writer was not inspired; in other words, that the idea of inspiration implies a knowledge of all human sciences, as well as of divine things; the inspired man being so taught and guided by the Spirit of God, that he is acquainted with the causes which produce natural phenomena; or at least, that the inspiring Spirit will preserve him from

making any mistake in his statement of facts, or in matters connected with his subject."[1]

The Church, though she has used Scripture as a mine, has never defined inspiration, nor has she ever affirmed that the Bible is inspired. If to Scripture—supposing it to form an integral part of the Christian system—we apply the law of the Incarnation, we shall be obliged to allow that it will have the outward, material side, and the inward, spiritual side, the latter infallible, the former fallible and imperfect. Thus Scripture will be infallible as a moral, spiritual guide, but that it will be full of imperfections, grossness, trivialities, and mistakes is also true. With Scripture it will be as with the priest; the priest in all that is sacramental is infallible, his sacramental acts are spiritually perfect, but all that is of himself is full of imperfection, error, and evil.

It is so with the Church.

The Church has a divine and a human part indivisibly united. The divine constitutes that which is infallible and eternally inerrable in the Church; and the human is fallible and errable.

In every modification of the law of the Incarnation there must be two factors, the earthly and the divine. Thus Scripture has its human side, and is errable on all that which is not spiritual.

The other theory admits the principle of development, but seeks to limit its operation to the early ages. According to this view, we ought to accept not only the Bible, but the Catholic creeds, together with the dogmatic decrees of the earlier Councils, but to reject as innovations all later developments.

[1] The Doctrine of Development. London, 1869, p. 25.

But the question at once occurs, Where is the line to be drawn? If development be allowed up to a certain point, why is it denied beyond that point? On what authority is that point to be fixed at the third or the fourth century?

As a matter of fact, the process of development is apparent in the Church and in the Bible. The Psalms of David are an advance on Mosaism, the Prophets on the Psalms, and the Apocrypha on the Prophets. And in the New Testament the fourth Gospel and the Epistles of S. Paul are developments of the synoptical gospels. The writings of the last Evangelist differ materially from those of his predecessors. His Gospel has a distinct character and individuality; it treats of the Incarnation under a new aspect. The other Evangelists are possessed with the facts of the Nativity, the Purification, the Passion, &c., and they narrate the events as historical facts. But in S. John's Gospel the narrative is omitted, and we have in its place theological dogma:—"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not any thing made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men." Here we have a string of theological dogmas of the Incarnation; no history, but doctrine. There was a growth of mind; an historical fact expanded into a theological truth, to suit the enlarged spiritual apprehension of the Church.

When S. Paul wrote, "I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures; that He was buried, and that He rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures," his confession of faith enunciated only the bare facts of the Incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ, and left untouched all the deeper mysteries of the Holy Trinity, the Atonement, and the like. The infant Church

was not prepared for such statements; their hour was not yet come. They were later developments, born in due time, not accretions, but outgrowths from the facts laid down.

At first the Apostles were ignorant of one of the first necessities of the Incarnation, that the Gospel should be made universal; for seven years at least they confined their labours to the Jews, and it was only when S. Peter and S. Paul broke the ring, that they acquiesced in the evangelization of the Gentiles. S. Paul speaks of the admission of the Gentiles as one of those things not at first known, but afterwards revealed, and still to be regarded as a mystery, an "economy of the grace of God."[1]

The comparatively short time which elapsed between the writing of the first book of the New Testament and the last, gives but little time for any great development to appear; but it is not a little remarkable, as has been shewn in a former chapter, that the grasp of some of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith by men of the mental calibre of S. Paul was somewhat uncertain.

There is nothing of theological science in the writings composing the New Testament, if, perhaps, we except the fourth Gospel. We find the writers penetrated with conviction as to the verity of certain facts, but as to the scheme of Redemption they seem not to have thought it out. All truths were there, but in suspension, to be precipitated into dogmatic formulæ at a later date. The faith of the early Christians was confined to certain facts, on which certain hopes were built up. That was probably enough for their age, but it was not enough when Christianity swelled above the ignorant and poor, and overflowed the intellects of the most cultivated men of the day.

[1] Blenkinsopp. This writer, in a treatise well deserving of perusal, traces the gradual expansion of doctrine in the Old and New Testaments, and in the Church.

Then we find a gradual unfolding of doctrine, logically deduced from the premisses held by the first Christians and recorded in the New Testament; and in the Middle Ages theology was organized into a system, intellectual and philosophical.

What was drawn out of the primary dogmas followed as rigidly as do all the results arrived at by astronomers from the doctrine of gravitation.

If we take the decrees of the General Councils for the first seven centuries, we see the system gradually emerging from the fog which had enveloped it, its outlines becoming more distinct, its features more pronounced, and its colours more vivid.

The Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325) affirmed the Son to be of the same substance as the Father. The Arians entangled in the mist, could not see that without the distinct affirmation of the divinity of Christ, Christianity was neither a religion nor a philosophy.

Constantinople (381) confirmed the doctrine of Nicæa, and affirmed that the Holy Ghost was of the same substance as the Father and the Son, thus developing into distinctness the dogma of the Trinity.

Ephesus (431) affirmed that the person of Christ was one, but that in His one person there were two natures; condemning Nestorius, who taught that Christ was so far two persons, that He was not born of the Virgin Mary as God, but only as man. To affirm more clearly the Catholic faith, it confirmed the title Theotokos, mother of God, to the blessed Virgin. It is evident to us, that it is essential to the Catholic system that the double nature should be distinctly recognized, for if one nature be supplanted by the other, or suppressed by the other, the whole significance of the Incarnation disappears.

Chalcedon (451) re-affirmed that our Lord had two natures in one person.

The second of Constantinople (553) confirmed the preceding Councils, and affirmed in still plainer language the dogmas of the Trinity and the motherhood of the blessed Virgin.

The third of Constantinople (680) affirmed that there were in Christ two natural wills, and that there were two modes of operation, without separation or confusion. In Him the divine will was one, and the human will was free, without which there would have been no real personality in His human nature.[1]

And is it not in strict analogy with all God's dealings with man, that He should give the fact, and leave it to develop its consequences by a slow process of evolution? The seed takes time to grow, the egg to hatch, the larva to change into the imago. The fact of gravitation having been established, years passed before the chain of consequences deducible from it was unrolled. The fact of the circulation of the blood was ascertained, and the results of that discovery are not complete yet. The existence of electricity has been proved, but we have not as yet attained to all the modifications to be effected thereby.

The question of Development is the question whether the Incarnation be a dead and dry historical fact, or whether it be a living reality. If it be a fact full of energy, its significance was not exhausted in the first century of the Christian era. If it be a divine reality, it must partake in the divine characteristics, and be infinite in its significance, as the world, another divine reality, is infinite in its mysteries. In a century we may exhaust the science of geology, because that is the science of a dead deposit; but

1 Union Review, 1869; Art. xxv. Development, p. 493.

physical science will never be run out; for it deals with forces endlessly undergoing modifications, and with living beings ever manifesting fresh evidence of the infinity of God's thoughts. That the great doctrine of the Incarnation shall be ever fertile, and that the limited mind of man shall never exhaust the mysteries involved in it is what we must expect, if it be a divine fact. The dogma of Development is nothing other than this, the assertion that one generation cannot empty that great mystery, the Incarnation, of all its contents, but that it is an inexhaustible source adapted to all generations, and full of truths which the world in all its generations will not use up, but which it will draw from in an unfailing supply to meet every contingency and to satisfy every candid inquiry.

And as there has been a development of doctrine from the hypothesis of the Incarnation, there have been other developments out of it, as it has been applied to the sense of the beautiful, and to the life of man. Christian art is as much a working out of the dogma of the Incarnation as is Catholic theology.

If in Christ the mind is to find intellectual pabulum, science ensues. If in Christ the moral sense is to find its law, moral theology results. If in Christ the æsthetic taste is to find its satisfaction, Christian art is a necessary consequence. And if Christ be not the satisfaction of art as well as of reason and morality, He is not the Ideal Man; and the Incarnation is shorn of at least one of its rays.

In the early ages of the Church, when she lived in persecution, such a development was impossible. There was little room, and less inclination, for display of art; and yet we find rude symbols and representations of the mysteries of the faith traced on the walls of the Catacombs. But

when the feeble folk who had worshipped underground emerged into light, and built churches, immediately Christianity flowed through the channel of art, budded and bloomed into a splendour to which the heathen world never attained. Pictures, as well as other ornaments, were recognized as proper adjuncts to public worship; and the second Council of Nicea (786) formally acknowledged their propriety; and art became the handmaid of religion.

So also has there been a development in the religious appreciation of nature. The heathen mind scarcely saw the beauty of a landscape, and had little love for the myriad forms of life which are the glory of our world. This has been observed by Humboldt in his "Cosmos," and Mr. Ruskin has traced with his delicate pen the gradual development of the sense of the beautiful through the Middle Ages down to our own time. It is true that the Greek perceived the exquisite loveliness of the human form, but there is little trace in the Greek poets and sculptors of perception of the beauty of the flower, of the insect, the beast, and, above all, of the great mountain forms.

Christ, in touching nature, has spiritualized it. Its beauty is music to the heart; but only slowly has appreciation of it broken upon man's soul, filling it with joy and gladness. In their respective lines Turner and Tennyson are Christian developments, like Erwin von Steinbach and Allan of Walsingham in sacred art, Handel and Mozart in music, and as S. Thomas Aquinas and S. Augustine in the line of theology.

So also has there been a development of devotional feeling. The early Christians seem to us stern, dauntless athletes; the ancient hymns of the Church are rugged, the ancient prayers grave and massive; in the writings of the

early doctors there is fire and dignity, and only here and there does the lambent flame of tenderness burn with a steady glow. Yet as time passes, the whole Christian character softens and sweetens, the eagle becomes a dove, the lion becomes a lamb. S. Bernard utters his "mellifluous" strains, and S. Thomas à Kempis writes his book of the heart; to the grim twilight of a Norman nave buds out a choir of florid Gothic, glittering with painted light; to the severe Byzantine figures stiffly standing on golden grounds succeeds the ease and grace of Raphael's pictures; to the stern Gregorian modes, follow music's laughter in Mozart and Rossini.

What again is that scientific enthusiasm which animates our age, but another development of the Incarnation? The love of nature has drawn man to it, the belief in law has led him to study it.

There is one more development to which I must allude, one which is beginning, and which is destined to fulfil its course, after centuries of repression: I mean, the development of pure constitutionalism, the application of the dogma of the Incarnation to the relations of man to man in society.

If that development should take place, with denial of the dogma to which it owes all, it will fail; for it will be without *locus standi*, and it will resolve itself into the autocracy of Force.

In concluding, I must signalize the limits of legitimate development.

A development in the Catholic faith is only legitimate when it is logically drawn from the dogma of the Incarnation;

If it contradict another dogma, it cannot be true; it is an accretion, not an evolution;

It must coincide with all the other dogmas, so as to form a chain of connected links.

Let us take and test an opinion which a party in the Church are endeavouring to erect into a dogma,—Papal Infallibility. Is this a logical deduction from the Incarnation, and does it coincide with other dogmas?

It does neither.

Individually, no member of the Church is infallible; the apostles themselves speaking separately were liable to error. Individually they formed wrong judgments on matters concerning the will of God, and also erred in conduct. S. Peter was wrong, and so was S. Barnabas, when they refused to communicate with the Gentile converts, and were rebuked for it by S. Paul.[1] Either S. Paul or S. Barnabas was wrong in the matter of taking Mark with them.[2] Several of them were mistaken about the nearness of our Lord's second coming.

In what way then is the Church infallible? When it speaks in General Council. That is, when the whole circle of the Church utters its voice; for the voice of the whole body is the voice of Christ. Such is the Catholic dogma. If this be tampered with, the catholicity of the Church is broken, and the Church resolves itself into a sect, revolving about a new centre. Let any man assume to be infallible, and he constitutes himself the centre of the Church, and by that act displaces Christ;—by his act he denies Christ, and such a denial is a veritable apostasy. Now this is precisely what every Protestant does who assumes his own private judgment to be the measure of universal truth. He becomes an autotheist, and sets himself against God. The Bishop of Rome sets himself up to be the oracle of truth, and thereby he breaks with Catholicity.

[1] Gal. ii. 11. [2] Acts xv. 39.

As Christ alone is the soul, and the Church is the material body, He alone can be the centre whence all truths radiate, and the whole truth can only be attained by the concurrence of the universal Church.

In concluding this volume, I feel that much that might have been said has been left unsaid, that points of Catholic doctrine have been left wholly unnoticed, and practical developments have been passed over without allusion.

I do not pretend to have done more than apply the Hegelian method to the rudiments of Christianity, and to establish the rationale of its fundamental doctrine, the Incarnation.

The work must be carried out by other and abler hands. If I have indicated a line of reasoning remarkable for its fecundity when applied to Christianity, I am satisfied. That even those who accept my preliminary hypothesis will follow me through the consequences which logically flow from it, I think is not always to be looked for. People shrink from consequences, because they fear them, and often they are content to stand in an irrational position, because they have not the courage to carry out what they conscientiously believe to be right.

But this is not altogether their fault. It is a characteristic of human nature. Apparently men's minds require long training before they can digest new truths. Greek anthropotheism and Greek philosophy were conditions of mind quite as necessary to ensure ultimate reception of Christianity, as was Jewish monotheism.

There is a necessity laid on the minds of generations of men to work out such propositions as they perceive to be true, to their ulterior consequences, before they are prepared to give attention to new propositions. Jewdom had elaborated monotheism into an exclusive system, walling the

son of Abraham off eternally from the Gentile, but supplying him with an easy, handy law of right and wrong. Greek polytheism had become delirious, and no man attended to its ravings, and yet it spoke words of truth when it declared that man to love God must love one like to himself. Greek philosophy had spent its energy, and it rested, listening for a new word of truth.

When the Gloria in excelsis smote on the classic ear, life and activity returned to exhausted thought. But only little by little did the full significance of that strain impress itself on the minds of men.

"In terris pax;" how? By the establishment of right on a foundation firmer than the eternal mountains; by making the emancipation of man from the law of violence obligatory; by making authority a prolongation of right only, to be used for the preservation to each man of the liberty to expand and ripen, physically, intellectually, and morally. There will be an end to strife and heartburnings when the rights of each are recognized by all, and authority is reduced to the protection of these rights.

When Constantine and his successors extended their hands to the Church to unite moral authority with sovereignty, a fatal error was committed; for sovereignty reposes on force, and is the faculty of doing wrong with impunity, that is of constraining men to surrender their rights, of curtailing their liberties, of dwarfing their growth.

The moral authority of the Church faded before the authority of force. The Crown placed its sword at the service of the mitre, and it was employed to cut off the tallest poppies in the garden of the Church, to suppress originality and level individuality. Activity was permitted in two channels only, mysticism and Christian art. To this therefore we owe the Divina Commedia, the Imitatio Christi

Chartres Cathedral, Raphael's Madonna del Sisto, and the strains of Palestrina. So that even that cloud had its silver lining.

Mediæval temporal autocracy was a mighty wrong. The governed were the chattels of their sovereign, to be imprisoned, driven to war, impoverished, sold, made to believe or disbelieve at the caprice of a monarch. It was a sacrilege on the divine rights of man. Its existenee, linked as it was to the Church, forced into life another wrong,—the Papacy set up as a counterpoise to the temporal power.

Then indeed the bondage of men was complete, the State violated the right of man to personal independence, and the Church turned the key on his right to intellectual freedom.

The work obligatory on every man sent into the world could not be done; he was not free in body, in mind, and in soul, to accomplish his destiny,—to make that liberty which is his potentially become his own effectually. "The initiation of all wise and noble things comes, and must come, from the individual," says Mr. Mill. The secret of well-being to the human race is the recognition of unity and individuality, in other words, of authority and of right. Unity without due scope for the man to stretch and grow dies into uniformity; and individuality, without recognition of solidarity, dashes itself to pieces in anarchy. The problem for States and Churches to work out is the preservation of unity and the particularization of the individual, the holding of authority and liberty in equilibrium.

Mediævalism did not attempt to solve this problem, it flung itself headlong into the negation of liberty and the falsification of authority. It adopted the principle of centralization, which is ruinous to the vitality of a State or of a Church. By concentration of power at the head the members were left impotent. The general activity

of the body gathered up at one point languished at the extremities.

The Reformation was the explosion of individuality. It had a double aspect, it was the assertion of the rights of man to think freely and to act independently. The second phase, constitutionalism, scarcely shewed above the surface in the sixteenth century, but it has been slowly emerging since; it is not as yet apprehended everywhere, it is acted upon as yet scarce anywhere.

The Church had been ramming dogmas down men's throats, as at Strasbourg they fatten geese, and they could bear it no longer. "We will eat," they said, "as suits our digestions and the capacity of our stomachs."

The Reformation was the proclamation of a grand truth, a truth necessary to flare into prominence, for Europe was rapidly becoming Chinese in thought and belief, and settling into a uniform grey, without strong shadows and without clear light. Had the Reformers rested in the establishment of the authority of private judgment to determine for each man the measure of truth adapted to his own capacity, they would have earned the lasting gratitude of all men. But unfortunately they mixed their grain of truth with a grain of error. They erected individual judgment, which the Church had practically denied, into an authority excluding all other truths, and especially that one which is paramount,—the correlation of truths. They authorized each man to apply his own judgment to the judgments of every one else, and to hack and hew away at all appreciations in excess of his own scant measure, in the same spirit as that in which the papacy had pulled at every single faith to stretch it to embrace that measure of excess it authorized and enforced. They constituted every man an autotheist, the master of truth, and therefore sovereign over God.

They placed him on the slip which must inevitably launch him into blank atheism, and wrote up for him as his motto the maxim of Olden-Barneveld, "Nil scire tutissima fides."

It is not therefore matter of surprise if Protestantism should have been the fertile mother of doubt, discord, and division; for the proclamation of half a truth as a whole truth is the enunciation of error, and the admission of error is the introduction of discord.

Protestantism has thrust asunder, to their mutual exclusion, those three aspects of absolute truth which God has joined together—Religion, Morality, and Art, in other words the True, the Good, and the Beautiful; and yet, as Longfellow sings,—

> "These are the three great chords of might,
> And he whose ear is tuned aright
> Will hear no discord in the three,
> But the most perfect harmony."

As a power emancipating Individuality it is dead. The explosion of the Reformation has buried it under a bed of scoria, and has produced an atmosphere stifling to originality. This may seem paradoxical, for the Reformation opened a vent to individualism. Nevertheless the results of the eruption have proved fatal to its development; for this reason, private judgment, instead of being given its true function, has been turned into a weapon wherewith every man was authorized to kill all originality except his own.

Public opinion, which is the consensus of the judgments of the multitude, has been erected into the sovereign standard of all that is true, good, and beautiful. And as the most inferior and uncultivated estimate is necessarily the most common, the lowest and rudest ideas on truth, virtue and beauty have become the dominant judgment.

The opinion of the many being opposed to that of the original genius, it resists it and tramples it under foot; and, as a matter of practical experience, we know that public opinion has proved a far more powerful engine than spiritual or temporal autocracy for grinding all men into one dead, drear level. Art must be vulgar, goodness must be common-place, truth must be Tupperish—allow me the word,—or public opinion will not tolerate it. A thousand hands are lifted against the man who would raise art out of the gutter, teach a goodness higher than respectability, and declare that the horizon of the eagle is not that of the badger. "Already," says Mr. Mill, "energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional." For that we must thank Protestant civilization. He who has the audacity to think for himself, and to have larger sympathies, or a deeper heart than Jack, Tom, and Harry, is given a nickname and is hissed off the stage. Literary and art criticism have fallen into the hands of the clique. Conventionality is the rigid norm to which every truth, right action, and work of art must be fitted; and minds and hearts must be bound with more cruel fetters than those forged by the slave-masters of imperial Rome; whilst ridicule—a torture more brutal than the rack—is applied by every clown to enforce the sentence of modern vulgarism against whatever is too noble for its pettiness, too true for its hollowness, and too beautiful for its bestiality.

To the lowest and grossest is committed the function to roar down the voice that rises in witness of better things, to drag down the hand stretched out to higher things, to put out the eyes that look up to purer things. Has not each coarse, foul-minded man, each mean-spirited man, become an Esau whose hand may be against every one who differs from himself? What is the vulgar laughter

at the earnest work of an enthusiast but an expression of the principle of belligerent private judgment? Hodge passes sentence on Holman Hunt's Light of the World with sublime self-satisfaction, decides that Mendelssohn's songs without words are nothing to "Paddle your own Canoe," and haw-haws over "The Holy Grail" as a parcel of folly.

In religion it is precisely the same. The most ignorant, prejudiced, and stupid are the judges who decide what dogmas are true and to be tolerated, and what are false and to be scouted. Those who would raise the pitch of morality, reunite long dissevered beauty and religion, and teach men that there are truths half an inch above the top of the rut in which they themselves stagnate, are hooted down as alienating the people from religion. The great goddess Vulgarity, to which so many modern nations bow down and give worship, has spoken and denounced eccentricity, originality and individuality, and the gifted artist, the pure moralist, and the profound theologian, who will not conform, are cast into the fiery furnace. It is quite true that alienation is taking place;—but it is an alienation from society of those who should be the strength of the nation, the higher intellects, the purer hearts, and the most earnest souls, who will not expose their treasures to the rude stare and blatant scorn of a kakistocracy.

And what of the future?

Protestantism has disintegrated into dust.

Romanism is powerless, rigidified by centralization.

Protestantism is the negation of unity, Romanism is the negation of individualism. No half truth will ever reconquer the world.

If Christianity is to recover lost ground, it will be by

bringing together those truths which have been denied by Protestantism on one hand, and by Popery on the other.

If such an union be not effected, and that speedily, we must despair for individualism, and therefore for the future of society which depends on its recognition.

Another reformation is needed, to pluck up individualism by the hair from the depths to which it has sunk. To effect this Catholicism is alone capable; but it must first rid itself of the spiritual autocracy of the Roman Pontiff.

Rome has its lesson to learn, and so has England. Too long has the State exercised control over religion; for if there be a God, to control religion is to control God in His action on the consciences of men, and it is therefore a sacrilege. Fortunately the exercise of this control of late years has been so outrageous in its injustice as to have opened the eyes of Churchmen to the immorality of the system. The conduct of government has greatly influenced the clergy and laity, and has nearly obliterated the old Tory High Church opinions. No body of men was at one time more loyal, more uniformly consistent in upholding the dignity of the Crown, than the old High Church clergy. Now all is changed. The prime ministers have hitherto refused to listen to any suggestions, or even direct appeals to increase the efficiency of the Church. Men have been appointed to the episcopate who were known to be obnoxious to large numbers of the clergy and laity of England; in fact, the ministry of the day has seemed often to go out of its way to have the gratification of vexing the consciences of the devout. The Supreme Court to judge ecclesiastical cases, is a tribunal incompetent, from its partizanship and its vindictiveness to

command respect and to exact compliance; nevertheless it has served a good turn in educating the Church party to distinguish between responsibility to God and an obedience of constraint to a tribunal assuming, without authority from God, to legislate on religion.

The High Churchman of to-day is indifferent whether England continue a monarchy or become a republic, but he is most desirous to have the anomaly of an union between Church and State, which can be only vexatious to the latter and injurious to the former, severed for good and aye.

It is somewhat remarkable that the rapid religious revival of this day should coincide with the spread of truer feeling on the constitution of government. Men are beginning to see that hereditary sovereignty is a relic of mediævalism, that autocracy is an immorality, and that the source of authority is in the people, not in the Crown. In like manner men are learning that the Crown has no divine right to meddle in the relations between man and God, to sanction some and to forbid others.

What M. de Tocqueville says of the spread of democracy may be applied to the development of religious life and advance in Catholic faith, which is so prominent a feature of the Church to-day. "It possesses all the characteristics of a Divine decree; it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference; and all events, as well as all men, contribute to its progress. The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere turned to its advantage: all men have aided it by their exertions; those who have intentionally laboured in its cause, and those who have served it unawares; those who have fought for it, and those who have declared themselves its opponents—have all been driven along in the same track,

have all laboured to one end, some ignorantly, and some unwillingly; all have been blind instruments in the hand of God."

When the Roman Church has succeeded in shaking off the nightmare of the Papacy, and the Anglican Church has accepted the full complement of Catholic truth, or has at least taught its members not to carp at truths they cannot see, we may hope that, with the reunion of Christendom, faith in the God-Man will once more become a mighty plastic power moulding society into perfect relations, and projecting individuality into vivid creativeness. The Church will then absorb the sects. There are men, as there are beasts, who can only see in twilight; the existence of sects is a proof that some souls can only accept a pinch, a grain, a scruple of truth. These can all find place in the Catholic Church of the future, if they will admit that their own crude notions are not the total of all truth, that grey dusk is not blazing noonday.

The Roman Church recognizes a distinction between truths which a Catholic must hold explicitly and those which he must hold implicitly. To the former category belong the fundamental dogmas of the existence of God, the Creation, the Incarnation, &c., whilst to the latter belong those doctrines which have been deduced logically and rigorously therefrom. In other words, she bids her more ignorant children not oppose what they themselves do not understand,—an excellent rule, one it would be well if the Anglican Church were to formulate in place of some of her articles of religion, which are a discharge that would prove more disastrous were it not levelled, accidentally or purposely, who can say? over the heads of the enemy, so as to explode in the air, making much noise, but doing little damage.

That the future will see the reunion of the Anglican and Roman Churches, not the absorption of one into the other, and of both with the Oriental Church, and next in order the absorption into the visible communion of all that is good and true in the sects, I think it is impossible to doubt. Rapidly the difference between Anglicans and Romans is ceasing to be one of doctrine, and resolving itself into one of constitutionalism *versus* absolutism. Another Pius IX. will suffice to burst the bubble of Papal autocracy, and then the barrier to the reunion of Christendom is prostrate.

In the meantime we have one of the hardest of lessons to learn,—toleration; toleration of faiths more rudimentary and imperfect than our own, and of faiths more highly organized and complete than our own. The Roman Church has attempted to exterminate the grub-beliefs, and Protestants have waged war against butterfly-creeds; and yet the larva contains the imago.

Unity is attainable either by centralization, or by corporation. The first is the unity of the army. In this unity every member is a piece of mechanism rather than a man. He has no will or thought of his own. His independence is surrendered. This unity is purely artificial, and it can only be maintained by force. The welfare of the body depends not on the elements of activity in its members, but on the abilities of the head. The second is the unity arising naturally and spontaneously from the necessities of social life. It is the only one which developes the capabilities of each member of the corporation, and which makes the whole body partake in the advantages of each.

The difference between Rome and England is in the sort of unity requisite for the Church. The Anglican

theory, which is simply that of the Primitive Church, and of the Orthodox Church of the East, is proving itself to be both sound and feasible. The former theory has been abandoned, or will be before long, by most civilized nations, in its application to their political institutions; for it has been found to be mischievous as well as immoral. It has proved equally mischievous and immoral in its application to spiritual societies.

The Church of England has developed into a federation of independent bodies, each perfectly autonomous, and yet all forming one great communion. If the Church be the organized social body of the invisible ideal, the God-Man, and be permeated by His energizing spirit, it is impossible to doubt that without in the smallest degree trenching on the individual freedom of each member, the unity of the body may be maintained indissolubly.

The spread of the Anglican communion, hampered as it is with State interference, and gangrened with Protestant error, is a token to us what the whole Church might effect if united on a constitutional basis, and animated with the Catholic spirit of toleration.

But, at the same time, undeniably the Church of Rome has done her utmost to prevent the possibility of reconciliation. She has organized herself into the most perfect military order, and has placed the spiritual lives of her children unconditionally in the Pope's hands. She can no longer pretend to be a city (civitas) at unity in itself, but is an army kept in order by artificial drill. She is a kingdom governed without a constitution, at the caprice of an irresponsible despot.

That Pius IX., or a future Pope, in the madness of spiritual pride, will lead the Church of Rome into a Caudine Forks, whence there is no escape except by corporate

humiliation, is our only hope. There is such a thing as corporate repentance as well as individual repentance, just as there is corporate pride as well as spiritual pride. We have not been exempt from pride ourselves,—pride in our insularity, in our Anglicanism, in our *viâ mediâ*, or session between two stools; but this pride has yielded greatly, and as a Church we are not far from smiting on our breasts and proclaiming ourselves sinners. But Rome has exhibited no trace of this repentant spirit. She justifies herself for all that is past,—her faults, her crimes, and her follies. Perhaps when brought by the present or some future Pope into the jaws of a dilemma, from which there is no escape, she will have to bow beneath the yoke, and then, with shame on her brow, she will not reject the embrace of her Oriental and Anglican sisters.

It was not till the great assembly infallibilized Herod that the angel of the Lord smote him, and he became the prey of worms. The Papacy has been borne with long, through all its errors and crimes, but, may be, the recent divinization of the Papal voice will be its final act, preluding an abject fall.

On English Catholics the proclamation of the Infallibility of the Pope produces a feeling of awe and horror, akin to that resulting from the utterance of a blasphemy. It is such a bold defiance flung in the face of God, so terribly like the boast of the archangel before he was cast into the abyss, "I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation, in the sides of the north; I will ascend above the heights of the clouds: I will be like the Most High;" that we put our hands upon our mouths, and look on expecting the end.

That some great religious crisis is at hand, few can doubt who note the aspect of the sky. That belief in the

Incarnation, and in the catena of dogmas depending upon it, will be rooted out by any amount of corrosive criticism, *is an impossibility*, for that doctrine and all its consequences are impetrated by the nature of man. The very constitution of his mind and heart are to him a gospel of the Incarnation, whose witness can never be effaced, a testimony to Catholicism whose voice can never be silenced. "When I consider the general weakening of moral principles," wrote Le Maistre, "the diversity of opinions, the overthrow of sovereignties which were baseless, the immensity of our needs and the inanity of our means, it seems to me that every true philosopher must choose between these two hypotheses,—either he must form a new religion altogether, or Christianity must be rejuvenated in some extraordinary manner."[1]

"I look," says the same writer in another place, "for a memorable revolution, of which that which we have seen has been only the terrible and indispensable preliminary;"[2]—"a period which will be sacred in the annals of the human race," for "everything announces some grand unity, towards which we are advancing with mighty strides;"[3] . . . "some great event which the world universally awaits, some immense event in the divine order, some third explosion of almighty goodness in behalf of the human race."[4]

[1] Considerations sur la France, 1797, p. 84.
[2] Du Pape, lib. iv.
[3] Soirées de S. Pétersbourg, 2nd Entrétien.
[4] Ibid., 11me Ent.

MUIR AND PATERSON, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.

00110844

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 19 September, 2016